

# THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST

NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

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## FROM THE EDITORS

This issue of the Political Economist features an essay by John Patty (Washington University in St. Louis) and information about the section business meeting and sponsored panels at the upcoming APSA meetings in Toronto.

Patty's essay focuses on perhaps the most common modeling tool used in political economy work across normative, comparative, international, and American subfields: the one-dimensional spatial model of collective decision-making. Part of the attractiveness of this model is that under its assumptions, group choice patterns can be well-behaved—for example, sincere majority voting is sure to be transitive and complete. This model relies on the assumption of "single-peaked preferences:" that there is some underlying ordering, or single-dimensional scale, of the alternatives, in which every individual's preferences can be described by an ideal and the distance of an alternative from that ideal along the scale. In many settings, the assumption of single-peaked preferences

can be questioned. Patty, however, raises a very different issue: if the decision process allows individuals any scope to manipulate outcomes through insincere voting, or otherwise misrepresenting their true preferences, then even single-peaked true preferences are subject to the standard social choice pathologies of intransitivity, dictatorship, etc. Since most real-world group decision processes do leave room for such manipulation, single-peakedness is no insurance against unruly social choice properties.

With respect to the APSA meetings, we provide the agenda for the Section business meeting (Friday, 12:15-1:15, Convention Centre 712), along with a list of related panels at the end of the newsletter.

See you in Toronto!

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## AGENDA FOR SECTION BUSINESS MEETING

**CONVENTION CENTRE 712  
 FRIDAY, 12:15-1:15PM**

1. Report of the treasurer
2. Discussion of rules governing nominations for awards (e.g. for the dissertation award, discussion to limit nominations to advisors rather than permit self-nominations, etc.)
3. Distribution of awards

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POLITICAL ECONOMY  
SECTION OFFICERS, 2009



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## FEATURE ESSAY

### Taking Something Clean and Making It Messy: Dimensionality, Sincerity, and Institutions

John W. Patty, Washington University in St. Louis

The concept of dimensionality is central to the positive theory of political economy. For example, the contrast between the conclusions of Black's median voter theorem and those of Arrow's Possibility Theorem illustrates the theoretical sensitivity of collective decision-making to whether individuals' policy preferences can be represented as being single-peaked with respect to some common ordering of the policies. As both Arrow and Black recognized,<sup>1</sup> the presumption that individual preferences are single-peaked implies that majority rule produces a transitive social ordering and a nonempty core. This well-known result, Black's Median Voter Theorem, is the foundation of over a half-century of work on policymaking institutions within the "unidimensional spatial model."

The theoretical power of assuming that individuals have single-peaked preferences has, of course, been recognized.<sup>2</sup> Of course, assuming that the unidimensional spatial model is descriptive of all, or even much of, real-world politics is bordering on the heroic.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly,

1 Arrow [1963] and Black [1948].

2 For example, Feld and Grofman argue that single-peakedness implies that "the process of collective decision making is dramatically simplified." [Feld and Grofman, 1988, p. 776] Speaking more broadly, the tension between collective rationality and democratic ideals disappears in these situations. Indeed, even the ever-skeptical William Riker conceded that when this condition holds "voters know the political world is coherently organized, the possibility of cycles is zero and the method of majority rule is wholly consistent and never tyrannical." [Riker, 1992, p. 107].

3 That said, no model is perfect and the field of applied political economy demonstrates the fecundity of the soil provided by Black's famous theorem. Several generations of models – encompassing a far-flung range of topics, including taxation (Wittman [1989]; Alesina and Rodrik [1994]), special interest politics (Grossman and

as John Aldrich recently argued in this newsletter (Aldrich [2006]), departing from the unidimensional spatial model is a step that must be taken. Aldrich points out correctly that our theoretical understanding of democratic policy-making outside of the unidimensional spatial model is relatively thin and, furthermore, much of what we do know is based on rather strong institutional assumptions. While I agree with Aldrich's points, both broad and specific, my purpose in this piece is to point out that our collective understanding of the operation of institutions inside the unidimensional spatial model is still lacking.

