Parties in the District?

 

  Christian R. Grose, Lawrence University

 
In the spring of 2002, I visited Georgia Republican Jack Kingston’s district office in Savannah (and a number of other congressional offices) for a project I was working on that examined congressional representation and constituency service (Grose 2002).  At one point during an interview with one of Kingston’s district staff, we were discussing military projects for the district and the staffer interrupted the conversation to show me a photograph of “Jack” with George W. Bush from an event at a local military base held soon after the 2000 election.  She excitedly pointed out a picture of Kingston sitting beside Bush and (at the time) neighboring Republican Representative Saxby Chambliss.  She then added: “You know what’s great about this picture?”  I was not sure where she was going with her query, but I figured she would perhaps talk about how successful the event was with veterans. 

 

Instead, she detailed how Democratic Senator Max Cleland was actually the one sitting between Bush and Chambliss in the original picture, but that having Cleland beside Bush was simply “no good.”  Thus, Cleland’s face had been airbrushed out of the photograph and Kingston’s was added in his stead (Kingston was at the event, but was sitting further away from Bush).  Following the “correction” of the photograph, it was displayed prominently in the district office.  I personally got a kick out of the story, as did the staffer while telling it.  But it illuminates a potential trend in contemporary congressional representation elsewhere: the renewed rise of party in legislators’ home styles and district activities.

 

Not long ago, a southern Republican congressman would have gladly left a picture of a moderate Democratic war veteran and Senator from his own state on the wall in his district office.  However, as the rest of the South has realigned, so too has Georgia and much of the country.  Kingston—or at least his staff—clearly wanted to be identified with the Republican president and not identified with Democrat Cleland. 1  Of course, I am not suggesting that this amusing anecdote signals the rise of parties at the congressional district level.  However, it is emblematic of other interviews I conducted in other congressional districts, where party was either explicitly or implicitly mentioned.  During many of these interviews, especially in offices of relatively new members of Congress, district staff pointed out that their strongest supporters were generally partisan voters.2

 

Of course, this is in contrast to what the dean of congressional scholars, Dick Fenno, found in his classic Home Style.  The relative unimportance of political parties for legislative behavior in the district was strikingly clear from his findings circa 1970.  As Fenno (1978, 113) has described, congressional representation back “home” in the district was often divorced from local party organizations and concerns: “[P]ermanent party organizations are said to be giving way to transient, candidate-centered campaign organizations as the most effective electoral vehicle….Most primary constituencies consist of people whose loyalties are to the congressman rather than the party.”

 

In contrast, I conjecture that while congressional elections are generally still candidate-centered, the effect of party on congressional elections is greater today than it was in the 1970s—and as a result the representational activities of legislators in their districts are also more party-oriented.  Today, primary constituencies of legislators are often both loyal to the legislator and to the legislator’s national party.  Just as individualized, candidate-centered elections arose over the last half-century as local party organizations deteriorated, perhaps the rise of stronger national party organizations in the last two decades has increased the importance of party in congressional representation.  Also, the closeness of control between Democrats and Republicans in the House and the Senate may intensify the importance of party among voters and primary constituents.  With the Congress so closely divided, partisan voters and even partisan leaners may be less likely to vote for the individual candidate when the victor in their legislative seat has a reasonable chance of determining partisan control of the House or the Senate.  Essentially, the effect of party is stronger among many voters and specifically among legislators’ primary constituents, and thus legislative activities in the district may reflect these changes.  I call for scholars of representation to examine more closely the significance of party in congressional representation at “home”.

 

This line of inquiry—that the importance of party is on the increase in Congress—has been the subject of intense scholarly debate in terms of legislative behavior in Washington.  Most congressional scholars have argued that party has substantially affected roll-call outcomes and the legislative organization of Congress, especially in recent decades (Aldrich 1995; Clinton 2001; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Nokken 2000; Oppenheimer 2000; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1998). 

 

Certainly, congressional scholars are aware of these findings that focus on the institution in Washington, as they have dominated much of the recent scholarship.  However, we need to take parties and partisanship more seriously at the constituency level and when examining representation beyond roll-call voting.  Evidence is building that partisanship is on the increase in recent elections among voters. (Bartels 2000).  Similarly, Brewer (2002) and Hetherington (2001) both argue that mass partisanship is on the rise due to elite behavior.

 

Jacobson (2002) has presented evidence that most contemporary congressional districts are extremely lopsided toward one party.  He argues that the partisanship in roll-call voting has “sturdy electoral roots.”  These electoral roots may have an effect on legislators’ home styles and activities in their districts as well. 

 

Interestingly, while partisanship may be increasing among voters, general election voters are likely to punish incumbent legislators for being too partisan or due to a change in party label.  Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan (2002) have found that, controlling for district partisanship, House members that cast more votes with their party win by smaller margins.  Also, in research I have done with Antoine Yoshinaka, we find that legislators who switch parties do worse in subsequent general elections, though their switch leads to a long-term reduction in competition in primary elections (Grose and Yoshinaka 2003).  These results suggest that the conventional wisdom that congressional elections are primarily candidate-centered may need to be reexamined and that the party label may matter more to voters than we realize.  However, the more partisan a legislator appears to be, the worse the legislator fares in general elections.  So why would legislators be so partisan if party label can have a negative effect at the ballot box?  Possibly due to the increased partisanship among primary constituencies—either defined as voters in primary elections or more broadly in Fenno’s sense of the term.

