100th Anniversary
Commemoration

Ralph J. Bunche, Ph.D.
Scholar and Diplomat

"Some Reflections On Peace In Our Time"
Nobel Prize Lecture by Ralph J. Bunche

Howard University Department of Political Science
202 Persons Awarded the Ph.D., 1967 - 2006

The Department Howard University continues to produce large numbers of African Americans earning degrees in political science.

1967
Hanes Walton, Jr.

1968

1969
Richard Bright
Winston Langely

1970
Houssam Khalil
Julius Okolo

1971
Beth Ausbrooks
Wesley Daley
Isabel Kulski

1972
Francis Awogu
Aleck Che-Mponda
Janet Feagans
David MeisterBala
Zuberi Mwamba

1973
Clement Ezeanil
Theophilus Igboei
Bakor Kashmeeri
Bassey Umoh

1974
Mariyo Nzuwah

1975
A. Coutris
Akram Deiraniah
George Jenkins
Emerson Kroma
Josiah Ogbonna
Rufus Olumba
Rachhpal Pandher
Richard Payne
J. Washington-
   Roundtree
Hilbourne Watson

1976
Rufus Akinmoladun
Gilbert Bluwey
L. Hatzilambrou
Mohammed Zabarah
Fassil Aradoum

1977
Rufus Akeju
Odeyo Ayaga
Folorunsho Faleye
Bevery Grisby Smith
Murel Jones, Jr.
Alexandre Mboukou
Paula McClain

1978
Angola Auma-Osolo
Irvin Brown
Bala Muhammad
Raphael Sebastien
Robert Smith
James Tinney
Alvin Thornton
Shirley Washington

1979
Richard Bragg
Daniel Brantley
Earl Chavis
Kofi Johnson
Sandra Vaughn

1980
Tran Bieu
Asikpo Essien-Ibok
Oluwemomo Peters
Samuel White

1981
Paula Abudu
Alex Dansor-Boafo
William Lewis
Stephen Carey
Deborah Sanders

1982
Linus Akunnakwe
Roy Jackson
Sampson Onwumere
Edward Thompson, III
Hilmi Yousuf
Richard Tolliver

1983
Getachew Metaferia
Offiong Offiong

1984
Cuthbert Baker
Sahibzada Ejaz
Dorith Grant-Wilson
Norma Miller
Anthony Nnadili
Adesanya Odejimi
Reginald Simmon

1985
Gary Clark
Mbu Ettangondop
Calixtus Idiong
Bamijoko Smith
Ebenezer Ugorji
Joyce Wando

1986

1987
Abdul Bangura, Jr.
Raymond Brown
Delores Duncan
Victor Ndubisi
Emmanuel Okwuosa
Habib Sesay
Louis Wright, Jr.

1988
Ijoma Egeolu
Ngozi Kamalu
Daniel Kumar
Abdul Salem
Mordu Serry-Kamal

1989
Daniel Akunwafor
Uyoata Ekandem
Clement Eyo
Willie Wright, Jr.

1990
Talie Al-Mutairy
Musa Musa
Emmanuel Uwalaka

1991
Philip Aka
Oliver Snyder
Festus Sowho
Rateb Sweiti

1992
Olufolajimi Adejokun
Agu Eke
Betty Ezuma
Debra Jones
Wilfred Okoh

1993
Gregory Hall
Sahr Kpundeh
Columbia Nnorom

1994
Violet Barriteau
Sara Grusky
Daryl Harris
Martin Muo

1995
Elaine Yarborough
Tina Evans-Mitchell
Dickson Ijesuorobo
Adekunle Oke
Elhelbert Okoro
Christian Onwudiwe
Leslie Wade

1996
John-Patrick Ifedi
Alice Jackson
Glenda Mosley
Ntanda Nkere
Irelene Ricks

1997
Derrick Cogburn
Clarence Lusane
Ridwan Nytagodien
Chiazam Okoye
Herbert Edeh

1998
David Hinds
Revathi Lyer

1999
Angela Agboli
Nat Andoh
Michael Asante
Hassan Hosseini
Julius Ndumbe

2000
Arnold Stewart
Michael Fauntroy
Amy Frederick
Guy-Maurille
   Massambia
John Ojo
Michael Simms
DaVance Walker

2001
Saleh Al Qahtani
Hayat Alvi
Benjamin Arah
Christopher Clement
John Davis
Sekou Franklin
Kisha Harris
Jean-Marie Jean-Pierre
Mehdi Nazer
Emmanuel Ogunsalu
Prachak Phromsiri

2002
Donna Cooper
Joseph Michael Green
Samuel Moki
David Montague
La Trice Washington

2003
Pearl Karen Ford
Robert Ansah-
   Birikorang
R. David
Baruti Jahi
Eugene Laney, Jr.
Vivian Luke-Vanzego
Mueni Muiu
Angela Parham
Faye Payne

2004
Wilmer Leon, III
Aretemisa Stanberry
Herma Percy-
   McDaniels
Ewa Unoke
Lisa N. Nealy

2005
Yolandra Plummer
   Diallo
Calvin R. Hill
William G. Jones
ReShone LeVelle
   Moore
Raymond Muhula
Diarra Osei Robertson
Stacey-Ann Wilson
Abdullah I. Elmoneif

2006
Kenneth Chijioke
   Akwuole
Shakir Bin Ahmed
   Alsaleh
Yolandra J. Butler
Kevin Lamont Glasper
Haytham Hassan
   Linjawi
Nailah Rukiya Macarthy
Jonathan Chima
   Ogbonna
Darryl Andrew Smith
Jo Ann T. Smoak

2007

2008
Victor Bassey Eno
Merve S. Kavakci,
Rhea Keisha Roper
   Nedd
Dennis Bernard Rogers
Jonathan L. Wharton

A REFLECTION ON RALPH J. BUNCHE
by
H. PATRICK SWYGERT
President, Howard University

In 1950, Ralph J. Bunche won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiating an end to the first Arab-Israeli War. It was a signal honor as Bunche became the first African American to receive the prestigious international award. To date, no other African American, with the exception of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., has ever been similarly honored.

Monumental as it was, the Nobel Prize was merely one crowning moment in a career filled with superlatives at every level. For, Ralph Bunche was a formidable intellectual, outstanding public servant, civil rights champion and ardent advocate of the development of Africa. Long before he committed himself to help build the United Nations in the 1940s for example, Bunche had been engaged in a movement to draw attention to, and improve the plight of Africa and its people. It was a cause to which he remained committed throughout his life.

Trained in political science at the University of California at Los Angeles and at Harvard, Bunche's activism was driven by a firm grasp of socio-political issues at both a humane and intellectual level. His was not a vain search for connections or achievements grounded solely in personal ambition. Rather, his stance was principled and conscientious as he sought to use his positions to influence positive change among the oppressed community of African Americans and indeed, the world. In the course of the struggle, he among other positions became a member of the "Black Cabinet" consulted on minority problems by the Roosevelt's administration and declined President Truman's offer to serve as assistant secretary of state because of the segregated housing conditions in Washington, D.C.

As an academic, Bunche spoke and wrote extensively. Always, the central tenet of his message was the immorality of racial prejudice and the absence of a scientific basis in biology or anthropology to support it. Further, there could be no compatibility between segregation and democracy and as a consequence, blacks should continue to fight for equality and accept the responsibilities of freedom. Whites meanwhile should demonstrate that democracy is color-blind.

Ultimately, the philosophy and life's work of Ralph J. Bunche represent the finest ideals of Howard University. Alongside his quest for justice and equality, Bunche embraced fully the need for diversity and dissent, certain that common grounds can be found within differences; that, often, it is in the heat of dissent that new ideas are born, creative energy unleashed and the doors to new beginnings opened.

I am honored and proud that Ralph Bunche spent 22 years of his life here at Howard as a member of the faculty and as chair of the Department of Political Science, which he founded. And, I commend the Department for commemorating Bunche's centenary year with this journal. The range of views on so many aspects of national and international affairs represented here are fully reflective of his interests and his lifetime effort to bring the world together under the banner of one common humanity.

As we peruse these articles and reflect on the legacy of Ralph J. Bunche, let us also reflect on the pivotal role that Howard must continue to play in the creation of such a world.

H. Patrick Swygert
President

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Ralph J. Bunche founded the Department of Political Science at Howard University in 1928. He was first African American president of the American Political Science Association and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1950. Bunche's indelible imprint shows up in the scholarship of Department's Ph.D. recipients who are considered as his intellectual off spring.

DEPARTMENTS

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

BLACK POLITICS

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

CAPITOL HILL REPORT

DEPARTMENT BRIEFS

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

Howard University

Through these gates leads to the Frederick Douglass Memorial Hall which is the home of Department of Political Science where Ralph J. Bunche taught, conducted research and served as chairman prior to becoming a world renowned diplomat.

RALPH J. BUNCHE:
THE SCHOLAR AND DIPLOMAT

MICHAEL FRAZIER, Ph.D.

The seventh edition of the *Government & Politics Journal* is dedicated to the centenary of the birth of Ralph J. Bunche who was instrumental in establishing the Department of Government at Howard in 1928. Bunche served as professor and chair from 1928 – 1944. It has since been renamed the Department of Political Science.

Additionally, the *Journal* celebrates the legacy of Bunche as a scholar and diplomat. To date, 202 Ph.D.s have graduated from the department, the names of which are on the cover. As Dr. Lorenzo Morris, Chairman of the department, puts it, these graduates are the founding chair's intellectual offspring."

The essays in this edition highlight the many contributions of the first of only two African Americans to ever receive the Nobel Peace Prize, the second being Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Dr. Hanes Walton, professor at the University of Michigan and the first Ph.D. (1967) graduate of the Department of Political Science and colleague, Maxie Foster, Ph.D., for example, illustrate the diverse nature of Bunche in an essay about his service as a political consultant to the Republican National Committee (RNC) in 1939 at their behest. The commemoration section of the journal synthesizes related works and includes a photo essay of the centenary conference held at Howard on October 14, 2004 under the theme "Moral Dilemma: A Dialogue in Contemporary Issues in Domestic and International Affairs."

The luncheon keynote speaker, Dr. Charles Henry, University of California reminded participants that Bunche's *A World View of Race* "provides a unit of analysis; a description of how the world system operates and a set of proposed solutions. While one may disagree with his emphasis on class, it forces the critic to respond in kind. That is, one must provide a better, more comprehensive analysis than his. Despite his reliance on class analysis, his belief in democracy and his commitment to empiricism prevents Bunche from becoming rigid or doctrinaire. These qualities remain timeless."

Bunche's concern for the plight of Africa and the Middle East, is reflected in the work of Dr. Michael Asante's, Ph.D., (1999) essay that addresses the Liberian Crisis, Raymond Muhula's, Ph.D. (2005) insightful article explaining the genesis of Political Islam in the Middle East, and Professor Ben K. Fred-Mensah's piece on the problems associated with regional security management and leadership issues in Africa. Beyond the concerns for Africa, professor Marilyn E. Lashley and Stacy-Ann Wilson, Ph.D. (2005) address multiethnic politics in the Republic of Fiji.

Perhaps the most far-reaching essay in the International Relations department is Dr. Nikolaos A. Stavrou's "Illusions of World Order" commentary. His basic premise is that democracy cannot be cannot be dictated, exported, or imposed; it can only be emulated.

It remains to be seen if Stavrou's prophecy will be rebutted by events taking place daily in Iraq and the Middle East.

Domestically, Dr. Bunche advanced the study of American society through his contribution to Gunnar Myrdal's *American Dilemma* and his own book, *A World View of Race*. The second series of essays speak to his tradition of scholarship.

Many of Dr. Bunche's intellectual offspring and professors in the department continue to follow the legacy he begun by integrating academic and social concerns to promote progressive outcomes. The honor roll of 197 political science Ph.D.s since 1967 is a lasting record of the legacy he started 78 years ago.

The Editor

Dr. Michael Frazier, Executive Editor, Government and Politics Journal. Associate professor of Political Science, Howard University.

RALPH J. BUNCHE
AND HIS INTELLECTUAL OFFSPRING

LORENZO MORRIS, Ph.D.

When Dr. Ralph Bunche committed himself to help build the United Nations in the 1940s, he had long before devoted himself to improving international understanding of, and support for Africa. Trained in political science at the University of California at Los Angeles and at Harvard, he had a comprehensive command of the discipline, a solid understanding of the social issues surrounding it and a clear commitment to using his analytical skills, humanist sensitivity, and experience in race relations to promote international understanding. It was not surprising therefore that in his lifetime, he became a renowned scholar and statesman, acclaimed for his contributions to world peace and human rights.

Bunche started as a teacher in Howard University's Department of Political Science which he created in 1928, making Howard the first of over 100 Historically Black Colleges and Universities to institutionalize the discipline. More importantly, he took the first big step in creating a legacy where faculty and students, would maintain a comprehensive approach to teaching and research grounded in black politics and reaching around the globe throughout the African Diaspora.

Bunche turned to African politics and international relations when he completed his doctoral dissertation on French West Africa in the early thirties. Yet, for much of the next two decades he devoted most of his scholarly attention to race relations with a class conscious bent. He amassed 3000 pages of research for his crucial contribution to Gunnar Myrdal's *American Dilemma*, a study that set a national standard for the research based assault on racial inequality that blossomed in later years.

Ironically, when Bunche was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950, it indirectly dwarfed a stellar academic career because he had done something that no other African American had done before, or would, do to this day except for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Bunche won the prize for his exceptional leadership in forging a settlement of earlier conflicts between the newly created state of Israel and surrounding Arab states opening the door to greater stability and the potential for peace in the region. He sandwiched this singular success between trips for the U.N. to the Congo in the Herculean task of bringing peace to the irreconcilable factions surrounding Patrice Lumumba's leadership.

Although he only visited Howard after 1950, Bunche's indelible imprint shows up consistently in the scholarship of the Political Science Department. To take just a few examples, the race conscious footing for his otherwise global research interests can be found repeatedly among the subsequent department chairs. One of the longest serving chairs after Bunche, Dr. Ronald Walters (1971-74 and 1990-96), is well known both as an Africanist and as a leader in the study of black politics. Moreover, his career reflects Bunche's commitment to active political leadership in that he has played critical roles in

presidential politics and in progressive party politics. Similarly, the only woman to chair the Department, Dr. Marguerite R. Barnett (1977-80), illustrates Bunche's global balance. She started her career with a successful book on Indian politics and moved to writing a groundbreaking analysis of the Congressional Black Caucus, as well as one on race and public policy before moving into educational administration. In terms of educational leadership and administration, there is a definite similarity to Bunche.

Despite his lifetime of international work, Bunche managed to contribute to the establishment of Phi Beta Kappa at Howard and became the first African American president of the American Political Science Association. Although Phi Beta Kappa had previously reached out to African Americans individually, Bunche's incursion into the APSA administration would stand as an isolated success for a long time to come. Ironically, if stories of his early days at Howard are correct, one could argue that he got his real training in dealing with administrative intricacies and conflicts by working with then President Mordecai Johnson.

Like nearly all the black political scientists at Howard, Bunche could not and did not escape, the ideological debates surrounding race and class inequality. And, like most of his successors, his sympathies were always with the political left but were never inflexible. He moved between a strong interest in labor and class inequality to support for civil rights, to a race conscious focus on injustice and finally to a preoccupation with international peace and justice.

Bunche left a diverse published legacy. In the book *A World View of Race*, he demonstrates his singular ability to integrate intellectual and social concerns in order to promote progressive social outcomes. He was one of Howard's most exceptional scholars and leaders and the embodiment of Howard's mission to provide *Leadership for America and the Global Community.*

Lorenzo Morris, Ph.D., Chair, Department of Political Science

Some of
DR. RALPH J. BUNCHE'S INTELLECTUAL OFFSPRING

MUREL M. JONES, JR., Ph.D.
Professor & Chariman
Department of Political Science
and Public Administration
Virginia State University

PAULA D. McCLAIN, Ph.D.
Professor
Director of the Ralph J. Bunche
Public Affairs Program,
Duke University

CLARENCE LAUSANE, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
American University

ROBERT SMITH, Ph.D.
Professor
San Francisco State University

HANES WALTON, Ph.D.
Professor
University of Michigan
First Howard University recipient
of the Ph.D. in Political Science

ALVIN THORNTON, Ph.D.
Associate Provost
Howard University

ALICE JACKSON, Ph.D.
AssociateProfessor
Morgan State University

CELEBRATING SEVENTY-EIGHT YEARS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1928-2006) AND THIRTY-NINE YEARS OF GRANTING 197 Ph.D. DEGREES (1967-2006) AT HOWARD UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Commemorating
RALPH J. BUNCHE
(1909-1971)

NOBEL PRIZE LECTURE:

SOME REFLECTIONS ON PEACE IN OUR TIME

by
RALPH J. BUNCHE

In this most anxious period of human history, the subject of peace, above every other, commands the solemn attention of all men of reason and goodwill. Moreover, on this particular occasion, marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Nobel Foundation, it is eminently fitting to speak of peace. No subject could be closer to my own heart, since I have the honour to speak as a member of the international Secretariat of the United Nations.

In these critical times—times which test to the utmost the good sense, the forbearance, and the morality of every peace-loving people—it is not easy to speak of peace with either conviction or reassurance. True it is that statesmen the world over, exalting lofty concepts and noble ideals, pay homage to peace and freedom in a perpetual torrent of eloquent phrases. But the statesmen also speak darkly of the lurking threat of war; and the preparations for war ever intensify, while strife flares or threatens in many localities.

The words used by statesmen in our day no longer have a common meaning. Perhaps they never had. Freedom, democracy, human rights, international morality, peace itself, mean different things to different men. Words, in a constant flow of propaganda—itself an instrument of war—are employed to confuse, mislead, and debase the common man. Democracy is prostituted to dignify enslavement; freedom and equality are held good for some men but withheld from others by, and in allegedly "democratic" societies; in "free" societies, so-called, individual human rights are severely denied; aggressive adventures are launched under the guise of "liberation". Truth and morality are subverted by propaganda on the cynical assumption that truth is whatever propaganda can induce people to believe. Truth and morality, therefore, become gravely weakened as defences against injustice and war. With what great insight did Voltaire, hating war enormously, declare: "War is the greatest of all crimes; and yet there is no aggressor who does not colour his crime with the pretext of justice."

To the common man, the state of world affairs is baffling. All nations and peoples claim to be for peace. But never has peace been more continuously in jeopardy. There are no nations today, as in the recent past, insistently clamouring for Lebensraum under the duress of readiness to resort to war. Still the specter of war looms ominously. Never in human history have so many peoples experienced freedom. Yet human freedom itself is a crucial issue and is widely endangered. Indeed, by some peoples, it has already been gained and lost.

Peoples everywhere wish and long for peace and freedom in their simplest and clearest connotations: an end to armed conflict and to the suppression of the inalienable rights of man. In a single generation, the peoples of the world have suffered the profound anguish of two catastrophic wars; they have had enough of war. Who could doubt that the people of Norway— ever peaceful, still deeply wounded from an unprovoked, savage Nazi aggression—wish peace? Who could doubt that all of the peoples of Europe—whose towns and cities, whose peaceful countrysides, have been mercilessly ravaged; whose fathers and sons, mothers and daughters, have been slaughtered and maimed in tragic numbers—wish peace? Who could sincerely doubt

that the peoples of the Western hemisphere—who, in the common effort to save the world from barbaric tyranny, came into the two world wars only reluctantly and at great sacrifice of human and material resources—wish peace? Who could doubt that the long-suffering masses of Asia and Africa wish peace? Who indeed, could be so unseeing as not to realize that in modern war victory is illusory; that the harvest of war can be only misery, destruction, and degradation?

If war should come, the peoples of the world would again be called upon to fight it, but they would not have willed it.

Statesmen and philosophers repeatedly have warned that some values—freedom, honour, self-respect—are higher than peace or life itself. This may be true. Certainly, very many would hold that the loss of human dignity and self-respect, the chains of enslavement, are too high a price even for peace. But the horrible realities of modern warfare scarcely afford even this fatal choice. There is only suicidal escape, not freedom, in the death and destruction of atomic war. This is mankind's great dilemma. The well-being and the hopes of the peoples of the world can never be served until peace—as well as freedom, honour and self-respect—is secure.

The ideals of peace on earth and the brotherhood of man have been expounded by philosophers from earliest times. If human relations were governed by the sagacity of the great philosophers, there would be little danger of war, for in their collective wisdom over the centuries they have clearly charted the course to free and peaceful living among men.

Throughout the ages, however, man has but little heeded the advice of the wise men. He has been—fatefully, if not wilfully—less virtuous, less constant, less rational, less peaceful than he knows how to be than he is fully capable of being. He has been led astray from the ways of peace and brotherhood by his addiction to concepts and attitudes of narrow nationalism, racial and religious bigotry, greed and lust for power. Despite this, despite the almost continuous state of war to which bad human relations have condemned him, he has made steady progress. In his scientific genius, man has wrought material miracles and has transformed his world. He has harnessed nature and has developed great civilizations. But he has never learned very well how to live with himself. The values he has created have been predominantly materialistic; his spiritual values have lagged far behind. He has demonstrated little spiritual genius and has made little progress toward the realization of human brotherhood. In the contemporary atomic age, this could prove man's fatal weakness.

Alfred Nobel, a half-century ago, foresaw with prophetic vision that if the complacent mankind of his day could, with equanimity, contemplate war, the day would soon inevitably come when man would be confronted with the fateful alternative of peace or reversion to the Dark Ages. Man may well ponder whether he has not now reached that stage. Man's inventive genius has so far outreached his reason—not his capacity to reason but his willingness to apply reason—that the peoples of the world find themselves precariously on the brink of total disaster.

If today we speak of peace, we also speak of the United Nations, for in this era, peace and the United Nations have become inseparable. If the United Nations cannot ensure peace, there will be none. If war should come, it will be only because the United Nations has failed. But the United Nations need not fail. Surely, every man of reason must work and pray to the end that it will not fail.

In these critical days, it is a high privilege and a most rewarding experience to be associated with the United Nations—the greatest peace effort in human history. Those who work in and with the organization, perhaps inevitably, tend to develop a professional optimism with regard to the prospects for the United Nations and, therefore, to the prospects for peace. But there is also a sense of deep frustration, which flows from the knowledge that mankind could readily live in peace and freedom and good neighbourliness if there were but a minimum of will to do so. There is the ever present, simple but stark truth that though the peoples long primarily for peace, they may be prodded by their leaders and governments into needless war, which may at worst

destroy them, at best lead them once again to barbarism.

The United Nations strives to be realistic. It understands well the frailties of man. It is realized that if there is to be peace in the world, it must be attained through men and with man, in his nature and mores, just about as he now is. Intensive effort is exerted to reach the hearts and minds of men with the vital pleas for peace and human understanding, to the end that human attitudes and relations may be steadily improved. But this is a process of international education, or better, education for international living, and it is at best gradual. Men change their attitudes and habits slowly, and but grudgingly divorce their minds from fears, suspicions, and prejudices.

The United Nations itself is but a cross section of the world's peoples. It reflects, therefore, the typical fears, suspicions, and prejudices which bedevil human relations throughout the world. In the delegations from the sixty member states and in the International Secretariat in which most of them are represented, may be found individual qualities of goodness and badness, honesty and subterfuge, courage and timorousness, internationalism and chauvinism. It could not be otherwise. Still, the activities of all are within the framework of a great international organization dedicated to the imperative causes of peace, freedom, and justice in the world.

The United Nations, inescapably, is an organization at once of great weakness and great strength.

Its powers of action are sharply limited by the exigencies of national sovereignties. With nationalism per se, there may be no quarrel. But narrow, exclusively self-centered nationalism persists as the outstanding dynamic of world politics and is the prime obstacle to enduring peace. The international well-being, on the one hand, and national egocentrism, on the other, are inevitably at cross-purposes. The procedures and processes of the United Nations as a circumscribed international parliament are unavoidably complex and tedious.

The United Nations was established in the hope, if not on the assumption, that the five great powers would work harmoniously toward an increasingly better world order. The existing impasse between West and East and the resultant "cold war" were not foreseen by those who formulated the United Nations Charter in the spring of 1945 in the misleading, but understandably jubilant, atmosphere of war's triumphant end. Nevertheless, the United Nations has exhibited a fortunate flexibility which has enabled it to adjust to the regrettable circumstances of the discord among the great powers and to continue to function effectively.

Reflecting the hopes and aspirations of all peoples for peace, security, freedom, and justice, the foundations of the United Nations are firmly anchored, and its moral sanctions are strong. It is served by a fully competent International Secretariat which is devoted to the high principles and purposes of the organization. At the head of this Secretariat is the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie[1], a great son of Norway, and a man whose name will be writ large in the annals of world statesmanship and peacemaking. No living man has worked more persistently or courageously to save the world from the scourge of war than Trygve Lie.

In its short but turbulent five years, the United Nations, until the past few weeks, at least, has demonstrated a comforting ability to cope with every dangerous crisis that has erupted into violence or threatened to do so. It has never been easily done nor as well as might be hoped for, but the fact remains that it has been done. In these post-war years, the United Nations, in the interest of peace, has been called upon to eliminate the threat of local wars, to stop local wars already underway, and now in Korea, itself to undertake an international police action which amounts to full-scale war. Its record has been impressive. Its interventions have been directly responsible for checking and containing dangerous armed conflicts in Indonesia, Kashmir, and Palestine, and to only a lesser extent in Greece[2].

That the United Nations has been able to serve the cause of peace in this way has been due in large measure to the determination of its members to reject the use of armed force as an instrument of national policy, and to the new techniques of international intervention which it has employed. In each instance of a threat to the peace, the United Nations projects itself directly into the area of conflict by sending United Nations representatives to the area for the purpose of mediation and conciliation.

It was as the head of a United Nations mission of this kind that Count Folke Bernadotte[3] went to Palestine in the spring of 1948. On his arrival in the Near East, he found the Arabs and Jews locked in a bitter, bloody, and highly emotional war in Palestine. He was armed only with the strong demand of the United Nations that in the interest of world peace, the Palestine problem must be settled by peaceful means.

In one of the most brilliant individual feats of diplomatic history, Count Bernadotte, within two weeks of his arrival on the scene of conflict, had negotiated a four weeks' truce and the guns had ceased firing. In order to supervise that truce, he requested of the Secretary-General and promptly received an international team of civilian and military personnel, numbering some seven hundred men and women. The members of this compact and devoted United Nations "peace army" in Palestine, many of whom were from the Scandinavian countries and all of whom were unarmed, under the early leadership of Count Bernadotte wrote a heroic chapter in the cause of peacemaking[4]. Their leader, Bernadotte himself, and ten others, gave their lives in this effort. The United Nations and the peace-loving world must ever be grateful to them.

We who had the privilege to serve under the leadership of Count Bernadotte revere his name. He was a great internationalist, a warm-hearted humanitarian, a warrior of unflinching courage in the cause of peace, and a truly noble man. We who carried on after him were inspired by his self-sacrifice and were determined to pay him the one tribute which he would have appreciated above all others—the successful completion of the task which he had begun, the restoration of peace to Palestine.

In Korea, for the first, and it may be fervently hoped, the last time, the United Nations processes of peaceful intervention to settle disputes, failed. They failed only because the North Korean regime stubbornly refused to afford them the chance to work and resorted to aggressive force as the means of attaining its ends. Confronted with this, the gravest challenge to its mandate to preserve the peace of the world, the United Nations had no reasonable alternative but to check aggressive national force with decisive international force. This it has attempted to do, and it was enabled to do so only by the firm resolve of the overwhelming majority of its members that the peace must be preserved and that aggression shall be struck down wherever undertaken or by whom[5].

By virtue of recent setbacks to United Nations forces in Korea, as a result of the injection of vast numbers of Chinese troops into the conflict, it becomes clear that this resolve of its members has not been backed by sufficient armed strength to ensure that the right shall prevail. In the future, it must be the forces of peace that are overwhelming.

But whatever the outcome of the present military struggle in Korea in which the United Nations and Chinese troops are now locked, Korea provides the lesson which can save peace and freedom in the world if nations and peoples will but learn that lesson, and learn it quickly. To make peace in the world secure, the United Nations must have readily at its disposal, as a result of firm commitments undertaken by all of its members, military strength of sufficient dimensions to make it certain that it can meet aggressive military force with international military force, speedily and conclusively.

If that kind of strength is made available to the United Nations—and under action taken by the General Assembly this fall it can be made available—in my view that strength will never

again be challenged in war and therefore need never be employed.

But military strength will not be enough. The moral position of the United Nations must ever be strong and unassailable; it must stand steadfastly, always, for the right.

The international problems with which the United Nations is concerned are the problems of the interrelations of the peoples of the world. They are human problems. The United Nations is entitled to believe, and it does believe, that there are no insoluble problems of human relations and that there is none which cannot be solved by peaceful means. The United Nations—in Indonesia, Palestine, and Kashmir—has demonstrated convincingly that parties to the most severe conflict may be induced to abandon war as the method of settlement in favour of mediation and conciliation, at a merciful saving of untold lives and acute suffering.

Unfortunately, there may yet be some in the world who have not learned that today war can settle nothing, that aggressive force can never be enough, nor will it be tolerated. If this should be so, the pitiless wrath of the organized world must fall upon those who would endanger the peace for selfish ends. For in this advanced day, there is no excuse, no justification, for nations resorting to force except to repel armed attack.

The world and its peoples being as they are, there is no easy or quick or infallible approach to a secure peace. It is only by patient, persistent, undismayed effort, by trial and error, that peace can be won. Nor can it be won cheaply, as the taxpayer is learning. In the existing world tension, there will be rebuffs and setbacks, dangerous crises, and episodes of violence. But the United Nations, with unshakable resolution, in the future as in the past, will continue to man the dikes of peace. In this common purpose, all states, irrespective of size, are vital.

The small nations, which constitute the overwhelming majority in its membership, are a great source of strength for the United Nations. Their desire for peace is deep seated and constant. The fear, suspicion, and conflict which characterize the relations among the great powers, and the resultant uncertainty, keep them and their peoples in a state of anxious tension and suspense. For the relations among the great powers will largely determine their future. A third world war would quickly engulf the smaller states, and many of them would again provide the battlefields. On many of them, now as before, the impact of war would be even more severe than upon the great powers. They in particular, therefore, support and often initiate measures designed to ensure that the United Nations shall be increasingly effective as a practical instrumentality for peace. In this regard, the Scandinavian countries contribute signally to the constructive effort of the United Nations.

One legacy of the recent past greatly handicaps the work of the United Nations. It can never realize its maximum potential for peace until the Second World War is fully liquidated. The impasse between West and East has prevented the great powers from concluding the peace treaties which would finally terminate that last war[6]. It can be little doubted that the United Nations, if called upon, could afford valuable aid toward this end. At present, the United Nations must work for future peace in the unhappy atmosphere of an unconcluded great war, while precluded from rendering any assistance toward the liquidation of that war. These, obviously, are matters of direct and vital concern to all peace-loving nations, whatever their size.

At the moment, in view of the disturbing events in Korea and Indo-China[7], the attention of a fearful world is focused on Asia, seeking an answer to the fateful question "peace or war?" But the intrinsic importance of Europe in the world peace equation cannot be ignored. The peace of Europe, and therefore of the world, can never be secure so long as the problem of Germany remains unsolved.

In this regard, those who at the end of the last war were inclined to dismiss Europe as a vital factor in reckoning the future security and prosperity of the world, have had to revise their calculations. For Europe, grievously wounded though it was, has displayed a remarkable

resiliency and has quickly regained its place in the orbit of world affairs.

But Europe, and the Western world generally, must become fully aware that the massive and restive millions of Asia and Africa are henceforth a new and highly significant factor in all peace calculations. These hitherto suppressed masses are rapidly awakening and are demanding, and are entitled to enjoy, a full share in the future fruits of peace, freedom, and security.

Very many of these millions are experiencing a newfound freedom. Many other millions are still in subject status as colonials. The aspirations and demands of those who have achieved freedom and those who seek it are the same: security, treatment as equals, and their rightful place in the brotherhood of nations.

It is truer today than when Alfred Nobel realized it a half-century ago, that peace cannot be achieved in a vacuum. Peace must be paced by human progress. Peace is no mere matter of men fighting or not fighting. Peace, to have meaning for many who have known only suffering in both peace and war, must be translated into bread or rice, shelter, health, and education, as well as freedom and human dignity—a steadily better life. If peace is to be secure, long-suffering and long-starved, forgotten peoples of the world, the underprivileged and the undernourished, must begin to realize without delay the promise of a new day and a new life.

In the world of today, Europe, like the rest of the West, is confronted with the urgent necessity of a new orientation—a global orientation. The pre-war outlook is as obsolete as the pre-war world. There must be an awakening to the incontestable fact that the far away, little known and little understood peoples of Asia and Africa, who constitute the majority of the world's population, are no longer passive and no longer to be ignored. The fury of the world ideological struggle swirls about them. Their vast numbers will prove a dominant factor in the future world pattern of life. They provide virgin soil for the growth of democracy, but the West must first learn how to approach them understandingly and how to win their trust and friendship. There is a long and unsavory history of Western imperialism, suppression, and exploitation to be overcome, despite the undenied benefits which the West also brought to them. There must be an acceleration in the liquidation of colonialism. A friendly hand must be extended to the peoples who are labouring under the heavy burden of newly won independence, as well as to those who aspire to it. And in that hand must be tangible aid in generous quantity—funds, goods, foodstuffs, equipment, technical assistance.

There are great issues demanding resolution in the world: the clash of the rather loosely defined concepts and systems of capitalism and communism; the radically contrasting conceptions of democracy, posing extreme views of individualism against extreme views of statism; the widespread denials of human rights; the understandable impatience of many among some two hundred million colonial peoples for the early realization of their aspirations toward emancipation; and others.

But these are issues which in no sense may be considered as defying solution. The issue of capitalism versus communism is one of ideology which in the world of today cannot, in fact, be clearly defined. It cannot be clearly defined because there are not two worlds, one "capitalist" and one "communist". There is but one world—a world of sharp clashes, to be sure—with these two doctrines at the opposite ideological poles. In between these extremes are found many gradations of the two systems and ideologies.

There is room in the world for both capitalism and communism and all gradations of them, providing only that neither system is set upon pursuing an aggressively imperialistic course.

The United Nations is opposed to imperialism of any kind, ideological or otherwise. The United Nations stands for the freedom and equality of all peoples, irrespective of race, religion, or ideology. It is for the peoples of every society to make their own choices with regard to ideologies, economic systems, and the relationship which is to prevail between the state and the

individual. The United Nations is engaged in an historic effort to underwrite the rights of man. It is also attempting to give reassurance to the colonial peoples that their aspirations for freedom can be realized, if only gradually, by peaceful processes.

There can be peace and a better life for all men. Given adequate authority and support, the United Nations can ensure this. But the decision really rests with the peoples of the world. The United Nations belongs to the people, but it is not yet as close to them, as much a part of their conscious interest, as it must come to be. The United Nations must always be on the people's side. Where their fundamental rights and interests are involved, it must never act from mere expediency. At times, perhaps, it has done so, but never to its own advantage nor to that of the sacred causes of peace and freedom. If the peoples of the world are strong in their resolve and if they speak through the United Nations, they need never be confronted with the tragic alternatives of war or dishonourable appeasement, death, or enslavement.

Amidst the frenzy and irrationality of a topsy-turvy world, some simple truths would appear to be self-evident.

As Alfred Nobel finally discerned, people are never deterred from the folly of war by the stark terror of it. But it is nonetheless true that if in atomic war there would be survivors, there could be no victors. What, then, could war achieve which could not be better gained by peaceful means? There are, to be sure, vital differences and wide areas of conflict among the nations, but there is utterly none which could not be settled peacefully—by negotiation and mediation—given a genuine will for peace and even a modicum of mutual good faith.

But there would appear to be little hope that efforts to break the great power impasse could be very fruitful in the current atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and mutual recrimination. Fear, suspicion, and recrimination in the relations among nations tend to be dangerously self-compounding. They induce that national hysteria which, in its rejection of poise and rationality, can itself be the fatal prelude to war. A favourable climate for peaceful negotiation must be created and can only be created by painstaking, unremitting effort. Conflicting parties must be led to realize that the road to peace can never be traversed by threatening to fight at every bend, by merely being armed to the teeth, or by flushing every bush to find an enemy. An essential first step in a civilized approach to peace in these times would call for a moratorium on recrimination and reproach.

There are some in the world who are prematurely resigned to the inevitability of war. Among them are the advocates of the so-called "preventive war", who, in their resignation to war, wish merely to select their own time for initiating it. To suggest that war can prevent war is a base play on words and a despicable form of warmongering. The objective of any who sincerely believe in peace clearly must be to exhaust every honourable recourse in the effort to save the peace. The world has had ample evidence that war begets only conditions which beget further war.

In the final analysis, the acid test of a genuine will to peace is the willingness of disputing parties to expose their differences to the peaceful processes of the United Nations and to the bar of international public opinion which the United Nations reflects. It is only in this way that truth, reason, and justice may come to prevail over the shrill and blatant voice of propaganda; that a wholesome international morality can be cultivated.

It is worthy of emphasis that the United Nations exists not merely to preserve the peace but also to make change—even radical change—possible without violent upheaval. The United Nations has no vested interest in the status quo. It seeks a more secure world, a better world, a world of progress for all peoples. In the dynamic world society which is the objective of the United Nations, all peoples must have equality and equal rights. The rights of those who at any given time may be in the minority—whether for reasons of race, religion, or ideology—are as

important as those of the majority, and the minorities must enjoy the same respect and protection. The United Nations does not seek a world cut after a single pattern, nor does it consider this desirable. The United Nations seeks only unity, not uniformity, out of the world's diversity.

There will be no security in our world, no release from agonizing tension, no genuine progress, no enduring peace, until, in Shelley's fine words, "reason's voice, loud as the voice of nature, shall have waked the nations".

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* The laureate delivered this lecture in the Auditorium of the University of Oslo. The text, taken from Les Prix Nobel en 1950, is that of the full version of the lecture; collation with the tape recording shows that it was considerably shortened in delivery.

Notes:

1. Trygve, Lie (1896-1968), prominent Norwegian lawyer and statesman; first UN Secretary-General (1946-1953).
2. For accounts of these conflicts and of others in the early years of the UN, see Clark M. Eichelberger, UN: The First Fifteen Years (New York: Harper, 1960).
3. Count Folke Bernadotte (1895-1948), Swedish humanitarian, president of the Swedish Red Cross.
4. See Ralph Hewins, Count Folke Bernadotte: His Life and Work (London: Hutchinson, 1950).
5. North Korea invaded South Korea in June, 1950, and was declared an aggressor by the UN Security Council; UN troops (a unified command under the U.S.) were sent to repel the attack after North Korea ignored the UN call for a cessation of hostilities; in November, 1950, Chinese Communists entered the war, which continued until an armistice was signed in July, 1953.
6. Nor have they been concluded as of 1971.
7. Indo-China's struggle for emancipation from French rule, successful in 1954 had reached a critical stage at the time of the laureate's lecture.
   From Nobel Lectures, Peace 1926-1950, Editor Frederick W. Haberman, Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1972

TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF
RALPHE BUNCHE'S ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS
(1943–1967)

by

MERVAT HATEM, Ph.D.

