

 **Book Notes**

The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy, by David M. Barrett, University Press of Kansas, 2005, ISBN 0700614001, \$39.95, cloth, 542 pages.

The relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Congress has been understudied in the current literature and yet the relationship is particularly important for understanding past and current debates in foreign policy. In his work, *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy*, David Barrett traces the development of the relationship between the CIA and Congress from the inception of the CIA under Truman during the 1940s through the 1950's and into the beginnings of the 1960s, ending with the Bay of Pigs Invasion under the Kennedy administration. This book provides not only the detailed story of the decisions and congressional oversight relations between these two bodies, but also provides some antecedents for understanding their current relationship.

Barrett's work is historical in perspective and based upon countless hours of research. Unfortunately many of the source documents on the relationship between the CIA and Congress are classified or unavailable. However, Barrett's research provides a picture of the relationship and methodically unfolds a story that is both interesting and insightful. Barrett lays out his work chronologically and provides some conclusions about the whole of the relationship between the CIA and Congress over the three decades.

The beginnings of the CIA lay in the wake of World War II and the perceived need of congressional leaders to have an intelligence agency that was founded upon constitutional principles and legally instituted. The current Central Intelligence Group did not meet these criteria in the eyes of the legislators. Barrett does indicate the fears of numerous members of Congress during this period, and in fact, throughout the Truman administration, about the role and extent of the CIA. During its first few years the CIA had several rocky encounters with both the Truman administration and Congress, including failing to predict the Soviet Union's testing of an atomic bomb.

The 1950s and the Eisenhower administration brought about some changes and more confidence in the CIA. Congress continued to struggle with the notion that members of Congress should be secondary in the practice of developing foreign policy. The lack of a consensus about the role of Congress led to inconsistent oversight of the agency, although oversight functions grew over time. During the late 1950s and the early 1960s the Congress was anxious about the growing power and influence of revolutionary Cuban leader Fidelo Castro. Congress increasingly pressured the CIA for more covert action. Under Kennedy the crisis with Cuba grew to new heights and the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched. Unfortunately, the Bay of Pigs, in early 1961, is considered one of the agency's largest failures. Barrett argues that while numerous individuals have considered the role the president (both Kennedy and Eisenhower) and their respective administrative officials had in shaping the policy, no one has studied the influence of a hostile Congress which may have led to the Bay of Pigs failure.

Barrett ends his study of the relationship between the CIA and Congress with several conclusions. First, "much of the conventional wisdom about Congress and the CIA is accurate" (458). Members of Congress not only lacked knowledge about the CIA but also felt they were secondary actors in the foreign policymaking process, leading to the Congress deferring to the president. Furthermore, the debates about the CIA were not bipartisan events. Second, "much of the conventional wisdom is wrong or incomplete" concerning the CIA and Congress (459). Congressional oversight varied, both in quantity and quality; however, Congress often urged for concealment and supported covert action. Finally, the responsibility of the CIA is not fully attainable, although it is clear that Congress, through its inconsistent oversight and deference to executive or CIA officials, gave the CIA more freedom to engage in questionable behaviors during this time period. Overall Barrett's work provides some important caveats for understanding the current relationship between Congress and the CIA given lack of intelligence pre-9-11 and the bad intelligence leading to the deployment of troops to Iraq. While this study primarily focuses on the development of the CIA from a fledgling institution to an important fixture in American foreign policy, Barrett is careful to recognize that the role of Congress goes beyond oversight and that institutional relationships do matter and shape the future.

Kate E. Carney
Carl Albert Graduate Fellow
Ph.D. student of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation: How Institutions Shape Interest Group Systems, Frederick J. Boehmke, The Ohio State University Press, 2005, ISBN 0814209963, \$39.95, cloth, 217 pages.

This study attempts to harness the effects of direct legislation, outside of the actual effect of passing or rejecting a public ballot referendum. "Direct legislation" is considered the enactment (or attempt thereof) of legislation within individual states through public ballot, thus the public enacts policy while circumventing the state legislature. In this study, Boehmke generates a model of "interest group influence" in order to assess the indirect effect that ballot access has on interest groups. Due to the fact that "direct legislation" or the initiative process is an institutional issue that varies across states, Boehmke attempts to determine how government institutions influence interest group development and action.

Over the past twenty-five years the initiative process has become a prominent part of state politics. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s (with 1996 being the high point year) the nation saw its greatest amount of initiative activity. This trend slowed in 2002 with the fewest number of initiatives occurring since 1986. These initiatives range from extremely controversial issues, to some of the most "mundane." State requirements on the initiative process vary greatly. Different states can have different regulations for signature collection, distribution of signatures, length of time a petition may circulate, and verification of signatures just to name a few. Thus the goal of Boehmke's model becomes specifically to determine how the nature of access to the initiative process can be utilized to generate predictions about how interest groups will approach the process.