Specifically, it is generally not recognized exactly what the assumption of single-peakedness accomplishes. In particular, I discuss below that, while the assumption of single-peaked preferences is useful, essentially no real-world political institutions are designed so as to take advantage of this structure. The ubiquity of "design flaws" is important not because it implies we should cast aside the unidimensional spatial model. Rather, the divergence of real institutions from the class of institutions that might leverage the power of Black's theorem and its kin is itself informative precisely because institutions are of course not exogenously imposed.<sup>4</sup>

Institutional provisions such as voting quotas and other procedural guaran- Helpman [1996]), campaign finance (Baron [1994]; Ashworth [2006]), immigration (Benhabib [1996]), education (Saint-Paul and Verdier [1993]), economic regulation (Congleton [1992]), and federalism (Bednar, Ferejohn, and Garrett [1996]; Dixit and Londregan [1998]) – have generated interesting, important, and testable predictions. 4 This point has been widely acknowledged. Seminal arguments along these lines may be found in Riker [1980], North [1990], and Ostrom [1990], to name three.

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tees are chosen for a variety of reasons, including the protection of special classes of members or the generalized “minority.” However, it is too rarely recognized that these institutional features create incentives for strategic, insincere behavior within the institution. The central point of this article is that the incentives for insincere behavior exist in real-world political institutions even within the unidimensional spatial model. In other words, even if preferences are structured so as to guarantee that the majority will be transitive, the construction of this will by examination of the collective choices of, or the profiles of individual actions within, the institution is not guaranteed to be a faithful rendition of the true majority will.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, the arguments here suggest a set of interesting and relatively unexplored trade-offs of institutional design (in terms of welfare, efficiency, and normative criteria).<sup>6</sup>

5 Indeed, even if preferences are single-peaked, there is no guarantee that the majority preference relation as constructed from observed behaviors within a non-neutral will be transitive.

6 These institutional design trade-offs have been examined in great detail recently in the information aggregation / “Condorcet jury theorem” literature (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks [1996], Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1998], Coughlan [2000], Meirowitz [2007]).

Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of single-peakedness, I believe two motivating concerns deserve special mention. First, the fact that essentially no real-world political institution satisfies the conditions required to guarantee sincere revelation of the majority preference relation even when the true underlying relation is itself transitive erects a large hurdle for those who attempt to definitively divine the majority will from observed choices within real-world institutions (e.g., Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle [1985], Riker [1986, 1988, 1996]). Second and relatedly, the results imply that, even if one accepts that majority rule cycles are nonexistent in real world politics (Mackie [2003]), the institutions that are used to make collective choices will effectively induce cyclic institutional revealed preferences. To the degree that legislators are instrumentally motivated, the normative and positive objections to interpreting collective choice as reflecting the “will of the majority” are once again in play in spite of granting the hypothesis that the latent majority preference relation is transitive.

### The Deceptive Simplicity of Single-Peakedness

While presumably intuitive to many of


the readers, it is important to consider for the moment exactly what single-peakedness means. In order to do that, it is useful to offer a formal definition of single-peakedness. That, of course, requires some notation. Let the set of policies be denoted by  $X$  and the set of individuals by  $N$ . For each individual  $i$ , let  $P_i$  be individual  $i$ 's strict preference over  $X$ , and let  $P$  denote an arbitrary profile of such preference relations for all individuals in  $N$ .

**Definition 1** Preference profile  $P$  is single-peaked on  $X$  if there exists some linear ordering  $Q$  of  $X$  such that, for all  $i \in N$  and all triples  $\{x, y, z\} \subseteq X$  with  $xQyQz$ ,  $xP_i y \Rightarrow yP_i z$  and  $zP_i y \Rightarrow yP_i x$ .

Three examples of preference profiles satisfying this definition are displayed in Figure 1. Each of the three profiles in Figure 1 satisfy Definition 1, but it can be verified that no two of the profiles are single-peaked with any common ordering. Figure 1 demonstrates why it is important to keep in mind that the definition offered below (Definition 1') is not equivalent to Definition 1. Definition 1' assumes that the ordering  $Q$  with respect to which preferences are single-peaked is fixed rather than simply that such an ordering exists.

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Figure 1: The Variety of Single-peaked Preference Profiles



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**Definition 1'** Fix a linear ordering  $Q^*$  of  $X$ . A preference profile  $P$  on  $X$  is single-peaked with respect to  $Q^*$  if, for all  $i \in N$  and all triples  $\{x, y, z\} \subseteq X$  with  $xQ^*yQ^*z$ ,  $xP_i y \Rightarrow yP_i z$  and  $zP_i y \Rightarrow yP_i x$ .