Ralph Bunche's work and views on race relations, Africa and the United Nations have been well examined and analyzed. Comparatively speaking, his involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict over a twenty-year period and his deepening knowledge of the Middle East in general, are less understood or appreciated. The literature on this subject tends to focus on his brilliant role as a master negotiator who single handedly prodded the representatives of Israel and the Arab states to sign the armistice agreements in 1949 ending the fighting in the first Arab-Israeli war. This work earned him the Nobel peace prize in 1950.

Those who adhere to this construction of his contribution to international conflict resolution tend to represent his relationship to the region in ahistorical and episodic terms. This dominant view offers a partial understanding of how Bunche's interest in the Middle East began in the early 1940s, and continued well into the 1960s, yielding intimate relations with its prominent diplomats and political leaders. This puzzling construction considers the Nobel Peace Prize, which Bunche received in the early part of his long distinguished international career, to be his crowning moment, overlooking the effect that it had in connecting him more closely to the region and affirming his standing as one of the few international actors with enough expertise, historical memory and prestige to push the boundaries of the possible in regional conflicts. I want to challenge aspects of this dominant construction speculating on why it has survived for such a long time.

As a member of Howard University's political science department since 1980 and professor of international relations and Middle East politics, I must confess that my interest in Ralph Bunche, who founded the department and played a prominent role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, has a recent history. This was partly due to the fact that the analytical eyes of political scientists are usually glued to the present with a desire to decipher its policy implications for the future. When they devote any attention to history, it is more likely to be the more recent. Bunche was a participant in the early diplomatic history of Palestine working with the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to articulate different scenarios to resolve the conflict. He also witnessed the political and the military consequences of the UN decision to partition Palestine: the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the outbreak of war between Israel and the neighboring Arab states, the dispossession of the Palestinians of their homeland and their emergence as a nation in exile at the end of the first Arab Israeli war.

The centenary celebrations of Bunche's birth revived everyone's interest, including mine, in the reexamination of his intellectual contributions to the study of American and international foreign policies. It coincided with my new research interests including the study of the history of the Arab American community in the US and its historical relations with two other minority groups: African and Jewish Americans. Bunche's work on, and connection to the Middle East at the end of the 1940s and throughout the 1950s, provides an interesting international perspective on these relations. The creation of the state of Israel transformed the agendas of Jewish Americans forever and Bunche's role in that process was part of the development of an important alliance between the two communities for civil rights in the US. The relatively small number of Arab Americans at the time and their lack of organization did not allow them to have

any presence or role in the US national arena. For Bunche and other Americans of the 1950s and the 1960s, the Arabs were not part of the American ethnic and political scenes. They were out there in a distant, alien and troubled part of the world.

As I began to sift through the published material on Ralph Bunche and his views of and relationships to the Arabs, it became increasingly clear that the discussion of his connection to the Middle East were much more complicated than the narrow and partial conventional construction. In addition to the single focus on the armistice agreements, most authors who discuss his role in the UN debate on Palestine and the first Arab-Israeli war, give the impression that he parachuted into this discussion without prior training or background. Nothing could be further from the truth. Bunche worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1941 where he had to add North Africa to his regional research interests in view of the United States' preparation to invade North Africa following Pearl Harbor.[1] He wrote a manual on the region titled *A Guide to North Africa* that was designed to educate American soldiers about these countries where they would be stationed. Edward R. Stetinius, undersecretary of state, wrote Bunche in 1943 telling him that his *Guide to North Africa* was greatly appreciated by soldiers who found its economic, geographic and sociological background on the different countries very helpful.[2] Even though the manual on North Africa was developed for intelligence purposes, it transformed Bunche into a Middle East expert who began to be invited to lecture on North Africa by universities providing training for those headed to the region.[3] When Bunche finally left the OSS to the State Department, his initial assignment was to the Near Eastern and African Section of the Division of Territorial Studies before he joined the Division of International Security and Organization.[4] What this showed was that Bunche's expertise in North Africa and the Near East was increasingly acknowledged by important government and academic institutions.

Yet, when Brian Urquhart, his sympathetic and respected biographer, described the skills that Bunche brought to the debate on the future of Palestine, he focused most of his attention on Bunche's ability to synthesize the ideas of the two diplomatic working groups that formed UNSCOP whose reports served as the basis for making important decisions that determined the political future of that country[5]. He neglected to mention that the diplomats and judges, who were members of these working groups were from Sweden, India, Peru, Canada and Uruguay, Guatemala, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands and Australia, knew much less about Palestine and the Near East than Bunche, who was in fact the only specialist among them with adequate knowledge of the history and the political history of the region. As the director of the UN's Trusteeship Division, he also brought legal and political experience with colonial matters to the discussion.

If these were some of the reasons why the UN Secretariat picked Bunche to work for UNSCOP, it was not emphasized in most discussions of his role on that committee. Writing as an international civil servant who first worked for Bunche and eventually rose in the ranks to become undersecretary at the UN, Urquhart preferred instead to emphasize Bunche's ability to draft reports, which the new international organization needed and which were in short supply. Bunche spent considerable time drafting the UNSCOP's reports, took enormous pride in them, derived considerable professional satisfaction in the way he facilitated the frequently vacuous international discussions and pushed it forward. Unfortunately, the emphasis on Bunche's bureaucratic skills contributed to the view that he was a brilliant political technician, but a technician nevertheless. It ignored his knowledge of the views of the political parties involved in the conflict and the creative negotiation of their differences.

When UNSCOP recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, this signaled the intensification of violence, which escalated into a full fledged war following British withdrawal and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. In response to these events, Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the UN at the time, appointed Bunche as his chief representative to

work closely with the UN mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden. As part of the difficult task of mediating between the warring parties and the monitoring of a military truce, Bunche supervised the less glamorous but very important organizational process that led to the establishment of "standard practices for UN observer missions" and wrote the document that described the technique that later on became known as peacekeeping.[5] When Count Bernadotte was assassinated by a Jewish underground organization connected to the Stern gang, Bunche took over the extremely dangerous position of "acting mediator" and demonstrated his political skills in successfully mediating the signing of the armistice agreements between Israel and its neighboring Arab states.

In recognition of this significant political achievement, Bunche was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1950. This put to rest the perception that Bunche was a technician and established his reputation as a skilled mediator, a consummate diplomat and the shrewd observer of people. Contrary to the popular conventional view, the prize did not mark the end of Bunche's involvement in Middle East affairs. During the Suez crisis in 1956 when the armies of Israel, Great Britain and France invaded Egypt, Bunche worked with Dag Hammarsjold, the new secretary general, to set up the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) on the borders between Egypt and Israel, which initiated ten years of peace on that front. He considered this force to be a continuation of the early work he did in peacekeeping and negotiating the armistice agreements. From then on, his trips to the Middle East included a stop at the Egyptian-Israeli border to examine the evolution of this successful experiment in peace keeping. The withdrawal of the UNEF in 1967, which triggered the third Arab-Israeli war, was one of his biggest professional disappointments.

Bunche was also engaged in other trouble spots in the region. He kept track of the Lebanese crisis in 1958 and was sent to Yemen in 1963 to communicate with the Saudis, the British, the Yemenis and the Egyptians in the effort to contain the Egyptian-Saudi military border confrontations.

As a result, it is safe to say that Ralph Bunche familiarity and knowledge of the Middle East deepened during the 1950s and the 1960s as he participated in the UN's effort to respond to other regional crises not directly related to the Arab Israeli conflict. In that role, he influenced UN policies towards the region for more than thirty years. The restraints that the UN placed on those who worked for it required them to exercise considerable discretion about the roles that they played and what they learned through their diplomatic contacts. This may explain why many students of Bunche and the UN sometimes labored under the wrong impression that his connection to the region stopped after the widely celebrated armistice agreements. The long, sustained and creative record of involvement in Middle East affairs, which was sometimes dramatic and highly publicized and sometime less dramatic and unreported, made Bunche one of the most knowledgeable Middle East specialists of his generation in the US.

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Endnotes

1. Charles Henry, <u>Ralph Bunche, Model Negro or American Other?</u> (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 125.
2. Brian Urquhart, <u>Ralph Bunche, An American Life</u> (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1993), p 103.
3. Benjamin Rivlin, "Preface", <u>Ralph Bunche, the Man and his Times</u> (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1990), p. xiv.
4. Henry, p. 131.
5. Urquhart, pp. 144-149.
5. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 161-162.

THE MAKING OF RALPH J. BUNCHE

by
RONALD D. PALMER

The year marked the centenary year of the birth of Ralph Johnson Bunche was marked in 2003. It was celebrated nationwide, but especially in the five cities that marked his passage from Detroit's Black Paradise Valley to collegiate athletic and academic stardom at UCLA from 1923-1927, to a Ph.D. at Harvard, and eventually to his teaching career at Howard University. Ultimately, Bunche's career included services as a professor, radical civil rights activism, pioneering studies of colonialism in Africa, the negative impact of discrimination and segregation on blacks in the United States, as well as extensive work in public service and international diplomacy.

The outbreak of World War II in 1939 accelerated Bunche's leadership opportunities even though he already had a spectacular career while still in his thirties. In 1940, he was recruited for the new Office of Strategic Services (OSS) the forerunner of the CIA 1943, at age 40, he had developed such an outstanding reputation for expertise on colonial issues that the State Department shifted him from OSS and assigned him to work on overall postwar planning. His experience and ability brought him to the attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who was already deeply interested in decolonization and postwar problems.

The man who would later become the first Black Nobel Peace Prize winner, was born in an immigrant neighborhood in Detroit on August 7, 1903. His mother, Olive, suffered from bouts of tuberculosis and rheumatic fever and his father, Fred, was unused to anything but the carefree life he had with the circus since he was a boy. Unable to find work, he and his family lived with his wife's mother, Lucy Johnson, a forceful matriarch who raised her five children alone after the death of her husband in 1890.

Described as an efficient commune, Fred found the Johnson's household constricting and eventually left with his family in search of work. His search would take him farther a field to Ohio but he found nothing to complicate matters, his wife gave birth to a second child, a girl named Grace. Thus, at six years old, Ralph was living with his unemployed father, ailing mother and baby sister in a single unheated room in Toledo, Ohio. The family returned to Detroit when Ralph's grandmother found out about the conditions and asked his father to bring his family back to live with her again.

From 1909 to 1911, Ralph's mother went into a sanatorium for treatment of tuberculosis. During that time, Lucy Johnson moved her family to an apartment on Monroe Street near the center of her life, the Second Baptist Church. She took Ralph with her but there was no room for Fred in the apartment. Nonetheless, he played a strong role in the boy's life, aided by Lucy's son Charlie, an avid athlete who taught Ralph to play baseball and other games. Together, the adults did everything to make young Ralph happy, but he was never spoiled or overindulged.

The years 1909 to 1915 were happy years for Ralph despite the death of his mother and the departure of his father from his life during this period. He became an eager fan of the Detroit Tigers baseball team and he continued to live with his grandmother, aunts and uncles in a household with a warm, embracing atmosphere. While he was not religious in the old-fashioned sense of the word and was never formally affiliated with any congregation throughout his life,

he developed a strong set of values in the church he attended with his grandmother. Later, he became greatly attracted to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s philosophy of non-violent protest and his vision for the integration of Blacks in America as a central tenet of his religious beliefs.

At the height of the Civil Rights Movement, Bunche was a towering figure marching alongside King at Selma and elsewhere. Still, he found himself criticized by the establishment for being too liberal and by Black Power advocates such as Malcolm X and Stokley Carmichael for being insufficiently militant. What they didn't know or appreciate was that he was confrontationally militant in the 1930s before many of them were born. He led drug store sit-ins, picketed segregated public facilities and was unafraid to hold conferences at Howard University on social, economic and political inequality, involving leftists and Communists. In other words, Bunche was militant long before it was safe to be.

One of his most dangerous activities in the pre-World War II period was his travel through the south to assemble data for the historic document, *The American Dilemma.* The Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal was in charge of the Carnegie Corporation-sponsored project and accompanied Bunche on some of his journeys. However, Myrdal was prone to what blacks used to call "loud-talking" and would happily engage white southerners in arguments that could have gotten them killed in the violent South of that period. Bunche often had to drag him to their car, away from potentially violent encounters.

Bunche was a major contributor to the *American Dilemma*, which appeared in 1942 just when he began working in the research and analysis branch of OSS. However, his pre-war Marxist-inspired militancy at Howard brought him repeatedly to the attention of racists, the FBI and McCarthyites. Even after he was awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 1950, he was forced to undergo several loyalty investigations ordered by enemies of the right wing and in Congress. Some of his enemies were blacks jealous of his popularity. He was not finally cleared of these smears until 1962.

Bunche mastered the skills of effective hard work and brilliant study. He matched these with dedication to high ideals. These were adequate to take him to top academic and professional levels. What remained, eventually, was the mastering of the statesmen skills that made him one of the most effective servants of the United Nations and one of the most honored Americans.

Ronald O. Palmer, retired after at 32-year career Foreign Service officer at the U.S. Department of State. He served as the U.S. Ambassador at three posts, Togo, Malaysia, and Mauritius from 1976-1983. In 2001, he retired as the Professor of Practice of International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is a 1954 magna cum laude of the Department of Political Science, Howard University.

THE 1939 BUNCHE REPORT TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

by

HANES WALTON, JR., Ph.D. and MAXIE FOSTER

Ralph Bunche's consultant role to the Carnegie foundation, which sponsored Gunnar Myrdal's study, *An American Dilemma*, is quite well known and well documented but much less so is the report he prepared for the Republican National Committee (RNC) in 1939 at their behest (Jackson, 1990; Southern, 1987, and Walton, 1994, pp. 19-38). Only recently has a portion of that study surfaced in the wave of the new scholarly and popular attention being attended to Bunche's numerous contributions to America and its institutions as well as to the United Nations and the international world order (Henry, 1995, pp. 85-91). Renewed interest in this role could not have surfaced at a better time because of the second Republican Party Revolution and capture of the White House, Congress and the Supreme Court in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections.

This new lease on American political life has sent the party in search of portions of the African American electorate in hopes of helping to maintain dominance in electoral contests for a very long time. In point of fact, in the first Republican Party Revolution, led by President Ronald Reagan and his vice-president George Bush Sr. (1980-1992), the party targeted 10-15 percent of the African American electorate for inclusion in it's winning electoral coalition so that it could sustain itself in power through the 21st century. That partial inclusion tactic failed (Bolic, DeMaio, and Muzzio, 1992 and 1993) primarily because it was only built on an ideological class appeal (Tate and Randolph, 2002, Eisenstadt, 1999). Party leaders learned nothing from Bunche's report and his recommendations. Hence, this second attempt is evolving similarly and is proving that it has either forgotten the report and/or is simply ignoring it for more politically correct in-house developed ideas. But Bunche's work then was just as insightful as it is now. Failure to appreciate it either then or now ensures continual party failure and hoped for hegemony.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To grasp the nature and significance of Bunche's role as a political party consultant and the continuing relevance of his recommendations for power maintenance in the two-party system and progress for Americans, this study will rely upon two major data sources. First, there is the need for contextual data from the moment that the RNC saw the problem and sought expert advice and guidance to respond and reform the political situation. Here, historical, organizational and electoral data is essential to reconstruct the times that motivated the RNC to act. Second, there is the data arising from the consultant report itself. Thirdly, there is data based upon primary and secondary sources as to why these recommendations were not implemented. And finally, data is needed on the consequences stemming from the failure to implement those recommendations.

In analyzing these four sources, this study will rely upon the well-established basic canons of textual analysis, the essentials of contextual constructions and where possible statistical techniques to ensure an empirical rending of the findings which will emanate from the analysis.

Using these findings, some judicious interpretations will be offered. Hopefully, this approach will permit us to see for the very first time what has been missed and its impact and consequences for the party system and the two political communities involved. In addition, these findings will provide a new perspective on Bunche's role as an African American scholar activist in the American political system.

THE POLITICAL & ELECTORAL CONTEXT FOR THE RNC REPORT

When the Republican Party was formed in 1854 in Ripon, Wisconsin, those African Americans who could vote had aligned themselves with the Whig Party, the Liberty Party and the Free Soil Party, depending on their political orientation and their values about abolition (Walton, 1969). By 1854, all of these parties were in serious decline at the presidential ballot box as major and third party organizations. Each of these parties were the forerunners and antecedents of the rising Republican Party. Although African Americans were not there at the founding of the Republican Party, by the time of its first presidential election in 1856 they were fully engaged in its electoral effort. This continued in 1860 when the Republican party captured the White House. That year, the leading African American spokesperson of that era, Frederick Douglas "ended up campaigning for Lincoln and the Republican Party in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Iowa."(Walton, 1972, p. 85). This was the beginning of the African American alignment with the party and it grew with the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments and the rise of African American elected officials during Reconstruction.

Even after Reconstruction ended in the Compromise of 1877 and there was a rollback of African American political gains, the alignment held (Beatty, 1987). When the Era of Disenfranchisement swept most of the African American voters from the registration rolls and made future registration impossible, the alignment held. Therefore, when the 20th century began and moved to the New Deal, the Republican Party had a core constituency that was nearly unfailing. Hence, when this historic alignment collapsed in the 1936 election and the African American voter realigned with the Democratic Party, Ralph Bunche was summoned by the RNC to tell them what happened and how to rebuild it.

However, to say that the historic alignment held even while the African American and community faced one political reversal after another while the Republican Party did little more than watch, is not the entire story. The truth is, that even while the alignment was holding, the relationship of the African American electorate and politicians to the party was changing. The first noticeable change came in the South. In 1889 in Texas, the state Republican Party split into two factions, one called the Lily-Whites and the other, the Black and Tans. The Lily-Whites wanted not only to remove all of the African American leadership from the Party but their voters as well. Leaders of this faction, seeming that the Democratic Party, in the State and region was committing itself to "white supremacy", felt that the only way to compete was to re-organize the fledging party in the state along those lines. Both parties had to have the same ideology, leadership and votes if the state wanted a two party system. The Black and Tans in Texas opposed this approach and the new faction (Hare, 1913; Walton, Wright, and Pryor, 2001). But despite the best efforts of African American leadership in Texas and elsewhere, soon every state in the South had two Republican factions (Walton, 1975).

Despite the motivations at the state levels to the rise of these two-Republican factions there was a national one. In 1896, Ohio Industrialist Mark Hanna, campaign manager for Republican presidential candidate, William McKinley, adopted a new strategy to ensure that they would win the party's nomination. This strategy involved, securing before the nomination, the commitment of one of the two Republican factions in each state to his candidate. The major reason for this

was that the South at this time had more than one-third of the delegates needed to secure the nomination. The political reward and/or pay-off to the faction would be all of the state patronage if the Republicans won the White House. But the consequence was that the factions did not need voters or victories in southern politics to survive. Hence, they became the factions become little more than political cliques of officeholders (Key, 1949). Thus, neither the Black and Tans nor the Lily-Whites had to mobilize voters and compete successfully for local and state elected offices.

Given this reality and the delegate numbers available in the South, more African American delegates from the South appeared at national conventions than from any other region of the Nation. Already bought and paid for, they had little say in the party platform and the policy priorities. Having muffled them and simultaneously bringing in western states to replace those votes lost from the South, the "Negro Problem", could be sidestepped by the Republican Party. The major consequence of this strategy was the eventual displacement and collapse of the Black and Tan faction.

Several factors led to the erosion of the state power of the Black-and-Tans and their eclipse by the Lily-Whites. The rise of the NAACP and the "New Negro" movement led to severe criticism of the Black-and-Tans by these organizations and individuals. Even Bunche attacked this group as self-aggrandizing uncle toms. Dubbed backwater politicians, these factions ran for cover. More importantly, such severe criticism eliminated potential recruits and newcomers. With fewer and fewer replacements, the Black-and-Tans literally collapsed on itself. By 1960, all of the old time leaders were dead and with them went the last vestiges of the Black-and-Tans factions (Walton, 1975). The Lily-whites, meanwhile, rejuvenated themselves. They remained in a reformed fashioned, which would flourish in the fifties and sixties.

The rejuvenated southern Republican Party meant the end of African American delegates from the region and the reliance upon delegations from the Northern and Western states to re-orient the party toward its old civil rights agenda. This small group made serious headway until the Goldwater conservatives, and later Reagan conservatives overwhelmed them and the party's commitment to their public policy agenda. The transition to this northern and western group was underway in 1936 when the RNC asked Bunche to write his Report. Then, the party elites and leadership saw the Lily-Whites and the South as virgin political territory. Here were electoral votes and not simply individual political voters that might be able to deliver what the party needed. Hence, the political context was a choice between adopting an ideology, which the South wanted or protect the rights of African American voters in the region and hope that they might be able to win some states and thereby deliver some electoral votes. Although the political context in the South offered this either or situation, support Lily-Whites or Black-and-Tans, merging the two was another alternative. The national party and southern white leadership embraced the Lily-White option.

THE 1936 ELECTION, CRITICAL FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN VOTERS

Journalists and scholars alike believe that African American voters realigned with the Democratic Party in the second New Deal election in 1936. This was one election behind the rest of the country. (Walton, 1990, pp. 49-64; Lubell, 1964). Table 1.1 provides an empirical look at the African American vote in the key urban cities in the nation in 1932, 1936 and 1940. Here one can see which major cities switched in each presidential election cycle:

Four cities—Detroit, Kansas City, Missouri and Pittsburgh—switched in 1932, seven switched in 1936 and nine in 1940. Only the African American voters in Boston stayed with the Republican Party in that presidential election. Hence, the realignment of African American

voters did take place in 1936. Armed with this information, that the African Americans had abandoned their historic Republican Party allegiance, the RNC commissioned Bunche to undertake the study of why this occurred. But there should have been no real question about this realignment. The African-American Republican loyalty lasted 80 years. With the passage of the 15th amendment in 1870, the Party provided no major public policies to assist and protect the community that had seen one reversal after another of their civil and political rights. Despite feeble attempts and numerous platforms, promise of help, nothing was forthcoming. More

TABLE 1
Percentage of Voters in Selected African American Precincts Voting for Democratic Party in 1932, 1936, and 1940

Urban Areas	1932 Vote %	1936 Vote %	1940 Vote %
Baltimore	46	55	64
Boston	12	31	37
Chicago	23	49	53
Columbus	26	47	53
Detroit	50	75	78
Kansas City, Kansas	42	61	60
Kansas City, Missouri	71	79	66
New Haven	40	61	59
Pittsburgh	53	77	77
Wilmington	28	40	42
Mean	39	58	59

Source: Adapted from Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944); 496, Table 1, for all cities except Boston. The Boston data were taken from Gerald Gann, *The Making of New Deal Democrats*: Voting Behavior and Realignment in Boston, 1920-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); 97. Authors did calculations.

importantly, President Hoover who used the southern African American Black-and-Tan delegates to secure his presidential nomination in 1928, turned against them on the eve of the 1932 election by helping to initiate a senate hearing into the supposed corruption of African American Black-and-Tan leaders in the South (Lisio, 1985). This was part of his overall strategy to eliminate African American leaders and have them replaced by Lily-White leadership.

Ultimately, the Republican Party's southern strategy was re-developed by Hoover. An apologist for Hoover's new southern strategy writes:

> Ignorant about racism and its workings, Hoover thus unwittingly became its captive. He was not a bigot with a lily-white southern strategy, as the standard interpretation argues. Indeed, southern Lily-Whites were the first to recognize this fact. Instead, a combination of ignorance about racism and his utopian idealism worked against both himself and black America (Lisio, 1985, p. xviii).

The end result of this "combination" the author argues was that when Hoover "attempted to put his southern reforms into practice, his black supporters who had earlier invested so much of their faith in him, became increasingly dismayed and alienated" (Lisio, 1985, p. xviii). The

author concludes that African Americans with "their hopes destroyed, perceived a tragic and perhaps fatal setback for racial progress under Republican leadership. For both Herbert Hoover and his black supporters, the experience ended in puzzled disillusionment"(Lisio, 1985, p.xviii). Thus, even when the Black-and-Tan leadership reached out to the Republican Party elites for meaningful public policies for the African American community, the party responded by trying to remove them and send them to jail.

BUNCHE'S 1939 REPORT TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

The Republican Party after sustaining two major losses to the Democrats and seeing its long time ally realign, urged Bunche to purse three major objectives in his study. They were:

1. "To present a general picture of those needs and problems of the Negro throughout the country (or in that particular area where the need or problem is most acute) that can be served by a practical, constructive, political program.
2. To indicate, wherever possible, what the Federal Government is doing or failing to do at present to ameliorate those needs and problems;
3. To present general, suggestive recommendations which look toward broad improvement of the condition of the Negro citizenry (Henry, 1995. p. 85).

However, after agreeing on the objectives of the Report, both Bunche and Republican official formally agreed that either the whole report be published or nothing at all. Soon after its completion, the Republicans wanted to publish only those sections critical of the New Deal, which Bunche vetoed. Later, the Democrats approached him to release those sections critical of the Republican Party, which Bunche also rejected. Hence the Report has laid, unpublished and unused in his papers at the Library in University of California at Los Angeles. In the report, Bunche responded to the queries and objectives of the RNC by telling them what constituted the nature of the problem. He wrote:

> "Actually, the Negro needs more of everything except taxes, prejudice and religion…The Negro is in need of everything that a constructive, humane, American political program can give him: employment, land, housing, relief, health protection, unemployment and old-age insurance, enjoyment of civil rights —all that a twentieth-century American citizen is entitled to (Bunche, 1939).

Of the New Deal, Bunche wrote, "the New Deal has done much to help, unquestionably, but it has fallen far short of meeting adequately the minimal needs of the Negro. It has gotten off on the wrong foot in some instances, gone up blind alleys in others, and has often run afoul of race prejudice." Thus, in his estimation, there was a lot more to be accomplished by the Democratic Party. According to him, as long as the "dual social system persists in America, specific attention to ways and means of Negro betterment must be undertaken by the political parties." He listed the following items in the report, which the Republican Party could embrace to make democracy real and the American dream true:

> the enfranchisement of the Negro in the South;
> the protection of the civil rights of the Negro;
> the enactment of an anti-lynching bill;
> the appointment of Negroes to responsible policy-forming positions in the government.
> (Bunche, 1939).

All of these recommendations would have simply effectuated full citizenship for African Americans. Economic interest and objectives for African Americans were the same as that for white workers and laborers. Hence, no special and/or racial legislative was needed. Universal policies were valid for African Americans because in Bunche's analysis and findings "there is a virtual identity of fundamental interest between the Negro and white citizens." (Bunche, 1939). Only the problem of African American citizenship remained to be addressed by the political parties and the government ultimately. This was the essence of Bunche' report to the RNC, made just as the depression had deepened inside the African American community.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUNCHE'S 1939 REPORT TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE

To date, this is the first and only formally commissioned political party report ever made by an African American. Bunche closed his historic report with a judicious forecast and prophecy:

> It must be clear that in politics one cannot successfully run with both hare and hound and the Republican Party will need to decide whether it prefers to court the dissident white vote of the Democratic South through continuance of its lily-white program and an obscure Negro policy, or really desires the Negro vote. It cannot seduce both (Bunche, 1939).

Sadly, the RNC, the party elites and Negro Republicans paid no attention to Bunche's Report or its prophecy. None of the recommendations were implemented. They were not even tried and the lily-white strategy continued under a new guise and name, the Southern Strategy. This left the African American Republicans marginalized and reduced to mouthpieces and window-dressers for the current Republican revolutions. Beyond the terrible and limited internal party relationships with its lack of African Americans in any organizational and leadership roles and/or functions and its lack of a substantive outreach to the electorate, the failure to respond positively to the Bunche Report has left the American two party system basically a one-party system for African Americans. Literally, they have only one option to turn to in elections. The end result of this is a much delayed and immature two party system in the country for all of its citizens. This has allowed the Republicans to introduce a conservative ideology and political regime to the party since the 1964 election. That approach has heightened the tension and inter-party rivalry. When and where it will stop no one currently knows. Bunche's Report offered party elites a signpost that all of this was coming with poor consequences for Americans. Most importantly, it was a way out of this entire morass.

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Ralph J. Bunche Centenary Conference

A PHOTO ESSAY

"Moral Dilemma: A Dialogue in Comtemporary Issues in Domestic and International Affairs"

Ralph J. Bunche Centenary Conference

"Moral Dilemma: A Dialogue in Contemporary Issues in Domestic and International Affairs"

Blackburn Center Howard University

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Conference Agenda

"True, we continue to pay lip service to the 'sacred' concept of the 'natural rights of man,' and its international corollary, the 'rights of people'. But the dominant peoples and powerful nations usually discover that such concepts cut sharply against their own economic and political interests. So with these favored groups, who knows well how to use them for their own profit, such doctrines come to assume a strange role."

A World View of Race,
Ralph J. Bunche

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9) Six African American U.S. Ambassadors. Standing (l-r) Joseph Segars, ret. (Cape Verde), Horace Dawson, Ph.D., ret. (Botswana), Ronald D. Palmer, ret. (Togo, Malaysia, and Mauritus)

Seated (l-r) Terence Todman, ret. (Chad, Spain, Argentina, Guinea, and Cost Rica), Ruth Davis (Benin) and Elliot Skinner, Ph.D., ret. (Burkina Faso)

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For Further information contact Dr. Michael C. Nwanze, Department of Political Science, Howard University, Washington, D.C. (202) 806-9343 or visit the website at: www.kent.edu/cicp/natoconference.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ILLUSIONS OF WORLD ORDER

by
NIKOLAOS A. STAVROU, Ph.D.

Two days before the United States attacked Iraq in 2003, in what President George W. Bush argued was a major effort to secure the world from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Later the goal of the war in Iraq became establishing democracy in Iraq and by extension in the entire Middle East. Professor Niklas Stavrou published in 2003 the essay, "Illusions of World Order". His basic premise is that democracy cannot be dictated, exported, or imposed; it can only be emulated. After more than four years of combat, a surge of more US troops, $7.5 billion in war expenses, 3,350+ American causalities and tens of thousands of civilian Iraqis deaths, American troops remain in the region with no exit strategy in sight. The situation forces pertinent question such as: Was the war worth it, specifically in light of the fact that no WMD was found. Is it possible to establish western style democracy in Middle Eastern societies? Given its relevance to the subject at hand, Dr. Stavrou's essay is reprinted here. It is especially instructive for students of world politics advocating democracy in Middle Eastern societies.

– Michael Frazier, Ph.D.

The United States is marching to war in a critical region of the globe harboring the illusions that in the end, it will reinforce a yet to be defined global order and assure domestic security. The outcome of the military phase of the showdown with Iraq is not in doubt. The dictator of Baghdad, whose model of efficient governing is Joseph Stalin, will be removed from power and hardly anybody will miss him. But the oncoming war, unlike other conflicts, is fraught with contradictions and pregnant with unintended consequences. If history is any guide, one can argue that the looming showdown will redefine Americanism for generations to come and could propel the country on a course of irreversible imperial overstretch.

There has been no serious debate about the constitutionality, legality, morality, cost, likely outcome, or less costly alternatives to another dazzling display of our high tech weapons. Instead, this war is being fused into our just war, against the murderers of September 11 and their sponsors, and is further burdened by regional agendas and illusions that the Middle East can revert to the good old days of British-inspired tribalism and the proliferation of corrupt emirs.

An entrenched group of neo-conservatives, incubated in the office of the late Senator Henry Jackson, floated to the Republican Party in the 1980s, and seemed determined to treat the U.S. military as an all-purpose instrument in pursuit of an illusory hierarchical global order. Their preference for force, instead of reason, thus far accomplished two things: 1) it diminished the spontaneous and overwhelming global support for our just war against terrorism 2) set in motion a process of privatization of the formulation of U.S. defense and foreign policies to the degree that national interest is confused with private gain.

It seems certain that the country is ready to embark on an adventure that would have undesirable consequences for our own security and for world order. For starters, an invasion of Iraq could saddle us with our own version of the West Bank. As civil war looms large within a liberated Iraq, radical movements stand ready to supplant Muslim regimes in the region and

beyond. Moreover, if the first Gulf war was any guide, hordes of refugees will flood neighboring countries in search of safety; and refugees bring along with their poverty, social turmoil and desperation that ultimately breed more terrorism. Anticipating his demise, Saddam Hussein saw to it that turmoil replace oppression. According to news accounts, six million small arms have been distributed to Baathist members raising the specter of "Lebanization" of Iraq and its neighborhood. A West Bank scenario would hardly enhance regional stability, but it could transform America into a garrison state, like Israel, with freedoms incrementally being traded for security. Former NATO Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clark, noted "this is an elective war;" promoted with shaky assumptions about its outcome and false analogies drawn from our World War II and Balkan experiences.

Too often war enthusiasts as a success story and as an example present the Balkans where the west defended Muslims. It is neither. Eight years after the Dayton Accords and four years after the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo our troops are pinned down in the "liberated Balkans" and a glorified cleptocracy, *de facto* under NATO protection, rules the day.

Iraq is not Japan or Germany. The latter two declared war on the United States, were soundly defeated and were given only one option: unconditional surrender and indefinite occupation, no apologies, no promises. Iraq is a secular Arab state belonging to a religion with over one billion believers. True, it is ruled by a brutal despot who, over thirty years, achieved what other satraps in the region have failed to accomplish: a highly educated, modern, urbanized, middle class society, seen by our social engineers as the most suitable ground to test a western type democracy that could be emulated in the region. What they do not see, however, is the irony of it all: a dictator has created a state which U.S. planners see as the best bet to embrace Jeffersonian democracy, and if all goes well, to serve as the pivot in redrawing the map of the Middle East. The latter objective would require wholesale regime changes–-perhaps beginning with Saudi Arabia—and a permanent Anglo-American presence. That is precisely what Assistant Secretary of State, John Bolton, announced in Tel Aviv and president George W. Bush, mastering the art of ambiguity, proclaimed: *we will be in Iraq as long as it takes and not one day longer*.

Unlike World War II where issues were defined by values, in the current debate we are asked to accept *a priori* the doctrines of pre-emptive wars and regime change, which neatly cancel our ideals and deprive America of the high moral ground in global affairs. Respect of ideas and fear of power are not interchangeable concepts. As a senior U.S. diplomat, John B. Kiesling, said in his letter of resignation to Secretary of State Collin Powell to protest U.S. policy on Iraq when our friends are afraid of us rather than for us, it is time to worry. And now they are afraid.

Outside of the context of just war, regime change will always be seen as a threat to sovereignty and a display of arrogance. As world reaction to the doctrine war first, explanations later shows, the U.S. approach to disarming dangerous regimes, has eroded core principles while a crude form of realism is now displacing American idealism. As defined by war hawks, realism means political inconsistency, gross disregard of history, and adoption of numbing improvisations as substitutes for grand strategy. In the current situation, realism would also mean that we disregard our cozy relations with Saddam, when he was keeping the Ayatollahs at bay at our behest, and Paul D. Wolfowitz's 1992 strategic concept, (resurrected in September 2002 as U.S. strategic doctrine) that defined even European allies as potential adversaries. With such a short memory, no wonder we fail to understand the position of Old Europe on Iraq. The U.S. now demands from allied governments to be realistic, ignore their public opinion, and support us or else. The polarizing slogan either your are with us, or against us is taking its toll in our global image. Still some allies got the message and act realistically or, one can say,

opportunistically. Our staunch ally, Turkey, demanded billions to let our troops pass through its territory; Israel followed up with a similar request to stay out of the fray; and Jordan would rather not talk about its loot. It is now fashionable, but hardly the American way, to engage in dollar diplomacy and to advocate war as a prelude to democratization. The proponents of this un- American doctrine seem to forget that democracy–to deserve its name–cannot be dictated, exported, or imposed. It can only be emulated.

Nikolaos A. Stavrou, Ph.D. is editor of the *Mediterranean Journal*, published by Duke University Press and a retired professor of political science at Howard University. The article has been reprinted with the permission of the author and *Washington Herald*, March, New York, pp. 22-23, 2003. The article was originally published in the Philoogue, School of Philosophy, University of Thessaloniki, (Winter 2002, No. 106) pp: 576 –578 under the title "The Language of Diplomacy: Its Uses and Abuses in Pursuit of Core Interest."

POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE GENESIS OF A MOVEMENT

by

RAYMOND MUHULA, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

The growth and development of political Islam took a multiplicity of trajectories. This is reflected in the disparity of the various Islamist movements in the countries of the Middle East. Scholars and commentators on the development of Islamism are all but agreed on this. Dunn (1994) observes, "anyone who has a greater familiarity with the subject will appreciate that Islamic revivalism is not a homogeneous phenomenon" (p.150); Fandy (1994) notes that in Egypt, "it is both diverse and complex" (p.607); Dekmejian (1994) notes " it is a pervasive pattern in contemporary Arab politics" (p.627); Faour (1993) indicates that political and social contexts shape the nature of Islamic movements thereby producing varying mutants of Islamist movements across the Middle East(p.62). In the Maghrib region, notes Hermassi (1994), the initial secularization of the state that had relegated the Islamists to tangential roles was reversed by a state that was determined to gain its legitimacy and to forestall opposition from the Islamists (p.61).

The main goal of Islamism, also called political Islam, is the establishment of Islamic states on the basis of the Koran and the Sunna (Faour, p.61). At the core of this ideology, is the desire for a theocracy in the countries dominated by Muslims.

GROWTH OF ISLAMISM: THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS

Fandy (1994) calls for an examination of the growth of Islamism that takes into consideration the social and political context of the day (p.68). This, he notes can facilitate an "understanding of how Islamic movements developed as a partial response to government policies" (p.68).

The rise and resiliency of the Islamist phenomenon in the Middle East can be attributed to a number of factors. Key among these are political and economic issues that pervaded many countries in the post nationalism years. The ideologies propounded by Nasser and the Ba'ath party of Iraq and Syria, lost their luster when supporters noticed their inability to translate the hard hitting idealistic rhetoric into visible actions (p.55). This, coupled with the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, spelled the death knell for Pan Arabism. The stage was set for a more radical movement that sought to locate the place of Islam in the state. At the center of this movement was the desire, not for a unified Arab state, but the "establishment of Islamic theocracy in Muslim countries (p.55). Pan Arabism had developed in response to the challenges of colonialism. It however, had its roots in the 19th Century Arab nationalism that protested Turkish rule.

The Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the main torchbearer of Pan Arabism. However, other Middle Eastern countries also adopted it. In its calls for Arab unity, Pan Arabism failed to take into account the differences that existed among the Arab countries. It offered "few feasible economic, political or organizational programs" (Faour, p.58). The alliance was therefore doomed to failure since every leader within the Pan Arab movement sought to emphasize the local traditions of his individual country, failing to take into consideration the larger goals of the

Pan Arab movement. Territorial concerns outweighed regional allegiance. There was a need for a movement that would appeal to all Muslims within the Arab world and transcend the territorial apprehensions of the political leadership. Radical Islamism developed to fill this vacuum.

Modernization presented major challenges to the Pan Arab movement, giving rise to political Islam. The ordinary Muslim was not well equipped with the requisite ideological consciousness to reconcile the demands of modernization (secularism) with those of Islamic theology (*Shari 'a*). The educated Arab Muslim was unable to choose between these two competing phenomena. This was therefore a breeding ground for a more radical ideology that would free the Muslim from what has been described as a "Levantine marginality" where the individual, caught up in a state of confusion of identities and unable to firmly identify with one ideology, becomes cynical and desperate (Hourani, 1993, p.59). This provided a perfect breeding ground to search for an alternative, to which Islamist thinking availed itself. In Saudi Arabia, it led to a challenge based on puritanical sentiments led by Prince Khalid bin Musa 'id against King Fahd's modernization agenda (Dekmejian, p.628). It is no wonder then that the early years of militant Islamism was marked by a membership whose demographic characteristic was mainly drawn from the middle class (Ismail 2000, p.382).

Politically, the Pan Arab movement was losing the war. The failure of a unification bid between Syria and Egypt in 1961, the defeat of the Arabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the death of Nasser in 1971 set the political stage for the demise of Pan Arabism. The Islamist front therefore marketed itself as an alternative. Religious values that the Islamists proclaimed appealed to the citizens as a way to cope with the losses they had suffered (Fandy, p.616). Anwar Sadat's decision to sign the Camp David Accords with Israel, only added to Islamists discontent regarding the way the state conducted itself. Moreover, the Prime Minister's association with the old feudal families drew constant criticism from the smaller tribes (p.616). This justified the emergence of a political ideology founded on the basic principles of Islam. Criticizing Sadat's policies was easy because, couched in Islamic language, they were immune from state sanctions (p.617). This rebellion coincided with the fall of communism, the main financier of socialist movements in the Middle East. Together with the subsequent refusal of the Arab countries to join the Gulf War on the side of Iraq, they further weakened the Pan Arab movement and gave way to Islamism. Most Islamists viewed the collaboration between the regimes of the Middle East with the rest of the coalition against Iraq with heavy Islamic overtones. They characterized the coalition forces as infidels that were adulterating the Gulf and specifically the holy land where the US troops, both men and women, were stationed. This significantly reduced the legitimacy of the Kingdom in Saudi Arabia and angered the Islamists (Dekmejian, p.630). They were disappointed that the Arabs had, once again, been defeated. Faour (1993) summarizes the impact more eloquently:

> This coupled with the demise of Pan Arabism and socialism, has led increasing numbers of Arabs to give their support to various forms of Islamism. Active and ready to lure new members and supporters, Islamic movements are seizing the opportunity to expand their ranks, particularly among the young (p.61).

The Muslim Brotherhood, the first major Islamic party, was suppressed by Nasser's regime. However, with the ascension of Sadat, an alliance between the state and the Brethrens came to being, allowing the latter to operate unhindered. They even ran for political offices but only on a ticket of an existing political party (p.61). The apparent endorsement of the Brotherhood and the new platform of national politics led to its growth and influence both in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. Sadat developed a strategic alliance with the Islamists to guarantee order at the

local level and used Islam for political reason (Fandy 1994, p.616). However, following years of political and social upheavals in the 1970s, animosity grew between Sadat and many of the Islamists who referred to him as "the pharaoh" (p.616). Part of the reason for this was the deliberate replacement of the minor tribes as a veritable constituency of Sadat's with the old feudal classes who threatened smaller tribes. The exclusion of the smaller tribes from many of the benefits in Sadat's regime ignited a wave of discontent with the status quo. There was only one place to seek refuge: Militant Islamism (p.616). The militant Islamic groups eventually assassinated Sadat. President Hosni Mubarak, who succeeded him, adopted a strategy that accommodated the larger Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood, but remained extremely repressive of the smaller more militant groups. This enabled the larger Islamist movements to grow unhindered and support for them broadened. Government reluctance to antagonize them has led to many concessions including ban on sale of alcohol in 14 of 26 governorates (Murphy 1992, p.A28), and the provision of air time to Islamists speakers on state run national television. The political calculation has benefited the government and the larger Islamist movements at the expense of the smaller ones. Mubarak made concessions to the larger groups whose views reflect those of many Egyptians, "in the hope of driving a wedge between them…the government has cracked down on militant Islamists, arresting and jailing many of them" (Faour, p.64). The Muslim Brotherhood enjoys substantial freedom of expression compared to the other Islamist organizations.

A similar political alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government has aided the growth of this movement in Jordan. Here, the government rescinded its earlier decision to exclude the Brethrens from the government following the former's support for the war effort in the Gulf. The power of the Islamists has been abbreviated however by a strong secular community representation in parliament and the national charter (p.67). Like in Egypt, the Jordanian government has been hard on small militant Islamist groups, arresting and detaining the members of the Prophet Muhammad's army. However, it is likely that if the Middle East peace process does not produce tangible results, the Islamists might find a platform to further challenge the authority of the secular state in Jordan (p.71). In Algeria, it was the opening up of the democratic space that made it possible for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) to win 81 percent of the total vote. This surprised both the Algerian leadership and the entire Arab community because the extent of their support had been underrated (p.73). Fears regarding the impending dictatorship associated with Islamism, led to repression of the FIS through decrees. More than anything, this led to the spread of Islamist thinking in Algeria, uniting all the major groups and gaining a widespread support among the populace.

However, the support that the FIS enjoyed among the Algerians has been attributed to the economic crisis that resulted from the incompetence of the ruling party. This produced high levels of unemployment that threatened the legitimacy of the regime. The economic, just like the political, is intricately intertwined with the development of Islamism in the Middle East (p.74). The cost of the Gulf War had been taking a toll on the countries that took part in it. plus unemployment and growing unease with the leadership were some of its effects that provided greater voice and support for the Islamists. The governments of the region could not provide the socio economic guarantees that the citizens were used to (Dekmejain 1994, p.630). The absence of jobs and a general decline in the standard of living made the movement attractive to the disillusioned young people. The ultimate price of all these was a greater threat to many regimes in the Middle East:

> the post-war resurgence of Islamism was a reaffirmation of identity, a protest
> movement against the monarchy and its western allies, and for some, a means to
> achieve social influence and, perhaps a takeover of power (p.630).

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

The demographic characteristics of the Islamist movements seem identical across the Middle East. The early Islamist movements in Saudi Arabia originally comprised tribal zealots from the king's warriors. These were basically working class elements. The takeover of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979 was also dominated by elements of the working class mainly "tribal, lower class, and poorly educated rebels" (p.629). This later changed to include the "middle class urbanites led by preachers, teachers, and students, mostly from the religious universities" (p.629). In Tunisia, for instance, support for the Islamists came from the cities, the universities and also from women (Dunn 1994, p.104). Leaders of the emerging Islamist movements in Tunisia in the 1980s were either well educated or came from highly affluent families. Participation of women in most Islamist organization was limited to men because of their violent nature. Women were lumped together as part of the reason it was necessary to return to rule by Sharia, and so were generally excluded from these movements (Hatem 1994, p.670). These young Islamists were well educated and more sophisticated in their political discourse. Hermassi (1984), in a more statistically grounded study, described the demographic compositions thus:

> [the] typical member of the Islamic movement may be described as a young
> person over twenty years old, born in one of the provincial towns of the country,
> of a popular background and having received a high level of education without
> the upward mobility that might lead him to repudiate his origins (p.46-47).

More recently however, there has been a change in this demographic as many other working class categories join the Islamic movements. For example, class plays a significant role in the Islamist discourse. Support for the Islamist cause in Egypt is more intense within the informal economic sector because this is the population least reached by government services. They have therefore found it easy to associate with the Islamists who have inserted themselves among them and effectively assumed the roles of the state. The most prominent of this category included the artisans, petty traders, and low-level service sector workers (Ismail 2000, p.375). It has been noted that there is a decline in the number of university students and an increase in lower middle class members (Ibrahim 1984, p.36). More interestingly, the deprived urban settlers also found their voice in the Islamist movement and supported their cause as an expression of their disenchantment with the more affluent urban dwellers. The Islamists tended to be young males of the ages between 20-40 years (Dekmejian, p.630). Looking at police data of militant Islamists arrested in Egypt between 1986 and 1993, Ismail (2000) found that it was predominantly male working class, with 75 percent of the activists below the age of thirty (p.383). This is a carry over from the predecessors of the latter day Islamists.

In Saudi Arabia as elsewhere in the Arab world, the Islamists viewed the emerging political economy as inimical to their aspirations and an insult to their manhood. The vulnerability of the whole region to Iraqi machination, and its subsequent reliance on US protection, raised serious value questions regarding the supremacy of Islam (Dekmejian, p.630). Support for the Islamist cause was therefore necessary for both political and economic reasons. In Tunisia, radical Islamism through the *Al-Nahda* movement was a result of the collapse of socialist experiments of the 1960s and the excessive secularism of the state (Dunn, p.151). The modernizing environment that was the promise of liberalization also threatened majority of the Islamists whose training in religious matters ill-equipped them for such an economy. Modernization had to be resisted at all costs (Ismail, p.637). The resurgence of Islamism was as much a search for

answers to all these troubling contradictions as it was an expression of discontent with the state, as it existed.

Liberal intellectuals and human rights groups have consistently challenged the Islamists in every Middle Eastern country with varying level of success. The liberals accuse the Islamists of not respecting the fundamental rights of Saudi women, among others. In Saudi Arabia for instance, they accuse the Islamists of having a hidden agenda of taking over the government through violent means. However, response to Islamists is not uniformly negative. The supreme authority of senior *Ulama* has been critical of some of the demands of the Islamists, taking every opportunity to respond to their attacks against the king. The public too has been resistant to the demands and practices of the Islamists. In particular, they resent the harassment of ordinary people on religious grounds. The fact that the "religious police" rarely harassed the upper classes has heightened the public's distaste for Islamists (p.638). However, among the *Ulama* too is where the Islamists have got some of the most valuable support. This was demonstrated by the refusal of seven of the 17 senior *Ulama* to sign a denunciation the *Ulama* had drafted against the Islamists (p.638). Their support for the young Islamists had been effectively registered and a more pro-government group duly replaced them.

In Tunisia, as in Algeria and Egypt, there has been a deliberate anti Islamist project conducted by the government. While in Egypt, the Islamists–especially the larger ones–have had a better relationship with the state, the situation is different in Algeria and Tunisia where government crackdown has sought to weaken the movement. In Tunisia for instance, in the wake of the Iranian revolution, the state sought to reduce the influence of the Islamists, in the process suspending the main groups *Ma'rifa* and *Al-Mujtama'a* respectively in 1979 and 1980 (Dunn, p.151). The attacks continued even after President Bourguiba, an avowed secularist, was replaced by a new president (p.156).

COLLECTIVE SELF RELIANCE: ISLAMISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STATE

The Islamists in Middle Eastern countries have sought to occupy the space left by government in terms of the provision of the socio-economic necessities that the citizens were used to. This has taken place in countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia where Islamists have implanted themselves in the new urban quarters to provide services to the residents (Ismail 2001, p.38). As this welfarist pattern emerges, so are the challenges of the Islamists to cope as an alternative to the state. The extent to which they can satisfy the demands of the people and the level of their ability to remedy the skewed distribution of state resources, will no doubt continue to shape the politics of Islamism in the Middle East (Zubaida 2001, p.20). Some scholars however, doubt the ability of Islamism to provide a viable alternative to the state (e.g. Roy 1994). Most Middle Eastern states are coercive and have little room for citizen participation. Authoritarian military regimes stifle democracy and control the provision of state resources through patronage, leaving very little room for alternative voices in majority of the states, with the exception of Turkey and Iran (p.251).

Islamists have developed their own "avenues of participation" that makes it possible for the citizens to participate in politics without necessarily coming into contact with the state. By occupying spaces within the peri-urban centers, organizing their social and economic structures to address the impact of state exclusion, the Islamists have been able to significantly challenge state hegemony. This is particularly evident outside Cairo where the *Jama 'a al-Islamiya* has taken advantage of the inaccessibility of the state to the spontaneous communities of the area to propagate radical Islamism (e.g. Ismail, 2000). The *Jama'a* effectively replaced the state with which it was in constant conflict, given the surge in its popularity with the community. They provided a structure through which the economically impoverished residents could be catered

for in terms of health care, education and food (Zubaida, p.381). More importantly, effective means of conflict resolution were instituted that remedied the absence of the state machinery and the inability of the traditional tribal council to cope with rising criminality in the communities. Ismail (2000) notes that the *Jama 'a* provided wide ranging services almost similar to those provided by the state.

In addition to preaching and providing social services, the *Jama 'a* attended to matters of social mores–forbidding mixing between sexes, banning music, and monitoring entry into the area. It enforced the rules and applied the *hudud* (religious ordinances) (p.381).

The Muslim Brotherhood has performed equally well in the provision of social services. This has enabled them to participate with significant results in the politics of Egypt. The schools, clinics, and the social services they offer have been just as impressive as the state's, thereby legitimizing their existence as an alternative (Bayat 1998). By taking over major spaces of social and political participation such as the mosques, the youth associations and the societies in which they anchor themselves, Islamists have been able to perform various roles originally reserved for the state in many Middle Eastern countries. They effectively use social activism and take advantage of already existing structures of opposition. This way, the "Islamists deployed their own idiom to describe activities that are not necessarily Islamic (Ismail 2000 p.37). The mosques have been used in Algeria to provide services that transcended the traditional religious functions. An emerging class of economic notables, whose wealth was generated through the informal networks that arose with state sponsored liberalization programs, funded construction of mosques. They were essentially the symbols of state retreat and identified easily with the Islamists who functioned as the alternative to the state in the provision of the social services in the absence of the state (p.38). Islamism has therefore become part and parcel of the communities in which they operate, understanding and expressing the political aspirations of the people with which they live. This inevitably shapes the nature of Islamism as a political project. Ismail (2000) notes:

"The fortunes of Islamism as a political movement are conditioned by political opportunities, changing social and political configurations and contingent identities. Islamists have adopted a multitude of strategies, ranging from outright confrontation and violent action to agitation in the public sphere to infiltration of societal spaces" (p.39).

CONCLUSION

The general feeling in the academe that the development of political Islam was fraught with complexity, confirms that it is difficult to predict the direction of militant Islamism in the Middle East. Some of the main factors associated with its resurgence are still intact in many Middle Eastern countries. Issues such as the massive presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia and several other Gulf states long after the Gulf War, the economic problems associated with its expenses, the question of the Palestinian state and the general infiltration of the western culture into the Middle East pose the same challenges they did several years ago with regard to continued radical Islamism. More significantly, the recent terrorist attack on two symbols of Western financial and military domination has raised renewed questions as to the agenda of radical Islamism. It has significantly broadened the domestic rhetoric against secularism into an international sphere of action that strikes at the domestic political front without necessarily aiming a blow at it. It is no coincidence that almost all the men involved in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the United States were well-educated, Saudi Arabian males. What lies beneath is a pervasive disenchantment with the regimes at home and the wider Middle East; their relationship with the United States and the role of the latter in the Palestinian-Israeli

conflict. Recent efforts by the Saudi government to have the US relocate their base elsewhere and the Kingdom's renewed role in the Palestinian question at the Arab League summit, point to a more activist role that the Islamists might identify with. The US led coalition attack on Iraq is even more likely to breed further discontent in the region given the generally intense regional and international condemnation that it has attracted.

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REGIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP ISSUES IN AFRICA: NIGERIA IN THE WEST AFRICAN CONTEXT

by

BEN K. FRED-MENSAH, Ph.D.

The end of the Cold War has made it possible for regional organizations to get involved in managing international peace and security in their respective regions. This has been a welcome development in the contemporary trend in global governance,[1] given the fact that the human and material capabilities of the United Nations (UN) are severely constrained in the wake of proliferative and apparently intractable conflicts world-wide (Boutros-Ghali 1995). Regional security management, however, raises critical issues of power, which is ultimately unavoidable from the problem of hegemony. In other words, not only is it impossible to conceive of regional security management in isolation from the distribution of power among the member states, but the very idea of regional security community raises issues of leadership, which, in turn, raises the question of resources (Clapham 2002). It is at this point where Nigeria's real and potential leadership role in West Africa comes in.

In this article,[2] I will concentrate on Nigeria and examine its real and potential leadership role in West Africa by assessing its resource endowments and self-perception vis-à-vis its ability to create and manage a national cultural environment. I will argue that for Nigeria to sustainably translate its leadership potentials and aspirations in the subregion into reality, it must develop a model of value beyond its material power and military capabilities that will counteract the centrifugal forces of enduring legacies of colonialism, the continuing neocolonialist ties, and the endemic anarchy of the international system.

ECOWAS AND THE WEST AFRICAN SECURITY COMMUNITY

As widely demonstrated by international news headlines in the past decade, the political situation in West Africa in the past 20 years can aptly be described as widespread disorder, reminiscent of Robert Kaplan's apocalyptic treatise—"The Coming Anarchy"—originally published in the *Atlantic Monthly* of February 1994. In the mid-1990s, five West African countries were engulfed in conflict, of which the violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone was the most devastating. The survival of the states and regimes in the sub-region has been threatened to a level where the area has constituted a *security complex* (Buzan 1983, pp. 186-229). It is primarily for this reason that the subregion's preeminent organization, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),[3] is serving more as a security community than as an economic grouping (Clapham 2002, p. 120).

As the first collective reaction to this situation, a group of the member states of ECOWAS, in 1990, formed a military wing of the organization, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and in August that year intervened in the conflict in Liberia.[4] This intervention by ECOWAS was as novel as it was historic. It clearly went beyond the imagination of its founding fathers when they signed the treaty in Lagos on May 28, 1975. As Nigerian scholar and diplomat Ibrahim Gambari noted, "whatever complications, dissension, and dissonance that might have existed over the establishment of ECOMOG, one element stands supreme: the consequences of the intervention for the subregion and for Africa as a whole are tremendous." The then Secretary-General of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim A. Salim, referred to the

intervention as "a very bold and very significant decision—an attempt by a group of African countries to say, "yes, we care about what is happening in our neighborhood." On its part, the Pan African News Agency (PANA) called it ECOWAS Political Baptism of Fire" (Gambari (1991, p. 132). Since then, ECOWAS has been involved in many other conflicts, including those in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal, and Guinea Bissau and, recently, in Cote d'Ivoire (Adebajo 2002).

Even though ECOWAS' operations have for some time now been dominated by conflict management activities, which at times involve humanitarian interventions, it is necessary to note that they do not detract from the organization's economic development objectives. Security management was not new to ECOWAS. As early as 1981, ECOWAS had adopted the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters. In fact, clause two, subsection j of article two of the organization's charter empowers the member states to get involved in any "activities calculated to further the aims of the community as the member states may, from time to time, undertake in common." After all, as the Ivorian former Foreign Minister and now the Secretary General of the African Union (AU) Amara Essy observed in 1998, without peace and security, the much sought economic integration in the ECOWAS context "will remain a mirage."[5]

LEADERSHIP ISSUES IN WEST AFRICA

Williams (1992) observed, that although it is ranked among the world's regional powers, Nigeria stands low on most of the power indices. However, relative to the other countries of West Africa, and, the African region as a whole (except South Africa), Nigeria stands out as a preeminent power. The country's preeminence derives primarily from two factors: the size of its population and its vast natural resources, particularly fossil oil and the enormously diversified vegetation and geological make-up.

Even though it has often been difficult to know the exact size of Nigeria's population, it is undoubtedly the most populous country in Africa. As Gambari (1989) noted, Nigeria has at all times been a country of the "largest concentration of African population." In my own opinion, Nigeria can be referred to as a "mega-country" in the West African context—depicting a situation in which the population of the country is larger than the total of the remaining 15 states of the subregion. The World Bank's 2002 *World Development Report* show that, with a population of 127 million, Nigeria accounts for more than half of the population of the West African (excluding Liberia). The population of the other 14 states is 103.934 million. Even when Liberia's population is added, it will make no difference. That country's population in 1998 was 2.969 million. Thus, the sheer size of Nigeria's population gives it an enormous room for influence over the other states in West Africa.[6]

Nigeria's economic boom, resulting from the export of oil since the end of the country's Civil War in the early 1970s, has been enormous. The oil has become the most important revenue-earning commodity for the country, and as Gambari (1989) observed, the country's membership in OPEC tends to assure it high world market prices and prestige. Compared to most other African countries, this has placed Nigeria in a better position to pay for its imports needed for domestic consumption and development. Apart from fossil oil, Nigeria is endowed with other important natural resources such as tin, columbite and coal, all of which are rare in Africa. Nigeria also stretches across a vast geographical area, covering different climatic and vegetation zones, thus assuring it great potentials for agricultural diversification.

Not only has Nigeria enjoyed higher degree of influence and prestige in the international community than other countries of West Africa, the country's internal problems are also watched more closely than those of its neighbors. This point was the subject of a roundtable discussion organized by the now defunct Overseas Development Council (ODC) in Washington, DC. The panel members noted that the importance of political stability in Nigeria lies not only in the

interest of its citizens, it is also necessary for the progress of West Africa as a whole.[7] On his part, Mr. Bill Clinton a former US president saw Nigeria as pivotal to Africa's progress and considered its democratic transition in the late 1990s as the most important event in Africa aside the "fall of apartheid" in South Africa.

NIGERIA'S LEADERSHIP SELF-PERCEPTION

Given its stance in the continent, it is perhaps not surprising that Nigerians, despite their internal disagreements, have never concealed their self-image as the political and economic giant of Africa. There is an endless list of statements made by the country's elites depicting that perception. For example, in a speech before the UN General Assembly in October 1979, the deposed president of Nigeria's Second Republic, Shehu Shagari, considered Nigeria to be on a racial mission, bearing the "black man's burden." The first military head of state of the country Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi reminded his ambassadors in Africa of Nigeria's leadership role on the continent.[8] Also, a former speaker of the Nigeria's House of Representatives Jaja Wachuku told his fellow citizens that their country's leadership role in Africa was godsend and that they should not abdicate the position. Even before the country's independence in 1960, such statements were common. For example, reacting against the failure African and Asian states to invite Nigeria to the Bandung Conference in 1955, the first governor-general of the country, Nandi Azikiwe, stated:

> ...any decision made at Bandung on the future of this [African] continent that does not take into account the fact that every sixth person in Africa is a Nigerian, is bound to blush like a flower that is born to blush unseen and waste its sweetness in the desert air.… The powers will do well to appreciate the historic mission and "manifest destiny" of Nigeria on the African continent.[9]

It should be noted that with the exception of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s, Nigeria has not perceived any significant threat to its security interest emanating from the immediate West African subregion. Nigeria felt that Nkrumah's staunch support for Pan-Africanism, his call for an African High Command, and his intense interest in the creation of continental African government were not without sinister motives. These suspicions were often supported by allegations that Nkrumah was carrying out destabilizing activities in African countries. Even though Nigeria claimed it considered Ghana as an "inconsequential rival", it was not until the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, and the deplorable economic and political malaise which accompanied it that the intensity of the rivalry was toned down.

Countries that Nigeria has perceived as real threats to its security interests are beyond its immediate borders. Nigeria has been preoccupied with what it has perceived to be military aggression and subversive activities of Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, whose pan-Islamic ideology is reminiscent of Nkrumah's pan-Africanist dreams (Baker 1986). Thus, Nigeria's suspicion of the motives of Ghana's Jerry John Rawlings, particularly at the initial stages of his populist regime was, therefore, not without historical antecedent as Rawlings has never concealed his admiration for both Nkrumah and Qadhafi.

Further, Nigeria has often believed that France sees it as the country that is likely to erode its persisting neocolonial influence in West Africa. The Nigerian Civil War did not only test the country's capability to prevent its disintegration, it also came to influence its international outlook, especially its policy towards the great powers, particularly France. Not only did the western powers fail to help the federal government to defend itself against the renegade

province of Biafra, France actually supported Biafra by funneling arms to it through its satellite states of Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire. Thus, Nigeria has since thought that a united West Africa with it (Nigeria) as the leader, would reduce the influence of external powers in the subregion and diminish the chance of its immediate neighbors being used as staging grounds of the powers that may aim to disintegrate it.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND YAWNING GAPS

There is no doubt that Nigeria has, on different occasions, shown its commitment to the actualization of this self-perception in Africa in general and West Africa in particular. Nigeria's most recent demonstration of subregional leadership has been the formation of ECOMOG, its financing and the contribution of troops, which has enabled the organization to intervene in conflicts in the area. Under its leadership, Nigeria got most of its neighbors on its side and with an initial numerical strength of 2,000 troops intervened, first in the Liberia's imbroglio and later in the other conflict-torn countries.

With the support of Togo, Nigeria had earlier played the leading role in the founding of ECOWAS itself in May 1975. On a larger scale, the country was instrumental in the negotiations of successive collective trade and aid agreements of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states with the European Union. For example, it was Nigeria's efforts that led to the removal of the reciprocity clauses from the original convention when it was signed in 1975.[10] There is no doubt that Nigeria has self-interest in all these activities, but it is equally true that the potential benefits to the other members are crucial.[11] Perhaps Nigeria's most and impact-making achievement was its leadership role in resolving the recent constitutional crises, first in Sao Tome and Principe and later in Togo. It must be recalled that under the staunch leadership displayed by the Obasanjo Government and with the combined pressure from the international community, particularly the ECOWAS and AU, constitutional order was restored in these two West African countries, thus preventing coup plotters from achieving their aim. As summarized by a Nigerian newspaper, "The resignation of Mr. Faure Gnassingbe as President of Togo… has shown that with a focused leadership, pressure can be an effective tool for Nigeria's policy in Africa."[12]

In spite of these contributions, there is no gainsaying the fact that, given the amount of resources that are available to it, Nigeria is yet to maximize its potentials as far as the translating of these resources into sustainable regional leadership status is concerned. Nigeria does not face any threat from its immediate neighbors and there is no evidence to show any foreseeable changes in the region's demographic make-up, economic structure, and military capabilities that will upset the structural balance. Moreover, the usually perceived threats from France are no longer credible because of declining French interest and influence. The main threats to Nigeria, as Achebe (1983) observed, are Nigerians themselves. To him, the country's problems are internal: unrelenting corruption, economic mismanagement, military usurpation,[13] frequent religious and communal unrest, and the precarious ethno-regional balance.

It must be admitted though, that there are external political forces that can and do frustrate Nigeria's leadership aspiration. For example, there is the usual international anarchy that any aspiring supranational leader will have to contend with. Also, the very idea of regional leadership runs counter to the commitment of "equality among states" and ideology of "juridical sovereignty" unyieldingly championed by Nigeria itself and which it has helped to entrench in the charters of Africa's organizations. Furthermore, the smaller states can and do seek economic and political protection from more powerful countries which they may consider less threatening than a "potentially predatory neighbor" (Clapham 2002). This was evidenced, first in the diplomatic efforts leading to the formation of ECOWAS in the mid-1970s[14] and the processes

leading to the formation of ECOMOG in 1990, both of which were spearheaded by Nigeria. As Chazan and others saw the latter case, "Nigeria's leadership in launching ECOMOG, in fact, rang alarming bells in some of the francophone West African capitals." The francophone-anglophone tension was reduced only after Nigeria had enlisted other states, notably the major francophone states of Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Benin (Chazan *et al* 1999, p 412).[15]

CONCLUSION

The essence of the argument in this paper is that most indicators show that even though Nigeria is the country which has both real and potential capabilities to play the needed leadership role in West Africa, the sustainability of this role can be ensured primarily by its ability to manifest behavior and practices that have a universal appeal to the other countries in that state system. In other words, for Nigeria to sustainably realize its leadership aspiration, it must develop national, cultural values that can serve as a model which other states in the region may find attractive. For example, in contrast to the former Soviet Union, the underlying strength of America's global reach goes beyond its economic power and military capabilities. It fundamentally includes the attractive power of its non-material resources, such as its popular culture, which include movies, television, fast foods and other forms of lifestyle. The American liberal ideology is not only attractive to people in many countries around the world, it also permeates preeminent global institutions like the UN system and the Bretton Woods organizations, thus giving the country what Nye has called "co-optive power" or the so-called soft power (Nye 1990, p. 191; see also Jackson and Sorensen 2003, pp. 196-202).

Conceived this way, I will suggest that Nigeria emulate the tradition and practices of a country like Botswana, which has achieved an enviable record of sociocultural sanity, political stability, and unparalleled economic growth. Unlike what Lewis (1993) called the "extremely unusual leadership" in Botswana—which is open, sober, humble, and effective—the leadership in Nigeria is corrupt and flamboyant with aggressive, avaricious, and ostentatious proclivities (Achebe 1983).[16] It was thus not surprising that in 1994, the influential weekly, *West Africa* devoted the entire cover story discussing the way Nigeria was being viewed by the outside world. Titled, "The Image Problem: Who is to blame?" the magazine showed how the behaviors of some elements in the country were distorting and tarnishing its image and, as a result, unfairly damaging the character of the highly enterprising, creative, law-abiding, decent, and considerate majority.

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Endnotes

1. Subsidiarity suggests that the responsibility for any situation belongs first to those who are nearest to the problem and that responsibility should be devolved to a higher body only if a solution cannot be found by the lower body.

2. This article is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, not only for his remarkable peacemaking initiatives, but also for his untiring efforts towards Africa's independence. This honor cannot come at a more propitious time as Africa is currently in a dire search for effective regional leadership to enable it to realize its dream of collective security management as a means of translating its independence into improving the welfare of its people.

3. ECOWAS is made up of 15 countries: Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Mauritania has withdrawn its membership.

4. The member countries that originally founded ECOMOG were The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo. They were later joined by Guinea and Sierra Leone.

5. ECOWAS has made significant efforts at achieving its objective of economic integration in recent years. For example, it has created a subregional insurance scheme called the ECOWAS Brown Card, it has institutionalized the ECOWAS Parliament, it is implementing its provision on free movement of people within the subregion, it is undertaking the construction of roads to link the member states, and making concrete efforts towards the creation of a common currency zone and formation of a subregional airline company.

6. Even at the continent level, the size of Nigeria's population relative to that of the others in the region is a force to reckon with.

7. www.odc.org/commentary/nigeria.html
8. Contained in his remarks to the Regional Conference of Heads of Missions in Africa, Lagos June 9, 1966. Cited by Stremlau (1977, p. 3).
9. Cited by Ohaegbulam (1982, p. 6)
10. This was the so-called Lome Conventions, named after the national capital of Togo where the original agreement was signed in 1975. It is currently called the Cotonou Agreement, a name adopted when it was revised and signed in the national capital of Benin in 2000.
11. Also, Nigeria was at the forefront of Africa's efforts to liberate itself from all forms of colonial domination, including the heinous and abominable *apartheid* system in South Africa.
12. See *This Day*, 2005, "In Togo, It's Victory for Nigeria," March 3, Lagos.
13. It was, therefore, easy for the rebel forces in the worn-torn countries in the subregion to ignore ECOWAS initiatives on the ground that the peacemaking states, most of whom did not have legitimate government at home, had no moral authority to interfere in their internal affairs.
14. The creation of Communaute economique de l'Afrique de louest (CEAO) by five francophone states—with active support of France—in 1973 was primarily meant to balance the influence which Nigeria was going to have over ECOWAS, which was to be launched in 1975. As explained by the then President of Niger, Diori Hamani, the move was meant to prevent Nigeria from "swallowing them up" (Bach 1983, pp. 608-609).
15. In his reaction to what was perceived as a heavy anglophone concentration in the conflict management initiative, the former Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny convened a meeting in the Ivorian capital at the end of June 1991 to discuss the issue. This prompted ECOWAS to create a new body called the Committee of Five, which included countries from anglophone, francophone, and lusophone counties. Not only did it help to dilute the perceived anglophone concentration in the conflict management scheme, it also endowed the ECOWAS conflict management initiative with a degree of trust and legitimacy. For example, Senegal committed troops when Abdou Diof became the Chairman of ECOWAS. (Chazan *et al,* 1999, p. 412).
16. Botswana's achievements must not necessarily be credited to the smallness of its population size and relative homogeneity of its ethnic make-up. They are primarily a result of the quality of its leadership and institutions.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE LIBERIAN CRISIS: INSIGHTS AND PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS

by

MICHAEL SOMUA ASANTE, Ph.D.

Until the recent exile of Charles Taylor, the Liberian crisis seemed to have defied solution. What started in late 1989 as a mission by a small band of armed rebels under the leadership of Taylor to forcefully remove President Samuel Doe from office, evolved into a brutal, protracted, factional civil war that was rooted in tribal rivalries, conflicting ideologies, and personal ambition. The result was the slaughter of thousands of civilians and displacement of numerous Liberians who became refugees, locally and in neighboring countries. Taylor's victory and subsequent election did not result in long-term stability and going by events of the past two decades or so, one can safely predict a recurrence of the crisis if new pragmatic measures are not taken to break the cycle of wars and chaos.

Nonetheless, the current break in the cycle of violence should provide an opportunity to take a critical look at the history and background of the crisis and bring attention to the roots of the seemingly unsolvable problem. The thrust of this paper is that it is impossible to explain the political instability, the succession of leaders who lack widespread legitimacy, the cycle of multi-factional civil wars, and the consequent failure of mediation efforts without due consideration of some key historical facts. A mediation strategy that would bring a long-term solution to the crisis cannot be formulated without adequate attention to the history of Liberia, in particular, inter-ethnic relations, and the consequences of Americo-Liberian settlement and attitudes.

This historical review is intended to put in perspective the animosities, ethnic rivalries, and economic inequities that have produced the highly unstable political environment, as well as to help develop pragmatic answers and a lasting solution.

ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND RIVALRY

Historical accounts show that since the fifteenth century, the area occupied by present day Liberia has been plagued with political competition and power struggles, leading to a constant movement of populations and shifting centers of alliance among chieftains and confederations. Records from 1962 revealed a total of 16 government-recognized ethnic groups (other estimates suggest as many as twenty-eight), members of which identified much more strongly with their communities than they did with the modern state of Liberia.

Ethnicity in Liberia, like most of Africa, is a conscious state of belonging, whereby a group of people identify with each other and differentiate themselves from third parties on the basis of a broad configuration of common factors: language; historical homeland; mutual interests; solidarity and cooperation in social and economic transactions; similarity of customs; and political unity.[1]

Accounts from the eighteenth century tell of groups that frequently changed their habitation—wandering bands of between four and five hundred people, and kings without land.[2] Those accounts also relate the successive domination of the area by linguistic groups such as the De and the Vai in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Temne and the Mende in the

seventeenth century, the Mandingo Confederation in the eighteenth century, and the Gola Confederation in the nineteenth century.[3] The westward expansion of the Mende people since medieval times forced the southward immigration of smaller groups, such as the De, the Bassa, the Kru, the Gola, the Temne, the Kissi and the Bakom.[4]

The concentration of several independent and culturally distinctive ethnic groups in the area resulted in an intense competition for control of land and trade. The incessant warfare, restlessness, competition and power struggles resulting from shifting alliances and centers of power established the grounds for a subsequent politically unstable region.[5] Historically, some ethnic groups were politically autonomous and culturally unique in several respects. The Vai, for example, has long been known for their independence and advanced culture, having developed their own script in the nineteenth century. They were, at some time, a dominant group known to have subjected others to slavery. The Bassas, to date, have rigidly stuck to their traditional religions and social behavior, much as their ancestors had done. The Mandingos, meanwhile, used to be a major political and military force in much of West Africa. Their involvement in trade afforded them special prestige among other ethnic groups in the region. Mandingo adoption of Islam, and reluctance to intermarry with other tribes, has set them apart as a proud "enlightened" group.

There exist several other examples of similarly unique groups in Liberia. Although they cohabited in a small area, the forces that divided the ethnically and religiously diverse people, and eventually their common country, have been overwhelmingly greater than those that tended to unite them. History, the diversity and uniqueness of cultures, a preponderance of ethnic religions, and the tendency for the various groups to remain attached to their cultures and ethnicity have persisted, reinforcing the ongoing competition and rivalry.

COLONIZATION AND NEW COMPLEXITIES.

Besides Sierra Leone, Liberia was an experiment in the repatriation of freed slaves from the United States. In both cases, the former slaves, who arrived at the height of competition for land, trade routes, and political power between the indigenous ethnic groups, chiefdoms and confederacies, gradually developed the attitudes of an alien settler community in their relations with the indigenous Africans, eventually dominating them politically, economically, and socially. Suggestions from American leaders such as Thomas Jefferson, Governor James Monroe of Virginia, James Forten, freed slaves of the Philadelphia Baptist Church, and the American Colonization Society for the establishment of Black States[6] eventually popularized the idea that the only feasible solution was to create a colony on the west coast of Africa. This new colony in West Africa could serve as a refuge for those who desired to return to the land of their ancestors and also for the others who had been freed from intercepted slave trading vessels. Historical accounts show that implementation of this scheme was not easy. In 1822, American naval officers, accompanying the first settlers to arrive in Liberia, engaged in protracted negotiations with Bassa and Dey chieftains for permission to land. Some accounts indicate that the natives were coerced into a deal. Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton of the U.S. Navy is reported to have made them negotiate at gunpoint,[7] eventually succeeding in securing the sale of Cape Mesurada for $300 worth of muskets, beads, tobacco, gunpowder, and other items. The indigenous negotiators only belatedly realized the full implications of this as well as an endless string of land sales to the "alien" settlers from America.

Following Stockton's purchase, some 1,200 freed men formed a colony along the coast. One after the other, all bearing American names such as Maryland, Bassa Cove, and Mississippi, was established, resulting in the settlement of some 22,000 immigrants in Liberia in the nineteenth century.

When Liberia became a sovereign state in 1847, leaders of the settler group considered it their mission to bring "civilization" to the "tribal heathens" of the hinterland. Reasons were advanced to expand Liberian influence beyond the original coastal settlements. It was argued that defense and natural growth of the colony demanded that Liberia expanded into the interior. The Americo-Liberians, as the settlers are still sometimes called, disregarded the marked contrasts between their culture and those of the indigenous people, and the fact that the process of expansion created a relationship of political dependency between themselves and members of several tribal groups. It was a relationship that was similar to that between whites and Africans in other parts of the continent. Apart from culture, the dependency relationship was based on barriers erected by the settlers against widespread assimilation of the indigenous peoples Dubious land acquisitions, modeled after Stockton's first purchase in 1822,[8] facilitated the expansion of political control over the subordinated ethnic groups. In some cases, lands were acquired on the basis of unrecorded purchases.