The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation takes a new and highly influential approach to the study of initiative and referendum politics. While previous research on this topic has focused on how interest groups utilize the initiative process, Boehmke shows that the implications of the initiative process reach far beyond the actual execution of initiative politics. Boehmke utilizes a general model discussed in chapter 2 to set up an analytical foundation for the empirical testing of nine different predictions and implications regarding mobilization and diversity of groups, policy outcomes, representation, resources, lobbying tactics, lobbying strategies, the resources and tactics of groups in states with initiatives versus states without them, and finally the use of inside versus outside lobbying and the effect that initiatives have on the ability to inside lobby.

This study is a must read for scholars of interest groups within states, as well as scholars of the initiative and referendum process. Boehmke takes a new, well theorized approach to this process that sheds a great deal of light on what shapes interest groups and how they act, in addition to the true effects that the initiative process has on state politics.

Curtis Ellis
Carl Albert Graduate Fellow
Ph.D. student of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

Issue Politics in Congress, Tracy Sulkin, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 0521671329, \$21.99, paper, 207 pages.

Issue Politics in Congress, a terrific book by Tracy Sulkin, creatively defines and explores the important topic of "issue uptake." Issue uptake sits at the heart of the representative process; stated plainly, it is the idea that a representative who is successfully elected or reelected to Congress endeavors to push issues that were raised by the challenger. That sounds simple, yet the concept is critical to understanding how issues that are discussed in elections are pursued once in office. A long line of research from the Michigan school of electoral research puts party ID at the center of a voter's decision calculus, with issues relegated to a distant third (after indeed the candidate characteristics). On the other side of the divide in legislative studies, those of us who study issue processing in institutions have for years seen an interesting array of patterns in terms of the types of issues pursued by members and processed by committees on the Hill. Hence, this idea that issues didn't matter much in campaigns always seemed troublesome given the range of issues that did not seem to always tie to the party. An important source of these patterns, Sulkin demonstrates, comes from the politics of issue uptake.

Chapter 1 begins with an interesting case example of Senator Bob Graham of Florida and then proceeds to define the concept of issue uptake and locate it within the various research literatures. In chapter 2, the author develops a theory of issue uptake based on strategic considerations and context. Chapter 3 discusses important matters of measurement and data. In chapter 4, Sulkin reveals her dependent variable or descriptive statistics on issue uptake. Chapters 5 and 6 then get down to the business of analysis of that variation, with the former looking at individual activity and the latter plumbing the location and timing of issue uptake. In chapter 7, the author takes time seriously by examining how issue uptake varies over time. Chapter 8 examines whether issue uptake matters in the legislative process. In chapter 9, Sulkin pulls it all together through the consideration of normative implications.

This book is excellent for several reasons. First, Sulkin provides a true linkage between elections and governance in terms of both theory and evidence. As she correctly points out, legislative scholars tend to run in one of two camps: elections or institutions. Sulkin eschews this dichotomy and provides a truly integrated project and product. The pathways of representation are critical to understanding American politics and it is a pleasure to see young scholars contributing to this literature (a research tradition that in the early 1990s was rumored to be dead!). Second, the research design is well conceived. In addition to having the elections and governance dimensions noted above, the author also pursues cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. The evidence for issue uptake and its explanations is robust as it is revealed in all manner of different analyses. Third, Sulkin shows the theoretical and empirical power of an issue-based approach to understanding Congress. Congress scholars have tended to, until recently, assume away issues and policy context and focus on positions on votes (in elections or on the floor), committee attributes, and other neater and tidier institutional units of analysis. Much can be gained by following issues in studies of the Congress. That is how the Congress is indeed organized. One need only look at the staff structure to see this fact. Legislative assistants and committee staff are organized by issue. Senior staffers become known in certain issue areas and get to know other staff, interest group representatives, and bureaucrats from that same area.

The shortcomings are few. I am not as of yet entirely persuaded of the legislative impact of issue uptake. It might very well be there. It is an empirical question. The analysis in chapter 8 shows that bills tied to issue uptake do as well (or a bit better) in the legislative process than other bills. While suggestive of impact, all that this analysis directly demonstrates is that such bills are normal. It doesn't show that issue uptake bills in general have true legislative impact. This is not a major flaw; in fact, it could be taken up in subsequent work. And, other than this issue, the book stands tall to theoretical and empirical criticism. *Issue Politics in Congress* is a book that even the most senior of scholars will learn from and which I highly recommend to all students and scholars of American politics and public policy. I look forward to future work from Professor Sulkin.

Glen S. Krutz
Associate Professor of Political Science
Associate Director of the Carl Albert Center
University of Oklahoma

It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office, Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 052167414X, \$22.99, paper, 203 pages.

Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox's new analysis sheds important light on the puzzle of stalled progress in women's representation in elected office. Beginning in the early 1970s, leaders of the women's movement touted the steady upward progress in the number of women serving in state legislatures and in Congress. Since 1997, however, the number of women elected to state legislatures and statewide elected offices has remained essentially flat, according to data from the Center for the American Woman and Politics. Scholars and advocates ask why, especially in the face of increasing numbers of women who comprise the professions from which most political candidates are drawn.

Lawless and Fox offer an explanation that is both convincing and disturbing. While the results of their work have been published previously in journal articles, this book brings together the full analysis and a persuasive argument for why women don't run for elected office.

The two political scientists base their work on a unique nationwide survey of 3,800 potential candidates and in-depth interviews with a representative sample of some 200 respondents who are part of their Citizen Political Ambition Study. The study attempts to provide new insight into political ambition and the role of gender in the candidate emergence process by focusing on individuals who occupy professions or backgrounds most prevalent in politics. These "eligibles" include lawyers, business persons, educators and activists. The survey explored social and economic factors, family arrangements, political activism and experience, and political outlook and willingness to run for office. The mailed survey elicited a very respectable 60 percent response rate.

Lawless and Fox find both similarities and differences among the men and women who are "eligibles." On the one hand, levels of political interest, attentiveness and participation vary little. But when the survey turns to the question of political ambition, the differences are striking and significant. Among the "eligibles" men outnumbered women, two to one in terms of those who have actually sought elected office. Further, women are half as likely to have "seriously considered" running for office (ch. 3). The women in the sample were more likely to have discounted their qualifications for office (ch. 5) and were less likely to have been recruited by party officials, elected officeholders or non-elected political activists (ch. 4).

Lawless and Fox argue that these differences are a product of traditional gender socialization which they suggest constitutes two main factors -- first, the complexities of women's lives and notions of traditional family roles, and second, the gendered nature of politics itself and the "masculinized ethos" ingrained in political institutions. These two factors, in turn, foster in women a "gendered psyche," which subtly discourages some of the attributes necessary for political candidacy. While their survey mostly offers indirect evidence of the origins of women's psychological doubts, the argument makes sense and seems the best fit of the data which Lawless and Fox marshal.

This book is accessible and well constructed for a wide variety of audiences. For students, Lawless and Fox's book ties together a number of important themes in gender and politics. For scholars, the book makes an important contribution to understanding the gendered nature of political ambition and identifies key questions for future research especially in the area of recruitment by political elites.

For persons interested in solving the pipeline problem, the authors' analysis is probably most pessimistic. Lawless and Fox admit that the task of dismantling masculinized political norms and changing deeply embedded gender roles will be daunting. They conclude: "Barring radical structural change in the institutions of politics and the family, achieving gender parity in the U.S. government is not on the horizon" (152).

Cindy Simon Rosenthal
Professor of Political Science
Director of the Carl Albert Center
University of Oklahoma

Money and Free Speech: Campaign Finance Reform and the Courts, Melvin I. Urofsky, University Press of Kansas, 2005, ISBN 0700614036, \$29.95, cloth, 320 pages.

As one would expect of a legal historian, Urofsky gives us an extensive historical view of campaign finance laws in America. But *Money & Free Speech* is of particular interest to legislative scholars, as it is one of the few campaign finance texts that offer more than a cursory look at the role of Congress. Urofsky understands that the courts would have a significantly smaller role to play if there were no law for the public to challenge.

Urofsky adequately (though briefly) summarizes each of the two sides of the debate and even admits his own change of perspective in the course of this project. Arguing that the Supreme Court has never adopted either position in the extreme (preferring to settle to the less well-defined middle ground), Urofsky gives a great deal of historical background to help make sense of the ambiguity that comes from many decisions. His own change of heart in the midst of this work allows for a fair treatment of both defined positions. And with the exception of the final chapter, *Money & Free Speech* is relatively free of the normative commentary one would expect to receive from an author with such clearly stated and decided preferences.

As stated earlier, perhaps the greatest strength of this work is the equal attention paid to both Congress and the courts. Of course, Urofsky sufficiently tackles the confusing mass of court decisions (especially Supreme Court decisions) stretching back to *Buckley v. Valeo*. And there are a full three chapters devoted to the district court and Supreme Court considerations of *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*. But the first few chapters are focused almost solely on Congress and the evolution of campaign finance law inside that institution. The final chapter also provides an interesting look at how political parties and other interested groups have made the transition since McCain-Feingold became law and brings to light some potential uncertainties that may require further clarification.

