Common Ground: Links Between Bureaucratic and Legislative Representation

Jill Nicholson-Crotty, Texas A&M University

Representation is typically studied as the level of congruence, or the similarity or dissimilarity between the attitudes and desires of the constituency and the actions taken by the legislative body. These studies usually investigate dyadic or policy representation, which focuses on issue-based agreement between legislators and their constituents. Responsiveness to constituencies can, however, be demonstrated in other ways. Collective representation is the assumption that representation can go beyond district boundaries. Weisberg (1978) argues that such representation occurs when the proportion of specific groups in the legislature reflects the same proportion of those groups in the general population and, as a result, policy is produced that reflects the interests of a more general public.

Inherent in this conception of collective representation is the assumption that district boundaries do not have to define the constituent boundaries. Studies of minority representation consistently find that minority representatives vote in the interests of constituents that have similar demographic characteristics. Substantively, this means that legislators’ roles represent some persons outside their districts and that their voting patterns will differ from non-minority representatives (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Bullock and MacManus 1981; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Lublin 1997, 69; Whitby 1997). Research has shown, however, that these individual impacts are often overwhelmed in the legislative process (Swain 1995; Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Nelson 1991) so that an increase in minority representatives is not associated with an increase in policies that favor minorities.

Unlike studies of racial minorities, early studies of women elected officials found some support for differences in attitudes but not in policy priorities (Mezey 1978). Women did not, according to Mezey (1978), support women focused policies any more than their male counterparts. More recent studies, however, provide some evidence that women do represent the interests of other women. Thomas (1991) finds that women in office do make a difference. According to her study of twelve state legislatures, women are more likely than men to introduce and pass legislation that addresses issues concerning women, children, and family. This is particularly true in issue areas where a women’s legislative caucus is present. Studies of other legislatures also have found female representatives affect the nature of legislation that is passed by legislatures (Flammang 1985; Thomas and Welch 1991).

Despite these findings, however, there is not a clear theoretical argument regarding when and why women will choose to represent the interests of women in general. Responsiveness to a constituency with clear electoral aspirations has a well-established theory; however, representation of constituents based on shared gender or race characteristics has very little theoretical support in the field of legislative representation. Because collective representation assumes that shared values are actually the key to the representational linkage, it is necessary to establish a set of criteria or conditions for this type of representation to take place.

In order for the study of collective representation to move forward we need to develop a clearer theoretical picture of the conditions under which legislators choose to represent groups that share their characteristics. Borrowing from extensive work in bureaucratic representation could be useful in this endeavor. Scholars assert that under certain circumstances bureaucrats have the ability to “translate values linked to demographic origins into decisions that benefit individuals of similar origins” (Meier 1993:1). The theory assumes that shared experiences or values, which may not be shared across gender or race divisions, could fundamentally affect the decisions made by and the actions taken by the bureaucrat. Bureaucratic representation can take two forms. The first is passive or descriptive. Passive representation occurs when the composition of the bureaucracy mirrors the demographic composition of the general (Dolan 2000; Dolan 2002; Naff and Crum 2000; Brown 1999; Esman 1999; Riccucci and Saidel 2001). For the most part, studies of passive representation do not make causal inferences as to the effects of representation. Representation in this view can be an end in itself.

A central theme of much literature in representative bureaucracy, however, is the assumption that this passive representation will lead to an active representation, where bureaucrats act purposely on behalf of their counterparts in the general population (Pitkin 1967). Active representation focuses almost exclusively on how representation affects policy-making and implementation. Active representation assumes a purposeful action taken by the bureaucrat on behalf of clients because of common values that result from common demographic origins. Specifically, active representation suggests that such values will be translated into programs, policies, and, decisions by bureaucrats that benefit those with similar demographic origins (Meier 1993).

Bureaucratic representation may provide leverage on broader questions of collective representation because scholars in this area have developed relatively advanced theories regarding the representation process in public bureaucracies. Meier and Stewart (1992) propose a set of necessary conditions for representation in the bureaucracy to take place. First, public administrators must have discretion in the decision-making/policy implementation process. Second, these bureaucrats must exercise this discretion in a policy area that has important implications for the group that they represent. Finally, in order to establish a connection between demographic background and policy outcomes, these administrators must be directly associated with the decisions that they make. These conditions provide the necessary theory for studies of bureaucratic representation to gain some continuity.

Most of the research on active representation has focused on race and ethnicity (Hindera 1993; Meier et al. 1989; Meier and Stewart 1992; Selden 1997). Numerous empirical studies of racial minorities find that bureaucrats with similar demographic characteristics do in fact actively represent the interests of individuals of the same group in the general population. These studies suggest that minority bureaucrats implement policies and use their discretion to reduce the disparate treatment that minority clients have historically received from various public bureaucracies (Hindera 1993; Meier et al. 1989; Meier and Stewart 1992; Selden 1997). Active representation of minorities has been found in the EEOC (Hindera 1993), in education ( Meier, Stewart, and England 1989 ; Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999), and in the Farmers Home Administration (Selden 1997).

When the theory of bureaucratic representation was applied to gender rather than race, however, early studies found no association. Hindera (1993) researched women in the EEOC and found no active representation of women by women bureaucrats. Similarly, Selden (1997) did not find active representation of women in the Farm Loan Association. Keiser et al. (2002) suggest that early null findings regarding the link between passive and active representation for sex could be due to the lack of attention scholars gave to the institutional and political context of the relationship between representation and gender. The Keiser et al. study was, in fact, the first to find the active representation of women by public administrators.¹ Their theory combined feminist theory and neo-institutionalism to suggest that when the biological characteristic sex reifies into the social construction gender, the role of the bureaucrat in the policy process can be fundamentally transformed, and representation based on gender can occur.

Keiser et al. (2002) represent another significant step forward in the development of bureaucratic representation theory. They identify several specific conditions, some political, some institutional, and some linked to identity that affect the transformation of passive gender representation to active gender representation. First, the policy that a woman bureaucrat administers may be one that directly benefits women as a class such as equal pay or child support. Second, the political process might define the issue as gendered and thus make it salient to women bureaucrats. Third, if the gender of the bureaucrat fundamentally changes the relationship between the bureaucrat and the client, active representation could occur. In this third instance, the relationship between the bureaucrat and the client is characterized by shared experiences that are not shared across gender lines.

The Keiser et al. (2002) study finds active representation of women in school districts. Additional studies, using the same theory and foundation, also find that there is an association between women in bureaucracies and the active representation of women in the general population for child support (Wilkins and Keiser 2002) and for law enforcement (Nicholson-Crotty and Meier 2002).

Though the theory developed by Meier and Stewart (1992) and Keiser et al. (2002) have been applied to the study of representation in the bureaucracy, they are in fact institutional theories. Due to the similarities of collective representation in both the bureaucracy and legislatures, the theory of representative bureaucracy should be useful for scholars of legislative politics as well. The original studies of representative bureaucracy have been replicated in a number of settings. Applied to legislative research, this theory could provide leverage on questions of collective representation in that institution as well as provide further external validation of the theory. Additionally, a unified theory of representation across two major institutions of government could be an important step toward the development of general theory in the study of American politics.

Notes

1. Passive representation can also lead to changes in how the organization treats its personnel. The works of Hale and Branch (1992), Hale, Kelly and Burgess (1989), Kawar (1989), and Stanley (1989) show that processes within the organization are different when women move into top management positions in large numbers.

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