The establishment of protectorate relationships with certain indigenous groups, who were more wary of their historical neighbors than the "strangers" from America, helped to expand political control over subordinated indigenous groups, certain treaties, prominent among them, the one between General J. J. Roberts and Chief Gatumba of Boporu, were concluded following defeat of the natives by the superior Liberian military forces. General Roberts' victory convinced other chiefs about the potential military power of the settler forces, compelling them to succumb to the ongoing territorial expansion and political domination. Commercial treaties negotiated in the 1850's with the Vai, Gola, and Loma tribes were quickly converted into Liberian deeds of ownership of the territories involved.[9]

The settlers also emulated their British and French counterparts, who at the time, were competing for control of the West African interior, by assuming that journeys of exploration provided the sponsoring state with a claim to any territory discovered by the traveler. There is evidence that, as late as the early decades of the twentieth century, the Grebo, the Kru, and the Mandingo stalwartly resisted settler expansion and economic dominance. Although the settlers eventually won a series of protracted military confrontations, the deep-rooted animosity generated in the process appears to have persisted even until the present. As the foregoing illustrate, in most cases, the expansion of settler influence in Liberia was not consensual but rather through force and deception. At the same time, because the bulk of Americo-Liberians remained clustered on the coast, the authority of the Liberian government, which they dominated, remained extremely weak in vast ethnic areas of the interior.

SUSTAINED INDIGENOUS REJECTION OF THE GOVERNMENT

Military-backed territorial expansion did not necessarily dislocate the established kingdoms and nation states. The Mandingos, for example, would not give up their Muslim faith. In addition, they continued to regard themselves as a noble, superior race, although they were being manipulated to offset threats from the Golas, the Vai and the Dei, who were bent on maintaining their political autonomy. The Krus and the Grebos, who enjoyed relative freedom from interference in their trade with foreign merchants, perceived the Liberian government's anti-slavery activities, and efforts to establish custom agents at the ports, to be a direct threat to their economic lifeline. Hence, long after the first settlers had won their battles, inter-ethnic conflicts, and "rebellions" against settler rule were the order of the day.

In 1856, for example, Grebo protesters reacted to attempts to move some indigenous people out of their native lands with a series of devastating attacks on government posts and facilities.[10] Again in 1893, some Grebos vigorously and violently protested the settler government's failure to honor certain rights of Grebo chiefs to the extent of declaring themselves to be under British

protection. Both uprisings were suppressed by military force. In an attempt to maintain their own sovereignty, some Gola chieftains refused to deal with the government, and, consequently, were excluded from the then emerging political system. Overall, the cycle of state-tribal conflicts continued, becoming more violent with time. The chronicle of inter-tribal conflict and anti-government rebellion in post-colonization Liberia is very long indeed.

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN LIBERIA

Although some level of assimilation occurred between settlers and the indigenous people, the prescribed form of integration was decidedly on Americo-Liberian terms and conditioned on the indigenous people's acceptance and adoption of various aspects of settler culture. Moreover, the indigenous people were compelled to accept the myth regarding the political and economic dominance of the Americo-Liberian settlers, and the negligible role of indigenous people in the founding of Liberia. There was no welcome for indigenous individuals who aspired to full participation in the emerging society.

The system of political administration, sometimes called indirect rule, evolved through several stages up to the April 1980 Samuel Doe-led coup which toppled the long-established Americo-Liberian-dominated political system.[11] The core principle of indirect rule was a near complete subordination of local administrators to the central government. A host of laws were utilized to implement the system, although the capacity to administer them was lacking. In 1908, in order to expand the central government's authority, the Liberian Frontier Force was established[11] to drive home the government's capacity to effectively occupy the whole country.[12] The Kru revolt, and the Gola war in 1918, represented the last violent efforts of indigenous people to reject the central government. Those revolts were bound to fail, given the powerful political system that was successfully assuming greater and greater control.

Subsequent administrations increasingly intervened in tribal political and economic affairs, further eroding traditional authority and reinforcing the central government's control over land. Different administrations, in particular the tenure of President Charles King (1920-1930), were marked by exploitation and abuse. Some government-appointed commissioners (administrators) are reported to have run their territories in the manner of autonomous petty despots, and used their offices for personal enrichment. There were accounts of slavery, forced export of laborers to Spanish plantations on the island of Fernando Po, exchange of indentured servants for money, and use of compulsory unpaid labor. One report observed that as late as 1962, a quarter of the wage earning labor force was recruited involuntarily.[13]

The core principle of indirect rule was the manipulation of traditional indigenous authorities into instruments to be utilized by the central government to maintain law and order at the local level. This strategy helped to perpetuate divisions among the indigenous peoples of the hinterland, and resulted in a country comprising a diverse collection of virtually autonomous chiefdoms. Such an arrangement made governance easy, but, at the same time, helped native institutions to flourish and reinforced ethnic divisions. Liberia was a classic case of a weak state seeking to assert itself over a host of diverse strong societies.[13]

The fundamental nature of Liberia's political and economic life effectively set the stage for continued political turbulence and unending exploitation and abuse by the settlers. Politicians at the national level controlled a lion's share of economic wealth, and the government itself became an important source of income for their supporters and activists.

EMERGENCE OF AMERICO-LIBERIAN DIVISIONS

After subduing the natives and assuming absolute political and economic power, the settler community eventually began to disintegrate into classes due to internal struggles for dominance. In this contest, pigmentation and occupational prestige split the ranks of the Americo-Liberians, with mulattoes (lighter skinned) feeling superior to the darker skinned, and merchants, civil servants, and rural farmers contesting with each other. Such divisions culminated in a virtual caste system in Liberia comprising four distinct orders: the official class, the common people, the "recaptives", and lastly the Africans.[14] The Mulatto elite, who occupied the highest level, avoided close interaction and marriage with the lower strata. Merchants, politicians, administrators, and church officials found a common bond of brotherhood, which facilitated the distribution of political and economic favors among themselves, and helped to maintain Mulatto hegemony.[15]

With time, the social, political and economic make up of Liberia became even more complicated, and the nation became embroiled in an even more complex mix of conflicts: between the tribes, each of whom still aspired for autonomy; between the tribes and the government, which to most indigenous people was an alien imposition; and between those controlling the government and those dominating the economy. The stage had effectively been set for a protracted crisis.

THE CIVIL WAR AND EFFORTS AT MEDIATION

The brutality of the Liberian civil war, the stubbornness of the factional leaders and the resulting failure to reach a settlement, all emanated from the historical experiences of the various groups and the contemporary political and economic arrangements. As became evident during the civil war and its aftermath, notably, the fate of Charles Taylor, it has been a contest in which there can be no clear winner, even if there was a semblance of military victory. The ongoing crisis is simply a continuation of the culture of conflicts that has plagued Liberia since pre-colonial times.

In 1985, after Samuel Doe was declared winner of the presidential elections, he brutally suppressed a coup attempt led by Thomas Quiwomkpa, a Gio. Doe's Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) engaged in bloody reprisals against real and suspected opponents, targeting mainly Gios and Manos. Hundreds were killed and/or detained without charge. The Taylor incursion was launched from Cote de Ivoire into Nimba, his home county where he enjoyed massive support from his ethnic group and the discontented Gios and Manos. The AFL responded with a ruthless counter insurgency campaign, indiscriminately killing civilians, burning villages, raping and looting mainly in Nimba areas. This brutality served only to swell the ranks of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), many of whom were Gios and Manos. The NPFL, for its part, targeted suspected supporters of the Doe regime, particularly members of the Krahn and Mandingo tribes. By the summer of 1990, the war had spread to Monrovia, the capital city, with the atrocities committed by all sides reaching astounding proportions.

The main factions at that time reflected severe fractures:

I. *The Interim Government of National Unity*: Set up in 1990 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as a transitional authority to organize post-war elections for a new democratic government, this government, headed by Amos Sawyer, was recognized by most of the international community, in spite of its apparent lack, of any authority. Its main military force was remnants of the Liberian Armed Forces, which, with the assistance

of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces, had been able to protect Monrovia from other factions, and barely hang on to the capital while Charles Taylor's Gbanga-based self-declared government controlled a large chunk of the country.[iii]

II. *The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)*: The NPFL leader, Charles Taylor, had been the most criticized of all the factional leaders due to the belief that his intransigence caused the then-prolonged stalemate in peace negotiations. It was this faction that started the invasion to remove Samuel Doe from office and triggered the subsequent phase of the crisis. By June 1992, Charles Taylor-controlled twelve out of thirteen counties.[16] Evidently recognizing his military advantage, he offered little compromise. Taylor rejected the ECOWAS plan that appointed the interim government, and formed his own administration, declaring himself the sovereign ruler of Liberia, on the principle of territorial supremacy. His faction defied all agreements that were brokered in a series of negotiations, refusing to disarm, and using force to keep a captive population compliant. Taylor contended that ECOMOG was an agent of Nigerian expansionism in Liberia and called for its replacement by a UN force, an indication of his lack of confidence in the mediation process.

III. *The United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO)*: Formed in 1991 by mostly Krahn ex-AFL soldiers who had fled to Sierra Leone in advance of the Taylor forces, ULIMO's political agenda was unclear, but like all others, it claimed to seek peace and democracy for Liberia. The largely Muslim group was a coalition of pro-Doe, anti-Taylor forces. It is on record that ULIMOs conduct in the areas it captured in 1992 included attacks on civilians, looting, and execution of suspected NPFL sympathizers.

The ULIMO leader, Alhaji Kromah, was a former Information Minister under Samuel Doe, and member of the mainly Muslim Mandingo tribe, which was allied with the Krahn, and became victims of Taylor's forces during the war. Kromah, on occasion referring to the coup that ended 133 years of settler domination, regarded Samuel Doe as a symbol of the termination of Americo-Liberian hegemony. ULIMO recognized the IGNU but refused to allow it to administer territories it had captured from the NPFL.

IV. *Other Factions*: ULIMO's emergence affirmed the worst fears of observers that there would be even more warring factions in Liberia at that time. A split in ULIMO's political leadership, between Alhaji Kromah and Raleigh Seehie, foreshadowed further splintering. At least two breakaway warlords surfaced in Lofa County in April 1993, and a shadowy group called the Nimba Redemption Council also emerged in Nimba.

The crisis remained highly complicated with deep ethnic roots, with origins that were not merely the recent incidents following the Samuel Doe coup or the elections of 1985. There were numerous reasons to predict correctly that the military intervention by ECOWAS and the US to stop the fighting and the suffering of the population would only be a short-term solution unless the deep historical roots of the crisis were given full consideration. This was later proven by ECOMOG and other failed diplomatic efforts.

UNSUCCESSFUL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

Liberia was the first attempt by ECOWAS, a mainly economic organization, to intervene in a political/military crisis. The first response, decided at the 1990 summit in Abuja (the Nigerian capital), was to dispatch a military intervention force.[iv] As has been indicated earlier, although the ECOMOG found itself engaged in a series of combats with one faction or another, in particular the NPFL, it achieved some short-lived objectives: relative peace was restored in Monrovia; some factions were confined to barracks, at least temporarily; and, an interim government was established.

Subsequent to those achievements, it became clear that ECOWAS was not equipped to move to the next level: maintaining the peace, and bridging the political and ethnic divisions. A long series of ECOWAS-sponsored peace talks aimed at seeking disarmament and the encampment of all warring factions to be followed by elections, achieved little success. To the frustration of ECOWAS, the factions consistently refused to comply with the terms of ECOWAS-sponsored, difficult and complicated negotiations. With time, ECOWAS and its military apparatus apparently took sides in the crisis, cooperating with some factions against others. The outcome was that some factions criticized the conduct of ECOMOG and accused Nigeria of not being impartial.

Ultimately, four years of protracted negotiations yielded little. As maintained earlier, the reason is clear: ECOWAS failed to take into account the most significant reasons for the crisis: historical animosity among the parties, and deep-rooted ethnic grievances. The outcomes of shuttle diplomacy, summits and conferences: disarmament, confinement to barracks and democratic elections were mere palliatives.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

Traditionally, the OAU played a minimal role in the crisis, allowing ECOWAS to play the leading role. Again, this was the first time the organization had to deal with a crisis of such magnitude. Bankrupt of resources, and lacking a full knowledge base, the Organization simply tabled the crisis for debate at every annual summit, and appointed former Zimbabwean President, Rev. Canaan Banana, as special envoy to Liberia in a bid to establish a permanent conflict-management body, but with minimal effect, if any at all. With Taylor's assumption to power, ECOWAS pretended everything was normal.

THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) APPROACH

The UN, for a long time, took the backstage on the Liberian crisis. During his tenure, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali supported regional and sub-regional initiatives in conflict management and mediation. This was suggestive of an emerging approach whereby local regional organizations would be allowed to intervene and mediate in local crises. Among other things, the UN: (i) endorsed ECOWAS efforts to solve the crisis; (ii) endorsed the special envoy to Liberia; (iii) footed the bills for logistics, such as the cost of ECOMOG, humanitarian aid, conferences, etc; (iv) proposed an arms embargo on Liberia at the bidding of the OAU; (v) sent an observer mission of about 360 to monitor the series of cease-fires and anticipated elections; and vi) belatedly co-chaired the fifth round of talks (*Geneva II*). In addition, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and the World Food Program provided on-and-off aid to alleviate the suffering of refugees and other victims. The UN also dutifully sounded the alarm whenever the humanitarian consequences of war worsened. What the UN did not do,

however, raised questions about its priorities and possible changing role in international crisis management. It stopped short of sending its own peacekeepers and refused to directly manage the negotiation process. To some observers, this smacked of double standards. The perception was that, regardless of the extent of casualties and human suffering, African crises were not worthy of the full attention and resources of the world body.

Considering that the dead and wounded in Liberia have been estimated at hundreds of times more than those in the Balkans, for example, and considering the extent of involvement of the UN and the United States in that crisis, the above argument sounds credible. The theory that the urgency assigned to international crises is closely linked to graphic television images and horrifying journalist accounts also seems to be credible.

Further, there is evidence that the then Chairman of ECOWAS, Benin's President Nicephore Soglo, openly invited the UN to take a leading role in negotiations when regional initiatives proved ineffective, and trust between some ECOMOG states and Charles Taylor evaporated. After a massacre at Harbel, for example, IGNU's information minister Lamine Waritay, appealed to the UN to "come to Liberia's rescue and save Liberians from themselves." But the UN's position did not change.

THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE WAS LARGELY MONETARY

US policies concerning Liberia had been critical throughout the crisis because of the historical connections and the long-standing special relations between the two countries. However, policies of the US were similar to the UN. The State Department maintained that the administration viewed the ECOWAS peace plans as the best hope for solving the crisis. In accordance with this, the US played a largely financial role. Between 1990 and 1992, the US government allocated over $320 million, $30.8 million of which supported the deployment of ECOMOG troops, and $19.8 million for a UN trust fund to pay for the troops, for disarmament and projected elections. A major contradiction in this policy was the refusal to recognize the ECOWAS-appointed interim government, an action that tended to strengthen the resolve of some of the factions and further hinder a settlement. The US formally condemned the support Bourkina Fasso gave to Charles Taylor's faction, and in what seemed to be the first tangible indication of US decisiveness, the ambassador in Ouagadougou was recalled and a new Bourkina envoy to Washington was prevented from assuming his post.

It remains unclear whether this attitude on the part of the US had been due to disinterest, distractions by important issues elsewhere, or simply a lack of capacity to help in a realistic practical manner. The commonly held opinion among Africans, however, is that the US let down the people of Liberia, who had hitherto assumed a solid historical alliance. The series of demonstrations in Monrovia pleading with the US to intervene, suggest that Liberians considered themselves connected in some special way.

WHAT COULD THE UNITED STATES DO TODAY

The increased attention given to Liberia by the Bush administration suggests some greater concern for the traumatized Liberians, and the continued instability the crisis has brought to the whole of West Africa. It is disappointing that President Bush's July 2003 visit to the continent has thus far produced nothing significant, except the short-lived heightened anticipation of policies and genuine action to help bring some long-term peace and stability. Clearly, considering the history of the crisis, a permanent solution is not expected to be easy. A stopgap measure would only defer the crisis to the future. Although the military has proven to be a

useful instrument for stabilizing the situation, a pragmatic long-lasting settlement cannot be achieved merely by arranging disarmament, demobilization and largely farcical democratic elections.

Regardless of whether the leading role comes from the US, ECOWAS, OAU or UN, it is crucial to tackle the roots of division among Liberians, recognizing the critical fact that Liberia is a complex multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. The different ethnic, and religious groups, and the prevailing economic disparity, imply extreme divergence of political and economic aspirations, values and perspectives, which tend to create a fractured society. Consequently, the state of Liberia has been a particularly weak entity. There exist strong allegiances to ethnicity and kinship. Economic, political, and social competition and inequities, as well as centuries-old cultural barriers cannot be overlooked.

So far, it has been commonly presumed that Liberians can become a united people under one legitimate strong central government. Events in Sierra Leone, Rwanda/Burundi, Zaire, Cote D'Ivoire, and Nigeria have proven that this is not yet true in most of Africa. The most feasible arrangement would be a political and economic system that allows reasonable autonomy or genuine representation for the different ethnic groups, and which, at the same time, fosters a strong unifying central government that cannot be dominated by any. There is a better chance that factional leaders and their followers will soften their stance and compromise if they are convinced that a new equitable system can be achieved.

In the current trend of international political and economic order in which Liberia and Africa remain increasingly marginalized, there may be few incentives to pay adequate attention to Liberia. However, present realities suggest that, as the US seeks to advance her military, political and economic interests, it is in her own long-term interest to deal with Liberia in a pragmatic manner. Believe it or not, Liberia and similar countries have become potentially fertile breeding grounds for the forces of terror.

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TAUKEI (INDIGENOUS PEOPLES) AND MULTIETHNIC POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI

by

MARILYN E. LASHLEY, Ph.D. with STACEY-ANN WILSON, Ph.D.

For many Americans, knowledge of the Republic of Fiji is limited to its fame as an exotic tropical tourist destination or to its infamy as a pacific island nation hobbled by repeated *coup d'etats*. However, by examining problems of governance and indigenous rights in the Republic of Fiji we not only become familiar with these pacific islands but we also greatly enrich our knowledge and understanding of politics in multiethnic societies. For example, contrary to the overly simplistic reports by journalists for international media, the series of Coups staged in Fiji since 1987 are not merely the result of racial conflict—In fact, the conflict is not racial but ethnic and arises from political and economic inequality. Rather, the conflict is over whether or how control of the political apparatus of state—sovereignty—should be shared among the indigenous Fijians and other ethnic groups in the Republic of Fiji. Given the centrality and salience of this question to governance, understanding politics in Fiji is instructive and has important implications for formulating viable solutions to problems of power sharing in other nations that were also created by expropriating the land and usurping the rights of indigenous peoples, particularly in Australia, Canada and the United States.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and discuss the central causes of political unrest in the Republic of Fiji. Therefore, we define the concepts of sovereignty and "indigenousness," and present a brief overview of the political and economic history, processes of political mobilization, and evolution of the Republic of Fiji as a democratic state. Thereby, we also address the following questions: What is the nature of political rule in the Republic of Fiji? Who actually rules? Who ought to rule? In addressing these questions, we find that the legacy of British colonialism that established and still sustains Fiji as an ethnically compartmentalized dual economy controlled by offshore interests, also fuels continued underdevelopment of Fijian communities and severely constrains the exercise of sovereignty. We also find that most Fijians remain mired in poverty despite having retained ownership of the land and having regained political control. Finally, we conclude that political distrust fomented by British practices of divide and rule, maintaining a dual economic system, and controlling land use collectively undermines shared governance by the dominant polities, Fijians and Indians.

The post-independence political instability in the Republic of Fiji is caused by ethnic conflict arising from indigenous peoples exercising sovereign rights in a rigid ethnically structured society with an externally controlled economy. Because the sovereign rights of indigenous peoples is at the heart of the questions above, this paper necessarily begins by defining and discussing sovereignty and indigenousness. Sovereignty is defined as "the power or authority which comprises the attributes of an ultimate arbitral agent (a person or body of persons) entitled to make decisions and settle disputes within a political hierarchy with some degree of finality" (Miller 1997 p. 492). Herein decision-making (discretion) implies independence from external powers and ultimate authority or dominance over internal groups. The proper exercise of sovereignty must fulfill four fundamental attributes: location, sequence, effect, and autonomy. Location describes where power is vested; the sovereign is the highest power in a political-legal system. Sequence describes the decision-making hierarchy, whereby the sovereign has the final or ultimate power of discretion within a political-legal system. Effect

describes the sovereign's capacity to influence the overall flow of action. Autonomy describes the independence of the sovereign in its relations with other agents (which cannot be subject to internal or external domestic or foreign agents). Sovereignty does not necessarily rest in one agent but can be vested among a plurality of agents, including legislators in an assembly, branches of government or states in federation while maintaining discretionary autonomy and final authority (ibid. p. 492-493). Hence sovereign rights are the highest, final and most general power or authority within an autonomous state.

Indigenous, on the other hand, is generally defined as "the first peoples" inhabiting the land who are encountered by explorers claiming discovery and seeking to occupy the newly "discovered" land. For indigenous peoples, land is intrinsic to identity as self, tribe and nation. Beginning with Columbus, claims of discovery spurred debates all across Europe on the rights of indigenous peoples (the "Indians"). According to Havemann, the resulting discourses and treatises in legal jurisprudence were actually debates over power—the obligations of rulers to their subjects and the rights of those subjects (2000, p.13). For more than four centuries (1492-1921) Euro-American laws of nations and indigenous peoples derived from one of two fundamental arguments: 1.) that indigenous peoples had rights given their status as human beings or 2.) that indigenous peoples had no rights given their state of "backwardness" and level of development (as pre-feudal or feudal nomadic hunter-gatherers). Those arguing the former, for example, Francisco Victoria (in 1526) and Pope Paul III (in 1537), rejected Pope Alexander VI's *Inter Caetera* in 1493 (Bull of Donation) granting the Kings of Spain all the world not already possessed by Christian states for Catholic evangelism and the doctrine of discovery (unless *terra nullius*) and notions that likened Indians to "infants" in the tutelage of the sovereign. For example, John Locke (in 1690), deemed indigenous people as "being in a state of nature" that disqualifies Indian society from recognition as a legitimate form of political society" and later Sir William Blackstone (in 1765) codified Indians as "unqualified for recognition as owners of the land 'for they lived in the state of primeval simplicity'" (ibid. p.13-17). Others, such as Samuel Pufendorf (in 1688) held that as property owners "Indians are within their rights to exclude even Europeans from their lands." Whereas Hugo Grotius (in 1604) and later Emmerich de Vattel (in 1758) promoted recognition of indigenous sovereignty which they "defined as independence from domination by any other nation; the right of self-government for any politically organized society is recognized in this context. Such a society might make treaties and cede self-rule. The doctrine of discovery could validate the subordination of wandering tribes without political-economic organization arising from the 'natural obligation' [of the European 'discoverers'] to cultivate the earth' and protect the weak. This is said to have influenced British doctrine on the acquisition of territory—the use of treaties...and *terra nullius*" (Ibid. p.15).

After practicing enslavement, genocide, subjugation and marginalization in one form or another for five centuries, the dominant Euro-American nations finally acknowledged the rights of indigenous peoples via the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. Subsequently the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations defined the characteristics of indigenous as follows: Indigenous peoples as have a priority in time over the land, voluntary perpetuation of their cultural distinctiveness, self-identification as indigenous, and experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion and discrimination by the dominant society (ibid. p20). Britain complied with the UN directives by initiating a process for the orderly transfer of the British Crown Colony of Fiji and on October 10, 1970 sovereignty over the Fiji Islands was transferred to the Fijians and other citizens of Fiji.

EARLY SOVEREIGNS OF THE FIJI ISLANDS
Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans[1]

The Fiji Islands consists of some 300 islands and 540 islets scattered throughout the Koro Sea in the South Pacific Ocean that comprise part of the Melanesian cultural area. Fiji has a total land area of approximately 1,000,000 square miles located 1,300 miles north of New Zealand and east of Australia. Only 100 of the islands, accounting for a total land area of 7,056 square miles, are inhabited. Fiji has a total population estimated at 821,000 in 2001 primarily residing in the two largest islands Viti Levu (great Fiji) and Vanua Levu. The current population consists of Fijians (52%) and Rotumans (1.3%), East Indians (a.k.a. Indo-Fijians, 44%), Chinese (.7%), Europeans (.4%), and all others. From 1874 until 1970, Fiji was a British Crown Colony. At independence in 1970, Fiji became a parliamentary democracy under British dominion and a member of the Commonwealth with its head of state, the governor-general, chosen by the Crown. On May 14, 1987 Fiji became a Republic by means of nonviolent coup d'etat.

The Fiji islands first inhabitants arrived from Melanesia at least 3500 years ago and the customary culture was shaped by Polynesian and Micronesian as well as Melanesian Papuan influences over the course of time. Prior to cession, the Fiji islands were organized into several loose and competing confederacies. The Bau, from the eastern side of Viti Levu (the largest and most populous island), asserted their hegemony over the western islands of the Koro Sea while the Rewa were ascendant over some eastern parts of Viti Levu and the Lau were dominant in the eastern islands and in Vanua Levu. Fijian society was primarily feudal and centered around the *mataqali* (clan or tribe) which were headed by hereditary chiefs (*Rau*). The chiefs were of differing rank with some chiefs traditionally subordinate to other chiefs. Paramount chiefs comprised an ascriptive aristocracy *Bose Vakaturaga* (Council of Chiefs) and "wield by turn the sceptre, the spear and the spade" and "a Fijian is implicitly submissive to the will of his chief" (Griffin 2003 p.47). Ownership of land was collective and *lewenivanua* (commoners, tillers of the land) owed the first fruits of the harvest to the chiefs as *lala* (goods or services due to a chief from his or her people)—like serfs to their overlords. This practice symbolized a tacit division of labor and responsibility among the *taukei* and cemented bonds of trust and faith between the *turaga* (village chiefs) and *lewenivanua* (Lal 1992 p. 14).

BRITISH CROWN COLONY

Although the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman first sighted the Fiji islands in 1643, early British and other European settlers included escaped convicts and sailors from Australia and Christian, primarily Methodist, missionaries. Commercial interest in the Fiji Islands was wetted first by the discovery of sandalwood in the early 19th century and in the 1820s by the growing *beche-de-mer* (sea cucumber) trade. Colonization and the first wave of massive settlement in Fiji were launched in the 1860s by a boom in cotton prices caused by the American Civil War. Similar to patterns of settlement and colonization of New Zealand, disputes over land and sovereignty within and between European and indigenous Fijian communities as well as problems with labor imported from other Pacific Islands led to violent confrontations and tribal instability. In 1865, seven independent chiefs representing the states (provinces) of Bau, Lakeba, Rewa, Lau, Cakaudrove, Macuata and Nuduri formed a Fijian confederacy that drafted and ratified Fiji's first constitution. Each province was a member of the General Assembly, which elected Chief Cakobau as its first President, who served for two consecutive years. However, this governing body collapsed when Chief Ma'afu of Lau, a Tongan, sought the presidency. In 1867, Chief Ma'afu formed the Confederation of North and East Fiji, consisting of Lau, Cakaudrove and Bau, and assumed its chairmanship as *Tui Lau* (Paramount Chief of the Confederacy).

In 1871, Seru Cakobau announced a new government replete with Ministers, to which Ma'afu subsequently swore allegiance and, in return, received a salary of L800 per annum and the title Lieutenant Governor of Lau. In 1874, Cakobau and the Council of Chiefs ceded Fiji to Queen Victoria without reservation. Cession effectively consolidated Bau hegemony over western Fiji, stemmed violent conflict among rival chiefs, halted the alienation of Fijian land, slowed the pace of massive settlement, and thwarted further violence from European and Klu Klux Klan members opposed to Fijian rule. Drawing upon its experience in New Zealand—of protracted wars with Maori tribes over land alienation—the Crown banned further sales of Fijian land. The Governor General, Sir Arthur Gordon, then restructured the local system of colonial administration. Fijians were to be governed through a system of indirect colonial rule based on the traditional political structure of Fijian paramountcy, the "Council of Chiefs," that derived its authority by hereditary through the *mataqali*. The Fijian structure of clan rule that had been fluid became fixed under the imposition of this new British system. Thus a British Governor General exercised control over the indigenous population through thousands of village chiefs that had been reorganized into seventeen provinces with some under their own hereditary chiefs and others under European Commissioners. A new supra-institution was created, the "Great Council of Chiefs," *Bose Levu Vakaturaga* that was comprised by a few of the most senior paramount chiefs as well as Fijian provincial administrators, district officers, appointed (nonhereditary) chiefs, and other officials. The Great Council of Chiefs primary function was to advise the governor general and the legislature and to assist in formulating native regulations. In concert, these actors devised and implemented the Native Tax Scheme—fashioned from the Fijian *lala* system—and a Native Lands Commission that assessed settler land claims, determined the structure of indigenous land ownership, and stipulated the terms of commercial use of Fijian lands. From time to time the Fijians were elected to the legislature through the Great Council of Chiefs.

Moreover, paramount chiefs steadily co-opted the Great Council of Chiefs to its own aggrandizement. Described by chiefs as "the strength and voice of the land," the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) quickly consolidated its power and hold over Fijian people (Knapman 1987, Teaiwi 2001 and Lal 1992). *Lala* progressively devolved into a special and burdensome system of taxes in-kind levied exclusively against Fijians (the Native Tax Scheme). Not only chiefs by birth could conscript goods and services from the people but also chiefs by administrative appointment (*buli*) were permitted *lala*. Between 1876, when the tax scheme was introduced and 1902 Fijians delivered to the government goods worth L455,040, an average of L17,500 annually (Lal p.22). The GCC increasingly adapted and perverted Fijian customs such that traditional relations and obligations were re-codified and made enforceable by law. For example, Fijians were banned from leaving the village without permission from the chief or *buli* (this prohibition held until 1987). Fijians also were required to build houses, plant gardens, build roads and to perform any other works of public good mandated by chiefs. In short order *lala* was transformed into an instrument for providing unpaid labor to government as well as an instrument for satisfying the rights and prerogatives of the chiefs. Although the custom of personal and official *lala* was abolished in 1905, the GCC enforced other labor-related ordinances that established and sustained Fiji as a dual economy. These included obtaining permission from *buli* to work out side the village, channeling all Fijian recruitment and hiring via the *buli*, and imposition of vagrancy laws against Fijians not engaged in outside wage employment as plantation laborers. Most important, Fijian labor laws set wages below those paid to indentured Indian laborers. Consequently, Fijians increasingly elected to pursue subsistence agriculture in the village or voted with their feet by stealing away from the villages and securing higher paid wage work offshore.

TO CONTROL THE LAND IS TO CONTROL THE ECONOMY

East Indians (henceforth, Indians) were first introduced to Fiji as indentured laborers on May 15, 1879.[2] Governor Gordon negotiated an agreement with the Government of India that supplied immigrant Indian laborers who were indentured for five-year terms to provide manpower for commercial agriculture—the *girmit* system. Shipping records indicate some 87 vessels transferred thousands of indentured East Indian laborers from Calcutta to Fiji between 1879-1884 alone. By 1891, there were 7,468 Indians, each responsible for cutting 3 tons of sugar cane at the rate of 1 shilling per day (Knapman 1987 p.12). Indentured Indians became the preferred and predominant suppliers of labor for the sugar plantations and processing mills monopolized by the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) of Australia. Colonial administrators, particularly governors Sir Arthur Gordon and John Bates Thurston effectively harnessed the Fijian economy to a few large companies run by corporate managers and by 1882 the CSR had ruthlessly monopolized the entire sugar industry (ibid p.7). The Colonial Sugar Refining Company was often called the "Great Company" because it functioned as "the other government." CSR not only compelled the Gordon, Thurston and other successive governments to accelerate the pace of East Indian immigration but these and subsequent government administrators also were persuaded to subsidize both the costs of introducing and repatriating Indian labor. Furthermore, the colonial governments also used current revenue, largely accruing from the Native Tax Scheme, to finance the steady pace of labor immigration, large-scale plantation development, and sugar mill construction (ibid.).

After the system of indentured labor was abolished in 1939, colonial administrators subdivided plantations into smaller plots that were then leased to more than 95,000 formerly indentured Indians who had been induced to remain in Fiji. These nominally independent farmers remained completely dependent upon the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Australia that aggressively extended its control and dominance over sugar production as the exclusive purchaser of Fiji's raw sugar crops. In 1940, Parliament established the Native Lands Trust Board and enacted the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA). The Native Lands Trust Board was established to negotiate and administer leaseholds over tribally owned Fijian land. Whereas ALTA was the instrument that gave farmers of other races leasehold to prime Fijian farmland for up to 30 years at extremely low rates. Taken together the Native Trust Board and ALTA effectively indentured Fijian land in lieu of indentured Indian labor by compelling Fijians to lease their lands at bargain basement rates. Rental rates for these lands are roughly equivalent to 2.4 percent of the value of the annual crop (Davies 2000 p. 3). In other countries agricultural rent is ten percent or more. Taken collectively, the indentured laborers agreement (*girmit*), the Native Trust Board, ALTA, and the guest labor program further served to exclude Fijians from effective economic participation in their homeland. Protectionism in agriculture policy advanced Indian commercial farming by ensuring the availability of cheap land leases in perpetuity, keeping wages low and minimizing competition. Largely due to increased Fijian mortality rates from European born diseases, greatly accelerated Indian immigration to sustain and promote commercial agriculture and out migration of Fijians seeking better wages, by 1943 the Indian population outnumbered Fijians. The 1946 Census showed 120, 414 Indians resident in Fiji and 118, 070 Fijian. Indians remained the majority population until 1996.

Today, Fijians retain ownership to 83% of their communally held lands and near shore fishing grounds. However, the Native Trust Board leases most of the prime communal land for agricultural production under the ALTA. For example, in July 2000 more than 103,473.57 hectares were leased for sugar production at an average rent per hectare equal to F$66.21 and more than 328,977.10 hectares were leased for non-cane agricultural production at an average rent of F$7.40 per hectare (ibid.). Perhaps more important, generally landowners are lucky if

they actually receive 50% of the annual rents owed them (Davies 2000, p.10). When and if these nominal rents are paid, the Native Lands Trust Board keeps 25% of the rent (for administration and development), pays 25% to tribal chiefs and distributes the remainder to tribal clan members.

In practice, a substantial percentage of the agriculture leasehold rents are never paid while Fijians fare even worse on land leased for property development. Hotel and other property development land rents at substantially lower rates than land used for agricultural production. Should Fijian land owners choose to opt out of renewing a lease for any reason, including nonpayment of rents, they can recover their land for their own use only after compensating leaseholders for economic improvements to the lands leased. Given the extremely low rents, the value of construction, and the economic position of Fijians generally, such compensation is clearly impossible. Hence, many Fijians deem leaseholds for property or hotel development, in particular, as a funeral because they lose their land just as decisively as if it was sold but without the corresponding material advantages of an exchange at market rates (ibid.).

Thus the British Crown effectively imposed a dual economy in Fiji that privileged British and other Europeans, Australian and New Zealand offshore investment, and Indian guest laborers to the detriment of the Fijian masses. Locking Fijians into the economy by means of village-based subsistence agriculture rendered them marginal, subordinate and impoverished in their own nation. Europeans retained political and economic power and control. Europeans held nearly all the seats in the legislature until communal voting rights were extended to Fijians in 1963. Fijians were denied voting rights because the Crown claimed Fijian interests were represented via paramount chiefs—the Great Council of Chiefs—while Indians were given communal electoral representation on the legislative Council in 1929 (Knapman 1987, Lal 1992 and Taeiwa 2000). However, the Great Council of Chiefs afforded only the semblance of Fijian participation and control as the chiefs were merely "advisors of state," who acted, first and foremost, in their own self-interest. For example, Ratu Sukuna, appointed first Speaker of the Legislative Council in 1954, was accused of "giving leases to Indians against the wishes of the people" (Norton 2000 p.2). Discontent with Sukuna's administration led many working-age Fijians to abscond from rural village life despite the longstanding prohibition against leaving the village imposed by the chiefs and sanctioned by British administrators. Increasingly Fijians migrated to urban and peri-urban areas and joined the trade union movement that was disaffected with self-serving chiefly leadership.

THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC OF FIJI
Political Incorporation and Limited Constitutional Reform

Fijians achieved political incorporation and control in stages and, in large part, via coercion—coup d'etats. The most significant events include the extension of the franchise to Fijians (voting rights) in 1963, the shift in governance from British Crown Colony to independent Commonwealth nation in 1970, and the 1987 coup. The 1987 coup d'etat resulted in the establishment of Fiji as an independent republic, affirmative action in the civil service, and reserving seats for Fijians in the legislature by means of constitutional revision in 1990.

Spurred by world events, in particular the 1960 United Nations resolutions defining colonial domination as repression of basic human rights, the British Crown undertook preparations to transform Fiji from a British Crown Colony to an independent self-governing commonwealth nation. At the same time, Indians, having held the franchise and seats in the Legislative Council since 1929 and given their majority status, saw themselves as heirs to British rule and actively sought to replace the British upon Fiji's independence. However, the Indian vision of a "new homeland free of oppression and colonial yolk, where Indians would be second to none and

where their values, culture and language could flourish" was met by concerted opposition and ethnic nationalist sentiment (Davies p.8). This new movement, *Taukeism*, with its attendant cries of "Fiji for the Fijians" culminated in massive protests against the Indian party by Fijians in 1968. Instead, the threat of violence and instability prompted Indian leaders to agree with Fijian leaders on a joint proposal for independence and Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, an eminent Fijian from the chiefly aristocracy, was named Fiji's first Prime Minister. On October 10, 1970, after 96 years as a colony, Fiji became an independent nation within the British Commonwealth and a new Constitution was enacted that established a bicameral Parliament composed of an Upper House and Lower House. This new legislature retained the colonial institutions and political systems—relying still upon the Great Council of Chiefs that did nothing to placate the wishes of Fijians seeking to regain their traditional autonomy and discretion. For 17 years after independence, Prime Minister Mara ruled at the behest of the British administrators and GCC with the support of Australia and New Zealand offshore investors and wealthy Indian commercial interests.