Overall, *Money & Free Speech* is a thought-provoking, though sometimes overly detailed, treatment of the arguments surrounding campaign finance in the United States. It seems appropriate reading for advanced undergraduates in this subject area, as it does provide a great deal of material for discussion and further research.

Courtney Cullison
Carl Albert Graduate Fellow
Ph.D. candidate in Political Science
University of Oklahoma

Parties, Rules, and the Evolution of Congressional Budgeting, Lance T. LeLoup, The Ohio State University Press, 2005, ISBN 0814251447, \$21.95, paper, 250 pages.

The practice of budgeting or the “power of the purse” is arguably one of the most important functions of Congress. Lance T. LeLoup in his work, *Parties, Rules and the Evolution of Congressional Budgeting*, argues that the development of the macrobudgeting process over the last three decades has changed the way Congress operates and has aided in the polarization seen in the current system. LeLoup approaches this study in an innovative manner, using both quantitative and qualitative tools to explain and gauge the influence of changes in the macrobudgeting process on the Congress. He approaches this study from the perspective of a historical institutionalist and seeks to intertwine budgeting into the larger field of theories explaining Congressional behavior. His use of historical institutionalism allows him to take a more expansive view of the changes in Congressional budgeting and their interactions with the events and political culture that helped bring them about.

LeLoup considers several major budget acts from the 1970s through the first George W. Bush administration. This study analyzes evolutions in congressional budgeting chronologically beginning with the 1974 Budget Act, which represented a shift in power back to the Congress and a reassertion of congressional authority over the budget process. Other changes to congressional budgeting that LeLoup analyzes include the Reagan tax cuts in 1981, the mandatory deficit reduction plans (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) of 1985, several deficit reduction plans in the 1990s including the Bush plan in 1990 and Clinton plan in 1993, the balanced budget agreement in 1997, and the tax cuts under George W. Bush in 2001 and 2003. Each of these developments and policy changes in Congressional budgeting came about as responses to particular evolutions within Congress or the larger political landscape. LeLoup argues that the changes in Congressional budgeting, particularly the evolution of macrobudgeting, have combined with other institutional changes to create the increased partisan behavior evident now in the Congress in policymaking.

While this work examines, in detail, what brought about changes in the macrobudgeting environment and the effects of these changes, LeLoup also seeks to place the budgeting process in a larger body of research that explains congressional change and development. He examines the impact of budget rules and trends in party cohesion and divided government to assess the impact of congressional budgeting on the institution as a whole. LeLoup concludes that “not all changes in rules have been consistent of effective” (204). Particularly in times of deficit spending, Congress has had trouble attempting to reach ambitious deficit reduction and other policy objectives. LeLoup reports the increase in omnibus budget bills that place a higher burden on party leaders for passage, as well as the abandonment of PAYGO and budget reconciliation procedures. However, he argues that Congress remains the central fixture in the budgeting process. LeLoup argues that while party unity and divided government have led to increasing polarization in Congress and contentious budget battles, that increasing deficit spending, particularly over the next few years, could decrease party loyalty. He also concludes that Congress has reestablished itself as an effective answer to the president in budget battles in times of divided government or as an important ally in unified government.

This work not only attempts to trace the evolution of congressional budgeting, but also to place an understanding of budgeting and its impact on the Congress as a whole in a wider body of literature. His work is interesting with compelling theoretical arguments, and it also has important implications for the future of budgeting in Congress.

Kate E. Carney
Carl Albert Congressional Fellow
Ph.D. student of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

The Press, edited by Genevva Overholser and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, The Annenbert Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, Oxford University Press, 2005, ISBN 0195172833, cloth, \$65.00, 433 pages.

The role of the press in our constitutional democracy has been an oft-discussed issue. In recent years media related stories have dominated the news. Changes in technology and communication have added additional haze to this "fourth estate."

The Press is an important compilation discussing numerous aspects of this changing and complicated necessity. Utilizing the contributions of over thirty journalists and scholars, *The Press* is another significant addition, along with *The Public Schools*, *The Legislative Branch*, *The Executive Branch*, and *The Judicial Branch*, in the *Institutions of American Democracy Series*.

The Press covers the basic issues relating to the press and the media in four main categories: the press and democracy in time and space, the functions of the press in a democracy, government and the press, and the structure and nature of the American press. Given the rise of globalization, instantaneous global communication, and the frequent discussion of the transportability of democracy, this first section is instructive. The work of Schudson and Tift on the historical perspective of American journalism is insightful if one desires the proper context within which to place today's media.

