Political Representation and the Internet: Wither Responsible Party Government?

 

  Thomas Zittel, Center for European Studies, Harvard University / Mannheimer Zentrum fuer Europaeische Sozialforschung (MZES)

 

Political Representation and the Internet

During the past three decades computer networks have become a popular medium of communication. In 1972, the prototype of contemporary networks, the ARPANET, connected 40 computers located in major research centers across the US. In the year 2000, the Internet consisted of approximately 93 Mio. Hosts worldwide (Deiss 2001, 3).1 According to the Irish market research organization NUA about 407 Mio. people had access to this global computer network by November 2000 (NUA 2001).2

Students of electronic democracy debate, among other things, changes in parliamentary representation as a result of the emergence of this new medium (Coleman, Taylor, and van de Donk, eds., 1999; Hague and Loader, eds., 1999; Hoff, Horrocks, and Tops, eds., 2000). Cyber-enthusiasts envision that the Internet will “cut out middle men” and strengthen a direct relationship between citizens and representative assemblies (Grossman 1995; Rash 1997; Coleman 1999).

These forecasts build on the observation that the Internet is providing new opportunities for direct and interactive communication. Discussion forums and bulletin boards are new technological means to deliberate with citizens; electronic opinion polls allow parliaments to learn about their particular policy interests in a timely manner; and websites, electronic newsletters, and web-cams provide new opportunities to communicate information about the political process and public policies in a comprehensive manner.

Most political scientists have been more or less sceptical about the political relevance of the Internet. Some ignore the e-democracy agenda based on the assumption that it is a domain of techno-maniacs and democratic activists. Others have voiced outspoken criticism. Those cyber-sceptics argue on the basis of empirical observations that the Internet will reinforce existing political structures rather than changing them (Margolis and Resnick 2001).

Both of these approaches are problem ridden. They rely on anecdotal evidence or single exploratory case studies that do not allow for general conclusions about recent developments in parliamentary representation. The debate between them also lacks a conceptual framework which could give a general definition of the dependent variable and which could provide a focus for cumulative research across the boundaries of single cases or technological phenomena. There is little agreement on what electronic democracy is all about. Both approaches furthermore lack an explanatory theory. They are over-deterministic because of their reliance on structural analogies and functional relationships at the macro-level of political analysis. They do not account for the fact that individual representatives take contingent decisions that could go either way.

A serious assessment of the impact of the Internet on parliamentary representation needs to overcome each of these problems. This presupposes the transgression of several boundaries within the discipline. Most important, students of electronic democracy have to go offline and open up to general theories of political representation and legislative behavior, while students of political representation and legislatures should go online to discover a world beyond their conceptual boundaries which might well matter to these very boundaries.

Traditional comparative theories of political representation provide a conceptual vantage point for defining the relationship between parliaments and citizens at a more general level of analysis and for focusing research on electronic democracy. The distinction between collectivist and individualist systems of political representation appears to be crucial in this respect. It provides a conceptual basis for two distinct visions of political representation in a networked society.

 

A Technological Approach Towards Political Representation in the Networked Society

Systems of collectivist representation emphasize the role of political parties as an important linkage between parliaments and citizens. Political parties are assumed to dominate the role perception of MPs, and to affect their legislative behavior as well as the process of political representation. The notion of responsible party government has been applied as a synonym for this type of representative system, which encompasses most European systems of representation. The American system of representation has been described as a contrasting case. It is individualistic in the sense that it stresses a direct and close relationship between individual representatives and particular geographic constituencies (Fenno 1978; Bogdanor 1985; Esaiasson/Holmberg 1996).

The new digital world matters to political representation because it alters transaction costs for individual representatives in their dealings with citizens in dramatic ways and across all types of representation. This hypothesis is based upon two assumptions. The first assumption perceives the goal of reelection as the very basis of any type of legislative behavior (Mayhew 1974). The second assumption stresses responsible party government as a strategy to achieve this goal in the context of particular incentive structures (Katz 1986).

A technological approach towards political representation stresses communication media as a main feature of this structure. It argues that traditional media fostered disciplined parties as a means to reach citizens and to mobilize political support (Sorauf and Beck 1988; Mueller 2000). The mass media, for example, raised general problems of access and control of the message which could be overcome more easily by way of collective action (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995). Other media, such as phones or printed newsletters, exceeded the resources individual representatives were able to spend on spreading the word, explaining policies, and receiving feedback. In these cases, political parties were organizational means to pool resources in order to utilize these types of media in the most efficient ways.

With the Internet, individual representatives need to spend fewer resources to communicate with particular constituents in direct and interactive ways. Standard hardware and software for a few thousand dollars, along with broadband Internet access, allows representatives to advertise policies, to deliberate with citizens, and to take polls on policy matters. As a result, political parties will become less relevant as a conduit for political communication and computer networks will establish a more direct flow of communication between MPs and particular constituents.

A more sophisticated concept of transaction costs certainly has to refer to a wider set of resources that are necessary to utilize the Internet. For instance, it takes skills to design a website and put it on the net. Other applications such as newsletters or discussion forums are even more difficult to use. However, in the process of generational change these costs will become negligible, as younger MPs who grew up with websites and chat rooms will have acquired these skills at an early age and will have to bear no additional costs when they enter public office. Designing a website will be as natural for them as writing a letter.