POST INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Political mobilization in the Republic of the Fiji Islands is centered on two seemingly contradictory principles: democratic governance and indigenous paramountcy. At independence in 1970, Fiji adopted the British colonial version of governance for the islands whereby: (1) the electorate would be separated on three separate electoral rolls—Fijian, Indian, and general electorate (of all other citizens); and (2) the traditional Fijian way of life, rights and interests would be preserved through two primary institutional arrangements, the National Land Trust Board (NLTB) and the Great Council of Chiefs, which was now a constitutional entity. Electoral democracy operated amicably, reinforcing the principles of indigenous paramountcy for 17 years after independence (1970 to 1987). Under Prime Minister Ratu Mara, the ruling Alliance Party appeared to have kept the two principles in check. This balance was threatened in 1977 when the Indian based party, the National Federation Party (NFP), won a narrow majority over the Fijian parties. The Fijian vote was effectively split between the moderate Alliance Party and the extremist Fijian Nationalist Party led by Sakeasi Butadroka. The political landscape looked as if it would change. However, in the days following the April election win, perhaps caught off guard by the victory, the NFP was slow in forming a government. By the time their Prime Minister designate, Siddiq Koya went to be sworn in, the Governor General Ratu Cakobau informed him that Prime Minister Ratu Mara was already sworn in. Ratu Mara formed a minority government until the follow up election in September, which returned him to power proper.

From 1977 onwards, Ratu Mara continued to uphold the delicate balance of democratic governance and indigenous paramountcy. However, in the 1987 general elections, the electorate showed Mara and his Alliance Party that their time was up. The Fijian vote was again split but "this time many of the more urbanized, professionally trained and better educated Fijians" aligned politically with the Indians (Laracy, 2001, p.21). The elections of 1987 brought two fundamental changes to the political landscape in Fiji: first, the coalition party that came to power did so primarily with the electoral vote of non-indigenous Fijians. In other words, Indian voters were the dominant supporters of the Indian formed coalition. Second, the Fijian who became Prime Minister, Dr. Timoci Bavadra, was *lewenivanua*, "a commoner" instead of a chief, and was from the western provinces—Historically paramount chiefs from the eastern provinces, including those serving on the Great Council of Chiefs, had ruled the islands. The 1987 Labour-Federation electoral win was fundamentally different from any other government previously elected in Fiji. Despite the fact that Dr. Bavadra was <u>indigenous</u> Fijian, his Indian

support base was deemed a threat to the future of indigenous Fijian rights and welfare. Critics of the government saw him as no more than a token leader put in place by the Indians to pacify indigenous Fijians while they eroded Fijian institutions. These criticisms were unfounded, especially when you consider that no legislation regarding indigenous Fijians can be passed in parliament without the majority consent of the Great Council of Chiefs. It is therefore unlikely that the GCC would pass any legislation that was not amicable to the interests of Fijians.

Whatever the practical arguments, the issue's emotional salience garnered widespread Fijian support for the bloodless military *coup d'etat* led by Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka in the face of growing opposition from the *taukei* movement. The fledgling Fijian National Party (FNP) revived the taukei movement whose "Fijian power" demands Prime Minister Mara had earlier suppressed. The FNP confronted Mara for having agreed to a constitution that did not guarantee permanent rule by Fijians and allegedly for neglecting Fijians while favoring Indo-Fijian business interests. The taukei movement was led by commoners and junior chiefs and supported by trade unions. It also succeeded in mobilizing disaffected Fijians and unemployed indigenous youth in urban areas. Taukeism represented a *realpolitik* of the Fijian masses that were outside the control of the aristocratic paramount chiefs.

Ordinary Fijians, especially those in the urban and peri-urban areas found a voice in the *taukei* movement and supported Rabuka who claimed to have carried out the coup in order to "preserve" Fijian way of life. Rabuka declared Fiji a republic in 1987 in an effort to halt any interference from Great Britain. Although he did not govern directly from 1987 to 1992, Rabuka established interim military rule in Fiji and reappointed Ratu Mara as Prime Minister to help rebuild democracy in Fiji. The interim government oversaw the installation of a new constitution in 1990. However, the new constitution maintained the role and authority of the Great Council of Chiefs, including appointment of the president and retention of separate communal electoral rolls and the preference voting system. Rabuka installed a civilian government and greatly expanded the civil service by mandating that 50 percent of all civil service jobs go to Fijians (affirmative action in the civil service).

The 1990 Constitution sought to permanently institutionalize indigenous paramountcy and locate sovereignty securely in Fijian hands. The 1990 Constitution established parliamentary representation at 37 seats for the Fijian communal roll (48%), 27 seats for the Indian communal roll (46%) and 5 seats for the general roll and one seat for Rotumans. This constitution, among other things, called for affirmative action to increase the number of Fijians employed in the public sector, Fijian dominance in parliament by reserving the greatest number of seats for indigenous Fijians, and the reservation of the office of the Prime Minister for Fijians. In the aftermath of the coup and promulgation of the 1990 Constitution there has been a mass out-migration of Indians to neighboring New Zealand and Australia and to Canada and the United States. With Indian emigration, Fiji lost both investment capital and human resources, especially in the professions. The international community, especially neighboring New Zealand and Australia and the United Kingdom were critical of Rabuka and the *taukei* movement. Rabuka made it clear to Fiji Islanders and onlookers that he was not interested in leading Fiji into the abyss of a military dictatorship. For the 1992 general elections Rabuka resigned his post in the military in order to run for office with his newly formed party. He won the elections in 1992 and became Prime Minister with Ratu Mara as President. It was under Rabuka's leadership that Fiji's most progressive constitution was promulgated in 1997. Based on proportional representation and first past the post voting, the 1997 Constitution reserved 23 communal for 23 Fijians, 19 communal seats for Indians, 3 general elector communal seats, one seat Rotumans and 25 open seats. Although this constitution retained the communal rolls, the national roll was increased substantially to permit cross-ethnic courting and voting. In addition, it maintained the pre-eminent role of the Great Council of Chiefs in indigenous Fijian affairs.

With the 1997 Constitution in place, the next general elections were destined to be historic. In the May 1999 election, Rabuka lost and, for the first time, Fiji swore-in an Indian Primer Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, leader of the Fiji Labour Party. The Chaudhry government came to power in the midst of a very sensitive time for Fijians and Indians alike, the expiration of agricultural land leases. Chaudhry inherited this issue from the Rabuka government that had not forcefully sought to promulgate a new deal as leases began to expire in 1997. When Chaudhry came to power he was expected to deliver for "his people." Indians who voted him in were anxious to solve the lease issue because they could be (and were being) evicted from the land when the leases were not renewed. The Indians who were evicted became squatters. And the squatting situation was growing worse rapidly for Indians and they expected "their man" to solve the problem. At the same time Fijians were wary of renegotiating their agricultural land leases at the hands of an Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, particularly one deemed by the electorate as arrogant and unable or unwilling to appease Fijians' worst fears about their future. Even though more than 83% of the land is protected and cannot be sold, the manner in which Chaudhry and other prominent Indians spoke about Fijians and the land issue, gave the impression that if given the chance they would drastically alter the situation. That is, if he could make the Indians feel more at home by availing them land, by extending the leases for periods much longer than the 30 years mandated under the expiring lease agreement, then he would do so and that was enough to scare the Fijian masses.

In the final analysis, Fiji Islanders in all ethnic communities were wary of Chaudhry's leadership. However, it was the part-European (part Fijian) George Speight and his followers, acting in the name of "indigenous" Fijians that ended Chaudhry's government and threatened to make Fiji a coup-prone state. In 2000, one year after Chaudhry came to power, Speight, a failed businessman who spent most of his life living in Australia, haphazardly carried out a civilian coup. He and seven other armed Fijian businessmen held the Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers hostage for five weeks inside the parliament building. Although he had some support, Speight did not inspire the masses and secure chiefly support as Rabuka had done for his 1987 coup. Speight borrowed the cause of "returning Fiji to Fijians" but his disrespect for Fijian institutions, especially the Great Council of Chiefs, made him unpopular among many Fijians. As the siege wore on, rioting and other civil unrest occurred with growing frequency and intensity and culminated in the shooting death of a police officer that prompted military involvement. On May 28, 2000 the siting President, Ratu Mara, resigned and Military Commander Frank Bainmarama, declared martial law and assumed executive authority over Fiji. The constitution was suspended and Parliament was dismissed. After weeks of negotiations, Speight released the hostages and stood down. Unlike Rabuka, Speight and his co-conspirators were arrested, subsequently tried and convicted of treason. Speight was sentenced to death, which was commuted to life imprisonment. An interim government was installed and on September 13, 2001 elections were held and a new government was sworn in with an indigenous and hereditary paramount chief, Prime Minister, Laisenia Qarase.

POST COUP REPUBLIC OF FIJI: STILL A DUAL ECONOMY CONTROLLED OFFSHORE

Since 1874 the Fijian populace was consigned to either eking out a living via subsistence farming in undeveloped rural villages on tiny plots or working the sugar plantations at extremely low wages. Many Fijians shifted to Suva, the national capital as the tribal bans against free movement were gradually relaxed. Most of these peri-urban Fijians resided in tin, wood and cement block shacks and many remained unemployed while employed peri-urban Fijians held low wage menial or casual jobs. Moreover, a very small number, who were related to paramount

chiefs or otherwise well-connected, secured low-pay civil service jobs. Although Fijians succeeded in wresting control of the political system, they remain excluded from meaningful economic participation. Despite Fijian gains in political control, Indians still dominate and control the commercial and retail sectors of the Fijian economy. Excluding multinational earnings, some estimates now suggest that Indian communities and private businesses earn over 75% of total personal income (Davies p.4).

Participant observation, interviews and analysis of publicly available government statistics and the UNDP Fiji Poverty Report (1997) are used to describe the wellbeing of Fijians and Indians since Independence.[3] The Republic of Fiji remains a dual economy, based on subsistence farming and free market capitalism with a markedly skewed and unequal distribution of wealth, and largely impoverished society (UNDP 1997). On nearly every physical quality of life and economic indicator Fijians are most the disadvantaged. Fijians have the highest crude birth rates at 25.7% and lowest life expectancy (68 years for women and 64 years for men). According to the 1997 UNDP Fiji Poverty Report conducted by the UNDP, in 1991 the average per capita income for Fijians is F$37.74 compared to F$66.77 for non-Fijians. More than 40 percent of Fijians between the ages of 18 to 25 are unemployed while the majority of Fijians are causal laborers (temporary or day labor). The wealthiest households derive a quarter of their income from agriculture, a third from permanent employment, 37 percent from business and only 4 percent from casual employment. Household incomes are lowest for Fijian households and highest for "other" households (predominantly, European and Chinese households), respectively 13 percent lower and 36 percent higher than the national average. However, the 1997 Fiji Poverty Report also indicates that Indians have lower and highest average weekly household income by ten percent groups.[4] The lowest ten percent of Indians earn an average of F$32.40 while Fijians earn an average of F$38.10 per household and the highest ten percent of Indians earn average weekly incomes of F$914.40 per household compared to F$537.10 for Fijians.

Table 1. Average weekly income by ethnicity.

	Average Household Income	Average per capita income
National	F$199.31	F$44.68
Fijian	173.65	37.74
Indo-Fijian	217.89	49.50
Others	271.08	66.77

Source: UNDP and Government of Fiji. 1997. Fiji Poverty Report p. 25.

Today, most Fijians still live in rural villages of a few hundred persons and engage in subsistence agriculture based upon pre-capitalist social formations and tribal obligations. Eighty-three percent of land in Fiji remains the inalienable property of one of 6500 indigenous clan groups. Nevertheless Fijians remain cut off from the money economy. Fijians own the land but they do not control its production—neither the fruits of its exploitation nor its use. Fijians

control the government and run the military but Australians and New Zealanders control and run the economy while Indians control commerce, running the business and retail sectors. Although Indians are differentiated by class and religion (Hindu and Muslim), and many are poor, nevertheless the highest 3 Indian income deciles earn four-fifths of Fiji's total income. Indians also dominate the professions and the working class. Even the private rental market for housing is overwhelmingly Indian owned and controlled. "On average the Indians are clearly much richer than the Fijians and they both produce and consume a disproportionate share of the nation's output. Visually, the contrast between the neon, concrete, chrome and steel, which proclaims urban Fiji Indian affluence, and the ramshackle tin, block, and wood shacks of the contemporary rural or peri-urban Fijian village—looking much like aboriginal reservations in Australia or Canada—is something which is not lost on the Fijians" (Davies p.4). Visitors and tourists to Fiji must "pinch themselves" or otherwise self-consciously recall that they are in Fiji as they encounter the rows upon rows of Indian businesses bearing signage in Hindi, the preponderance of opulent Hindu temples and resplendent onion-domed Islamic mosques in Nadi and Suva.

Table 2. Average weekly household income by deciles and ethnicity in Fijian $.

	Average household income		Average per capita income	
Decile	Indo-Fijian	Fijian	Indo-Fijian	Fijian
1	32.40	38.10	7.10	8.10
2	60.80	67.66	13.60	13.60
3	81.60	89.50	17.80	17.50
4	101.80	107.00	22.10	21.50
5	124.30	126.70	27.30	28.60
6	152.50	147.60	32.60	30.40
7	186.70	175.00	40.91	36.20
8	240.60	217.60	52.50	44.40
9	327.90	288.50	74.80	60.20
10	914.40	537.10	227.60	131.00

Source: UNDP and Government of Fiji. 1997. Fiji Poverty Report p. 25.

In the face of the ostentatious display of wealth, Indians discriminate against their Fijian hosts in housing, education, and employment. Fiji's schools are racially segregated—Indians attend Indian schools while Indians educators also run the schools attended largely by Fijians. In the main, Indian businesses employ only Indians in all but the most menial and casual labor jobs. Indian entrepreneurs unabashedly place advertisements in the Fiji Times "to let" and "situations vacant" stating "Indians only" or "Indians preferred." "Indeed a tally of the racially specified adverts in the 'To Let' classified of the Saturday editions of the Fiji Times for 1996 shows 127 'Indians only/preferred' compared to 0 for 'Fijians only/preferred. Some of the real estate companies also solicit for properties on a similar basis, the most blatant being 'Prasad's

houses/flats wanted for Indian families only, near city, urgently needed'" (Davies op. cit. and Fiji Times, November 2, 1996).

In practice, offshore interests control the Fijian economy. Australia and, secondarily, New Zealand are the regional metropoles that effectively constitute a new Australian-New Zealand hegemony over the south pacific island region. Australian corporate entities own and control banking, finance, shipping and transport, and commercial agriculture principally, the Colonial Sugar Refining monopoly. New Zealand is a lesser partner in the banking and transport industries and commercial agriculture but owns and controls major stakes in the dairy monopoly. In the main, banks in Fiji are essentially regional branches of the Australian and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), Colonial National Bank (of Australia) and Westpac Banking Corporation (U.S.) with head offices in Suva. These banks offer branch services from agent offices in Nadi City, Nadi International Airport, Lautoka and Labasa. Like many other island nations, foreign-owned tourism is a rapidly growing industry in Fiji that employs increasing numbers of Fijians in menial temporary service and maintenance jobs (casual labor) at very low wages.

Furthermore, the Republic of Fiji's increasing regional and global integration also constrains sovereignty and democratic participation of all citizens as well as the indigenous rights of Fijians. Over the last three decades, there has been a steady proliferation of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to remove barriers to trade and forge closer economic linkages between national economies, promote regional security, and to assist or chastise failing/failed states, halt or avert genocide and restore order and human rights. As a signatory member of the Pacific Islands Forum, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and other intergovernmental organizations, the Republic of Fiji is subject to and obligated to IGO agreements and mandates. As international organizations comprised by heads of state (or appointed non-state actors) the Pacific Islands Forum, ASEAN and APEC not only remove individual citizens from democratic participation but also erode national parliamentary authority and discretion. The ensuing signed agreements between heads of state commit national legislatures and citizens alike to decisions and acts of intervention made by external actors—decisions from which particular heads of state may dissent but nevertheless must uphold and obligate their citizens.

For example in July 2000, at the insistence of Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Pacific Islands Forum nations were pressured into endorsing the Biketawa Declaration.[5] This declaration imposed limits to the domestic sovereignty of member states by overturning its previous policy on non-interference and established a mechanism for diplomatic, economic, and military intervention. On August 12, 2003, again at the urging of Prime Minister Howard, the Forum initiated its first use of the Biketawa Declaration and declared the Solomon Islands a failed state. Forum members further authorized "cooperative intervention" in the domestic affairs of the Solomon Islands and subsequently deployed an Australian-led peacekeeping force of 2225 troops and police to restore order and disarm gangs. More recently, in April 2004 the Eminent Persons' Group, commissioned by the Pacific Islands Forum to review of Forum procedures and policies, proposed a new plan for the Pacific Islands. Under pressure of threats to withdraw aid from member states by Prime Minister Helen Clark of New Zealand and Prime Minister John Howard of Australia, member nations signed on to a new "Plan for the Pacific" that redefined the Forum's mission as breaking away from the traditional "Pacific Way" of doing things. The Pacific Plan further maintained that the "bottom line is that future inter-country relationships will need to be closer and more mutually supportive if the region is to avoid decline and international marginalization. Enhanced regional cooperation and integration, and the sharing of resources of governance, are likely to be features of future developments. New thinking about the relationships between sovereign states may hold the key to future sustainability" (Eminent Persons' Group Review of the Pacific Forum, April 2004 p.3). Hence,

regional integration engenders obligations between governments that pose important additional challenges to both the established meanings and practices of sovereignty and democratic participation as well as the newly won political gains, understandings, and accords on the rights of indigenous peoples in the Republic of Fiji.

CONCLUSION

Fijians believed that political control of the state would lead to fuller economic participation and benefits. In spite of the orderly transition to independence and three coup d'etats the tribal aristocracy still holds sway and the dual economic system continues undiminished. The Republic of Fiji remains an ethnically cleaved nation mired in poverty sustained by a dual economy controlled offshore and the Fijian chiefly aristocracy. Fiji is a nation that can not afford secure livelihoods to the growing numbers of Fijians or Indians between the ages of 18-35 years—there is simply no work to be had. Moreover, skilled and college educated Fijians are locked out of permanent employment because of their ethnicity while Indian laborers whose leases have expired drift from the farms to squatter housing—there is simply no housing to be had. Growing numbers of educated and unskilled Fijians alike are consigned to seek life opportunities and employment abroad while protracted negotiation over extending the tenure of land leases fuels further economic instability, political uncertainty and growing unrest.

In conclusion, the political climate the May 2000 coup left in its wake has proved difficult for Fiji economically, politically and socially. There is much distrust and resentment between the two dominant communities. There is also the question of Fiji's ability to maintain a balance between democratic governance and indigenous paramountcy. Are Fijians committed to the democratic game for the long haul or are they only in until they get the results they want? How long will Indians and others continue to be locked out of political power before they too have an uprising against their Fijian cousins? Are the newly wrested sovereign rights of indigenous peoples and the citizenship rights and aspirations of Fiji's Indian communities necessarily at cross-purposes and doomed to irreconcilable conflict? The political landscape in Fiji is rich with uncertainty and where democracy is only understood and accepted by only one of the dominant ethnic communities we have the recipe for a "coup-prone" state. What seems clear is that the indigenous peoples of Fiji have no problem sharing the spoils of modernity with their fellow citizens but they are very guarded and extremely protective of their land rights and their sovereignty. For Fijians have witnessed the dispossession of other indigenous peoples around the world and particularly in New Zealand, Australia and North America. And Fijians know by virtue of the experiences of their pacific island brothers that should Fijians fail to protect *vanua* and *toanga* (the land and her treasures/resources) these tangible assets can easily be "negotiated" away. As *taukei*, sovereignty over their lands is paramount—As the indigenous peoples of Fiji, the land is self, the land is tribe, the land is nation; the land is the Fijian identity.

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Notes

1. The indigenous peoples of Fiji refer to themselves as "Fijans" not as indigenous Fijians. Henceforth the authors will adhere to this convention.
2. Indo-Fijian is an academic label, which is highly contested locally especially among Fijians who argue that the use and promotion of the label is an attempt by Western academics and Indians to co-opt the Fijian identity and by extension Fijian rights and land. Citizens of Fiji are called Fiji Islanders and Fijian is reserved exclusively to identify the indigenous population. Indo-Fijian is therefore only appropriate if one is referring to someone of mixed Indian and Fijian heritage.
3. Reliable economic and census data beyond 1996 are not available from Fiji's Government Statistics Office.
4. The UNDP Report utilizes measures of income that combine cash and noncash income, including crops produced for a family's subsistence. These measures are inflated by differences in the composition of Indo-Fijian households (which tend to be larger, with more children and unemployed adults, e.g., wife and grandparents) and indigenous Fijian households (with both parents employed). Fiji data are not sufficiently robust and operational definitions may not be equivalent across racial groups given the preponderance of indigenous Fijian households engaged in subsistence agriculture. For example, cash values are calculated and added for all goods consumed and all gifts received, and for the equivalent rental of all owner-occupied and rent free housing. Subsistence income is estimated by valuing the items produced at local market prices and adding this to other reported income and thus actually inflate incomes of Fijians.
5. The Pacific Islands Forum includes Australia, New Zealand, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tulvalu, and Vanuatu.

A B A A

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

BUSH V. GORE 2000:
JUDICIAL AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL POLITICS

by
HERMAN PERCY-McDANIEL, Ph.D.

A legal analysis and an examination of the social and political backgrounds of the Justices was conducted to address the research questions. The Richard Lempert and Joseph Sanders' Judicial Autonomy model was used to guide the research. Extensive use of case summaries, historical texts, and journal entries were employed to develop information and data for the study.

THE LEGAL ANALYSIS

The research focused primarily on the five majority supreme court justices whose ruling determined Bush as the winning candidate in the cliff-hanger elections of 2000 (Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98-2000 Docket Number: 00-949). The Rehnquist majority has been accused by scholars and the legal community of Republican partisanship because most of the record seemed less sensitive to claims of equal protection, yet they determined a presidential election on questionable equal protection grounds.

The study examined prior opinions of the five justices as judicial nominees; their opinions on relevant areas of equal protection, precedent, and states' rights; their extra judicial writings and speeches concerning the role of the court; and statements of judicial philosophy in articles or their confirmation hearings. The study contrasted the prior decisions and writings of the majority justices with the opinions they joined in *Bush v. Gore*.

The legal analysis presented unusual and remarkable inconsistencies between the Rehnquist majority's previously expressed opinions and their decision in *Bush v. Gore*. It also showed their interpretation was consistent with their political affiliation but inconsistent with their usual pattern of decision-making. They deviated from precedence and from their own judicial principles. The departure provides compelling evidence that political and personal influences may have affected judicial autonomy. Table 1 presents the findings of the legal analysis.


George W. Bush, The State of Florida and Albert Gore: 2000 Presidential Election (Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98-2000 Docket Number: 00-949)

TABLE 1
Prior Opinons of the Rehnquist Majority on the Legal Principles of Bush v. Gore

JUSTICES	PRIOR OPINIONS AND JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES
William Rehnquist	• Unwavering support of states' rights *in National League of Cities v. Usery*, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), *Fry v. United States*, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), *Sumner v. Mata*, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981), *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority*, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). • Discussed the importance of precedent in *Hubbard v. United States*, 514 U.S. 695 (1995). • Maintained equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination in *Hunter v. Underwood*, 471 U.S. 222 (1984), *United States v. Armstrong*, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), *Califano v. Boles*, 443 U.S. 282 (1979), *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,* 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Sandra Day O'Connor	• Strongly supported states' rights in her 1994 essay in *Public Values in Constitutional Law,* and 1985 essay in *Views From the Bench;* and *Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority*, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). • Advocated precedent is important for judicial consistency in *Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985)*, *New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).* • Maintained equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination in *Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)*, Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. (1995).
Anthony Kennedy	• Supported states' rights. See for example, *New York v. United States*, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). • Showed a commitment to relying on precedent in *Patterson v. McClean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), *Missouri v. Jenkins*, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). • Maintained equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination. See for example, *McClesky v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Clarence Thomas	• Supported states' rights in *U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton*, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), *New York v. United States*, 505 U.S.144 (1992), and his 2000 article in the *Drake Law Review.* • Acknowledged the importance of precedent in *Holder v. Hall*, 512 U.S. 874 (1994). • Maintained equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination. See for example, *M.L.B. v. S.L.U.*, 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
Antonio Scalia	• Supported states' rights in *New York v. United States*, 505 U.S.144 (1992). • Demonstrated his respect for precedent in his 1989 article in the *University of Chicago Law Review, United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), *James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia*, 501 U.S. 529 (1991), *Hubbard v. United States,* 514 U.S. 695 (1995). • Maintained equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination. See for example, *McClesky v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).

Source: Compiled by Author, 2003.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND EXAMINATION

The study examined the social backgrounds of the Justices to discover any relationship that might exist between their background and their decision-making, especially as it relates to the *Bush v. Gore* case. Social background studies maintain, "certain attributes or background characteristics (religion, education, occupation and region) present socializing experiences that affect political attitudes, which in turn affect decision making behavior."[1] Judicial behavior research advocates there is an association between relevant background factors and significant decision-making influences.[2] This research has found that background variables such as party affiliation, education, prior judicial experience are the main variables correlated with decisional patterns.[3]

The social and political background research revealed that each majority Justice had a more significant personal stake in the outcome of the election than the four dissenting justices. The study found that the personal motivations of the majority could be summarized as follows: Rehnquist and O'Connor perhaps wanted to retire and have their replacement named by a Republican President; Kennedy and Scalia wanted to be promoted to the Chief Justice position; Scalia's sons represented Bush in some of the cases; and Thomas' spouse worked for the Bush transition team.

The research on the political backgrounds of the justices revealed characteristics that could have motivated political interests in the case. First, each justice was appointed to the bench by a Republican President. Presidents have traditionally selected judicial appointments with similar party affiliation and who seemingly support their substantive policy goals. Studies have shown that presidents consider party affiliation and ideological positions as the two main criteria in the selection of Supreme Court Justices.[4] Similarly, senate confirmation is dependent on party affiliation and ideologies, and less on merit.[5] A Supreme Court appointment can therefore provide representation of certain values on the bench.

This study maintains that perhaps the partisanship affiliation for which the Rehnquist majority was appointed strongly influenced their decisions in *Bush v. Gore*. Studies have confirmed that the ideologies held by the party, and the values to advance the party's agenda, are often represented by the Justices appointed to the bench.[6] Judges tend to reflect the particular views of those responsible for their appointment. Furthermore, the findings in the leading research in political science on judicial behavior support the argument that in a case such as *Bush v. Gore* that presented partisan issues, justices are likely to demonstrate partisan and ideological preferences.[7] Segal and Spaeth's 1993 study on judicial decision-making, predicted judicial behavior in a presidential election dispute:

> If a case on the outcome of a presidential election should reach the Supreme Court, that would evidence legitimate argument on both sides as a result of which the Court's decision might well turn on the personal preferences of the justices. This is hardly idle speculation.[8]

In the 2000 presidential election, it is likely the five majority Justices' partisan motivation ended the Florida recount in order to secure a Republican victory. Furthermore, prior to being appointed to the bench, most of the Justices were extremely active in advancing the Republican party's policy agenda and ideologies.[9] Most of them were involved in party and campaign management, and either had close political relationships or personal ties with the president who appointed them. These justices held strong Republican views and may have been influenced by them in their decision in *Bush v. Gore*.

The second characteristic of the Rehnquist majority that could have influenced the justices decision is the fact that they share similar ideological preferences, and most often join each other in decisions than with the four who dissented.[10]

The third similarity among the justices is their social backgrounds which studies suggest affect judicial orientation.[11] Supreme Court Justices represent the ranks of the nation's political and economic elites. Each Justice enjoyed the benefits of an elite education. They attended five Ivy-League schools; Rehnquist and O'Connor were classmates. Each, except for Thomas, came from economically secure families.[12] This class interest was protected by the support of a victory for a party that is generally assumed favors a certain tax base of voters.

The evidence presented in this study, as outlined in Table 2 , established the Rehnquist majority's application of the law in the case reflected political, economic class and cultural interests. At the very least, the personal and political motives presented are substantial reasons why the justices should have recused themselves because of the possible influence of these motives.[13] In addition, even if these motives are speculative, they still provide considerable grounds as to why they should not have accepted the case and deferred it to another branch. The personal and political motivations reported in this study are compelling extra-legal factors that may have affected judicial autonomy in *Bush v. Gore.*

Is it reasonable to expect that the judiciary can be autonomous in its decision-making? Scholarly debate in the field has always concerned whether justices base their decisions solely on law, or whether personal values, attitudes, beliefs and personal preferences also influence their decisions. The study concludes with a consideration of the practicality of judicial autonomy in the 2000 election dispute.

DOES JUDICIAL AUTONOMY EXIST?

The judicial autonomy model by Richard Lempert and Joseph Sanders maintains that when examining any legal system, it is important to assess the ways in which institutional arrangements affect how courts apply the law. If the legal system is to be autonomous, in the ideal sense, it must be free from the influences of sources of power and authority in society. The legal system needs to be "self-legitimating, for to depend upon political, social, or ethical forces for authority is to be vulnerable to the encroachment of such forces on decision making."[14] However, the legal system exists as part of the social system and legal procedures involve the influence of other sectors of society. For example, laws must derive from somewhere, and lawmaking procedures allow groups seeking to advance their interests to infuse their values. In other words, law is a social product and cannot be fully independent of social influences. The circumstances that lead to the enactment of laws, and the effects that law have on society, all affect what is occurring in the legal system.[15] The interdependent process therefore affects the legal system, as illustrated in Figure 1.

The legal system allows for the penetration of partisanship, as well as social and economic class influences in the law application process. The institutional framework in which Supreme Court Justices operate, restricts expression of personal and political preferences, but allows substantial leeway for such expression. For example, prior to Chief Justice Rehnquist's 1972 appointment to the Supreme Court, he strongly advocated state sovereignty, and publicly complained in a 1957 *US News and World Report* article of the "liberal" biases that included the "expansion of federal power at the expense of state power…."[16] When he became a Supreme Court Justice, he vigorously limited the powers of the national government over state governments in his decisions. This exemplifies the significant latitude in the system for Justices to promote their own substantive agendas. Additionally, decisions of the Supreme Court may not be fully "independent"

TABLE 2
Summary of the Legal Analyis abd Background Examination of the
Five Majority Justices

Justices	Political Background	Legal Analysis	Decision in Bush v. Gore	Personal Motives
William Rehnquist	• Republican Party lawyer • Presidential campaign	• Supported states' rights • Equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination	• Abandoned position on state autonomy • Found equal protection violation without purposeful discrimination	• Retirement
Sandra Day O'Connor	• Co- chair of Nixon's Arizona campaign • Goldwater's campaign • Republican county precinct & district chair, Republican state senator, majority leader • Republican party asked her to run for Governor	• Supported states' rights and precedent • Equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination	• Abandoned position on state autonomy & precedent • Found equal protection violation without purposeful discrimination	• Retirement
Anthony Kennedy	• Active in California state politics as a lobbyist and lawyer at the state capital • Politically connected family & personal ties	• Supported states' rights • Equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination	• Abandoned position on state autonomy & precedent • Found equal protection violation without purposeful discrimination	• Chief Justice promotion
Clarence Thomas	• High level position in Republican administration	• Supported states' rights and precedent • Equal protection claims must show intentional discrimination	• Abandoned position on state autonomy • Found equal protection violation without purposeful discrimination	• Party loyalty • Spouse • Al Gore and Joe Lieberman voted against him during his confirmation
Antonio Scalia	• High level position in Republican administration	• Supported states' rights • Never found that a minority plaintiff's equal protection rights were violated	• Abandoned position on state autonomy • Found equal protection violation without purposeful discrimination	• Chief Justice promotion • Sons

Source: Compiled by Author, 2003.

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│     SOCIAL CONDITIONS       │
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┌─────────────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────┐
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
Figure 1. Interconnections: The Social Context of Law
Source: Sheryl J. Grana and Jane C. Ollenburger, *The Social Context of Law* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), [11]

because often the values of the justices were chosen by those who appointed them. This serves to affect the neutrality of law, and the influence of the dominant class.[17]

Our legal system in the ideal sense is only partially autonomous. Judicial autonomy is an "imperfectly realized ideal," but if laws are applied as given, considerable autonomy in the application process is possible. However, this does not mean that law is a "tool of the dominant class' immediate self-interest, the plaything of those in high offices…it is important to realize that partial autonomy can allow for considerable independence."[18] The key is whether courts take a formalistic approach when they apply the law, or a substantive approach that is motivated by the desired outcome of the case. Only if a formalist court applies the law can autonomy resist the penetration of political, social, and ideological forces that surround it.[19]

IS THE REHNQUIST MAJORITY A FORMALIST OR SUBSTANTIVE COURT?

The Rehnquist majority in *Bush v. Gore* does not fit the description of a formalist court. A formalist court interprets the law strictly based on law and procedures, without considering the outcomes. A Justices' values will not be advanced in a formalist court because it strictly adheres to consistent rules, procedures, and legal categories. In the formal rationality system, court decisions are based on precedent, legislative intent and legal norms. Decisions are predictable because they are based on legal principles or precedent. Similar cases are adjudicated similarly. Had the *Bush v. Gore* case followed the formal rationality approach to law, the decision would have been predictable and consistent with legal norms.

The substantive rationality system best describes the Court's decision in *Bush v. Gore*. A substantive court considers sources external to the law in its application of the law. The unpredictability of a decision is characteristic of the substantive court because decisions are not based on established rules, but instead on extralegal factors. The Rehnquist majority in *Bush v. Gore* can be considered a substantive oriented court because the limiting language of the decision makes the legal principles only applicable to this case; the lack of analysis without sound legal principles; and because the opinion is inconsistent with other jurisprudence by the

Court's majority. The Rehnquist majority retained formal characteristics, but obtained a substantive result. Although a substantive oriented court's decision is derived from sources external to the legal system, it still works within the "confines of the law and legal procedures… dress(ing) up an opinion in formalistic language."[20]

The High Court's application of the law in the case retained formal characteristics when they cited certain election cases to support their decisions. Nevertheless, their approach had more substantive characteristics because the cases they referred to resulted in a different outcome. The decision was also not predictable because it was inconsistent with rules, procedures and precedent, which are not features of a formalistic court.

LESSONS FROM BUSH V. GORE ABOUT JUDICIAL AUTONOMY

If judicial autonomy is defined as impartiality, independent of political and social influences, decisions grounded in law, the requirements have not all been met. *Bush v. Gore* demonstrated the penetration of the social, political, and ideological influences into the legal system. The application of the law in the case reflected partisan, ideological, and economic class interests. In a presidential election where the Justices have participated as citizens and stand to benefit or lose in their judicial capacity, personal and partisan interests can affect judicial autonomy without reference in the decision to the particular concerns.[21] The judicial autonomy model suggests Justices can wrap their interests in formalistic language to achieve substantive goals. In other words, even in reference to legal principles in the decision, the Rehnquist majority can make a political decision and justify it with selective application of legal rules or principles.

In the 2000 election dispute, the legal system also advanced one social group over the rest. Republican justices appointed by Republican presidents advanced partisan interests in the election crisis. As the judicial autonomy model asserts, even in the ideal sense, if laws were autonomously applied, it could not guarantee that it will not perpetuate or advance socioeconomic, ideological, or political differences.[22] Procedures in our legal system allow the influence of extralegal factors such as party influences in the appointment of justices. Laws are enacted to meet a certain end, and Supreme Court justices are appointed with certain ends in view. As the theory maintains, "These ends will, in practice, always be in some person's or group's interests."[23] Additionally, the judicial selection process that seeks to control the values on the bench by elected officials can be considered a limitation on judicial autonomy.

The research revealed that political and personal factors influenced the decisions of individual Justices in the *Bush v. Gore* case and compromised the autonomy of the Supreme Court. The research also reaffirmed the theory that complete judicial autonomy is an intellectual ideal and not a political reality.

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1. Terri Jennings Peretti, *In Defense of a Political Court* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 107.
2. John Schmidhauser, "Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States," *University of Toronto Law Journal* XIV (1962): 194-212.
3. See generally Glendon Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe: Fess Press, 1959); Martin Shapiro, *Law and Politics in the Supreme Court* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); John Schmidhauser, "Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis of 1837-1860," *The Journal of Politics* 23, no. 4 (November 1961): 615-640.

4. See studies such as Henry Abraham, *Justices and Presidents*: *A Political History of Appointment to the Supreme Court*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Sheldon Goldman, "Judicial Appointments and the Presidential Agenda," in *The Presidency in American Politics*, eds., Paul Brace, Christine Harrington, and Gary King (New York: New York University Press, 1989); Laurence Tribe, *God Save This Honorable Court* (New York: Random House, 1985).

5. One study concluded nominees were more likely to be approved when the Senate majority was of the same party affiliation by (89 percent) compared to lowered rate of approval if the nominee was affiliated with the opposition party (59 percent). See Jeffrey Segal, "Senate, Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics," *Journal of Politics* 49, no. 4 (1987): 998,1007; For additional works that support this conclusion see David Rohde and Harold Spaeth, *Supreme Court Decision Making Supreme Making* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976); and P.S. Ruckman, Jr., "The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993): 793-797.

6. See Robert Carp, "The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush," *Judicature* 76 (1993): 298-302; James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni and Deborah Merritt, "Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern," *Ohio State Law Journal 60* (1999):1675-1771.

7. See Jeffrey Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, *The Supreme Court and The Attitudinal Model* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

8. Ibid., 70.

9. Most of the justices in the majority had an extensive political activist background prior to their appointment on the bench. Rehnquist and O'Connor were extremely active in Arizona state politics and presidential campaigns. To a smaller extent, Kennedy had some background of activism from his earlier career in California politics as a lobbyist and lawyer practicing at the state capital. Scalia served in a variety of high-level positions under the Nixon administration and Thomas had a few positions under the Reagan administration.

10. For studies that present the similar voting pattern of the Rehnquist majority see Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold Spaeth and Thomas Walker, *The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions & Developments* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2001); Lawrence Baum, *The Supreme Court* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2001).

11. For classical works on the social background approach see Glendon Schubert, *Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Chicago: Rand McNally 1964)*, John Schmidhauser, "Judicial Behavior and the Sectional Crisis of 1837-1860," *The Journal of Politics* 23, no. 4 (Nov.1961): 615-640.

12. Lani Guinier's study maintains Bush was the candidate of the rich in 2000. She wrote, "His voters were more educated and better-off than those who voted for the Democratic candidate. Bush campaigned at one location without apology as the candidate of the rich and stated, "This is an impressive crowd. The haves and the have-mores. Some people call you the elite. I call you my base." See Lani Guinier, "And to the C Students: The Lessons of Bush v. Gore," In Ronald Dworkin, ed., *A Badly Flawed Election* (New York: The New Press, 2002), 231.