Any profile  $P$  that satisfies Definition 1' obviously satisfies Definition 1, but the converse does not hold when  $X$  contains at least three elements. Accordingly, it should be noted that many of the works on implementation in single-peaked domains utilize Definition 1' and also presume that the fixed ordering  $Q$  is known by the institutional designer and can be incorporated into the definition of the collective choice rule (i.e., the rules of the institution).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> A few examples include Moulin [1980], Border and Jordan [1983], Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou [1991], Dryzek and List [2003], and Saporiti [2009]. Also, this point has been recognized by other scholars. Blin and Satterthwaite [1976] discuss this point in some detail and provide an illustrative example.

## Single-Peakedness and The Structure of Coalitions

When preferences are single-peaked under either Definition 1 or Definition 1', the set of coalitions that can be realized over any possible binary vote possesses an orderly and useful structure. Figure 2 illustrates coalitions in a typical single-peaked example. The figure demonstrates the fact that holding a given alternative as the baseline for comparison (c in the figure) and sequentially varying its opponent along the ordering,  $Q$ , the coalition supporting that alternative x at first shrinks, at some point "flips," and then expands. This structure is part of the reason that the majority rule core is always nonempty in this preference domain. However, identifying the majority rule core requires constructing the coalition structure as demonstrated in Figure 2. Doing this requires pairwise majority votes. In particular, as Austen-Smith and Banks lucidly describe [Austen-Smith and Banks, 2004, Ch. 2], a necessary condition for obtaining strategy-proof-


ness in the single-peaked domain is that the collective choice rule compares ballots in accordance with this feature of the structure of coalitions. Specifically, the collective choice rule does not need to know which people should be in each coalition (such knowledge would, of course, make the problem trivial). Rather, the rule must in essence examine the structure of the coalitions with respect to the ordering  $Q$ . When there are more than two alternatives, this requirement is not trivial: in most cases, it implies that the ordering  $Q$  must be known a priori. In other words, the institution must know the structure (though not the entire content) of individual preferences prior to the submission of ballots by individuals.

## Neutrality and Coalitional Manipulability

An important divergence between the theoretical ideals of Black's median voter theorem and the empirical realities of political institutions con-

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**Figure 2: The Structure of Majority Rule with Single-Peaked Preferences**



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cerns the treatment of different policies. An institution that treats all possible choices equally is referred to as neutral.

For simplicity, I will represent institutions here in social choice theoretic fashion, using the notion of a collective choice rule, which maps preference profiles into final policy choices. Letting  $D$  denote the set of possible preference profiles, the formal definition of a neutral collective choice rule is as follows:

**Definition 2** A collective choice function  $C : D \rightarrow X$  is neutral if for every permutation  $\sigma$  of  $X$  and every profile  $P \in D$ ,

$$C(P) = x \Leftrightarrow C(\sigma(P)) = \sigma(x),$$

where  $\sigma(P)$  denotes the profile of preferences corresponding to the permuted set of alternatives.

That is, if the “names” of alternatives are scrambled, then the chosen alternatives are renamed by exactly the same scrambling. While neutrality is a fairly straightforward and appealing characteristic, very few real-world political institutions exhibit it. Violations of neutrality come in various forms, including privileging certain alternatives and/or prohibiting others. The non-neutrality of a political institution can be explicit (e.g., the description of voting procedures) or implied by other institutional requirements. For example, the use of a supermajority rule necessarily renders an institution non-neutral. This is similarly true of political institutions that require the consent of multiple (institutional or individual) veto players for policy change (e.g., the requirements of Article I, §7 of the U.S. Constitution). In many cases, such institutions privilege the status quo policy, though sometimes (e.g., appropriations) the reversion point may be quite different from the currently prevailing policy.

## Manipulation

The issue of manipulation in mechanism

design and social choice theory is motivated by the informational realities facing both political philosophers and policymakers. In many situations, though one may have sincerely altruistic motivations when considering what a group should choose, what individuals really want is to some degree unknown. Accordingly, effective pursuit of one’s altruistic goals will necessitate asking the individuals what they want. This then raises the question, of course, of what one should do with the responses after they have been submitted by the individuals. Manipulation occurs when one or more individuals behave so as to portray their preferences as being different than they truly are.

