During the past three decades
computer networks have become a popular medium of communication. In 1972, the
prototype of contemporary networks, the ARPANET, connected 40 computers located
in major research centers across the
Students of electronic
democracy debate, among other things, changes in parliamentary representation
as a result of the emergence of this new medium (Coleman, Taylor, and van de
Donk, eds., 1999; Hague and Loader, eds., 1999; Hoff, Horrocks, and Tops, eds.,
2000). Cyber-enthusiasts envision that the Internet will “cut out middle men”
and strengthen a direct relationship between citizens and representative
assemblies (Grossman 1995; Rash 1997; Coleman 1999).
These forecasts build on
the observation that the Internet is providing new opportunities for direct and
interactive communication. Discussion forums and bulletin boards are new
technological means to deliberate with citizens; electronic opinion polls allow
parliaments to learn about their particular policy interests in a timely
manner; and websites, electronic newsletters, and web-cams provide new
opportunities to communicate information about the political process and public
policies in a comprehensive manner.
Most political scientists have been more or less
sceptical about the political relevance of the Internet. Some ignore the
e-democracy agenda based on the assumption that it is a domain of
techno-maniacs and democratic activists. Others have voiced outspoken
criticism. Those cyber-sceptics argue on the basis of empirical observations
that the Internet will reinforce existing political structures rather than
changing them (Margolis and Resnick 2001).
Both of these approaches are problem ridden. They rely
on anecdotal evidence or single exploratory case studies that do not allow for
general conclusions about recent developments in parliamentary representation.
The debate between them also lacks a conceptual framework which could give a
general definition of the dependent variable and which could provide a focus
for cumulative research across the boundaries of single cases or technological
phenomena. There is little agreement on what electronic democracy is all about.
Both approaches furthermore lack an explanatory theory. They are
over-deterministic because of their reliance on structural analogies and functional
relationships at the macro-level of political analysis. They do not account for
the fact that individual representatives take contingent decisions that could
go either way.
A serious assessment of the impact of the Internet on
parliamentary representation needs to overcome each of these problems. This
presupposes the transgression of several boundaries within the discipline. Most
important, students of electronic democracy have to go offline and open up to
general theories of political representation and legislative behavior, while
students of political representation and legislatures should go online to
discover a world beyond their conceptual boundaries which might well matter to
these very boundaries.
Traditional comparative
theories of political representation provide a conceptual vantage point for
defining the relationship between parliaments and citizens at a more general
level of analysis and for focusing research on electronic democracy. The
distinction between collectivist and individualist systems of political
representation appears to be crucial in this respect. It provides a conceptual
basis for two distinct visions of political representation in a networked
society.
A Technological Approach Towards
Political Representation in the Networked Society
Systems of collectivist
representation emphasize the role of political parties as an important linkage
between parliaments and citizens. Political parties are assumed to dominate the
role perception of MPs, and to affect their legislative behavior as well as the
process of political representation. The notion of responsible party government
has been applied as a synonym for this type of representative system, which
encompasses most European systems of representation. The American system of
representation has been described as a contrasting case. It is individualistic
in the sense that it stresses a direct and close relationship between
individual representatives and particular geographic constituencies (Fenno
1978; Bogdanor 1985; Esaiasson/Holmberg 1996).
The new digital world matters to political
representation because it alters transaction costs for individual
representatives in their dealings with citizens in dramatic ways and across all
types of representation. This hypothesis is based upon two assumptions. The
first assumption perceives the goal of reelection as the very basis of any type
of legislative behavior (Mayhew 1974). The second assumption stresses
responsible party government as a strategy to achieve this goal in the context
of particular incentive structures (Katz 1986).
A technological approach towards
political representation stresses communication media as a main feature of this
structure. It argues that traditional media fostered disciplined parties as a
means to reach citizens and to mobilize political support (Sorauf and Beck
1988; Mueller 2000). The mass media, for example, raised general problems of
access and control of the message which could be overcome more easily by way of
collective action (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995). Other media, such as phones or
printed newsletters, exceeded the resources individual representatives were
able to spend on spreading the word, explaining policies, and receiving
feedback. In these cases, political parties were organizational means to pool
resources in order to utilize these types of media in the most efficient ways.
With the Internet, individual
representatives need to spend fewer resources to communicate with particular
constituents in direct and interactive ways. Standard hardware and software for
a few thousand dollars, along with broadband Internet access, allows
representatives to advertise policies, to deliberate with citizens, and to take
polls on policy matters. As a result, political parties will become less
relevant as a conduit for political communication and computer networks will
establish a more direct flow of communication between MPs and particular
constituents.