13. This is consistent with Rehnquist's acknowledgment in *U.S. v. Microsoft*, 530 U.S.1301(2000) which he wrote, "Section 455(a) contains the more general declaration that a Justice "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." As this Court has stated, what matters under §455(a) "is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance, *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U. S. 540, 548 (1994)."

OUTCOME BUDGETING:
ANAYLSIS AND ASSESSMENT

by
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ABSTRACT

There is no generally agreed upon definition of outcome budgeting in the public administration literature. Moreover, many efforts for its implementation have been, unfortunately marred by confusion about its basic definition, resulting in the multiplicity of goals and objectives.

An academic debate in the theory and practice of administrative reform has implicitly cast doubts on the potential for outcome budgeting as a future major budgetary reform. These doubts are compounded by the fact that budgetary reforms are often oversold and do not always fulfill their promises. There are considerable challenges at the political level for acceptance of a rational model of budgeting.

This article attempts to introduce empirical evidence that would bring some resolution to the debate concerning the merits of outcome budgeting. We investigated the perspective of some experts, direct participants, and experienced users that we believe constitutes an outcome budgeting system. We administered an outcome budgeting survey to budget and finance officers, analysts, and auditors working in federal, state, and local governments.

In some cases, results show some degree of agreement in respondents' perceptions across levels of government with respect to some outcome budgeting objectives. However, most of the respondents disagreed that outcome budgeting implementation's root lies in increasing program effectiveness by promoting a focus on results. The respondents also did not agree that the motive behind outcome budgeting implementation lay in the improvement of fiscal discipline by limiting growth in expenditure.

This study represents a portion of a research project attempting to ascertain whether fashioning the budget into a contract for performance in government could be successful to the extent it would lessen the impact of political decisions into the budgetary process.

INTRODUCTION

An era of entrepreneurial budgeting, in particular outcome budgeting, is emerging within the reinvention framework, which guides the general effort toward achieving management improvement. Clearly, outcome-based budgeting, which is now being touted for implementation by some government agencies, signals the emergence of an important tool for effective governmental management and accountability. As Miller, Hildreth, and Rabin (2001, 3) indicate, the focus on inputs, outputs, and outcomes, along with citizen participation in assessing and resolving issues of their concern, are the characteristics of outcome budgeting, a potential major budgetary reform of the 21st century.

Outcome budgeting is seen as a concept built upon earlier fiscal practices in that: 1) its use of strategic planning and program structure draws upon the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System; 2) the setting of objectives and targets is derived from Management by Objectives; and

3) its designation of expected levels of performance for each level of expenditure was introduced with the Zero-Based Budgeting (Southern Growth Policies Board, 1996). But unlike these past reforms, which aimed to optimize programs, outcome budgeting seeks to improve organizations (Schick, 1990).

Paradoxically, the research on outcome budgeting is still very weak (Forrester[1], 2001), and the consensus is that there exists no generally agreed upon definition of this concept in the literature of public administration (Martin, 1997). Unfortunately, many efforts to implement outcome budgeting have been marred by confusion about its basic definition, which has resulted in the multiplicity of goals and objectives. Indeed, in various places, either in the literature or in practice, outcome budgeting is known by different names, with varying goals and objectives.

However, criticisms that a rational model of budgeting, such as this one, goes against political norms and is unworkable in a pluralist and individualist society, have arisen and have not yet been settled (Wildvasky, 1997, 9). Wildvasky contended that budgeting techniques would not substitute for political decisions about who "wins" and "loses" in the budgetary process, and the inability to account for such a shortcoming might explain the failure of Planning, Programming Budgeting System.

Hence, the use of outcome budgeting is a subject of debate in the theory and practice of administrative reform. The debate has cast doubts on the potential for its success as a future major budgetary reform, which could provide momentum to move governments toward being entrepreneurial and innovative in the delivery of services. Regrettably, these doubts are compounded by the fact that budgetary reforms are often oversold and do not always fulfill their promises.

The article is to introduce empirical evidence that will bring some resolution to the debate concerning the merits of outcome budgeting as a future major budgetary reform. The issue inherent in the study is to explore whether there are grounds for doubting that outcome budgeting can fulfill its promise of improving organizations. In particular, this work aims to ascertain what constitutes an outcome budgeting system, in terms of its goals and objectives. Agreement in perceptions across levels of government about the goals and objectives of outcome budgeting would facilitate widespread acceptance of this reform.

DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING OUTCOME BUDGETING

Some states have implemented "performance-based budgeting" to enhance communication and improve programs, while others were motivated by cost savings (Melkers and Willoughby, 2001). Some others found interest in this budget reform in order to demonstrate government responsiveness to the citizenry and to indicate awareness that taxpayers are no longer willing to pay for efforts, but only for results (King, 1995). King also reported that actual performance-based budgeting systems might have a variety of goals in that "they may or may not require measurement of outcomes; and that they may support strategic planning or focus on measurement development."

But Campbell (1997) describes "performance-based budgeting" as a system in which "performance measurement has been fully integrated into the budget process." According to him, this system is designed to "reduce or eliminate the micromanagement of inputs by elected officials, keeping them focused instead on getting the best results for the public's money." He also asserts that the focus is not on the unit cost of providing a service, but rather on achieving a particular outcome.

Mission-driven budgeting, or budgeting for results at the federal level as provided under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), is purported to achieve improved

Congressional decision-making with objective information. It is also linked to increased federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality and customer satisfaction (NPR, 1994).

Cothran (1993) termed the budgetary reform of the 1990s entrepreneurial budgeting, a new approach to budgeting using decentralization, with increased accountability to entice entrepreneurial behavior in government in order to improve management performance. He distinguished three types of this reform, which he termed: a) expenditure control budgeting, also called "profit sharing and various other things", experimented in by U.S. cities and used by city councils to set expenditure limits; b) budgeting for results, practiced by a number of national governments, especially those from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, in response to the fiscal stress and cutbacks of the 1970s and 1980s, in order to achieve "central control of total spending, decentralization of authority to departments in the use of the funds and enhanced accountability for results"; c) mission budgeting, proposed as a way to improve U.S. defense budgeting at the Pentagon. This system entails "centralized priority setting, decentralized implementation, and enhanced accountability."

Hendrick and Forrester (1999) indicated that outcome budgeting "or results-oriented budgeting system, also called performance or mission-driven budgeting" is a system in which "decisions focus on programs, performance, and outcomes." They asserted that the "bounds of accountability are broadened to closely parallel the notion of accountability used by non-profit and private sector organization." Anthony and Young (1995) point to a redefinition of accountability under outcome budgeting in order to "emphasize control over program performance."

Kettner, Moroney, and Martin (1990, 162, 177-178) describe outcome budgeting as an extension of program budgeting and the linking of outcome goals and objectives to those programs in order to derive "unit costs per outcome."

Osborne and Gaebler (1992, 161), who were not the first to venture a definition but who popularized the concept in their influential book *Reinventing Government,* have referred to outcome budgeting as a system that focuses on the outcomes of the funded activity."

Gianakis (1996, 141) asserted that outcome-based performance measurement systems help to realize the promises of the executive budget and of professional public management. He pointed out that the exercise of policy and financial controls (which are unavoidable elements of public management) through the oversight of program inputs could compromise the effectiveness of program managers. Using program outcome measures in the resource allocation process enable these oversight functions to focus on program results. He sees such focus as less intrusive to public managers and allows them greater discretion in deciding how inputs will be used to accomplish targeted results. Thus, managers can focus their energies on achieving those results instead of concentrating them on the political games necessary to secure inputs in the absence of results-oriented measures of performance. Such promise, he added, can act as catalyst for program managers to participate in a meaningful way in the development effort (1996, 142).

CENTRAL QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

Considering the difficulties in defining outcome budgeting and the resulting multiplicity of goals and objectives, this research investigates the perspective of some experts, direct participants, and experienced users that believe constitutes outcome budgeting, in terms of its goals and objectives. The study specifically addresses this main question: What is outcome budgeting conceptually, in terms of its goals and objectives?

This research question seeks to determine a certain level of agreement about three most considered objectives of outcome budgeting, which are:

Improvement of fiscal discipline by limiting expenditures;
Increase of program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on results and service quality; and
Improvement of decision-making with objective information.

The researcher hypothesized that:

H.1.) There is a difference in terms as to outcome budgeting goals and objectives at the federal and state government levels.

H.2.) There is a difference in terms as to outcome budgeting goals and objectives at the federal and local government levels.

H.3.) There is a difference in terms as to outcome budgeting goals and objectives at the state and local government levels.

This study provides some insights into the concept of outcome budgeting and whether such budgeting system could deliver on its promises and potentially receive serious consideration as a future major budgetary reform in the public administration literature. The potential success of such rationale budgeting system could lessen the impact of political decisions into the budgetary process. The efforts at reinvention in terms of administrative reforms, in particular outcome budgeting reforms, will play an important catalytic role for improving organizational effectiveness and the budget process in the 21st century. Such efforts will certainly provide momentum in moving governments around the world toward being more democratic, entrepreneurial and catalytic in the delivery of services. Thus, this study will be meaningful in the academic field and practice of administrative reform.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study used a quantitative approach to collect and analyze data focusing on outcome budgeting conceptualization and implementation at all levels of government in the United States.

Through the use of a survey instrument, the researcher collected quantitative data focused on the ABFM[2], AABPA[3], GFOA[4], and NASBO[5] member assessment of what constitutes an outcome budget. A survey was distributed to non-elected members randomly drawn from the directories maintained by above-mentioned organizations. The survey questions relating to the three hypotheses of difference in terms as to outcome budgeting goals and objectives across government levels are the following:

Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following question:

Why do organizations implement outcome-based budgeting?

	SA	A	N	D	SD[OC]
• Improvement of fiscal discipline by limiting growth in expenditures.	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏
• Increase of public accountability by promoting a focus on results.	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏
• Increase of program effectiveness by promoting a focus on service quality.	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏
• Improvement of executive decision-making with objective information.	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

[OC] Opinion category—SA- Strongly Agree; A-Agree; N-Neutral; D-Disagree; and SD-Strongly Disagree

The sample size was split into three sub-samples of 500, 250, and 250 for the local, federal, and state government levels respectively. Overall response rate increased to 22% (Federal level, 28%; State level, 38%; and Local level, 11%), after two mailings, email messages, and telephone calls. The data collected were subjected to univariate and chi-square analyses and Scheffe's procedure whenever the separation of means was deemed appropriate (for ordinal data that were treated as if converted to interval level).

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION OF DATA

The findings are presented for each question asked on the survey and the tables depicted below include summary statistics on the responses, for each level of government, provided by non-elected members of ABFM, AABPA, NASBO, and GFOA.

When the cross-tabular analysis and the Scheffe's procedure were significant for a particular question, we considered both results if these tests did not lead to a conflicting conclusion. In the affirmative, we considered only, for the conclusion, the results of the cross-tabular analysis, which provides more information.

Generally, we counted opinion categories "agree" and "strongly agree" together as "yes," or considered these categories as constituting an "agreement" by levels of government to a requirement for outcome budgeting. On the other hand, we counted opinion categories "disagree" and "strongly disagree" together as "no," or considered these categories as constituting a "disagreement" by levels of government to a requirement for outcome budgeting.

Four questions or statements relate to the three hypotheses and probe the multiplicity of views, among public employees, with respect to outcome budgeting goals and objectives.

1) Improvement of fiscal discipline

Respondents were asked whether government agencies implement outcome budgeting to improve fiscal discipline by limiting growth in expenditures. The findings are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1.
Government respondents' opinions on whether outcome budgeting is implemented to improve fiscal discipline by limiting growth in expenditures.

Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following question: Why do organizations implement outcome-based budgeting?	SA	A	N	D	SD
1. Improvement of fiscal discipline by limiting growth in expenditures	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Government Level	Opinion Category[OC]				
	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
Federal	8.70	24.64	33.33	30.43	2.90
Local	3.57	28.57	23.21	37.50	7.14
State	3.30	31.87	38.46	24.18	2.20
Total (N)	11	62	71	64	8

Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square (χ^2_{MH}) = 0.14	p-value = 0.7060	Test significance[*,**]

	Mean[SM]	Standard deviation
Federal	2.94[a]	1.01
Local	3.16[a]	1.04
State	2.90[a]	0.88

* Statistical test is significant when p-value is equal or less than 5%.

** Statistical test is highly significant when p-value is equal or less than 1%.

[SM] Separation of means—Any two means with the same superscript a, or b, or c within a column are not significantly different at the five percent level of probability using Scheffe's method.

[OC] Opinion category—SA- Strongly Agree; A-Agree; N-Neutral; D-Disagree; and SD-Strongly Disagree

The results fail to support the three hypotheses of difference in terms of outcome budgeting goals and objectives across government levels, as they indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in perceptions across levels of government with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to improve fiscal discipline by limiting growth in expenditures (Table 1). The percentages indicate little support for this proposition.

Overall, the mean values of public employees' perceptions indicate that federal and state respondents tended to disagree, whereas local respondents expressed neutral views with respect to this outcome budgeting objective (although results were not statistically significant).

2) Increase of program effectiveness and public accountability

Two questions or statements below relate to these three hypotheses of difference in terms of outcome budgeting goals and objectives across government levels. Further, it probes whether there is a difference among public employees' perceptions with respect to public agencies implementing outcome budgeting in order to increase program effectiveness and public accountability.

The first question probes whether outcome budgeting activities are implemented by government agencies with a view to increasing public accountability by promoting a focus on results. The findings to this question are reported in Table 2.

TABLE 2.

Government respondents' opinions on whether outcome budgeting is implemented to increase public accountability by promoting a focus on results.

Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following question:
Why do organizations implement outcome-based budgeting?

SA   A   N   D   SD

2. Increase of public accountability by promoting a focus on results.   ☐   ☐ ☐ ☐   ☐

Government Level	Opinion Category[OC]				
	SD (%)	**D (%)**	**N (%)**	**A (%)**	**SA (%)**
Federal	1.45	7.25	21.74	52.17	17.39
Local	0.00	3.57	8.93	66.07	21.43
State	0.00	1.10	12.09	53.85	32.97
Total (N)	1	8	31	122	54

Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square (χ^2_{MH}) = 11.50	p-value = 0.0007[**]	Test significance[*,**]

	Mean[SM]	Standard deviation
Federal	3.77[b]	0.88
Local	4.05[ab]	0.67
State	4.19[a]	0.68

[*]   Statistical test is significant when p-value is equal or less than 5%.

[**]   Statistical test is highly significant when p-value is equal or less than 1%.

[SM]   Separation of means—Any two means with the same superscript a, or b, or c within a column are not significantly different at the five percent level of probability using Scheffe's method.

[OC]   Opinion category—SA- Strongly Agree; A-Agree; N-Neutral; D-Disagree; and SD-Strongly Disagree

These results show a statistically significant difference in the magnitude of public employees' perceptions with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to increase public accountability by promoting a focus on results (c^2_{MH}[**], Table 2). Generally, an overwhelming majority of local and state respondents (about 86.00%, at each level), compared to a lesser proportion of federal respondents (69.56%), agreed with the view that outcome budgeting is implemented to achieve this objective. These results, while lending considerable support to the three hypotheses of differences in terms of outcome budgeting goals and objectives across government levels, fall in line with one of the stated purposes of the GPRA (OMB, 1993). This is because differences are only in magnitude: the majority of respondents, at each level of government, expressed agreement with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to increase public accountability by promoting a focus on results.

On the other hand, when considering the statistical significance of the results of separation of the mean values of public employees' perceptions, only the first hypothesis (H.1.) of difference, in terms of outcome budgeting goals and objectives between the federal and state government levels, is supported. But, the results of separation of means of public employees' perceptions do not support the hypotheses of differences between the federal and local government levels (H.2.), on the one hand, and the state and local government levels (H.3.), on the other hand. This is reflected in the fact that state and local respondents were more likely to

have means that suggest agreement with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to increase public accountability by promoting a focus on results.

The next question probes whether outcome budgeting activities are implemented by government agencies with a view to increasing program effectiveness by promoting a focus on service quality. The findings to this question are reported in Table 3.

TABLE 3.
Government respondents' opinions on whether outcome budgeting is implemented to increase program effectiveness by promoting a focus on service quality.

Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following question:
Why do organizations implement outcome-based budgeting?

| | | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 3. Increase of program effectiveness by promoting a focus on service quality. | | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

Government Level	Opinion Category[OC]				
	SD (%)	**D (%)**	**N (%)**	**A (%)**	**SA (%)**
Federal	0.00	4.35	27.54	49.28	18.84
Local	0.00	5.36	12.50	64.29	17.86
State	0.00	3.30	14.29	73.63	8.79
Total (N)	0	9	39	137	31

Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square (χ^2_{MH}) = 0.18	p-value = 0.6746	Test significance[*,**]

	Mean[SM]	Standard deviation
Federal	3.83[a]	0.79
Local	3.95[a]	0.72
State	3.88[a]	0.59

*   Statistical test is significant when p-value is equal or less than 5%.
**   Statistical test is highly significant when p-value is equal or less than 1%.
[SM]   Separation of means—Any two means with the same superscript a, or b, or c within a column are not significantly different at the five percent level of probability using Scheffe's method.
[OC]   Opinion category—SA- Strongly Agree; A-Agree; N-Neutral; D-Disagree; and SD-Strongly Disagree

The results in Table 3 indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in public employees' perceptions across levels of government with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to increase program effectiveness by promoting a focus on service quality. Thus, these results do not offer support for the three hypotheses (H.1., H.2., and H.3.) of differences in outcome budgeting goals and objectives across government levels.

These results are consistent with one of the stated purposes of the GPRA (OMB, 1993) and findings obtained by Melkers and Willoughby (2001). There seems to be some degree of agreement, across government levels, reflected in the majority of respondents having expressed an agreement with respect to this objective.

4) Improvement of decision-making with objective information

The question or statement below relates to the three hypotheses (H.1., H.2., and H.3.) of differences, across government levels, and probes whether there are differences among public employees' perceptions with respect to government agencies implementing outcome budgeting in order to improve decision-making with objective information.

Respondents were asked whether outcome budgeting system is implemented by government agencies in order to improve executive decision-making with objective information. The findings to this question are reported in Table 4.

TABLE 4.
Government respondents' opinions on whether outcome budgeting is implemented to improve executive decision-making with objective information.

Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following question:
Why do organizations implement outcome-based budgeting?

SA A N D SD

4. Improvement of executive decision-making with objective information. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

Government Level	Opinion Category[OC]				
	SD (%)	D (%)	N (%)	A (%)	SA (%)
Federal	0.00	2.90	30.43	42.03	24.64
Local	0.00	1.79	16.07	55.36	26.79
State	0.00	0.00	18.68	51.65	29.67
Total (N)	3	47	107	117	29

Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square (χ^2_{MH}) = 3.50	p-value = 0.0615	Test significance[*,**]

	Mean[SM]	Standard deviation
Federal	3.88[a]	0.81
Local	4.07[a]	0.71
State	4.11[a]	0.69

*   Statistical test is significant when p-value is equal or less than 5%.

**   Statistical test is highly significant when p-value is equal or less than 1%.

[SM]   Separation of means—Any two means with the same superscript a, or b, or c within a column are not significantly different at the five percent level of probability using Scheffe's method.

[OC]   Opinion category—SA- Strongly Agree; A-Agree; N-Neutral; D-Disagree; and SD-Strongly Disagree

The results in Table 4 indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in public employees' perceptions across levels of government with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to improve executive decision-making with objective information (although results are statistically significant at 10% level). Thus, these results do not offer support for the three hypotheses (H.1., H.2., and H.3.) of differences in outcome budgeting goals and objectives across government levels.

There seems to be some degree of agreement, across government levels, reflected in the majority of government respondents (at least 67%, at each government level) who generally expressed an agreement with respect to this objective. These results are consistent with those of Melkers and Willoughby (2001).

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS

The findings from this study can be generalized to the broader budgeting and finance population at the state and federal government levels. However, they are least likely to be generalized to the broader budgeting and finance population at the local government level. The study has limited applicability when considering the context of the budgets of the various government agencies. The study is directly applicable to "business-like" activities of the government whereas it may not be applicable to "non-business-like activities" of government such as research and development, education and training, healthcare, regulation, and recreation (including museum) agencies or institutions. In the case of "non-business-like activities" the issue of performance measures, in particular outcome measures, and their connection to the budget is far more complex and beyond the scope of this study.

The results show a statistically significant difference in the magnitude of public employees' perceptions with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to increase public accountability by promoting a focus on results. Generally, an overwhelming majority of local and state respondents (about 86.00 percent, at each level), compared to a lesser proportion of federal respondents (69.56 percent), agreed with the view that outcome budgeting is implemented to achieve this objective. These results indicate some degree of agreement in perceptions across levels of government as reflected in the majority of respondents, at each level of government, who have expressed agreement with respect to this objective. These results are in conformity with one of the stated purposes of the GPRA (OMB, 1993).

Overall, the results show some degree of agreement, across government levels, with respondents who have expressed overall agreement with respect to outcome budgeting as implemented to: 1) increase program effectiveness by promoting a focus on service quality; and 2) improve executive decision-making with objective information.

The respondents did not agree that the motive behind outcome budgeting implementation lay in the improvement of fiscal discipline by limiting growth in expenditure.

The results, suggesting the lack of agreement in perceptions across levels of government about the goals and objectives of outcome budgeting, raise some concerns. Outcome budgeting would not gain widespread acceptance if the concept were not well defined and agreed upon by many government stakeholders.

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THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN
PUBLIC POLICY FORMULATION IN AMERICA:
THE CASE OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

by
J. ANYU NDUMBE, Ph.D.

Control over the activities of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) has been a highly controversial issue. On one hand, developing nations have been seeking tighter controls over the activities of TNCs as well as a greater proportion of their profits. Corporations such as General Motors, Exxon and Ford Motors rank above most developing nations in earnings.[1] They sometimes intervene in the politics of other nations or bribe foreign leaders in order to gain contracts. For example, investigations have revealed that Lockheed Aircraft and Exxon spent millions of dollars to bribe overseas politicians—a practice that the U.S. policy-makers tried to halt through the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).[2] Critics claimed that the Transnational Corporations had become global mini-empires beyond the reach of national laws, undermining the traditional nation-state, and adversely affecting development in some countries. American officials, on the other hand, defended the TNCs, claiming that they benefits to developing nations in terms of higher wages, tax revenues and technology transfer. The American government was reluctant to restrain TNCs activities because these corporations enhanced the U.S. economy. Prior to the enactment of the FCPA, no federal law specifically forbade an American corporation from making illicit payments to foreign officials or from making monetary or service contributions to foreign political candidates.

The absence of specific statutory prohibitions of foreign bribery seemed to have resulted largely from government complacency.[3] Evidence indicates that Americans were aware of widespread bribery during the 1970s.[4] A deputy legal adviser of the State Department remarked that "there is little new or startling in the revelation that American businessmen have made bribe payments while operating abroad."[5] In fact, the American government's role in the consummation of foreign bribes was far from occasional. The Defense Department and State Department seemed to have taken an active role in informing American businessmen of the complexity of foreign payments. For example, a defense security assistance agency issued a memorandum entitled "Agent Fees in the Middle East," which was circulated among American corporations and strongly insisted that "companies should pay lucrative fees to local agents and should allow them discretion to distribute the money among local officials."[6] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through its clandestine operations, helped promote foreign bribery as well. For example, with the cooperation of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, payments were made to labor unions, the press and the military in Chile.[7]

Business executives insisted that foreign payments abroad were necessary for a number of reasons. They asserted that since foreign officials accepted payments from abroad, that acceptance itself was a more compelling reason for the payment. Furthermore, it was argued that any attempts to regulate foreign payments would adversely affect American companies operating in the global economy because they would lose businesses to foreign competitors that considered such payments part and parcel of conducting business overseas.[8]

An additional esoteric rationale to avoid criminalizing foreign payments was the notion that since business reflects the values of the society, attempting to control bribery would be futile until there was a corresponding change in the social fabric. It should be noted that the reverse of this is also true.[9] The failure to act, exacerbated the problem and made reform inevitable.

This article examines the role played by Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter in influencing and guiding the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and its subsequent amendments. It also examines the various tools employed by the executive branch to advance corrupt practices reforms and to increase enforcement efforts by the Justice Department and the Security and Exchange Commission. Finally, the essay examines the nexus between corruption and the terrorism within the context of the money laundering provision of the USA Patriot Act and its relationship with the FCPA.

The executive branch has a variety of techniques and tools it can use to influence public policy. Some of these tools are the powers that are granted to the executive branch in the constitution, informed powers that are derived from the nature of the presidency and the unique leadership skills of individual presidents. In sharing power among the respective branches of government, the framers of the U.S. Constitution granted only minimal legislative power to the executive branch (President). Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution—the Presentation Clause—provides that every bill, before it becomes a law, shall be presented to the president for his signature. He can either approve the bill and sign it, or he can veto it, and return it to Congress with objections; he can do nothing, letting it become law without his signature.[10] Furthermore, Article II, Section 3, of the Constitution provides for the president to inform Congress "from time to time" on the State of the Union, to recommend necessary and expedient measures to Congress, and to adjourn that body in cases of disagreement between the two branches of government.[11]

FORD AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES

On February 10, 1976, President Ford called on key federal agencies to conduct a thorough investigation into the issue of questionable and illegal foreign payments by U.S. corporations to foreign government officials. Pursuant to this presidential order, the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formed a joint task force to determine whether there were criminal and prosecutable violations of federal law. By April 20, 1977, the SEC had undertaken thirty-one enforcement actions and referred approximately 300 cases to the Department of Justice.[12] In 1977, the Justice Department reached agreements with a number of countries around the world regarding the sharing of evidence in the cases in question. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought legal action against a number of U.S corporations, including Rockwell International, on grounds that they had committed violations under the Federal Trade Commission Act. This Act made it illegal for U.S. corporations to bribe foreign officials, because bribery creates an atmosphere that leads to unfair business competition. Rockwell challenged the action in court, questioning the FTC's authority to investigate illegal payment abroad.[13]

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required disclosure to the Secretary of State of all payments in connection with foreign arms sales. Both the State Department and Justice Department worked jointly to apply stricter laws that required disclosure of payments and fees in weapon sales and purchases. Following an investigation by the Defense Contract Auditing Agency, on September 25, 1976, the State Department made it mandatory that U.S. Arms exporters had to certify their contracts for the purchasing government, the names of any agents, and the fees paid. The Defense Security Assistance Agency required the approval of such certification by the purchasing government.

Furthermore, the Secretary of the Treasury, William E. Simon, requested that the Internal Revenue Service investigate the tax returns of companies involved with bribing foreign government officials in exchange for the award of contracts. Section 162(c) of the Internal

Revenue Code forbids the deduction of bribes or kickbacks from taxable income. In April 1976, the IRS sent out eleven questions to be answered by 1,200 companies and their audit firms.[14] However, Fidelity Corporation, an Atlanta Insurance Company, challenged the action of the IRS in court. A Federal district court ruled that the questions prepared by the IRS were too broad. It also limited such IRS investigations to the "effects on the tax payments by the corporation."[15] The Internal Revenue Service subsequently audited 110 companies on charges of illegal income tax deductions. The Kennedy and Simon study, which examined and analyzed more than 900 of the corporations' responses to the IRS's questions, found 300 companies with slush funds and more than fifty potential instances of domestic tax evasion. The tax evasion charges were subsequently investigated.

Overseas, the study uncovered some sixteen instances of currency exchange control avoidance, eleven instances of tax avoidance and fifteen instances of deposit into third country's bank accounts.[16] These discoveries were reported to the SEC. The agency investigated these charges of irregularities, and legal action was brought against the guilty parties.

THE TASK FORCE ON CORRUPT PRACTICES

On March 31, 1976, President Ford announced the formation of a cabinet-level Task Force on Questionable Payments Abroad chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, Eliott Richardson. The President told the Task Force to "study the very broad ramifications… [of the payment as a basis for developing] a comprehensive government policy to avoid the problems that [America has encountered] in the last few years in an area that involves our economy, [and] involves our foreign relations."[17] President Ford instructed his Foreign Policy and International Trade Advisers to work with other governments to develop multinational guidelines that would regulate corporate conduct.

The presidential Task Force members included the Secretaries of Defense, State and the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, as well as the Assistants to the President for Economic Affairs and National Security Affairs. It was asked to report back to the president through the National Security Council and the Economic Policy Board by the end of December.[18] It was also directed to conduct a broad policy review of this matter and to recommend additional policy measures as the situation required.

The Ford Administration made it clear that "…the purpose of this Task Force is not to punish American corporations but to ensure that the United States has a clear policy." In addition, President Ford, in denouncing corporate bribery, asserted that "corrupt business practices strike at the very heart of our own moral code and our faith in free enterprise."[19] He added that the issue might never be fully resolved to the satisfaction of all the concerned parties. However, he was adamant that the central policy issue was "how… to prevent such questionable activities in the future."[20] The Ford administration argued that its objectives were to protect American businesses from "strong-arm practices" by transnational corporations and to establish a "clear enforceable standard" for prevention of questionable payment, as well as to ensure "ethical" conduct in the international marketplace.

PRESIDENT FORD AND THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT OF THE ACT

Based on the findings of Richardson's Task Force, President Ford on June 4, 1976 announced three new initiatives. He directed that legislation be prepared requiring corporate disclosure of all payments made with the intention of influencing foreign government officials and that the law be enacted and enforced by civil and criminal penalties. The Ford

administration also expressed its support for legislation already proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The proposed SEC legislation required that corporations report all foreign activities to shareholders. Finally, the administration sought a policy that would encourage a multinational code for the regulations of corporate conduct. In a statement released on June 14, 1976, the administration argued that inspite of the relatively small number of American firms implicated in making illegal payments abroad, three problems were evident. Illegal corporate payments abroad threatened to harm foreign relations. If allowed to continue, this practice could badly erode public as well as international confidence in American business and American institutions. The United States must provide leadership for "free, honest, and competitive behavior" in the international business arena.[21]

On August 3, 1976, the Ford administration sent a bill, The Foreign Payments Disclosure Act, S.37410, to Congress. It essentially called for the confidential reporting of all foreign payments to the Secretary of Commerce. These reports were to be made public after a year, unless the Attorney General or Secretary of State decided against disclosure for foreign policy or judicial process considerations. Furthermore, information in the corporation's reports submitted to the Secretary of Commerce could be released at any time to the State Department, Justice Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, congressional committees, and foreign governments.[22]

The proposed bill adopted a disclosure mechanism, which would provide a much more easy avenue of obtaining proof of failure to report payments, without establishing the recipient of such payments, a motive, or a prohibited purpose. This disclosure system proposed by the administration would automatically overburden both "domestic concerns" and "issuers". However, the bill excluded the disclosure of payments or small payments as well as bona fide payments such as taxes.

The penalties for enforcing the Foreign Payments Disclosure Act would have been $100,000 civil fine for non-compliance with the reporting requirement and a $50,000 criminal penalty for deliberate violation of disclosure. In his message transmitting the proposed legislation to the Congress, the president stressed the overarching purpose of the administration's proposal as reversing the erosion of "confidence in our free enterprise institution" and restoring "confidence in American business standards."[23] The administration also indicated the two main advantages to its legislative approach. First, it argued that its approach would deter improper payments. Second, the proposed legislation would help restore the confidence of Americans and their trading partners in the ethical standards. He acknowledged that "there is a substantial basis in existing law for effective action by the U.S. Government."[24]

CARTER AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977

The election of Jimmy Carter as President of the United States ended the acrimony between the Executive Branch and Congress over the passage of the FCPA. Ford had failed to get Congress to pass the legislation in the 94th Congress because of a disagreement over the details of the law. The point of contention was over the legislation should require only disclosure or a prohibition on foreign payments. The debate over the larger question of the role of U.S. corporations in the implementation of American foreign policy was not defined as yet.

The election also led to a shift in American foreign policy beyond what congressional activists had hoped for. The entire Carter strategy during his presidential campaign was one characterized by the notion of the "transparent, honest man." In his view, a President should give the country a government as decent as the Americans. This doctrine of transparency

became the hallmark of the new administration and was quite evident in his foreign policy. The new initiative pursued by the Carter Administration was in support of a law that would prohibit illegal and questionable payments abroad. Bribery was no longer only ethically repugnant and economically undesirable; it was also in direct conflict with the stated American policy.

It was the view of the Carter Administration that the removal of the bribery would pave the way for American corporations to dominate the international business arena quickly. In essence, the Administration did not see any conflict between its own desire to utilize corporations to achieve foreign policy objectives and the traditional profit motive corporations.

On January 19, 1977, shortly after President Carter took office, Senator Proxmire introduced Senate bill, S. 305, which, in principle, was identical to a prior bill S.3664, a bill that received unanimous support in Congress.[25] On March 16, 1977, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal testified before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in favor of the bill.[26] He reported the Administration's support for imposing specific criminal penalties for acts of bribery abroad. He informed the Senate that the administration would pursue bilateral and multilateral treaties with other countries to supplement the bill after its passage.[27]

The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Roderick Hills also testified on the merits of the bill. The SEC was willing to accept the criminalization provisions, but it had some reservations. Although the commissioner recognized the congressional interest in enacting these prohibitions, he argued that enforcement of them did not easily fit within the Commission's mandate. In this regard, he recommended that section 103 should not be included in the legislation. However, he stated that if Congress wished to change in the SEC's statutory role, the commission had no objection to the inclusion of section 103 in the final legislation.[28] With the retirement of Roderick Hill, the new Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Harold William took more aggressive stances against foreign payment and strongly favored legislation. He was more willing than his predecessor to embrace the idea that the SEC should undertake the criminal enforcement functions under the new legislation.

Meanwhile, the SEC chairman, Hill Slao, echoed his doubts as to the enforcement of the disclosure provision of the bill within the framework of his agency. He thought a better approach to address the problem of illegal payments abroad would be the negotiations of bilateral treaties with foreign countries.[29]

The floor debates in both the House and the Senate once again emphasized the foreign policy implications of the law. In Conference, both Republicans and Democrats echoed similar sentiments on the significance of the legislation in terms of America's global interest. Consequently, Senate bill S.305 was passed by the Conference Committee and was approved by Congress.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

The Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission had autonomous but parallel enforcement responsibilities under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The division of enforcement responsibilities between the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission was as follows:

1) Violations by domestic concerns may be investigated and prosecuted only by the Justice Department.
2) The SEC may investigate violations by issuers but may refer the case to the Justice Department for prosecution or the Justice Department can conduct its investigations with or without an independent SEC investigation.[30]

The Congress in passing the FCPA, empowered the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce the anti-bribery provision of the Act against "issuers" through seeking civil injunctive solutions in cases that do not deserve criminal prosecution. In fact, in the case of <u>SEC v Dresser Industries INC,</u> the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia ruled that the SEC might proceed with the investigation of possible securities infractions. The court also ruled that the SEC might undertake civil enforcement actions, even after the Justice Department had begun a criminal investigation into the same alleged violations.[31] Indeed, the court's ruling permitted parallel investigation by the Justice Department and the SEC in special circumstance in which the character of the proceedings would not have any demonstrable prejudicial effect on the rights of the investigated parties or on the part of government.

THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT

Because the SEC led the investigations in illegal payments abroad, it was logical for Congress to give the SEC enforcement functions under the Act. The rationale was grounded in the idea that the Agency already had the ability to enforce compliance with the existing securities laws.[32] Furthermore, it delegated enforcement responsibilities to the SEC because of illegal foreign payments that were not disclosed to the investors violated securities laws.

The responsibilities of the SEC under the FCPA of 1977 include the following: conducting investigations, bringing civil injunctive action, starting administrative proceedings where necessary, defending the SEC and its staff in law suits that result from the agency's obligations under the FCPA, and referring criminal cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.[33]

The SEC had sought to implement the accounting requirement of the FCPA since its inception. The agency had enforced regulations that were designed to halt individuals from indulging in the falsification of corporate records. The laws were also designed to forbid directors and officers of corporations from making false, misleading, or incomplete statements to auditors or when preparing reports.[34] Additionally, the agency has also enforced these rules through the filing of enforcement actions.

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT

Since the enactment of the FCPA, the Justice Department has brought a relatively small number of legal actions. The cases brought by the agency had centered on alleged violations of Section 104 of the Act (i.e. corrupt action by an issuer or domestic concern). In November 1979, the Justice Department issued a policy statement of its "enforcement priorities" with respect to the bribery requirements of the FCPA.[35] It outlined a number of factors that would increase the likelihood for investigation or prosecution. These factors included the following:
1) The making of prohibited payments or gifts to high ranking officials or cabinet officials of foreign governments;
2) Under circumstances where there are no competitors but one where the American company is the lone company engaged in corrupt practices;
3) The making of the illegal payments in countries where the only other competitors are American corporations; and
4) Situations where a foreign nation is making efforts to eliminate corrupt practices.

However, other factors that may necessitate the likelihood of prosecution should include the following:

1) The size of the transaction;
2) The passive or active involvement of top management;
3) The previous conduct of the corporation in question;
4) The strength of the available evidence;
5) The size of the payment; and
6) The involvement of lower level employees in situations where the company had failed to exercise due diligence in supervising the activities of the employees.

Furthermore, on March 24, 1980, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti approved regulations creating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Review procedures in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. These regulations required corporations covered by the FCPA to submit to the Justice Department all documents and materials concerning a proposed transaction. They also allowed corporations to seek from Justice a statement of their "present enforcement intention" under section 103 and 104 of the FCPA. The intent of the review procedure was to allow corporations to know whether they had violated the law or whether the Justice Department might bring enforcement action against them.[36]

In its Release 34-17, 099, the SEC made it clear that as a matter of discretion, it would not take a legal action in any situation in which an "issuer" obtained a review letter from the Justice Department prior to June 1981. The SEC's decision was based on a review of subsequent Justice Department rulings.[37]

The review procedure appeared to be advantageous in situations where the transactions in question were of a public nature. For example, the Lockheed Corporation and the Olayan group of Saudi Arabia sought a review letter regarding a proposed agreement with one another for a joint venture with the Saudi Airline Corporation (Saudia). Sheik Suleiman Olayan, chairman of the Olayan group, was also a member of the Board of Directors of the Saudi Airline Corporation, a situation so public that the Justice Department should have been aware of it, even without the request of a review letter.[38] In this instance, the Justice Department indicated that it had no intentions of taking any legal action on the basis of the agreement between the two corporations.