Of particular importance to today's scholars will be the discussions of the relationship between the government and the press. While there are surprises (Who knew Silent Cal Coolidge had 521 press conferences? 239) and reminders (of how dependent the government and the press are upon one another, 248-262), the role of the media during military conflicts take center stage. Churchill's famous phrase, "In wartime truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies," is frequently mentioned, but less so is the impossible task of articulating clear public policy between the first amendment and national security. William Prochnau's piece on the press in time of war is particularly informative. While some will take issue with his short discussion regarding the Vietnam War and the media, his look at the relationship between the government and the media throughout American military history is nevertheless insightful. Given that the United States has "been at war or had troops in action in all but 37 of 225 of its history," this issue is not likely to be resolved in the near future (329).

Also given considerable space is discussion of the current state of the American media. While many are not ready to sound the alarm bells, others are concerned about the return to a partisan press and the homage the media must pay to advertisers, shareholders, and shifting entertainment-seeking demographic audiences. As Jaroslav Pelikan states in his introduction, "periodically throughout its history the press has been willing to sacrifice its primary responsibility to the idols of voyeurism and the marketplace, and at least sometimes no less flagrantly than it has in recent decades" (xviii). Likewise, the internet poses its own benefits and problems. Given that communication is now sometimes comparable to instantaneous rolling public opinion polls, the necessities of context, perspective, and perception for an informed and educated citizenry and government are sometimes forgotten. What this means "for the future of constitutional *representative* democracy is one of the most troubling questions coming out of this entire enterprise" (xxiii).

What is the difference between a responsible press and a free press during times of war? How does American journalism compare to journalism around the world? How has American journalism (particularly First Amendment jurisprudence) evolved over our history? Is there an escape hatch out of the trap between "the economics of journalism and its mission" (xxv)? Which function of the press in a democracy is most important: watchdog, agenda setter, marketplace of ideas, mobilizer, or information disseminator? These are but some of the questions and issues discussed in this important work. Overholser and Jamieson have provided an invaluable source for those interested in understanding and engaging the press in this dynamic new century.

Matt Field
Carl Albert Graduate Fellow
Ph.D. student of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Carter to Bush, Second Edition, Craig Volden and David Brady, Westview Press, 2005, 0813343208, \$20.00, paper, 242 pages.

In this second edition of *Revolving Gridlock*, Brady and Volden are able to extend their theoretical framework by adding as a comparative dimension the first term of President George W. Bush. Their analysis now covers presidencies from Carter to Bush 43 and their corresponding congressional majorities. The latter offer a mix of Democratic, Republican, and divided control. Thus, they now claim that their theory is sustained across the various permutations that the separation of powers and bicameralism might offer. Since I raise a few questions about their approach below, let me at the beginning say that I admire greatly the rigor with which they seek to provide an empirical foundation for theory building across time.

Their theory, "revolving gridlock," is grounded in rational choice. The authors argue that members of Congress can be arrayed along a single ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative. The "gridlock zone" in the House and Senate is defined by the policy positions of members constrained by the median member, the president's position (since he might veto a bill), and the super-majorities required to override a veto or to impose cloture in the Senate. These "pivot points" define the range of available policy action. Because both the country and the Congress have been divided in their policy preferences, policies are developed within or dragged into the gridlock zone. Hence, major policy change is foreclosed.

This theoretical approach is by now a courant in congressional studies, marked by such well-known work as that of Cox and McCubbins (whose emphasis on the role of political parties Brady and Volden reject) and the Khrehbiel *oeuvre* (especially his *Pivotal Politics*, which Brady and Volden accept). The strength of this kind of approach is that it drives for parsimonious explanations which, because of their very simplicity, cut to the core of the matter at hand. If "revolving gridlock" theory in fact explains the pattern of policymaking, then we need seek no further for an explanation.

But does it? I travel outside of my limited competencies here, but offer some questions that occurred to me. First, what is gridlock? It would appear to me that if policy making is in fact dragged inside the zones identified by Brady and Volden, it may nonetheless proceed incrementally. If policies outside the gridlock zone are bound to fail, this does not necessarily mean that gridlock has occurred if in fact incremental policy change over time is consequential and consistent with the preferences of a majority of voters for a moderate pace of change. One might ask what the counterpoint would be? That the only thing that counts as substantial policy change would occur when the preference distribution is skewed to the right or left?

Second, can we say that some new policies are quite substantial without necessarily conceding that they reflect the preferences of a majority of members, a majority of voters, or even the pivot point voter in the House or Senate? One wonders, for example, if the No Child Left Behind Act, the last major farm bill, the last transportation bill, the last energy bill, the late bankruptcy bill, the prescription drug benefit bill, or other recent policy changes in fact reflected the true policy preferences of, well, anyone. They were engineered by a party regime that was able to strong-arm the votes.