Empirical instances of potential manipulation vary widely. Consider a life-long environmental activist casting his or her ballot for Al Gore instead of Ralph Nader in the 2000 election because the vote was more likely to be pivotal for Gore than Nader, an advocate arguing in favor of civil unions for gay couples rather than full-blown marriage rights because of a fear of an electoral backlash, or a proposal of an extreme “killer” amendment in hopes that it will be approved and lead to failure of the final bill. In all cases and despite the somewhat pejorative nature of the term, manipulation can be in pursuit of the most noble of goals. Furthermore, a rational choice to manipulate through being insincere is always based on the ways in which the (formal and informal) “rules of the institution” translate one’s individual behavior into a final collective choice.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Part of the power of the theoretical results on manipulation – principally the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard [1973], Satterthwaite [1975]) – is that their structure implies that one does not need to distinguish between formal rules and “informal” aspects of an institution such as conventions, norms, folkways, etc. This power partially flows from the fact that the results are “negative.” So, thinking for a minute, it becomes clear that while the theoretical frameworks (replete with terms like “mechanisms” and collective choice rules) seem to allow for only formal institutions,

Most theories about manipulation (e.g., the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) focus on manipulation by an individual. However, features such as political parties, multi-member districts, committees, and staggered election cycles<sup>9</sup> are just a few near-ubiquitous forms coordinated strategic behavior within political institutions. To the degree that groups of individuals can coordinate their behaviors within a political institution, one needs to consider coalitional manipulations. It is important to note that in multicameral and separation of powers systems, the coalition seeking to manipulate might be some (or even all) of the members of one or more of the branches or chambers.<sup>10</sup>

In words, a collective choice rule is coalitionally manipulable if there is a coordinated deviation (i.e., a coordinated set of “strategic ballots”) by some subset of the individuals such that all of the deviating individuals are made strictly better off. Formally, coalitional

any informal processes that might play into the determination of the final choice could just as easily be “written down” as formal rules and, hence, are covered by the results. <sup>9</sup> In this case, the recent work of Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams, and Hanson [2009] provides a vivid example of coalitional manipulation within the bicameral and non-neutral structure of the U.S. budget process. <sup>10</sup> This point makes clear how the social choice approach unifies a set of related findings derived within non-cooperative frameworks. For example, within the literature on American political institutions, for example, the models of Hammond and Knott [1996], Epstein and O’Halloran [1999], Groseclose and McCarty [2001], Bendor and Meirowitz [2004], Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty [2006], Crombez, Groseclose, and Krehbiel [2006], Gailmard and Hammond [2008], and Gailmard and Patty [2006] are effectively examining coalitional manipulation. This point is discussed at some length in Penn, Gailmard, and Patty [2008]. Note that the incentive for coalitional manipulation in these models exists in spite of the presumption that preferences are single-peaked (most of these models restrict most of their attention to unidimensional spatial settings).

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manipulability is defined as follows.

**Definition 3** A collective choice function  $C : D \rightarrow X$  is coalitionally manipulable if, for some profile  $P = (P_1, \dots, P_n) \in D$  and some coalition  $L \subseteq N$ , there exists a profile  $P' = (P'_L, P_{-L}) \in D$  such that

$$C(P')P_i C(P) \text{ for all } i \in L.$$

A choice function is coalitionally strategy-proof if it is not coalitionally manipulable.

One must be at least slightly skeptical about the “sincerity” of individuals’ behaviors within an institution that is not coalitionally strategy-proof. According to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, so long as individuals may have any transitive preference ordering, a coalitionally strategy-proof institution that can select three or more alternatives is necessarily dictatorial (i.e., it assigns all decision-making power to one individual). But intuitively, this conclusion may seem to rely upon a cyclic majority preference relation. Accordingly, this result might not extend to settings where preferences are single-peaked. However, Penn et al. [2008] have recently demonstrated otherwise. Even if one assumes that preferences are known to be single-peaked but the ordering of alternatives is unknown, any coalitionally strategy-proof collective function that can choose three or more alternatives is dictatorial. Viewed slightly differently, any non-neutral institution is coalitionally manipulable.

**Theorem 1** (Penn et al. [2008]) Any collective choice function  $\phi$  that is coalitionally strategy-proof on the domain of all single-peaked preferences (under Definition 1) is dictatorial.

Note that an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that any coalitionally strategy-proof mechanism must be neutral. This is because the structure of single-peakedness is not a restriction on the way in which the alternatives may be ranked by any individual. Rather, the pre-

sumption of single-peaked preferences (as defined in Definition 1) restricts only the way in which the individuals’ preferences are structured in relation to one another, as illustrated by the construction of pairwise voting coalitions in the example pictured in Figure 2. This is not true when the domain restriction is presumed to satisfy Definition 1’ – consider augmented median voter rules (Austen-Smith and Banks [2004], Definition 2.8, p. 37) – because the alternatives themselves are not ex-changeable, many (but not all) permutations of the labels of the alternatives result in preference profiles that are themselves not possible.