The 1988 amendments set up procedures under which the Attorney General was required to decide within six months of the enactment date (August 23, 1988) whether compliance would be enhanced and the business community would be assisted by additional clarification of the provision of the 1988 amendments. If that was the case, the Attorney General could issue (i) guidelines pertaining to the activities that were in accordance with the Justice Department policy regarding the FCPA and (ii) "General Precautionary Procedures" to enable domestic concerns to conform their conduct to the Justice Department's enforcement policy.[39] Furthermore, the Attorney General was also required to establish procedures to provide timely guidance with regard to the FCPA to exporters and small businesses that were unable to obtain specialized counsel.[40]

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW

Although the importance of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has been obvious, legal actions under the Act have been relatively infrequent since its enactment. Of all the suits that have been brought, only a relative handful of them have been directly involved with international business transactions and foreign corrupt practices. The legal actions brought by the SEC sought the enforcement of the Accounting standard provision of the FCPA in domestic transactions.[41] Legal action were also brought under the "reason to know" language in an otherwise unrelated context.[42]

Nevertheless, the SEC and Justice Department have been determined to enforce the Act in situations where there is evidence that a violation has occurred. Indeed, in Dresser's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia, the court held in part that the SEC and the Justice Department shared a dual investigative role in preparing for civil and criminal legal actions. Furthermore, the courts stated that both agencies were unconstrained in sharing the information "at the earliest stages of any investigation."[43]

In 1981, W.S. Kirkpatrick and Company, a contracting firm, learned that Nigeria was about to contract for the constructing and equipping of an aeronautical center at a Nigerian Air Force base. Its CEO, Harry Carpenter, sought to secure the contract by arranging to funnel illegal payments to Nigerian government officials through a third party, Benson Akindele, a Nigerian national. This scheme was disclosed by an unsuccessful bidder, Environmental Tectonics Corporation, to both the Nigerian government and the American Embassy in Lagos. Following an investigation by the FBI, W.S. Kirkpatrick and Co. and Carpenter were indicted under the Act, and both pleaded guilty.[44]

Subsequently, Environmental Tectonics brought civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Kirkpatrick and others, seeking damages under Robinson-Patman Act and the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that the "act-of-state doctrine" precludes an American court from invalidating the official acts of a foreign sovereign nation performed within its national confines. However, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the "act-of-state doctrine" had no applicability in this case because the change was based on the foreign officials' unlawful motivation in awarding the contract, not on an invalid act of the foreign sovereign.[45]

Although the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted some twenty-three years ago, it was only recently that renewed interest in the law became evident. The expansion of the U.S. companies into emerging markets have increased the likelihood of liability under the Act and increasingly prove that the FCPA does place U.S. corporations at a comparatively disadvantaged position in international business transactions.

Recently both the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission have embarked on aggressive enforcement of the Act. As of 1995, both agencies had prosecuted sixteen FCPA bribery cases since the Act was passed.[46] The Justice Department and SEC investigations suggested that American corporate illegal payment to foreign official might be emerging as a serious problem for the first time in twenty years.[47] According to the top enforcement official at the SEC, William McLucas, he would not be surprised if more cases were brought against corporations charged with making illegal payments to foreign officials. He added, "I am worried about a level of behavior by some U.S. companies that may be benign indifference or tolerance of payoff or bribes."[48] Furthermore, McLucas suggested that the SEC had "a number of investigations under way" relating to illegal payments abroad by American corporations.[49] Given the fact that the SEC was expanding its investigations on illegal foreign payments, it was apparent that U.S. corporations had reasonable grounds to be concerned about possible liability under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Accordingly, the renewed interest in prosecuting violations of the Act was evident in the SEC enforcement action against Triton Energy Ltd. This international oil and gas development corporation agreed to pay $300,000 to settle allegations that one of its subsidiaries made illegal payment to officials of the government of Indonesia in 1989 and 1990. Triton settled the case without admitting or denying the allegations. The SEC in its civil filing with the court, alleged that Triton and senior officials of Triton's Indonesia subsidiary, Philip Keever and Richard McAdoo, violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The complaint alleged that Triton officials not only made illegal payments that were in violation of the FCPA, but that company records were falsified

to make the bribe seem as routine business payments.[50] In essence, the SEC enforcement action against Triton resulted in a substantial monetary settlement and negative publicity for the company.

The SEC in recent years has brought one enforcement action against Montedison, an Italian chemical company that does business in the U.S.; for falsifying company records. The SEC alleged that the company had overstated its profits by conceding on its records about $400 million in bribe payments to Italian government officials.[51]

The Justice Department and the SEC also investigated whether IBM Argentina violated the FCPA by making illegal payments to government officials in order to obtain a $250 million contract to modernize the computer system of Banco de La Nation. At issue was the point that a subcontractor, Capacitacion Y Computacion Rural S.A. (CCR) was employed to execute the payoffs.[52] It is widely reported that IBM had paid $21 million to CCR before auditors from Argentina tax agency realized that IBM had received no services in return, and that CCR in turn had paid most of the money to phantom subcontractors.[53]

In 1997, the Justice Department also indicated that there were at least 75 cases under investigation. The agency anticipated that the number of bribe investigations would increase by the end of the decade. The rationale for the likely increase in the number of bribe investigations might be attributed to the employment of more aggressive methods to investigate possible FCPA violations. Methods such as continually monitoring telephone conversations and search warrants are being used more frequently.[54]

Accordingly, anticipated tighter enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act increases the legal risk for American corporations considering international mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures. American companies would be liable even in situations where a foreign subsidiary or joint venture offers bribes. Foreign investors usually have a difficult time satisfying the monetary demands of local custom officials. As a result they must navigate between the local custom officials and the FCPA. This could be mind boggling for small firm and new-to-market firms.[55]

As a result of the Justice Department and SEC tightening their enforcement efforts, American corporations must now exercise a high degree of caution and adopt strict standards of compliance in order to avoid possible violations of the law.

FCPA ENFORCEMENT AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

American corporations are increasingly concerned about liability under the FCPA as they engage in international business transactions, especially with developing nations. A number of experts have noted that increasing corruption has been a product of the increase in foreign investments in emerging economies. The foreign investment in these economies increased from $44 billion in 1990 to $167 billion in 1996.[56]

Some experts argue that the rush to open up new markets in traditionally state-controlled economies, such as those in South East Asia, the former Soviet Union and Latin America, has opened the doors to corporations eager to enter into these untapped markets and acquire new customers.[57]

As developing nations attempt to modernize and reform their economies, corruption seems to be persisting and evolving. This corruption syndrome gives rise to bribe payments by corporations competing for market shares in these emerging markets. Thus, American transnational corporations are subject to an increasing amount of bribe solicitation when bidding for contracts and licenses in these countries. For example, bribery is considered an everyday occurrence in former communist states in general and is rampant in Russia in particular.[58] As a result foreign investors must satisfy the expectations of the local officials if they are interested in doing business in these countries. Despite the existence of FCPA, American corporations

willing to do business there are left with no choice but to pay protection money to individuals or to the "Mafia" who illegally control the economy.[59]

Apart from this, the expansion of democracy has come with increased incentives for corruption as political parties solicit campaign contributions from potential foreign investors. In most developing nations, projects may be more valuable for their graft (illegal profit from government business) than for their direct benefit. Consequently, globalization has magnified the risk of liability for American corporations under the FCPA as they increase their direct foreign investments in the new markets such as Russia,[60] China and India, among others. In these countries where bribery is common, the undertaking of major infrastructure projects by foreign corporations becomes more hazardous in view of the provisions of the FCPA.[61]

Evidently the executive branch under Presidents Ford and Carter played a vital role in the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Their role in pushing through the legislation as well as its subsequent amendment cannot be understated. Presidential speeches and testimony of members of the administration played a significant role in shaping the character of the Act. It should also be noted that federal agencies were charged with the enforcement and interpretation of the law. The dual enforcement roles assigned to the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission led to conflicting enforcement procedures. Differences in the interpretation and the ambiguous language of the initial legislation gave ammunition to its critics. Congress responded by amending the Act in1988. This amendment revamped and strengthened the law. The enactment of the law gave the U.S. the legal and moral standing to cajole the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization of American States (OAS) to pass similar anti-bribery laws governing international business.

The law is more relevant today than ever because the definition of terrorism now includes corruption and all its transnational character. The terrorists who masterminded the September 11 attack on U.S. landmarks were funded through corrupt means. In fact, most of their finances were obtained from laundered money from the illegal trade transactions involving precious meters such as diamonds. For example, there is ample evidence to show that Al Qaeda was involved in smuggling blood diamond from Sierra Leone through Liberia to the world markets. The proceeds from the sales of smuggled blood diamonds were used to purchase arms and finance criminal activities around the globe. The US government enacted laws designed to halt money-laundering activities. The USA Patriot Act was one of the major legislative actions that were taken by the US government to arrest the problem. The money laundering provision of the law broadens the powers of the government to investigate terrorism and its source of funding. The law specifically outlines the requirements for recordkeeping and reporting of certain financial transaction. This provision strengthens the accounting and bookkeeping provision of the FCPA. Accountants under this law are obliged to report all corrupt acts including money laundering.

It is hope that the same global effort that is being employed to the fight against corruption is mirrored in the fight against terrorism. After all, corruption and terrorism are complimentary evils that must be destroyed. The world should be prompt, and rigorous in confronting these twin evils that are threatening to destabilize the global system. Multilateral action is most viable approach to these cancers. America should bring the world together in this struggle. Trying to fight it alone would be an error of monumental proportions that will only result in colossal failures. A global effort is essential because terrorism is not confined to any one country nor does it strike with advance notice.

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BLACK
POLITICS

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A PLACE FOR THE CONFEDERACY?

by

MICHAEL FRAZIER, Ph.D. and REX ELLIS, Ed.D.

For many, including these writers, the Confederacy is one of the most important markers of the black experience in the United States. The exclusion of African Americans as equal citizens in every aspect of American life, especially during the antebellum period of the 19th century, directly relates to the origins and activities surrounding the evolution of the Confederate States of America. The purpose of this essay is to discuss (1) the rationale for the Confederacy as articulated in its Constitution, (2) The Nature of the Black Confederates, and (3) the work of Paul Lawrence Dunbar an important social critic and literary artist of the period. In the essay terms, African America, black, Negro, and colored are used interchangeably and are referencing people of the Negro race and considered as decedents of Africa who were enslaved in the United States.

THE CONFEDERACY

Following the Civil War and subsequent emancipation and freedom for enslaved black Americans, the model of southern identity espoused by the Confederate's example, continued to push true freedom away from the grasp of African Americans. When one thinks of the white supremacy mentality that led to the Confederacy, it is difficult to think of it in terms other than its mission to preserve as much as possible, ancient southern life and culture through the continued oppression and subjugation of African Americans. Alexander Hamilton Stephens, Vice President of the Confederacy argued in 1881:

> The founding fathers at Philadelphia in 1787, had erred in establishing the United States on the assumption of the equality of the races. The South's new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests upon the great truth that the Negro is not equal to the white man; subordination to the superior race is his natural and moral condition."[1]

The supporters of the Confederate Constitution of 1861 as well as the ideology of white supremacy in America, has led to the formation of political movements and organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, the White Citizens Councils formed after the Supreme Court's Brown vs. Board of Education decision in 1954, as well as the rise of legal segregation, Jim Crow, lynching, disenfranchisement, and poll taxes. All of these mechanisms were designed to support the Confederacy's idea of African American subordination and white supremacy. The Confederacy collapsed with the end of the Civil War in 1865 but its philosophy set a precedent that gave rise to a mentality of oppression that continues to exist today.

The nature of black life during the years of the Confederacy is best illustrated in the 1859 ordinances of its first capital, Richmond, Virginia. These ordinances were legal restrictions and modes of discrimination to control the behavior of blacks, free and enslaved. Sever punishments were imposed for violation of these ordinances and the word "Negro" was constructed to mean mulatto as well as Negro. For example, slaves absence from home

without a pass may be punished by stripes; other offense which could lead to similar punishment or fines include:

1. riding in hack or carriage;
2. carrying canes at night; and
3. are not permitted to have slaves to remain on their lots, and if any Negro shall organize, or attempt to organize, or form any secret society, for any purpose whatsoever, or shall attend or be present at any such society, he shall be punished by stripes, not to exceeding thirty-nine at any one time.[2]

These examples of the legal ordinances enacted by the Confederacy to manage Black people demonstrate that they wanted to erect the first complete slave society in North America.

BLACK CONFEDERATES

In order to achieve a total slave society, the Confederacy would have had to recruit and arm slaves and free Negroes to fight against the Union forces. For Confederate leaders like Jefferson Davis as well as military officers, arming slaves and free Negroes was extremely controversial and considered dangerous. Just thirty days before the Confederate surrender at Appomattox, the Confederate Congress handed down legislation that allowed black troops to fight for their cause. The paradox of black men fighting on the side defending the institution of slavery and fighting alongside white soldiers, whose sole purpose was denying them their freedom, to this day, raises many questions relating to black motivation for putting themselves in such a position. Was it slavery that they were fighting to support? Did they believe in separation of the races and felt the only way to fight for it was alongside their white oppressors? Were they persuaded through promises of freedom or some type of reward once the battle was won? Were they being faithful to their masters? What separated them, for instance, from the eighteen thousand blacks who joined the Union standard of General William T. Sherman as he marched from Atlanta to Savannah? Alexander Stevens, vice president of the Confederacy, was very clear about the objectives of the Confederate cause: "Our new government's foundations are laid; it's cornerstone rests upon the great truth that the Negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition."[3] Nevertheless, the evidence is clear. There were African American Confederates who fought alongside their masters and other white Confederates. The majority of slaves and free Negroes were assigned as servants, laborers, cooks, teamsters, musicians, and nurses. Many of these assignments were not voluntary but forced into the service of the Confederacy by their masters or Confederate forces.[4] Apologists often boast of the loyalty of the slaves and their faithfulness to their masters. For instance, Thomas Nelson Page, Irvin Russell, and Joel Chandler Harris wrote in black dialect verses that were an apology for slavery. These works pictured the black man as docile and happy in servitude. Most white dialect writers presented the image of black people as objects of ridicule and served to document social notions about inferior and superior races.[5]

Regardless of what spurred their displays of loyalty, slaves may have had for their masters, it was also clear that the vast majority desired to be free. For slaves and free Negroes alike, the Civil War (1861-1865) was a fulfillment of the Old Testament prophecy of the Israelites that were being held in bondage by Pharaoh. For white Confederates, meanwhile, the Civil War was fought to preserve chattel slavery and Negro subordination in the name of a constitution whose central government and territories were required to recognize and protect slavery. As a consequence, the rationale for black Confederates participation in the Civil War is open to numerous interpretations, the above, included. Further, it is clear that slaves and free blacks in the Confederacy had no input

into the political decisions that shaped their behavior and aspirations during the antebellum and Civil War period because they had no legal rights, economic influence, or political power. Further, there was no commitment from Confederate authorities that blacks fighting against the Union army would be given their freedom after the war.

SOCIAL CRITIC AND WRITER: PAUL LAURENCE DUNBAR

The slaves and the free Negroes in the Confederacy expressed their hopes, dreams and fears in the oral tradition because the written word was illegal for so many years. Music, oratory, informal education and religion became the channels through which African American leaders and their followers in various communities rebelled, debated and sermonized on every aspect of their lives. The poetry of Paul Lawrence Dunbar (1872-1906) represents an excellent example of this oral tradition. Born in Dayton, Ohio, to former slaves Dunbar got his rich background of Southern life from his mother, Matilda, and it would figure prominently in his works. A gifted poet, Dunbar wrote at a time when the country was but thirty years from the Civil War, a time in which many were looking back with much regret to that period. Not only was there general emphasis on the sentiment in American literature when Dunbar began his work, but there was also special emphasis on what were supposed to be the good times in the South before the war.[6]

Dunbar avoided direct attacks on American racism in his writing and from his knowledge of many dialects he was able to produce poems that could be read with ease and pleasure by northern whites. Though he wrote most of his poems in standard English, using conventional symbols, rhythms, and rhyming patterns, the popularity of his dialect poetry overwhelmed the appreciation of his skill with mainstream language and forms. Dunbar would become the first African American poet and writer to be able to earn a living with his writings. Presented below are three poems which illustrate the hopes, dreams, and fears of slaves and colored soldiers and offered a blunt critique of the Confederacy. The pieces speak to the power of the spoken word, the humanity of the speakers and their simple but palpable understanding of their perceived place in America.

Battery A, 2d U.S. Colored Light Artillery, Department of the Cumberland,
Published in *Free at Last*, p. 429; *Freedom Solders*, p.63.

### An Ante-Bellum Sermon[7]
Paul Laurence Dunbar

We is gathahed hyeah, my brothahs,
In dis howlin' wildaness,
Fu' to speak some words of comfo't
to each othah in distress.
An' we chooses fu' ouah subjic'
Dis—we'll 'splain it by an' by;
"An' de Lawd said, 'Moses, Moses,'
An' de man said, 'Hyeah am I.'

Now old Pher'oh, down in Egypt,
Was de wuss man evah bo'n,
An' he had de Hebrew chillun
Down dah wukin' in his co'n[8]
"Twell de Lawn got tiahed o' his foolin',
An' sez he: "I'll let him know—
Look hyeah, Moses, go tell Pher'oh
Fu' to let dem chillun go."
An' ef he refuse to do it,
I will make him rue do houah,[9]
Fu' I'll empty down on Egypt
All de vials of my powah."
Yes, he did–an' Pher'oh's ahmy
Wasn't wuth a ha'f a dime;
Fu' de Lawd will he'p his chillun,
You kin trust him evah time.

An' yo' enemies may 'sail you
In do back an' in de front;
But de Lawd is all aroun' you,
Fu'to ba' de battle's grunt.
Dey kin fo'ge yo' chains an' shackles
Fom do mountians to de sea;
But de Lawd will sen' some Moses
Fu' to set his chillun free.

An' de lan' shall hyeah his thundah,
Lak a blas' f'om Gab'el's[10] ho'n,
Fu' do Lawd of hosts is mighty
When he girds[11] his ahmor on.
But fu' feah some one mistakes me,
I will pause right hyeah to say,
Dat I'm still a-preachin' ancient,
I ain't talkin' 'bout to-day.

But I tell you, fellah christuns,
Things'll happen mighty strange;
Now, de Lawd done dis fu' Isrul,
An' his ways don't nevah change,
An' de love he showed to Isrul
Wasn't all on Isrul spent;

Painting by Rick Reeves, pg. 18 *Black Soldiers*, published by
Eastern National Park and Monument Association,
copyright 1996.

Now don't run an' tell yo' mastahs
Dat I's preachin' discontent.

'Cause I isn't; I'se a-judgin'
Bible people by deir ac's;
I'se a-givin' you de Scriptuah,
I'se a-handin' you de fac's.
Cose old Pher'oh b'lieved in slav'ry,
But de Lawd he let him see,
Dat de people he put bref in,—
Evah mothah's son was free.
An' dahs othahs thinks lak Pher'oh,
But dey calls de Scriptuah liar,
Fu' de Bible says "a servant
Is a-worthy of his hire."
An' you cain't git roun' nor thoo dat,
An' you cain't git ovah it,
Fu' whatevah place you git in,
Dis hyeah Bible too'll fit.

So you see do Lawd's intention,
Evah sence de worl' began,
Was dat His almighty freedom
Should belong to evah man,
But I think it would be bettah,
Ef I'd pause agin to say,
Dat I'm talkin' 'bout ouah freedom
In a Bibleistic way.
But de Moses is a-comin',
An' he's comin', suah and fas'
We kin hyeah his feet a–trompin',
We kin hyeah his trumpit blas'.
But I want to wa'n you people,
Don't you git to Brigity;[12]
An' don't you git to braggin'
'Bout dese things, you wait an' see.

But when Moses wif his powah
Comes an' sets us chillun free,
We will praise de gracious Mastah[13]
Dat has gin us liberty;
An' we'll shout ouah halleluyahs,
On dat mighty reck'nin' day,
When we'se reco'nised ez citiz[14]
Huh uh! Chillun, let us pray!

Painting by Rick Reeves, pg. 18 *Black Soldiers*, published by Eastern National Park and Monument Association, copyright 1996.

COMPANY E, 4th UNITED STATES COLORED INFANTRY. Over 186,00 blacks fought under the Union Flag during the Civil War. Company E was one of the detachments assigned to guard the nation's capital. (Library of Congress)

Aunt Janes's Prayer
Paul Lawrence Dunbar[15]

Der Maussuh Jesus, we all uns beg Ooner (you) come make us a call dis yere day.
We is nuttin' but poor Etiopian women and people ain't t'ink much 'bout we.
We ain't trust ask any of dem great high people for come to we church, but do'
you is de one great Maussuh, great too much dan Maussuh Linkum, you ain't
shame to care for we African people.

Come to we, dear Maussuh Jesus. De sun, he hot too much, de road am dat
long and boggy (sandy) and we ain't got no buggy, for send and fetch Ooner.
But Maussuh, yo' 'member how yo' walked dat hard walk up Calvary and ain't
weary but tink bout we all dat way. We know you ain't weary for to come to
we. We pick out de torns, de prickles, de brier, de backliding' and de quarrel
and de sin out of yo' path so dey shan't hur Ooner pierce feet no mo'.

Come to we, dear Maussuh Jesus. We all luns ain't got no good cool water
for give yo' when yo' t'irsty. You know, Maussuh, de drought so long, and
de well so low, ain't nuttin' but mud to drink. But we gine to take de 'munion
cup and fill it wid de tear ob repentance and love clean out ob we heart.
Dat all we hab to gib yo', good Maussuh.

An' Maussuh Jesus, you say you gwine stand to de door and knock. But
you ain't gwine stand at we door, Maussuh, and knock. We sets do door plum
open for yo' and watch up de road for see you.

Sisters (turning to the other women in the church), what for you'all ain't
open de door so Maussuh know He welcome? (One woman rose quietly
from her knees and set the church door wide.)

Come Maussuh Jesus come! We know you is near, we heart is all just
tremble, tremble, we so glad for hab yo' here. And Maussuh, we church
ain't good 'nuff for yo' to sit down in, but
stop by de door jes' one minute, dear Maussuh Jesus, and whisper
 one word to we heart—one good word—we do listen——Maussuh

The Colored Soldiers
Paul Lawrence Dunbar[16]

If the muse were mine to tempt it
And my feeble voice were strong
If my tongue were trained to measure
I would sing a stirring song
I would sing a song heroic
Of those noble sons of Ham[17]
Of the gallant colored soldiers
Ho fought for Uncle Sam!

In the early days you scorned them
And with many a flip and flout
Said "These battles are the white man's
And the whites will fight them out."
Up the hills you fought and faltered'
In the vales you strove and bled.
While your ears still heard the thunder
Of the foes' advancing tread.

The distress fell on the nation,
And the flag was drooping low;
Should the dust polute the banner?
No! the nation shouted, No!
So when War, in savage triumph,
Spread abroad his funeral pall –
Then you called the colored soldiers,
And they answered to your call.

And like hounds unleashed and eager
For the life blood o
Ah, the rallied f the prey,
Spung they forth and bore them bravely
In the thickest f the fray.
And where'er the fight was hottest,
Where bullets faster fell,
There they pressed unblanched and fearless
At the very mouth of hell.

Ah, they rallied to the standard
To uphold it by their might:
None were stronger in the labors,
None Were braver in the fight.

CRITIQUE

Although Dunbar was not a Southerner by birth, poems are a reflection of slave life in the Civil War era. The first two, "An Ante-Bellum Sermon" and "Aunt Jane's Prayer" are written in the black dialect of the period, a form of what would be called "Ebonics" today. These are civilian poems and implicitly talk about the Confederacy in biblical terms. The poems are religious in nature with the slaves mostly praying to God to deliver them from "Pharaoh." The slaves obviously believed that God answers prayers because he had delivered the Israelites from bondage and he would do the same for them.

Both the sermon and the prayer reflect the oral tradition of transmitting values to black communities because the slaves were a bookless people. The dialect used in the poems is a reflection of how the slaves spoke during the ante-bellum period and therefore there is no shame for people denied opportunities to get an education. The Richmond and other Black Codes made sure that slaves would not become enlightened. Stated differently, there was a respect for the dialect used by the slaves. Dunbar's poems reflect an understanding of the plantation and rural life and compassion for the people and their predicament as they tried to rear their families in an oppressive environment.

In contrast to the first two poems, the "Colored Solider," reflect a transition from dialect to standard English in the discourse. When the former slave or freeman put on the military uniform of the United States, they became defacto citizens. The uniform meant these men were no longer slaves because it represented freedom and they now belong to a greater effort. In the words of the poem "…the colored soldiers answered your call…And like hounds unleashed and eager for the life blood of the prey."

Clearly, the poems represent two distinctly different but interrelated communities: civilian and military. Both communities recognized that the common obstacle preventing them from being free was the Confederacy. The military poem represents the transition in language from the civilian dialect of the black community, which was common to all blacks in the Confederacy. After all, the orders of the white officers commanding color troops were not given in dialect but in Standard English.

When Dunbar wrote these poems, he was honoring the entire black community. Unfortunately, he was never applauded for his use of Standard English. Rather, the dialect poems allowed him to earn a living as the first African American to write in that form. It is important to point out that Dunbar's poems were written at a time when a black person was being lynched every other day. The year 1892, was the high point in such atrocities with a black person murdered by lynching every 48 hours in the name of Confederate ideology.

The last decade of the 19th Century was a period of accommodation, apology and a desire to prove to whites that the black man was "somebody." Booker T. Washington the founder of Tuskgee Institute (now Tuskgee University) grew up in this climate and so did Dunbar. Washington advised blacks to learn those occupational and social skills which would make them acceptable to white society. Diligence and acceptance of white guidance were prerequisites to this end. Washington's approach was an effort to achieve social peace in an attempt to change the objective situation of the Negro in the North and the South. He believed that black progress economically would eventually lead to the death of racism. He was wrong.

In conclusion, there is no honorable place for a dishonorable Confederacy. Its leaders and supporters tried to destroy the United States based upon an ideology premised on protecting slavery from legislative enactment to end it. However, if slavery had not existed to begin with, there would have been no need to resort to arms to abolish the evil institution.[20] Dunbar's poems are written in both dialect and Standard English and served as answers and retorts to the

mentality of the Confederacy, a mentality that helped to define the struggle for equality that African Americans continue to mount. An understanding of the history of the Confederacy therefore, is central to an understanding of the journey of African Americans in the United States and the world. Whereas the American flag represents hope for the future for us and most others, the Confederate flag simply serve as a reminder of evil and treachery and, ultimately, the deaths of over 620,000 Americans.

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Endnotes

1. Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the Civil War*. New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1989.
2. Maurice Duke and Daniel P. Jordan, *A Richmond Reader 1733-1983,* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), pp. 108-112.
3. James W. Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your History Textbook Got Wrong*, (NY: Touchstone, 1995), p. 190.
4. Philip Thomas Tucker, From Auction Block to Glory (New York: Michael Friedman Publishing Group, 1998) pp 74-76.
5. Grossie Harold Tucker, "A Biography of Paul Laurence Dunbar" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1970), p. 200.
6. Ibid., p. 199.
7. Before the Civil War.
8. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Nellie Y. McKay, Eds. *The Norton Anthology of African American Literature* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997) pp. 891-893.
9. Worst.
10. Hour.
11. In the Bible, Gabriel is the archangel of good news.
12. Prepare for the battle.
13. Biggety, self-important
14. Jesus Christ
15. Citizens.
16. Margaret Washington Creel, *A Peculiar People: Slavery, Religion and Community – Culture Among the Gullahs* (New York: New York University Press, 1988) pp. 342-343.
17. Gates and McKay, The Norton Anthology of African Literature, p. 889.
18. In the Old Testament, the second of Noah's three sons, traditionally labeled the father of the black race.
19. Margaret Washington Creel, *A Peculiar People: Slavery, Religion and Community – Culture Among the Gullahs* (New York: New York University Press, 1988) pp. 342-343.
20. Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the Civil War*, pp. xii-xiii.

WALTER RODNEY'S INTERNATIONAL AGENDA: A REFLECTION, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER

By
GRACE VIRTUE, Ph.D.

> *The system does not stop at racial discrimination. Because it is a system of class oppression, it only camouflages its class nature under a racial cover. And in the end, it will move against anyone irrespective of colour…*
>
> Walter Rodney
> Public Street Meeting in Guyana, 1976

Vincent Harding et al (1981) in their introduction to Walter Rodney's seminal work, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,* describe*d* the late Guyanese scholar as a man whose intellectual discipline and political instinct was matched by a disciplined force of spirit, and an unflinching commitment to collective work on behalf of the wretched of the earth.

A leading historian, Pan-Africanist theoretician and spokesman during the turbulent decade of the sixties and seventies, Rodney endorsed the Black Power ideology embedded in the philosophies of Marcus Garvey and forcefully articulated by activists like Malcolm X and Kwame Toure during the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Rodney's vision of black power, however, extended beyond people of African descent to embrace East Indians in the Caribbean, whom he believed had been equally violated by European slave traders and their descendants.

BLACK POWER

Rodney (1969) saw Black Power in the Caribbean embracing three interrelated ideas: (i) a break with imperialism which is historically white and racist (ii) the assumption of power by the black masses in the island; (iii) the cultural reconstruction of the society in the image of blacks (p.38). From the onset, the idea of black power even in its most benign form, attracted negative publicity from the mainstream, perceived as it was by many as a violent ideology articulated by a fringe group of black radicals. Even a cursory reading of Rodney's work however, reveals that his articulation of black power merely expressed the hope of people of African descent to control their own destiny and have the rest of the world recognize their dignity as members of the human race. Such a desire, Rodney believed, was in no way incompatible with a multi-racial society anywhere in the world. For according to him, "the moment that power is equitably distributed among several ethnic groups, then the very relevance of making the distinction between groups will be lost" (1969: p.40). Further, despite the multi-ethnic nature of the Caribbean societies, which emerged out of plantation slavery, Rodney argued, the vast majority of people were united by their economic ties—a race of working people.

In Guyana, Rodney affirmed a sense of identity that was the same whether an individual was Indo or Afro-Guyanese. At a public meeting in Georgetown in 1976, he said: It is time that we understand that those in power are still attempting to maintain us in that mentality—maintain us captive in that mentality where we are afraid to act or we act judiciously because we believe that our racial interests are at stake. Surely we have to transcend the racial problems? Surely, we have to find ways and means of ensuring that there is racial justice in this society? But it

certainly will not be done by a handful of so-called black men monopolizing the power, squeezing the life out of all sections of the working class." [1]

In Jamaica, where he lived for almost four years as a student at the University of the West Indies and for a short time after, Rodney agitated for the recognition of the island as a predominantly African society, dismissing the political directorates preferred label of the society as "multi-racial." Rather, he believed that non-black groups should be made to understand that while they have the basic right of all individuals, their skin color was not license for them to exploit Africans the way the white planters had done during the era of plantation slavery (1969: p.43).

Ultimately, Rodney believed that a critical function of the Black Power Movement in the West Indies was the transformation of the black intelligentsia into the servants of the masses. Rather than leading the fight against the exploitation of the black and the poor however, the intelligentsia was absconding on its duties by buying into a false sense of progress "measured in terms of front lawn and ownership of the latest model of an American car."

THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY

Rodney entered the world into a working class family and into a heritage of struggle in Georgetown, Guyana on March 23, 1942. From his father, a tailor and his mother, a dressmaker, he learned the importance of discipline, hard work and community and the value of a good education. With both parents deeply involved in the growth of the multi-racial People's Progressive Party (PPP) founded by the Indo-Guyanese, Cheddi Jagan, Rodney also learned very early that the nations of the Caribbean, not long out of slavery and colonialism, required revolutionary transformation if the majority was going to attain a decent standard of life for themselves and a secure future for their offspring.

Unlike other Caribbean political parties that only became attracted to Marxist/socialist ideas in the sixties and seventies, the PPP adopted that doctrine of radical social transformation from its beginning in the 1940s. Rodney became exposed to it as a boy attending meetings with his father and became an early activist, organizing grassroot support. By the end of Primary School, the trajectory of hi s life as an intellectual and a politician was already taking shape. He received a prestigious open exhibition scholarship to the Queen's College, an elite school previously reserved for the children of the wealthy until the 1950's. In response to growing nationalism however, the government assigned limited spaces to the children of the working class thus making it possible for someone like young Rodney to attend. He would make full use of the opportunity displaying tremendous prowess in both sports and academics and earning for himself the prestigious Guyana Scholarship to the University College of the West Indies (UCWI), now University of the West Indies, in Kingston in 1960. There, amidst the contrasting social landscape of the Jamaican capital, he explored the complexities of the society and accelerated his activism and his commitment to social and political transformation.

In 1963, at age twenty-one, Rodney graduated from the UCWI with a first class honors degree in history, and a scholarship to the University of London where he entered the School of Oriental and African Studies to pursue his doctorate in African History. According to Harding et al (1981), his interest in politics, particularly through the Marxist paradigm, fomented significantly as he became a part of a study group guided by Trinidadian C.L.R. James, author of the *Black Jacobins*, the classic work on the Haitian Revolution and the leading Caribbean Marxist and revolutionary scholar of the time. By the time he had earned his degree and left London for Tanzania in 1966, Rodney was ready to write the history of black people from what he called "a revolutionary, socialist and people-centered perspective" (p.xv)

In a career that truly straddled the Diaspora and deepen his commitment to the working class, Rodney began work as a lecturer at the University College of Dar-Es-Salaam from 1966 to 1967. A year later, he returned to Jamaica to teach African History at Mona, intending to expand the program in African and Caribbean Studies and to use Jamaica, an island of sharp divides between rich and poor and black and white, as a testing ground for his belief that revolutionary intellectuals should remain integrated in the daily lives of the working class people, if genuine social transformation was going to take place. That desire led to a series of meetings with ordinary Jamaicans, mostly members of the Rastafarian sect and among the poorest on the island. The content of those meetings became the material for Rodney's well-known booklet—*The Grounding with my Brothers*, published in 1969.

Rodney's portrayal of the unqualified misery in which the majority of Jamaicans lived, and his participation in a black writer's conference in Montreal in 1968, drew the ire of the Hugh Shearer-led Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) government. Fearful of his fierce affirmation of black power, and nervous about the implications for the island where both economic and political power were controlled by a small-non black minority, the government declared him *persona non grata* and barred his re-entry into the island. The government's action sparked widespread riots in Kingston and a two-week suspension of classes at the Mona campus. The government held fast to its decision however. The ban remains in place today, 25 years after Rodney's death.

Unable to re-enter Jamaica, Rodney returned to the University of Dar Es Salaam in 1969 after a short stay in Cuba. There, he continued his involvement in liberation struggles in Tanzania and other parts of Africa, holding fast to his belief that he should make his skills available in the fight for economic and psychological emancipation. Campbell (1991) believes that this period in Tanzanian was possibly the most important in the formation of Rodney's ideas since he was at the forefront of establishing an intellectual tradition which makes Dar es Salaam one of the centers of discussion of African politics and history even today. The dialogue, Campbell asserted, deepened the Marxist tradition with respect to African politics, class struggle, the race question, African history and the role of the exploited in social change. It was within the context of those discussions that the book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, was written. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* sought to situate Africa's crisis of persistent under-development in its more than 500 years of exploitation by Western capitalist powers, contrary to existing western analysis, which, for the most part, studiously ignore the impact of slavery and colonialism on the African continent. Rodney argued however, that the responsibility for Africa's underdevelopment lies in the operation of the imperialist system that has drained the continent of its wealth and made it impossible to develop what resources remained. Notwithstanding, he argued, Africans, many of whom were complicit in the continent's exploitation, were ultimately responsible for Africa's development. A part of that responsibility included a commitment to self-emancipation and recognition that there would be no salvation in the post colonial leadership of either the Caribbean or Africa. Widely hailed for its frank analysis of the impact of slavery and colonialism, Strickland (1980) noted that: "more so than most books of its genre, the work is clearly imbued with the spirit, the intellect and the commitment of its author—both the man who produced the audacious and wide-ranging study before he was thirty, and the man who moved with an unswerving integrity to live out its implications in his relatively brief years" (xi). In 1974, Rodney returned to Georgetown to take up a position as Professor of History at the University of Guyana, a position he had repeatedly sought and was denied for several reasons. When an offer was finally made, the University, under pressure from the government, rescinded his appointment before he even began teaching. By then, the reign of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, which began ten years earlier, was growing increasingly repressive and intolerant of opposition, especially from someone like

Rodney who agitated for Afro and Indo-Caribbean people to unite in the face of their common dilemma. This was a radical departure from the *modus operandi* of Forbes Burnham who had fueling deeper divisions between the races and thus securing a political base for himself.

No doubt seeing Burnham's hand at work in the withdrawal of his appointment to the University, Rodney resolved to remain in his homeland, deepen his participation in its political life and combat the civil and human rights abuses which had become common to the Burnham regime. A year earlier, Burnham had proposed changes to the constitution that would guarantee his presidency for life, a decision that would be based on the results of a referendum. Rodney then was evolving as the primary opponent to Burnham's policies.

CRY, A REGION

From 1974 to 1980, Rodney remained in Guyana steadfastly refusing to leave in the face of opposition to his presence and instead combining his academic research with political activism and traveling outside of the country occasionally to lecture abroad. In 1979, he declared the Working People Alliance (WPA), the movement he founded, a political party and voiced the organization's aim to overthrow Forbes Burnham's increasingly repressive regime. As his activism grew, so did the threats to his life, threats that not long after would evolve into ugly realities for Rodney and those he believed in the ideology he espoused. Only a few months after, he and four of his colleagues were arrested and charged with arson following the burning of a government building in Georgetown. By 1980, Rodney was an eminent political and scholarly figure throughout the Caribbean, Africa and the African-American community. Thus, when his trial for arson began on June 2 that year, it was watched by his supporters in Guyana, the wider Caribbean and human rights group from the United States and Britain. A weak prosecution case collapsed before their eyes as the government requested more time to prepare, leading to an early adjournment. One week later, Rodney was killed by a bomb that exploded in his hand, hidden in a two-way radio he collected moments before from a man, supporters believe was a government operative who had infiltrated the WPA. A month after his death, the government held its referendum and approved sweeping changes to the Guyanese Constitution. Burnham became Guyana's Executive President for Life and Commanding Chief of the Army. He remained in power until his death in 1985, leaving behind a legacy of repression and bitter divisions among those whom he sought to control.

A quarter century after his death meanwhile, the course of Rodney's life remains a study in commitment to scholarship and selfless idealism. Banned from Jamaica for his unqualified support of the black underclass, and killed in Guyana for his steadfast support of a process of change that he believed would liberate the people from the desperation of their existence, Rodney's ideas live on in the ever present struggle for self definition and liberation among the people of Africa, the Caribbean and the wider Diaspora.