This raises a third question. Other recent work, for example that of Fiorina (*Culture Wars*) and of Hacker and Pierson, argues that the policy process is severely off track, reflecting no gridlock at all. In *Off Center*, Hacker and Pierson suggest that the congressional Republicans, acting in concert with the Bush administration, have used techniques of agenda control to ramrod legislation that is substantially at odds with the preferences of the American people or the median or pivot point member. The Republicans accomplish this in part by limiting the alternatives that can be considered. As David Price has suggested in his book *The Congressional Experience* and related articles, the House Republican leadership often heads to the floor with a narrow whip count and then holds the vote open until enough arms are broken to pass the bill. If the House-passed bill is revised in the Senate, then the GOP simply rewrites the bill in conference, denying participation to the Democrats, and rams through the conference report. These procedural abnormalities lead me to think that procedure and party are important variables that stand independent of the preference schedules of members. Members' preferences can only be given life by the alternatives that they are offered.

It is perhaps for this reason that Brady and Volden spend more time on the Senate than they do on the House. The Senate is a more decentralized body and each senator has power under its rules. The result is that senators have more latitude to act on their preferences than do representatives. They can filibuster or threaten to. They can offer non-germane amendments. They can offer entire bill substitutes. This greater flexibility makes it more likely that the Senate process will produce outcomes defined by the positions of pivot point senators than would be the case for their House counterparts. If pivot point members controlled policy in the House, then why do moderate Republicans so often toe the line?

Given the underlying dynamic of their "revolving gridlock" theory, I would like to learn more about how that dynamic is affected by the use of agenda control and other devices by party leaders to shape the context within which the preferences of members are allowed to be expressed.

Ron Peters
Regents' Professor of Political Science
Carl Albert Center
University of Oklahoma

Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives, by Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 0521619963, \$24.99, paper, 336 pages.

What role does the majority party play in the organization of the House of Representatives? Political scientists developed two broad approaches to answer questions of congressional organization and behavior. One approach explains congressional organization as serving non-partisan goals such as reelection, providing information, and legislative bargaining, which focuses little on majority party activity. A second approach describes congressional organization and behavior as serving partisan objectives (e.g. responsible party government, conditional party government) (1-5). In *Setting the Agenda*, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins situate themselves between these two literatures by expanding their argument in *Legislative Leviathan* to formulate Procedural Cartel Theory. This theory posits that political parties form in the House of Representatives to monopolize the legislative agenda, because "even though voting power in democratic legislatures is everywhere equal, proposal and veto power are everywhere unequal" (9). The purpose of *Setting the Agenda* is twofold: to respond to criticisms levied by the nonpartisan approach to legislative organization and behavior (e.g. Krehbiel), and to alter the research agenda of political parties in Congress.

The authors argue that a political party must attain legislative success in order to maintain the party's brand name, which, in turn, helps to satisfy congressional members' goals of reelection, policy, power, and majority party status. To attain legislative success, the political party must strive to overcome the collective action problem (the political party's brand name is considered a public good for politicians), and do so by delegating powers to central authorities. Cox and McCubbins add to this argument, hence adding to theories of party government, by analyzing the incentive to become majority party - control over the legislative agenda (21-24).

According to Procedural Cartel Theory, majority party leadership presiding over offices of agenda control (e.g. committee chairpersons, speakership) will utilize positive and negative agenda powers based upon the degree of homogeneity within the majority party. Positive agenda powers include the ability of majority party leadership to push bills to the floor, and negative agenda powers include the ability to block bills (delay, veto) that are unfavorable to the majority party. Cox and McCubbins hypothesize that, when the majority party's preferences are relatively homogeneous, leaders will exercise positive agenda control, but when the majority party's preferences have a high degree of heterogeneity, leaders will utilize negative agenda control by blocking bills that may cause public cleavages within the party. The majority party exploits their agenda control to manage conflict before it starts.

Cox and McCubbins used an extensive data set (all bills reaching the floor on the House of Representatives from 1877-1999) and multiple methodologies (historical description, statistical techniques, and formal modeling) to test empirically Procedural Cartel Theory against the Floor Agenda Model (89-105). Their findings indicate that agenda setting powers reside in the majority party, not the House floor, and that the majority party rarely endures the passage and enactment of a bill that is contrary to its wishes (221). In addition, Cox and McCubbins show: (1) majority parties have not significantly changed Reed's rules, and when they have been altered, the rules merely redistribute power within the majority party, (2) in the rare occasion the majority party loses agenda setting control, it is usually during times of divided government, and (3) these rules allow policy to shift toward the majority party's policy preferences (225-226).

By accomplishing the first purpose of the book, responding to criticisms of the Cartel Agenda Model, Cox and McCubbins accomplish the book's second purpose of altering the research agenda of political parties in Congress, originally established by E.E. Schattschneider's important work on political parties. Schattschneider believed a highly salient issue could divide the majority party because its members would vote with their constituents, and as a result, political scientists have followed a research agenda that has neglected party organization in Congress, instead analyzing individual members, committees, and interest groups (220). Of the literature concerning political parties in Congress, most of it focused on internal organization and floor voting. The authors contest existing partisan organizational approaches (specifically Responsible Party Government and Conditional Party Government) by claiming that political party influence is not conditional; instead it results from "an array of procedural advantages enjoyed by the majority party that are not conditional on its internal homogeneity" (6).