Representatives may choose not to bear even a minimum of costs if benefits seem unlikely to follow – that is, if no one can be reached. While this might have been a problem in the past, the diffusion of the Internet, especially in established democracies, is now well advanced and has surpassed a critical mass (Norris 2001). While most surfers are drawn to juicier and more entertaining material, significant minorities do pay attention to political websites and other political communication on the net.

The important assumption in this line of reasoning is that new strategies of digital communication will eventually have a direct effect on the institutional basis of political representation such as role perceptions, rules and structure. Only if this relationship proves to be true will we be able to witness a real convergence of representative systems towards individualist types of representation

 

An Institutional Approach Towards Political Representation in the Networked Society

Theories of legislative behavior suggest a more cautious approach to the Internet. While many students in this field share the basic theoretical assumptions outlined above, they emphasize political institutions as the most crucial influence on individual members of parliament. In many of these analyses, the type of electoral system and the type of government have been singled out as institutional factors that pattern legislative behavior in major ways (Mayhew 1974; Mitchell 2000; Strom 2000).

From this perspective, list-based electoral systems and parliamentary government can be seen as major pillars of responsible party government. These institutional structures make the support from party elites and fellow party members a crucial prerequisite for electoral success and for office keeping. As a consequence, members of parliament will perceive themselves as part of a team rather than as individual players. They will behave accordingly in their attempt to mobilize electoral support.

These institutional incentives will not change with the Internet. As a result, the institutional approach suggests little impact of the Internet on responsible party government as long as its main institutional pillars stand tall. It assumes that MPs in European representative systems will keep their strategic focus on parties and that the use of the Internet as a means of direct, interactive communication with constituents will be restricted to those cases such as the U.S. where different institutional incentives are in place.

 

Personal Websites in the U.S. House, the Swedish Riksdag, and the German Bundestag

These alternative visions of political representation in the networked society can be tested in a statistical analysis of personal websites in the German Bundestag, the Swedish Riksdag and the U.S. House of Representatives. To some degree, this analysis supports the technological model of representation because it demonstrates that MPs are taking advantage of the Internet to communicate with constituents across all cases. However, this analysis also shows that the institutional context strongly affects the scope of this development.

Table 1 stresses the relationship between the institutional context and the use of personal websites. This relationship is in line with the considerations sketched above. More U.S. representatives have websites than we would have expected in the case of independence between the institutional context and the use of personal websites. In contrast to this, Swedish and German MPs, who are situated in systems of responsible party government, use the Internet to a lesser degree than we would have expected. The dark grey shading indicates that this relationship is statistically significant (p < .05). As Table 1 indicates, similar differences can be found regarding the quality and quantity of information published via these websites.

 

 

 

However, Table 1 also demonstrates that MPs in Sweden and Germany do take advantage of the Internet to a considerable degree. We consider as relevant the fact that almost one-third of those MPs in a system of responsible party government bother to develop personal websites.

 

Table 2 adds further evidence to the assumption that technological change matters to political representation. This table looks at the relationship between the age of MPs and the use of personal websites. In the German case it stresses a clear relationship between age on the one hand and the decision to introduce an information-rich personal website on the other. This relationship is in line with the theoretical assumptions sketched above. In Germany, more young members of parliament publish information-rich personal websites than expected if age and the use of personal websites were independent of each other. The dark grey shaded cells indicate that these relationships are statistically significant in the German case (p < .05).

 

 

 

Discussion

This finding is only a snapshot of a larger empirical project. In this short piece we highlighted two major achievements of the project:

1) It provides a theoretical synthesis between theories of electronic democracy on the one hand and established theories of political representation and legislative behavior on the other;

(2) It undertakes the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the political use of the Internet in the legislative realm that is both grounded in theory and comparative.

The project deals with two further important questions that we were not able to discuss in this short research note. The first question focuses on the institutional ramifications of digital communication. We use case studies to explore changes in the rules and organizations of parliamentary representation as a result of new strategies of political communication. This research is important in order to address the far-reaching claims of institutional change related to the debate on electronic democracy.

The second question addresses the process of change and the relative weight of technology and particular institutional variables. This part of our research uses semi-standardized interviews to test the assumptions of the theoretical considerations sketched above and to further understand developments in digital communication as well as related institutional adjustments. This research also asks about the role of third variables which have not been invoked in the debate so far. The Internet could appear for example as a catalyst to developments such as the growth of policy advocates among MPs (Norton 1997) or the general erosion of political parties in European democracies (Fuchs and Klingemann 1994). In this case, the Internet might not be the cause of the impediments of responsible party government, but an important facilitator of change to be reckoned with.

 

Notes

1.  For a short history of computer networks see Rogers/Malhotra 2000.

2.  The Internet is not a centrally administered medium. It is therefore impossible to know the exact number of users. Most published numbers are based upon survey research and vary with methodology. For a critical overview see Norris 2001.

 

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