Theorem 1 relies on the difference between Definition 1 (in which the existence of an ordering is known, but that is all) and Definition 1’ (in which the ordering  $Q$  is known). Specifically, the equivalence between dictatorial and strategy proof collective choice rules holds when the ordering is unknown. As argued above, this is true of virtually every political institution of which I am aware.<sup>11</sup> The use of this domain – the domain of single-peaked preferences where the ordering is a priori unknown – also theoretically justifies the empirically realistic presumption that the institution must allow, and be well-defined following, the submission of any profile of ballots – even profiles that are not rationalizable as sincerely revealed single-peaked preferences.

<sup>11</sup> Specifically, this result holds for any institution that does not utilize a linear ordering,  $Q$ , of the alternatives to “throw out” ballots that violate single-peakedness with respect to that ordering. Not only are such institutions incredibly rare in the real world, they also must be designed carefully, for if the individuals’ preferences are not single-peaked with respect to that ordering (e.g., they could be single-peaked with respect to a different ordering, as illustrated by Figure 1, or not single-peaked at all), then the institution will necessarily violate the weak Paretian axiom (Austen-Smith and Banks [1999], Definition 2.13, p.50). Also, unsurprisingly, such an institution might not be well-defined in the sense that it might throw out all of the ballots.

## Conclusions

Even if one accepts the supposition that political preferences do not themselves admit cyclic majority preference (as argued by Mackie [2003]) a version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem still applies. More importantly, unless the political institution in question is dictatorial, there is no reason to believe that a transitive sincere majority preference relation will be translated into a transitive revealed majority preference. To avoid this conclusion, one must essentially assume that the true ordering of policies – i.e., the structure of political preferences – is known a priori and, furthermore, is incorporated into the rules of the political institution itself. Even more specifically, unless the institution in question detects and ignores insincere actions/ballots, the supposition that preferences are single-peaked is simply not enough to provide an “acceptable escape-route” from “the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.”<sup>12</sup> Even in settings as well-behaved as the unidimensional spatial model, properly describing the connection between individuals’ preferences and their actions requires paying attention to the institutions in which the behaviors are taking place.

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Dryzek and List [2003], p. 28.

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## APSA CONFERENCE PANELS

Event	Date: Start Time	Participants
6-3: The Politics and Geography of Development	09/03: 8:00 AM	None scheduled yet
6-13: Pushing the Boundaries of Trade	09/03: 8:00 AM	Mark R. Brawley, Youngchae Lee, Holly Jarman, Daniel Verdier, Byungwon Woo, Ernesto F. Calvo, Aldo Fernando Ponce, Charles R. Hankla
26-11: Judicial Opinion Writing in Comparative Perspective	09/03: 8:00 AM	Tom Clark, Kirk A. Randazzo, Richard Waterman, Andrew Martin, Joseph L. Smith, Robert Howard, James Spriggs, Matthew Gabel, Meghan Leonard, Chad Westerland
6-11: The Domestic Politics of Globalization in Developing Countries	09/03: 10:15 AM	Michael Tomz, Andy Baker, Kenneth F. Scheve, Xiaobo Lu, Matthew Slaughter, Sarah M. Brooks, Raymond Hicks, Helen V. Milner, Dustin Halliday Tingley, Stephan Haggard