Altering this research agenda, Cox and McCubbins study the importance of party behavior before floor voting, because "parties matter, in our view, not so much because they influence how their members vote on bills (although they do), but rather because the majority party controls which bills their (and other) members have an opportunity to vote on to begin with" (221). This emphasis on the early stages of the lawmaking process coincides with new research agendas and trends in political science (e.g. Glen S. Krutz's work on "winnowing").

This book departs from *Legislative Leviathan* in two important ways. First, control over the legislative agenda is the most important resource to the majority party, because it represents a less costly way to manage conflict than candidate screening and party discipline during floor votes (both of these costly devices are secondary to agenda control); the most divisive issues never reach the House floor. The cartel can assure party loyalty to bills pushed by leadership because key votes are those on procedure, not the final passage. Procedure votes are less visible to the public, and a congressional member can vote with the majority party on procedure, which can ensure the passage of the bill while his/her constituents oppose the substantive language in the bill (29). Second, Cox and McCubbins posit a new analogy of the political party as a partnership. Political parties act in a similar fashion as accounting or law firms with many senior partners, each with autonomy (32-33).

In answering questions about the role of the majority party in the House of Representatives, Cox and McCubbins wrote a well-organized book, with excellent usage of sub-headings and appendices. *Setting the Agenda* has an efficient literature review to situate the argument and to further the debate on congressional organization, which will make this book a welcomed addition to graduate student seminars.

Paul Jorgensen
Ph.D. student in Political Science
University of Oklahoma

The Shadowlands of Conduct: Ethics and State Politics, by Beth A. Rosenson, Georgetown University Press, 2005, ISBN 1589010450, \$26.95, 256 pages.

Part of the American Governance and Public Policy Series, *Shadowlands of Conduct* plumbs the rise and diffusion of legislative ethics laws at the state level. Combining historical narrative and multivariate regression analysis, Beth A. Rosenson concisely explores the circumstances and factors that prod state legislators to pass laws that limit or proscribe their behavior. The book looks at the period 1954–2004 and focuses on the different steps state legislatures have taken to regulate potential conflicts of interest of their members. Readers who are statistically faint-of-heart will particularly appreciate the book's organization. An appendix for each chapter is provided and contains the models and data sources which underlie that chapter, leaving the text a flowing and persuasive account.

Rosenson's principal conclusion is that ethics reform is a punctuated policy process that is scandal-driven and principally the product of external forces. The actions of federal prosecutors (especially in the decades following Watergate), the media, public interest groups, and governors have cast the policy spotlight on ethics reform and brought outside pressure to bear on state legislatures. The richness of this conclusion is supported by the book's consistent consideration of scandal alongside a wide range of other independent variables in explaining passage or failure of ethics legislation (the dependent variable). Independent variables are: political scandals and corruption; legislative compensation; interparty competition; a state's ideology and political culture; policy of neighboring states; the presence of a voter-ballot-initiative mechanism; and whether a state has previously adopted other related ethics reforms. Rosenson clearly defines her variables and crafts a number of research hypotheses to test these variables.

Opening with revealing case study analysis of ethics reform in three states (California, Massachusetts, and New York), the greater part of *Shadowlands* consists of broader and more quantitative analysis of state legislative ethics reform measures. The book divides its analysis into two periods: Pre-Watergate (1954–1972) and Beyond Watergate (1973–1996). Before summarizing its findings in the final chapter, *Shadowlands* takes a particular look at state independent ethics commissions. Established in a number of states to enforce legislative ethics laws, these commissions, Rosenson concludes, are a "mostly toothless tiger." Rosenson aptly diagnoses the situation as a principal-agent problem, in which the legislature (i.e. principal) is reluctant to cede power over its members to an independent commission (i.e. agent). Also reflecting interbranch competition between the legislature and executive, the fate of these independent commissions is cast against a state's larger political landscape.

Shadowlands provides a practical and scholarly illumination of legislative ethics reform at the state level.

Martin Hanifin
Carl Albert Congressional Fellow
Ph.D. student of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting, Keith T. Poole, Cambridge University Press, 2005, ISBN 0521851947, \$65.00, cloth, 230 pages.