 

Thus, activities beyond roll-call voting, which are more likely to be driven by a legislator’s primary constituency, should be examined in greater detail for evidence of partisan behavior by legislators.  Examples of these legislator activities, current research in these areas, and suggestions for research questions are below:

 

· Presentation of self.  What role does party play when legislators communicate with constituents?  Lipinski, Bianco, and Work (2001) find that legislators from the majority party who made pro-Congress statements in congressional newsletters were more likely to face negative electoral consequences.  Lipinski (forthcoming) finds that legislators from districts with strong parties are much more likely to embrace the institution of Congress in constituent communications.  A project I am working on with Keesha Middlemass will also address partisanship in legislators’ communications to constituents by examining newsletters.

 

· Position-taking. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) have examined position-taking, finding that national party positions may drive congressional candidate position-taking more than the district median.3 Is this the case with other measures of position-taking behavior in the district? On specific issues?

 

· Project allocations.  Stein and Bickers (1995) and Lee (1998), among others, have examined the connection between legislators and project allocations at the congressional district or state level.  However, further research that analyzes the allocation of projects within congressional districts to various party and/or personal constituencies should be conducted (see Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2000 and Grose 2001 for examples of studies examining allocations of projects to specific constituencies and smaller geographic units).  Do legislators allocate projects to voters who are partisans or to voters who may support the incumbent but who also engage in ticket-splitting for other races?  What role, if any, does party play in project allocations within congressional districts or within states?

 

· Staff allocations to the district.  Are staff members hired in district offices drawn from party organizations or key partisan groups within the district?  Are district offices located in geographic areas of the district that overwhelmingly supported the legislator and candidates from the legislator’s party in other races?

 

In sum, I am not suggesting that legislators have become party automatons in their districts or that party drives district-oriented activity.  In fact, the argument presented here is more hypothesis than analysis, though I hope to raise interesting questions for future study.  Just like Fenno observed, most legislators’ interactions with constituents are still candidate-centered.  However, my hypothesis is that party has reared its head even in the context of what goes on in congressional districts.  The distribution of projects, the allocation of resources, the location of district offices, and so on may be determined in part by where a legislator’s key supporters are located.  And in recent elections, especially among incumbents elected within the last ten years, these key supporters are more likely partisans.

 

Notes

 

1. The picture was taken and displayed prior to Bush’s post-September 11 popularity.

 

2. The legislators in this sample were all southern and the purpose of that study was not to examine partisanship in district constituencies.  Thus I am not generalizing from this study to other legislators, but simply noting a pattern that merits further investigation.  However, I did conduct 29 interviews in 17 congressional districts.

 

3. Also see Powell (1982) for a nice, earlier take on issue representation that could also be described as an analysis of position-taking.

 

 

References

 

Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 45:1:136-159.

 

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Alan Gerber, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2000. “Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and the Distribution of Public Expenditures in the American States.” Typescript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

<http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/ansolabehere/equal_votes_final.pdf>

 

Bartels, Larry M. 2000. “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996.” American Journal of Political Science 44:1:35-50.

 

Brewer, Mark D. 2002. “A Divided Public? Party Images and Mass Polarization in the United States.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

 

Canes-Wrone, Brandice, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan. 2002. “Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting.” American Political Science Review 96:127-140.

 

Clinton, Joshua D. 2001. “Representation and the 106th Congress: Legislators’ Voting Behavior and their Geographic Constituencies.” Typescript, Stanford University.

 

Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House.” Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

Fenno, Richard F., 1978.  Home Style: House Members in Their Districts.  Boston: Little, Brown.

 

Grose, Christian R. 2001. “Pork Projects and Racial Representation in Congress: Which Constituents Are Rewarded with Distributive Policy Projects?” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. <http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/034/034005GroseChris.pdf.>

 

Grose, Christian R. 2002.  “Beyond the Vote: A Theory of Black Representation in Congress.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

<http://apsaproceedings.cup.org/Site/papers/022/022010GroseChris.pdf.>

 

Grose, Christian R. and Antoine Yoshinaka. 2003. “The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching by Incumbent Members of Congress, 1947-2000.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 28:1.

 

Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization.” American Political Science Review 95:3:619-631.

 

Jacobson, Gary C. 2002. “Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral Connection.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

 

Lipinski, Daniel, forthcoming.  Shaping Public Perceptions of Congress. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

Lee, Frances E. 1998. “Representation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds.” Journal of Politics 60:34-62.

 

Lipinski, Daniel, William T. Bianco, and Ryan Work. “The Electoral Consequences of Institutional Loyalty in the Contemporary Congress: The Case of the 1994 Elections.” Paper presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

 

Nokken, Timothy. 2000. “Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll-Call Behavior, 1947-97.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25:417-44.

 

Oppenheimer, Bruce I. 2000. “The Roll Call Behavior of Members Who Switch Parties, 1900-99: The Effect of Variations in Party Strength.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

 

Powell, Lynda W. 1982. “Issue Representation in Congress.” Journal of Politics 44:3:658-678.

 

Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

Sinclair, Barbara, 1998.  “Do Parties Matter?”  Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

 

Stein, Robert M. and Kenneth N. Bickers, 1995.  Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.