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## APSA CONFERENCE PANELS

Event	Date: Start Time	Participants
6-17: Democratic Representation and Policymaking	09/03: 10:15 AM	Micah Altman, Joel Simmons, Irfan Nooruddin, Amanda Louise Beal, Junggho Roh, Robert Franzese, Simon Hix
Section Meeting and Awards Ceremony	09/03: 12:45 PM	
6-7: Deliberation and Decision-Making in Monetary Policy Committees	09/03: 2:00 PM	Kevin M. Quinn, John Woolley, Joseph Gardner, Henry Chappell, Rob Roy McGregor, Todd Vermilyea, Cheryl M. Schonhardt-Bailey, Andrew Bailey, William T. Bernhard
6-19: Inequality and Redistribution	09/03: 2:00 PM	Barry M. Mitnick, Andrew Kirkpatrick, Amy H. Liu, Donald M. Beaudette, Lloyd Gruber, Brian D. Cramer, Robert R. Kaufman, Ahmet Faruk Aysan, John Stephen Ahlquist
6-16: The Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences	09/03: 4:15 PM	Thomas Oatley, Helena Simone Yeaman, James Shoch, Min-young Han, William Clark
6-6: The Political Economy of Corruption	09/04: 8:00 AM	
6-8: The Governance and Crisis of International Finance	09/04: 8:00 AM	Lloyd Gruber, Leslie Elliott Armijo, Kathryn Lavelle, Layna Mosley Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, Brian Burgoon, Panicos Demetriadis, Henry Laurence
6-22: Leadership and Rhetoric	09/04: 8:00 AM	Randall L. Calvert, Catherine Hafer, John Patty, Elizabeth Maggie Penn, Torun Dewan, David P Myatt, Rafael Hortala-Vallve
6-4: International Institutions and Domestic Policy Change	09/04: 10:15 AM	
6-21: The New Politics of Economic Policy Making in Japan	09/04: 10:15 AM	William W Grimes, Gene Park, Myung-koo Kang, Yves E. Tiberghien, Jennifer Amyx, Kay Shimizu
6-18: Politics of Fiscal Policy	09/04: 2:00 PM	Edward C. Page, Vera Eva Troeger, Christina Schneider, Charles R. Hankla, Joachim Wehner, Paolo de Renzio, Oleg Kodolov, James E. Mahon
6-10: Political Economy of Migrants' Financial Flows	09/04: 4:15 PM	David Andrew Singer, Rikhil Bhavnani, Margaret Peters, David Leblang, Covadonga Meseguer, Angela O'Mahony, Tobias Pfutze

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# THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST

## APSA CONFERENCE PANELS

Event	Date: Start Time	Participants
Elections and Voting Behavior 36-23: Europe and Elections	09/04: 4:15 PM	Matthew Gabel, Erik Tillman, Catherine De Vries, Simona Guerra, Jonathan T. Polk, Ryan Bakker
6-2: Comparative Subnational Politics and Political Economy in Asia	09/05: 8:00 AM	
6-5: The Political Economy of Trade Agreements and Trade Instruments: New Insights into Causes and Effects	09/05: 8:00 AM	
6-14: The Lobbying of Businesses, Bankers and Agencies	09/05: 8:00 AM	Oleg Kodolov, Michael A. Witt, Gordon Redding, Ophelia Eglene, Kevin Young, Scott Ainsworth, Erik Kinji Godwin, Kenneth Godwin, Joachim Wehner
6-9: The Politics of Financial Crises: Responses to the 2007-2009 Crisis in Comparative and Historical Perspective	09/05: 10:15 AM	Benjamin Cohen, Stefanie Walter, David Steinberg, Patrick Leblond, Sara Binzer Hobolt, James Ashley Morrison, Jeffrey A. Frieden
6-20: The Economics of Voting Behavior	09/05: 10:15 AM	David Hugh-Jones, Seth J. Hill, Lucy Goodhart, Torun Dewan, Samuel Berlinski, Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Jowei Chen, Gary C. Jacobson
6-12: New Approaches to Regime Performance and Transition	09/05: 2:00 PM	David J. Samuels, Ben William Ansell William Clark, Robert Kaufman, Thomas Flores, Paul Poast, John Stephen Ahlquist, Erik Wibbels, Barbara Geddes
6-24: Theme Roundtable: Political Science and the Shifting Study of Economic Development	09/05: 2:00 PM	Richard F. Doner, Ben Ross Schneider Catherine Boone, Melani Cammett, Dali Yang, Robert H. Bates, Atul Kohli
6-15: Institutions of Monetary Policy	09/05: 4:15 PM	J. Lawrence Broz, Nick Vivyan, Bjorn Hoyland, Joseph J. St. Marie, Shahdad Naghshpour, Samuel S. Stanton, Bruno Sergi, Cassandra Rose Grafstrom, Michael G. Hall, Robert C. Lowry
6-25: Varieties of Change in European Political Economy	09/05: 4:15 PM	
6-23: Trade and Partisanship	09/06: 8:00 AM	Stephanie J. Rickard, Jesse Wasson, Krzysztof J. Pelc, Su-Hyun Lee, Joe Weinberg, Stephanie J. Rickard
6-1: Corruption and the Sources of Democratic Success and Failure	09/06: 10:15 AM	