A more sophisticated concept of
transaction costs certainly has to refer to a wider set of resources that are
necessary to utilize the Internet. For instance, it takes skills to design a
website and put it on the net. Other applications such as newsletters or
discussion forums are even more difficult to use. However, in the process of
generational change these costs will become negligible, as younger MPs who grew
up with websites and chat rooms will have acquired these skills at an early age
and will have to bear no additional costs when they enter public office.
Designing a website will be as natural for them as writing a letter.
Representatives may choose not
to bear even a minimum of costs if benefits seem unlikely to follow – that is,
if no one can be reached. While this might have been a problem in the past, the
diffusion of the Internet, especially in established democracies, is now well
advanced and has surpassed a critical mass (Norris 2001). While most surfers
are drawn to juicier and more entertaining material, significant minorities do
pay attention to political websites and other political communication on the
net.
The important assumption in this
line of reasoning is that new strategies of digital communication will
eventually have a direct effect on the institutional basis of political
representation such as role perceptions, rules and structure. Only if this
relationship proves to be true will we be able to witness a real convergence of
representative systems towards individualist types of representation
An Institutional Approach Towards Political Representation in the Networked Society
Theories of legislative behavior
suggest a more cautious approach to the Internet. While many students in this
field share the basic theoretical assumptions outlined above, they emphasize
political institutions as the most crucial influence on individual members of
parliament. In many of these analyses, the type of electoral system and the
type of government have been singled out as institutional factors that pattern
legislative behavior in major ways (Mayhew 1974; Mitchell 2000; Strom 2000).
From this perspective, list-based
electoral systems and parliamentary government can be seen as major pillars of
responsible party government. These institutional structures make the support
from party elites and fellow party members a crucial prerequisite for electoral
success and for office keeping. As a consequence, members of parliament will
perceive themselves as part of a team rather than as individual players. They
will behave accordingly in their attempt to mobilize electoral support.
These institutional incentives
will not change with the Internet. As a result, the institutional approach
suggests little impact of the Internet on responsible party government as long
as its main institutional pillars stand tall. It assumes that MPs in European
representative systems will keep their strategic focus on parties and that the
use of the Internet as a means of direct, interactive communication with
constituents will be restricted to those cases such as the U.S. where different
institutional incentives are in place.
Personal Websites in the
These alternative visions of
political representation in the networked society can be tested in a
statistical analysis of personal websites in the German Bundestag, the Swedish
Riksdag and the U.S. House of Representatives. To some degree, this analysis
supports the technological model of representation because it demonstrates that
MPs are taking advantage of the Internet to communicate with constituents
across all cases. However, this analysis also shows that the institutional context
strongly affects the scope of this development.
Table 1 stresses the
relationship between the institutional context and the use of personal
websites. This relationship is in line with the considerations sketched above.
More
However, Table 1 also
demonstrates that MPs in
Table 2 adds further evidence to
the assumption that technological change matters to political representation. This
table looks at the relationship between the age of MPs and the use of personal
websites. In the German case it stresses a clear relationship between age on
the one hand and the decision to introduce an information-rich personal website
on the other. This relationship is in line with the theoretical assumptions
sketched above. In

This finding is only a snapshot
of a larger empirical project. In this short piece we highlighted two major achievements
of the project:
1) It provides a theoretical synthesis between theories of
electronic democracy on the one hand and established theories of political
representation and legislative behavior on the other;
(2) It undertakes the first comprehensive empirical analysis
of the political use of the Internet in the legislative realm that is both
grounded in theory and comparative.
The project deals with two further
important questions that we were not able to discuss in this short research
note. The first question focuses on the institutional ramifications of digital
communication. We use case studies to explore changes in the rules and
organizations of parliamentary representation as a result of new strategies of
political communication. This research is important in order to address the
far-reaching claims of institutional change related to the debate on electronic
democracy.
The second question addresses
the process of change and the relative weight of technology and particular
institutional variables. This part of our research uses semi-standardized
interviews to test the assumptions of the theoretical considerations sketched
above and to further understand developments in digital communication as well
as related institutional adjustments. This research also asks about the role of
third variables which have not been invoked in the debate so far. The Internet
could appear for example as a catalyst to developments such as the growth of
policy advocates among MPs (Norton 1997) or the general erosion of political
parties in European democracies (Fuchs and Klingemann 1994). In this case, the
Internet might not be the cause of the impediments of responsible party
government, but an important facilitator of change to be reckoned with.
1. For a short history of computer networks see
Rogers/Malhotra 2000.
2. The Internet
is not a centrally administered medium. It is therefore impossible to know the
exact number of users. Most published numbers are based upon survey research
and vary with methodology. For a critical overview see Norris 2001.
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