Researchers analyzing roll call data or interested in designing their own roll call indexes will find Keith T. Poole's latest book, *Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting*, useful in their pursuits. Poole asserts, "Anyone can construct a spatial map [of roll call voting]....But the maps are worthless unless the user understands both the spatial theory that the computer program embodies and the politics of the legislature that produced the roll calls" (209). Poole addresses the former problem, lending thorough and necessarily technical insight into the spatial theory underlying statistical models of roll call voting.

Those well versed in advanced statistical methods and with solid grasp of matrix algebra will be able to understand and employ the computational aspects of the book, which essentially serve as tutorial for the construction of roll call models. For those wishing to design models similar to the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE data sets for state or foreign legislatures, Poole's discussions of the geometry of parliamentary roll call voting (Ch. 2), his optimal classification method based on chapter two's spatial geometry (Ch. 3), and probabilistic spatial models of parliamentary voting (Ch. 4) will serve as a guide to both understanding and constructing roll call models. Poole also addresses practical statistical issues researchers may encounter in constructing these models (Ch. 5), and even presents several general natural experiments which can be conducted with data sets constructed using his methods (Ch. 6).

Poole stresses that his "talents lie in the *engineering* side of the discipline, not in the *theory* side" (202), but readers will recognize that Poole's work on spatial models is both grounded in *and* an exhaustive mathematical representation of a theory of roll call voting guided by rational choice theory. In this sense, the book has relevance beyond its immediate application as an example of a truly *scientific* social science method. Granted, roll call votes are but one political behavior in a discrete and highly institutionalized venue, but the efforts of Poole and others to accurately capture and measure these behaviors is both impressive and commendable.

Although the empirically gifted will certainly take the most from *Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting*, legislative scholars using roll call data will find the book generally useful for better understanding the nature, uses, and limitations of their data. Political scientists more generally may find *Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting* interesting for its theory-grounded empiricism.

Walter Wilson
Carl Albert Graduate Fellow
Ph.D. student of Political Science
University of Oklahoma

Uncompromising Positions: God, Sex, and the U.S. House of Representatives, Elizabeth Anne Oldmixon, Georgetown University Press, 2005, ISBN 158901071X, \$26.95, paper, 244 pages.

Elizabeth Anne Oldmixon has taken on a formidable challenge in analyzing the role of culture in policymaking concerning what are typically described as "moral issues." This book details her research on how legislators legislate when policy conflicts are defined in explicitly cultural terms, and concludes that while certain patterns do emerge, overall the process remains very personal and individualistic, even to the exclusion of partisan preferences.

The author begins with the development of the two dominant cultures in contemporary American politics, progressive sexuality and religious traditionalism, devoting a separate chapter to each. Advocates of progressive sexuality view certain previously unconventional social practices as appropriate, such as the use of contraception by both married and unmarried individuals, federal funding of family planning programs, legalization of abortion with limited restrictions, and the existence of civil unions, domestic partnerships, and gay marriage. Religious traditionalists are more supportive of grounding public policy in Christian values, and assert the feminist and gay rights movements are the result of inattention to basic values. This culture promotes the belief that social relationships are defined by Christian values, and moral decisions should be made in that same context. Religious traditionalists strongly support prayer in schools, oppose abortion and gay rights, and strive to overcome the growth of progressive sexuality as an appropriate culture in the United States.

The real value of this book lies in the evaluation of the manner in which members of the House address the conflict between these two cultures. Through elite interviews of both Republican and Democrat representatives and staff, and analysis of roll call votes, the author captures the difficulty legislators encounter when forced to address nonnegotiable issues which do not fit into the normal legislative process, those issues which leave compromise unattainable. Decision making on gay issues, reproductive policy, and school prayer exhibit different motivations than issues such as highway funding or taxation. Normal considerations such as electoral connections or partisan loyalty are not the most significant factors. The author conducts a logit analysis to measure legislator's support for progressive sexuality and for religious traditionalism through both roll call votes and sponsorship/co-sponsorship decisions on reproductive policies, gay-related policies, and prayer policy for the 103rd through the 107th Congresses, and concludes party, ideology, and religion are significant to a limited degree and in different combinations for each issue area. The bottom line is that legislators make their decisions based on their own internal values rather than economic or electoral considerations, and usually find other ways to keep from confronting the most controversial questions, such as committee delays, reshaping the issue to become an appropriations question rather than a cultural issue, and when all else fails, simply standing by their principles. Given the finding that aggregate policy preferences of most Americans tend to support a middle-ground approach, Congress has learned to take the least confrontational approach available in dealing with these cultural issues.

The material in this book is very well-organized, concisely written, and provides a plethora of information on legislative decision-making, the role of interest groups in the policy process, and social regulatory policy. As the author openly acknowledges, it does not fully address the topic, but it does provide a solid foundation for those seeking a theoretical framework to adopt in examining the management of moral issues in the contemporary political arena.

Margaret Ellis
Professor of Political Science
University of Oklahoma