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[1] Please see the *Grenada Revolution Online* for full text.

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For Further information contact Dr. Michael C. Nwanze, Department of Political Science, Howard University, Washington, D.C. (202) 806-9343 or visit the MAU website at: www.modelafricanunion.org.

POLITICAL
SOCIOLOGY

FAITH, JUSTICE, AND RECONCILIATION

by

MICHAEL FRAZIER, Ph.D.

In the wake of race rioting in the late 1990s and early 2000 in the city of Cincinnati the Episcopal Diocese of Southern Ohio, Christ Church Cathedral and the Christ Emmanuel Fellowship launched a faith-based Racial Reconciliation initiative from October 28th-2, 2004 at the Christ Cathedral. The Cathedral also initiated a Distinguished Reconciliation Scholar's series. for which the author was chosen as an inaugural scholar. The following remarks were adapted from the author's published keynote address.

The social history of Cincinnati began when it was founded as a village in Ohio near the river in 1788. One year after the United States Constitution was written, a military order named the village Cincinnati, in honor of an ancient Roman general of 300 BC, who, victorious in a just war, turned to the pursuits of peace. The Society of Cincinnati was organized for mutual aid and assistance following the end of the American Revolution and the establishment of this new nation.[1]

From the antebellum days to the present, race relations has presented Cincinnati just like the rest of America with a dilemma: the sin of black slavery, the greed in non-black privilege and the temptation to convert privilege to further racial oppression. Hence, when the depression of 1829 led to a re-definition of occupations in Cincinnati, black jobs–cutting, digging and hauling–were suddenly seen as good enough for unemployed Caucasians. Blacks were forced out of the city.[2]

When the nation split over the question of slavery, the black community of Cincinnati's black commuinty organized the Black Brigade to protect the city. The 50th U.S. Colored Troops (Infantry) was made up of men from Cincinnati and other parts of Ohio. They earned five medals of honor for their heroics in battle, the largest number of the 135 black brigades in the Civil war. As elsewhere, this distinguished service did not move the larger community any closer toward equality and justice.

Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the relationship between the two worlds of color have osculated between truce and trouble: truce when things were quiet but simply unsettled; trouble when things were unsettled. In this regard, what role has the Christian faith played in the mediating conflicts in periods of truce and trouble in America and by extension the religious community in Cincinnati?

Cincinnati across time, is a city with a dual personality–a northern city, a southern city, two cultures two unrecognized strivings, and two warring ideals. Racial conflict there had its origins in the late nineteenth century when free blacks and runaway slaves lived in a tense atmosphere.[3] Recently, Cincinnati experienced social unrest and the tragic loss of human life. Yet, the vast majority of its citizenry, white and African Americans alike, are believers in Christianity. The central question facing Cincinnati and other communities is this: Is it possible for Christians to reconcile racial animosity while promoting justice, humility and love for their neighbors?

FAITH

Historically, race and religion have been defining elements throughout the American experience since the arrival of Columbus to the present. One of the reasons religion has been seen, as the critical element in society is because the Christian church is the transmitter of religion and comes from God and racial classification is derived from man. Therefore the intensity of these concerns showed up first in matters of religion and faith: God the creator, God savior, God the father. For example, the pilgrims promised and used as there religious motivations to come to the New World to sit the city of God upon the hill as a beacon to mankind. They saw the task as being larger than anything that they could do at the time so they sought to use the people that they met here and failed. Hence, they turned to Africans to use their intelligence not just muscles and they were brought here as fully human creatures ordered to do complicated things.[4]

Surveys have shone that 80 percent of Americans call themselves Christians and believe in the acts and sayings of Jesus of Nazareth as related by his followers and apostles. For believes Jesus was crucified by Roman authorities for his ministry among the poor and disposed. He set the standard in the United States for true meaning of faith, justice and reconciliation for all times. Unfortunately, many Christians have not follow Jesus teachings but rater they have supported slavery, discrimination, corruption, racism and greed.[5]

I concur with one of America's leading public intellectuals, Cornel West, who argues Christian fundamentalism has distorted the true meaning of the Jesus' message of love, justice, and mercy. He contends there are two forms of Christianity, Constantine and Prophetic, which have been battling each other since the first centuries of the Christian movements that emerged out of Judaism. Ironically, Jesus' message of love and justice promoted a separation of his prophetic witness from Caesar's authority – "render unto Caesar what is Caesar's," Christ said. Render is associate with the material world (money) and which is the acknowledgment and recognition of the secular magistrate and necessary support that is required to fund the public good in the form of taxes in order to pay for goods and services for citizens.

Nevertheless, when the Roman emperor Constantine realized he could not stop the growth of Christianity he decided to co-op it into the empire and legitimize the faith and provide it with respectability. Unfortunately, the faith lost its prophetic fervor of Jesus and the apocalyptic fire.[6]

The rich prophetic tradition in the United States has had many powerful voices against social injustices. In the 19th century the Social Gospel moment was influenced by the corruption and greed that were flourishing in American industry expansion and spoke out against its many injustices. Theologian Walter Rauschenbusch and others warned that Christians had a duty to combat the abuse of workers by management that was not constrained by morality or government regulation.[7]

During the national trauma of the Vietnam War, priests and other prophetic Christians led antiwar activities and established SANE/FREEZE, the largest peace and justice organization in the United States. Numerous black prophetic Christians worked tirelessly for the disinherited and the oppressed in the spirit of Jesus. Some of these include Martin Luther King, Jr., David Walker, Ida B. Wells, Frederick Douglass, Benjamin E. Mays, Howard Thurman and many others.

Today, many of the communities of Christian are in crisis because they have been seduced by the market economy, which motivated by greed and the Christian faith is defined by creed. A balance must be struck between the two because, unfortunately for many, there is a deficiency of life necessities. Social naivety has resulted in a Christian finding themselves surprised when their fellow colleagues of color disturb the entire community in their quest for justice. For

example, in April 2001, the intensity of anger in Cincinnati came as a shock to national and local authorities after rioting erupted in several minority neighborhoods. The instruments through which faith and justice worked during the Civil Rights era was the belief in faith in America's ability to pursue justice with all of the risk that was entailed by that pursuit.

JUSTICE

The United States was founded on the proposition that justice in this world was possible and it needs not conflict with the idea of spiritual justice. We are of course, discussing social justice; justice within the beloved community. Social justice in this nation has been seen as both a goal and an experiment. The goal it appears to me was to maximize the presence of justice and minimizes the presence of injustice through self-government. This goal led our founding fathers to reject the injustice of kingly rule and the idea of titled aristocracy, and exalt the common man as reflected not in King George III, but Benjamin Franklin the citizen. The new America was seen as the new Eden based upon the doctrine of we the people but equally not only in the sight of God but the eyes of one another. Thus, justice and equality in their most basic sense have been the larger goal of this experiment we call the United States of America. The means by which this is obtained has to do with how we distribute the good things of this rich nation. The method to achieve such a vision is far beyond the power of the politicians and rest with the moral power of the committed Christian who which to close the gap between religious principles and social practice.

While all faiths have a gap between principle and practice, America's failing in this regard has been enormous. For instance, the Civil War was the most violent on our soil based upon our failing to recognize human equality and natural rights of the none offending persons of color. Slavery was a sin so great that the experiment almost failed, and only through a combination of the inherent principle of this nation and its Christian character rightly understood does not justify the reduction of any of Gods children to the level of beast of the field.

The American people paid for this lapse in justice through the Civil War, which ended legal bondage but not the presumptions upon which this bondage rests. A failure to follow through in the rectification of our egregious moral error meant that we are still in the process of trying to comprehend the nature of this ongoing injustice as reflected in the gap between white and black in length of life, quality of health, level of income, volume of inherited goods, levels of education access and attainment—gaps so large that we have what the eminent historian, John Hope Franklin, called the worlds of race, or the 1967 Kerner Commission Report on Civil Disorders deemed, two nations under one flag.

For many of us the injustices cited above are seen as willful immoral situation that the most powerful and wealthiest nation on the globe tolerates, one wherein we presume to remove the mote from the eyes of other nations and ignore the beam in our own. Thus, we speak of nation building in places like Iraq and others areas around the globe. We speak of rebuilding nations and not rebuilding our own to enlarge the presence of justice for those damaged by our moral failings.

RECOCILLIATION

Reconciliation is the restoration of justice to our civil community. It is both a process and an end product. The process is what we do through instruments in which we act, and the concrete goals we pursue. The end state of reconciliation is a condition of justice, which no reasonable persons, however placed in life, can complain. Ideally, it is the kind of situation that restores our faith in the American dream and Martin Luther King's up lifting version of it. It is a condition that restores Gods faith in us. The world has seen of many reconciliation experiences; Protestants and Catholics have reconciled to live in peace, the national combatants of World War II are now colleagues in economics and world trade; South Africa officially established a reconciliation structure known as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to implement that law. They recognized where they were and they are continuing to define their vision as to where they want to go. This nation has been involved in the reconciliation process but, our reconciliation needs to be based on a moral principle and social standard that we have develop in principle, but have yet to reach in practice.

It is not for me to construct the details of reconciliation devices and operations. Rather, it is for committed Christian on the ground in Cincinnati and other communities to develop an inventory of activities aimed at specific targets. The attainment of these goals represents a movement toward justice as reality and justice as righteousness.

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Notes

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[2] Ohio Anti-Slavery Society, Memorial of the *Ohio Anti-Slavery Society to the General Assembly of the State of Ohio* (Cincinnati: Pugh and Dodd Printers, 5th and Main, 1838, p. 18).

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[5] John W. Wright, ed. *The 2004 New York Times Almanac* (NY: Penguim Putman, Inc., p.487). The Episcopal Church in Southern Ohio, "What We Believe", http://www.episcopal-dso.org/index.php?, 9/10/2004.

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CAPITOL HILL
REPORT

LEGISLATION AND THE POLITICS OF TERROR
by
JAMILA K. TAYLOR

INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have resulted in quite obvious changes in legislations governing foreign relations in the United States Congress. Whether the legislation precludes a new department like Homeland Security or allocated funds in billions to countries suspected of housing terrorists or nuclear weaponry, the public agenda has shifted from domestic urgency to combating terrorism abroad and aiding the countries in the Middle East.

This report provides precise information on some of the most controversial legislation currently on the public agenda and their immediate implications. A brief summary of the State of the Union Address is included to set the stage for the legislation in question, all of which were mentioned and supported adamantly by the President.

THE UNITED STATES PATRIOT ACT

Congress passed the USA Patriot Act (also known as the Act) in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Act gives federal officials greater authority to track and intercept communications, both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. Additionally, The Act further closes United States borders to foreign terrorists, while detaining and removing individuals within our borders. New crimes, new penalties, and new procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and international terrorists have been created including giving the Secretary of the Treasury regulatory powers to combat corruption of United States financial institutions for money laundering by foreign interest. The Act is not without safeguards, though critics have stated that some of its provisions go too far. For others, it is outright unconstitutional.

The Federal Communications Privacy Law features a three level system, which was created for the dual purpose of protecting the confidentiality of private telephone, face-to-face, and computer communications while also enabling authorities to identify and intercept criminal communications. At the first level, electronic eavesdropping on telephone conversations, face-to-face conversations, or computer and other forms of electronic communications is prohibited in most instances. However, it does give the authorities a narrowly defined process for electronic surveillance to be used as a last resort in criminal cases. The next level of privacy protection encompasses the use of telephone records, emails held in third party storage, and the like. Here, the law grants enforcement officials access under a warrant or court order, and in some cases under a subpoena. Originally, this was only plausible in connection with a criminal investigation and without the extraordinary levels of approval or constraint. At the last level, court orders are governed to approve the government's use of trap and trace devices and pen registers like a secret "caller id." This device identifies the source and destination of calls made to and from a particular telephone. The 'court' orders are available based on the government's certification and not a court's. Under these circumstances, it is presumed that the use of the device is likely to

produce information relevant to the investigation of a crime.

The United States Patriot Act modifies the procedures at each of the three levels:

- it permits pen register and tap and trace orders for electronic communications (e.g. email)
- it authorizes nationwide execution of court orders for pen registers, trap and trace devices, and access to stored email or communication records;
- it treats stored voice mail like stored email and not like telephone conversations
- it permits authorities to intercept communications to and from a trespasser within a computer system (with the permission of the system's owner)
- adds terrorist and computer crimes to the predicate offense list of Title III
- encourages cooperation between law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigators
- establishes a claim against the United States for certain communication privacy violations by government personnel; and
- terminates the authority found in many of these provisions and several of the foreign intelligence amendments with a sunset provision (to take effect Dec. 31, 2005). The Act also eases some of the restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States. At the same time, it affords the United States intelligence community greater access to information during a criminal investigation with safeguards against official abuse. The specific details of these powers encompass:
- permits for surveillance (court orders omitting identification of the particular instrument, facilities, or place where the surveillance is to occur when the court finds the target is likely to impede identification with particulars)
- increases the number of judges on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court from 7 to 11
- Allowance for the application of the FISA surveillance of search order when gathering foreign intelligence is a significant reason for the application rather than *the* reason;
- authorization of the pen register and tap and trace device orders for email as well as telephone conversations;
- sanctions or court ordered access to any tangible item rather than only business records held by lodging, car rental, and locker rental businesses;
- carrying out of a sunset provision
- establishing a claim against the United States for certain communications privacy violations by government personnel; and
- the expansion of the prohibition against FISA orders based solely on an American's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights.

Federal authorities attack money laundering through regulations, criminal sanctions, and forfeiture. The Act expands the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate the activities of United States financial institutions. This is particularly so in the area of foreign relations with individuals and entities. In federal law, money laundering is the flow of cash or other valuables derived from, or intended to facilitate, the commission of a criminal offense. New money laundering crimes are delineated in the Act, as well as amendments and increased penalties for earlier crimes. It allows confiscation of the property of any individual or entity that participates in or plans an act of domestic or international terrorism and it permits confiscation of any property derived from, or used to facilitate domestic or international terrorism.

New federal crimes governed by the Act are for terrorist attacks on mass transportation facilities, for biological weapons offenses, for harboring terrorists, for affording terrorists

material support, for misconduct associated with money laundering (aforementioned), for conducting the affairs of an enterprise, which affects interstate or foreign commerce through the patterned commission of terrorist offenses, and for fraudulent charitable solicitation. It should be noted that these crimes are generally supplement with existing law; they fill preconceived gaps and increase penalties.

New penalties are also a major part of the Act and allow for increases in the penalties for acts of terrorism and other crimes. Further, The Act establishes an alternative maximum penalty for terrorism, raises the penalties for conspiracy to commit certain offenses, sets goals of sentencing perpetrators to life-long parole, and increases the penalties for counterfeiting, "cyber-crime", and charity fraud.

THE ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

After substantial congressional oversight President George W. Bush gave forward motion to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. On June 6, 2002, he proposed the establishment of the entity to the 107th Congress. The President transmitted his proposal to the House of Representatives on June 18, where it was subsequently introduced by request (H.R. 5005). The House approved the bill in amended form on July 26. The Senate began consideration after the August congressional recess. When both houses of Congress reconvened after the fall elections, a new compromise bill was introduced in the House (H.R. 5710). The bill was ultimately signed by President Bush and became P.L. 107-269.

Through planning and implementation, the department has grown to be one of the largest and most important government agencies. A crucial aspect of any new department is the initial implementation of the legislation creating it. According to the General Accounting Office, new and reorganized agencies experienced substantial start-up problems. This may be due to delays in obtaining key officials, insufficient funding, needed staff, or inadequate office space.

The key considerations for making the Department of Homeland Security a successfully operating organization are the strategy and time table for selecting department leaders and putting them in place, connecting leaders with workers through electronic networks, shifting components into new management arrangements, and including other supporting administrative mechanisms into operation. This new department was within complicated planning confines, and the plan became effective without any formal congressional approval. The plan was ultimately criticized for failing to address such key considerations as the creation and implementation of a planning, programming, and budgeting system, a human resources management system, or an electronic communications enterprise architecture system.

TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY

International terrorism has long been recognized as a serious foreign and domestic security threat. A modern trend in terrorism is toward loosely organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists. Another trend is toward terrorism that is motivated by religion or ideology. United States policy toward international terrorism contains a significant military component as reflected in the war with Iraq, and United States operations in Afghanistan. President Bush has expressed a willingness to provide military aid to "governments everywhere" in the fight against terrorism. Issues for Congress have included whether the Administration has provided sufficient information about long-term goals and costs of its military strategy and whether military force is necessarily an effective anti-terrorism instrument in certain circumstances.

As terrorism becomes a global phenomenon, major challenges face policy-makers including how to maximize international cooperation and support, and to do so without compromising United States national security interests. After weeks of public relations and debates, the United States military operation was launched against the Taliban regime which repeatedly, harbored Al-Qaeda since 1996. A total of 136 countries offered military assistance to the United States, including flight and landing rights and accommodations for U.S. forces. The Taliban was removed from power, all known Al-Qaeda training sites were destroyed, and some Taliban leaders were killed or detained

UNITED STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for terrorism, were the primary justifications put forward to explain the necessity of military actionby the United States. On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons to depart Iraq within 48 hours. On May 19, offensive operations began. Twenty-seven days later, American forces were in control of all major Iraqi cities and political and military leadership virtually disintegrated.

On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to all "major" combat operations in Iraq. Soon after, he submitted an emergency supplemental financial year 2004 appropriations request for $87 billion to help rebuild Iraq in addition to a $62.37 billion FY2003 supplemental budget request previously approved by the Congress. Ultimately, both requests were approved and signed off by President Bush. To this date, no chemical or biological weapons stockpiles have been uncovered.

AFGHANISTAN IN U.S. POLICY

The defeat of the Taliban, who ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996-2001, has largely prevented the Al-Qaeda organization from using it as a base for operations. It has been reported that Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms previously forbidden under the Taliban regime. It is estimated that about two million Afghan refugees have returned, and women have returned to schools, the workforce, and participation in politics. However, there is still a lack of security in many parts of the country, particularly in the southeast, the former power base of the Taliban.

Policy making in the United States have focused on the stabilization and security for Afghanistan. Measures include an extension in the writ of the central government, which was widely perceived as weak and unable to control many regional leaders. Other countries are also joining the U.S's attempt at strengthening Kabul by building a national army, supporting an international security force, setting up regional enclaves to create secure conditions in the event of reconstruction, and disarming independent militias. To help foster development, United Nations and the Bush Administration have lifted most sanctions imposed on Afghanistan, many of which were imposed since the Soviet occupation of the 1970s. A total of over $815 million was given to Afghanistan during FY2002, and in FY2004 which aid will raise to about $1.6 billion. This aid package was approved and signed by President Bush in early November 2003 and became P.L.108-106.

THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FY2005

The President's budget projects a deficit increase of almost 50 percent this year, yet promises that it will be cut in half in five years. So far, this Administration has presided over a $648 billion increase in the deficit since 2001, and added $1.7 trillion to the country's gross debt. Five specific areas are fuelling heated debate in the proposed budget:

1. ***Largest Deficits in History*** – The $5.6 trillion ten-year surplus projected when the President took office has been replaced by a ten-year deficit of at least $4 trillion. For 2004, the budget proposed a deficit of $521 billion—$146 more than the 2003 deficit, which also set a record. Deficits for every year are worse than projected a year ago.

2. ***More Oversized Tax Cuts*** – In the face of such fiscal deterioration, the Administration centers its budget on another set of tax cuts, reducing revenues by more than $1 trillion. The budget does not acknowledge the tax cuts' impact on the deficit.

3. ***Domestic Priorities*** – The Administration asserts that it is increasing non-defense and non-homeland security appropriations by less than one percent. However, when international affairs funding is discounted, non-homeland security domestic appropriations are actually cut below the 2004 level. This cut allocates a small subtraction from the deficit amount, yet environmental protection, transportation, and other priorities are predicted to suffer from this aspect of the budget process.

4. ***The Effect of Past Tax Cuts*** – President Bush has justified deficit-financed tax cuts on the grounds that they will help job creation. The economy has lost 2.9 million jobs in the private sector over the past three years under this same policy.

5. ***Omitted Costs*** – This budget omits funding for the country's development in Iraq and Afghanistan, a long-term fix for the alternative minimum tax, the revenue effects of Social Security privatization, and long-term costs of human space travel to Mars. If these costs were added, the deficit numbers would be even larger, and it would seem highly unlikely for it to decrease over the next five years.

CONCLUSION

The legislation reported reflects the current public agenda set by the Bush Administration and Congress. Foreign relations efforts will continue to be addressed through the onset of this year's presidential and congressional elections. The Bush Administration continues to solidify America's relationships with other countries.

Jamila K. Taylor, doctoral student, Department of Political Science, Howard University.

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INSIDE THE
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POLITICAL SCIENCE

Howard's graduate program in Political Science has a very rich history. It's Master of Arts, Master of Arts in Public Administration (MAPA), and doctoral programs exist along side an undergraduate program in Political Science that includes seven areas of concentration including public administration, comparative politics, American government, international relations, black politics and political theory. The Department was designed and developed by individuals such as Ralph J. Bunche, Emmett E. Dorsey, Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, Robert Martin, and Vincent J. Browne, and it has emerged as the source of the second highest number of African Americans, and a significant number of international students, receiving Masters and doctoral degrees in Political Science. Many members of its current faculty have a distinguished research and publication record, and provide significant leadership to professional organizations and service to the University, College, Graduate School and Department. Graduates of the Department's MAPA program hold diverse positions in municipal, state, county, federal government agencies, and the private sector. From 2005 - 2006, 124 students received their B.A. degree, 14 graduated with the MAPA degree and 19 new Ph.D. degrees were awarded by the university. During this same period, 15 students were inducted into Phi Beta Kappa and a new student group, Public Policy Scholars, organized a series of private sessions with Supreme Court justices including Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas.

MAPA Program is Accredited by the National Association of Public Affairs and Administration

Dr. Michael Frazier and MAPA graduates at 2004 commencement.

In 2002, the Commission on Peer Review and Accreditation (COPA) found that the Masters of Arts in Public Administration (MAPA) were in conformity with NASPAA (National Association of Public Affairs and Administration) standards. The program was accredited for a period of seven years and is included on the Annual Roster of Accredited Programs. COPA found the application to be inclusive, responsive and complete.

The MAPA is a professional degree designed to train individuals for government service and related fields. While the growth in public sector employment has slowed over the past decade, the need is greater than ever for talented and well-trained individuals to develop and carry out programs administered at the federal, state and local levels of government. This is especially crucial for African Americans and other minorities.

The core curriculum of the MAPA covers such areas as organizational and managerial skills, political and legal institutions, concepts and routines in budgeting and financial management, economic and social systems, techniques of quantitative and qualitative analysis and a mandatory internship. While the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects a decline in employment of nine percent through 2008, a growth of about 14 percent in management analysts is projected for the same period. The projected reduction in federal jobs reflects government devolution–the practice of turning over the development, implementation and management of some programs of the federal government to state and local governments. This means that the demand for competent managers at the sub-national level of government will also increase over the next decade. The MAPA program at Howard University prepares its students to fill this demand for managerial talent.

Phi Beta Kappa

For more than two hundred years, election to Phi Beta Kappa has been an indication of superior academic achievement. Founded in 1776 at the College of William and Mary, it is the nation's oldest and most prestigious honor society. Currently, there are chapters of Phi Beta Kappa in 234 institutions of higher learning. The Howard University chapter was established in 1953 Gamma Chapter of the District of Columbia www.pbk.org.

DEPARTMENTAL STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

Graduate Political Science Student Association

The Association's mission is to foster research, learning, and understanding of the discipline of Political Science, and assist the department with its efforts to provide students an excel graduate education through an interactive program of instruction that includes formal courses

and simulations, research opportunities, academic and career counseling, internships, and community service. The Association seeks to enhance understanding of the importance of political awareness and participation in the political process. It provides opportunities for members of the university and general community to address issues of public concern through regular seminars, debates, and lectures. In doing, the Association uses the political skills and resources of Political Science students, faculty and other members of the Howard University family.

Howard University Public Affairs Scholars (H.U.P.P.S.)

It is the mission of the Howard University Public Policy Scholars to organize a student leadership class unequivocally dedicated to the development of future public policy through the study, research and advocacy of domestic and global issues. H.U.P.P.S seeks to create productive liaisons with other universities and top public policy officials to further seek positive resolve in policy practices, while advocating for true social justice.

H.U.P.P.S has been designed to be a working research and advocacy organization managed by students. The student representatives of H.U.P.P.S are from a diverse range of academic disciplines throughout Howard University, allowing for a unique blend of intellectual interaction. H.U.P.P.S will usher in and unite university collegians from all walks of life, who uphold the values of Howard University and are a part of the "Leadership for America and the Global Community."

In the efforts to fulfill the mission of H.U.P.P.S, research and the study of public policy has become an integral focus of our organization. Student representatives will spend a significant

H.U.P.P.S. *with Justice Clarence Thomas*

H.U.P.P.S. *students and faculty pose with Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor*

amount of time researching and educating others through forums and lecture series on policy issues that affect America and the Global Community.

Often the younger generation is often noted as being the most apathetic and uninformed when it comes to political issues. Often some students are silenced and ignored by individuals unwilling to yield or give merit to the intellectual capacity of collegians. As a student organization, H.U.P.P.S acknowledges the importance of making young collegians a part of the political policy dialogue. H.U.P.P.S representatives will lead students toward making proactive progress through the advocacy and lobbying of pertinent policy issues. Scholars of this organization will preserve the values of our social institutions and will be proactively involved in the field of public policy.

Calendar of Events

November 30, 2004	Supreme Court of the United States Attended oral arguments and met with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in a question and answer session.
March 17, 2005	United States Senate Committee on Armed Services Dirkren Senate Office Building SD-106 Testimony of Porter J. Gross, Director of Central Intelligence Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, USN
March 23-24, 2005	National Conference of Black Political Scientists 36th Annual Meeting. Washington, D.C.
April 26, 2005	Supreme Court of the United States: Invited to attend two oral arguments as guest of Justice Clarence Thomas. Following the hearing there was an opportunity to meet with Justice Thomas for questions and answers.
June 6, 2005	U.S. Supreme Court of the United States: Invited by the Supreme Court Historical Society for a dinner hosted by Justice Stephen G. Beryers.
September 1-4, 2005	Attend the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting
September 2005	Meeting with Howard Dean, M.D. at the Democratic National Committee
October 2005	Meeting with former President William Jefferson Clinton in New for questions and answers.
October 2005	Tour the United Nations headquarters and meet with Kofi-Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
November 2005	Tour the U.S. Department of State and met with Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of State.
November 2005	Supreme Court of the United States: Invited to attend two oral arguments as geust of Justice Stephen G. Breyer following a hearing. Justice Clarence Thomas hosted a reception for questions and answers.

H.U.P.P.S. Officers

Kareem Redmond, *Chair*
Juliette Gallegos, *Vice Chair*
Nyron N. Crawford, *Research Director*
Daya Washington, *Secretary/Communications*
Joy Jackson, *Founding Member*
Michael Henderson, *Founding Member*
Bernard Glenn-Moore, *Chief of Staff/Resident Fellow*
Adrian L. Small, *Member at Large*
Lorenzo Morris, Ph.D., *Department Chair*
Julia Jordan-Zachary, Ph.D., *Faculty Advisor*

Steps of the U.S. Supreme Court

The Charles H. Houston Pre-Law Society

The Charles H. Houston Pre-Law Society is an organization of students who are interested in law school and a legal career. Membership is open to all students, notwithstanding academic major. The Pre-Law Society works with the Department's pre-law advisor to assist students with issues related to preparation for law school and the admissions process. It sponsors law school recruitment sessions, LSAT preparatory classes, and seminars with lawyers. Interested students may obtain information about these organizations in Douglass Hall 144 or 112.

RETIREMENTS

Rosemary Betha retires

After 30 years as secretary for five chairs of the Department of Political Science.

From left to right, Dr. Alvin Thornton, Ms. Betha, Dr. Lorenzo Morris (current chair) and Dr. Ron Walters.

Dr. Joseph McCormick, III retires

After more than 20 years the Director of the Master of Public Administration program retired in 2003. He is credited with initiating reforms, which lead to the MAPA program receiving accreditation from the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Public Administration (NASPPA). He now serves as Director of Academic Affairs, University of Pennsylvania at York.

Dr. Joseph P. McCormick (left), receives award for outstanding service to graduate students, from Steven Glaskper, 2002 Political Science Graduate Student Association President.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES BY FULL-TIME FACULTY

Faculty members published two books, 15 book chapters, at least 10 peer review articles as well as a larger number of general articles. They received eight grants and applied for many more. They presented papers and lectured at more than twenty-five professional conferences and meetings in the U.S., Asia and Africa. Each of the full-time faculty member's professional activities is summarized as follows:

Olayiwola Abegunrin, Ph.D. (Howard University) published two book chapters and a full length work entitled, *Nigeria in the Global Politics in the 20th Century and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Professor Olajide Aluko*. This is a collection of essays discussing the relationship and interaction between Nigeria and the world in the 20th and early 21st century.

John Cotman, Ph.D. (Boston University) is conducting long term research on the life of Maurice Bishop. He is also completing research for an article, "Caribbean Convergence and CARICOM States and has submitted a book chapter, "Caribbean Convergence: Contemporary Cuba-CARICOM Relations" edited H. Erisman and J. Kirk. He is conducting long-term research on the life of Maurice Bishop, the Grenadian Prime Minister who was assassinated in 1983.

Donn G. Davis, Ph.D. (University of California at Berkley) has directed the Graduate Studies programs for the past three years. He published one book chapter and four-refereed articles. His public lectures include, "American Democracy, A Dream, In Progress." Philips-Stokes Fund and "The US Federal System of Government, Mississippi Consortium for International Development, both sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. Dr. Davis received the faculty authors awards for scholarly work published from the President & Provost, Howard University: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005. From 2004 – 2005 he served as a graduate faculty member on seven dissertation committees.

John Davis, Ph.D. (Howard University) recently edited the study, *The Global War on Terrorism: Assessing the American Response (*Nova, 2004) and has two additional works scheduled to go to press in the fall of 2005: Perspectives in *Black Politics and Black Leadership* (Univ. Press of America) and *From 41 to 43: Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War* (Ashgate). Davis's research interests include American foreign policy, international relations, international terrorism, national security, presidential studies and African American/Black politics.

Ben Fred-Mensah, Ph.D. (Johns Hopkins University) joined the Department in August 2002 Among other activities, he has published two journal articles, two articles on World Bank's Indigenous Knowledge Homepage (both translated into French), two book chapters (one translated into French and Swahili and other reprinted in another edited volume), two book reviews; and two newsletter articles (including one film review). He is currently working on two main projects: (i) African immigrants in the Greater Washington Area and (ii)Scaling up intra-community values for national/subregional/regional integration in Africa.

Jane Flax, Ph.D. (Yale University) recently published two journal articles: "What is the Subject: Review Essay on Psychoanalysis and Feminism," *Signs: Journal of Women and Culture* 29, 3 (2004); and "The Power of Desire: Recuperating Freud's Three Essays on Sexuality," Contemporary Psychoanalysis 40, 1 (2004). Additionally, she published two dictionary pieces in *New Dictionary of the Ideas of History*, "Essentialism" and "Equality" (2005) and is currently working on two books, one is co-edited.

Michael Frazier, Ph.D. (University of Maryland at College Park) Has an edited and co-edited books in progress: *Global Perspectives: International Development, Politics and Public Administration* and *Come Join Us Brothers: Essays Honoring African Americans in the Civil War* is being co-edited with Russell Adams, Ph.D. retired chair of the Department of Afro American Studies. Additionally, Dr. Frazier was selected for a 2006 Fulbright Senior Specialist grant in public administration at Jiangxi University of Finance & Economics, Nanchang, People's Republic of China. He is the 2005 recipient of the Anna Cooper Teaching Award from the National Conference of Black Political Scientist, Arlington, VA. Frazier was also selected to represent Howard University in CIEFF international faculty development seminar, "Brazil Societal and Economic Perspectives," Sao Paulo, Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil May 29 - June 14, 2005. Additionally, Frazier lectured in nine cities in Japan and China (PRC) under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and Beijing. He also successfully directed eight dissertations and 16 MAPA issue papers.

Daryl Harris Ph.D. (Howard University) specializes in political philosophy and theory. His research explores the varied dimensions of the Black Experience, including the logic of Black subordination. He is interested in examining the retention of cultural values (Africanisms) in the Americas as a part of the liberation process for the African Diaspora.

Mervat Hatem, Ph.D. (University of Michigan) published a book chapter, "Women and Colonial/Imperialist Policies in Egypt" in *The Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Societies* (Brill: Brill Publications, 2004) and has a book in progress titled, *Gender and Discourse in the Modern History of Egyptian Women*. Hatem received an Excellence grant for "the Evaluation of the Core Course of the Graduate International Studies Certificate titled "Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Affairs".

Julia Jordan-Zachery, Ph.D. (University of Connecticut) recently published a paper in a peer review journal, "Reflections on Mentoring: Black Women and the Academy" in a peer review journal, PS (October 2004) and received a $14,798 grant for a study on Fatherhood and marriage proposals: and a fellowship for a summer research training workshop at Columbia University, July 2004

Mae C. King, Ph.D. (University of Idaho) chairs the Admissions and Financial Aid Committees. She was the recipient of the Jewel Limar Prestage Mentorship Award at the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS) 36th annual meeting, Arlington, Virginia, March 24-26, 2005. Additionally, King was honored for her scholarship and her work in mentoring students for over three decades. A founding member of the NCOBPS, King received a cash prize of $1,000.

Marilyn Lashley, Ph.D. (University of Chicago) has a book chapter in *Indigenous Rights and the New Face of Western Hegemony: Eternal Colonialism*, by R. Benjamin and G. Hall Editors. Rutgers University Press forthcoming. Lashley's scholarship focuses on the parallel development of ethnic and indigenous movements and attendant policy responses seeking to address problems of ethnic and gender inequality in the United States and other New World nations. Her research examines both the parallels between struggles by African Americans and those by other communities of color for social justice in the U.S. society and parallel development of African Americans struggles with those of indigenous peoples of New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and other Pacific Island nations.

Lorenzo Morris, Ph.D. (University of Chicago) Morris and D. Davis, submitted "Race Specificity in American Law and Public Policy Revisited," for publication to Perspectives on Politics, a leading journal of the American Political Science Association. Together with Rodney Green, Ph.D., Department of Economics, Morris received a HUD (Housing and Urban Development) Community Development Work-Study Grant for $150,000 for two years (2005 to 2007). The grant provides funding for public administration students involving in community development work.

Morris presented the State Department distinguished scholars lectures in French and English in Senegal and Sierra Leone over two weeks from mid February to March 4, 2005. He is an editorial board member of *National Political Science Review*.

Mwabilu Ngoyi, Ph.D., submitted a journal article with G. J. Miller, and M. Holzer (2005), "What is Outcome Budgeting Conceptually Defined?" Public Administration Review (under review). He presented on "outcome budgeting" at the 16th Annual Conference of the Association for Budgeting and Financial Management held in Chicago in October 2004.

Michael Nwanze, Ph.D. (University of Leeds, UK) is director of undergraduate studies; is a member of two field committees; directed one dissertation to completion; and directs the annual National Model NATO and the fourth Annual National Model African Union simulations. More than forty-five U.S. colleges and universities including military academies participate in these two events.

Richard Seltzer, Ph.D. (University of Denver) is currently working on a book titled *Worst Racial Experiences*. His research interests include attitudes toward American Institutions, Black-Latino relations, and levels of support for American institutions. Seltzer has also been active in several judicial cases involving discrimination and juries.

Maurice Woodard, Ph.D. (University of Kansas at Lawrence) has an article in *Political Science & Politics*, published by the American Political Science Association. He is also Director of the Masters of Arts in Public Administration program (MAPA).

New 2006 Ph.D. Recipients

Kenneth Chijioke Akwuole
Dissertation: Trade Liberalization As an instrument of Development: The United States Trade Policy Toward Sub-Sahara Africa.
Advisor: Marilyn Lashley, Ph.D.

Shakir Bin Ahmed Alsaleh
Dissertation: Diversification as the Nucleus of Economic Reform Polices in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: A Tripartite Study.
Advisor: Michael Frazier, Ph.D.

Yolandra J. Butler
Dissertation: The Dilemma of Devolution and Decentralization in Federal Grants: A Case Study of the Social Service Block Grant Program.
Advisor: Maurice Woodard, Ph.D.

Abdullah Ibrahim Elmoneif
Dissertation: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in World Politics: Oil, Islam and International Peace.
Advisor: Michael Frazier, Ph.D.

Kevin Lamont Glasper
Dissertation: Black Interest Groups' Responses to Police brutality and Racial Profiling: An Analysis of Organizational Behavior, constraints, resources, and policy influences, 1995 - 2004.
Advisor: Lorenzo Morris, Ph.D.

Haytham Hassan Linjawi
Dissertation: Societies in Transformation: Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Advisor: Michael Frazier, Ph.D.

Nailah Rukiya Macarthy
Dissertation: Significance of Race: Comparative Analysis of State Time Limit Policies
Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.
Advisor: Julia Jordan-Zachery, Ph.D.

ReShone LeVell Moore
Dissertation: Citizen Participation Unleashed? An Analysis of the Mississippi Delta
as an Employment Zone, 1994-2004.
Advisor: Michael Frazier, Ph.D.

Jonathan Chima Ogbonna
Dissertation: An Assessment of the Impact of Political Regime Type of Socioeconomic
Development in Nigeria, 1979 - 2001.
Advisor: Michael Nwanze, Ph.D.

Darryl Andrew Smith
Dissertation: The Critical Success Factor of Information Technology outsourcing in government
(The Human Element)
Advisor: Marilyn Lashley, Ph.D.

Jo Ann T. Smoak
Dissertation: The Policy Implications of Improving Minority Achievement in E-Learning
Program in the Consortium of Universities of the Washington Metropolitan Area.
Advisor: Michael Frazier, Ph.D.

New 2005 Ph.D. Recipients

Mr. William G. Jones
Dissertation: "Congress and Africa's Constituency: In he Intersection of Racial Factors and Related
Business Interest in the Development of the Africa Growth and Development Act (AGOA)
Advisor: Lorenzo Morris, Ph.D.

Mr. Diarra Ossi
Dissertation: "Black Politics Re-Considered: A Conceptualization of the Role of Agency and
Culture in the Political Process". Advisor: Lorenzo Morris, Ph.D.

Ms. Stacy-Ann Wilson
Dissertation: "Ethnicity and Politics in Small Plural societies: A Comparative Study of Trinidad
and Tobago, Guyana and the Fiji Islands." Advisor: John Cotman, Ph.D.

Ms. Yolandra A. Plummer-Dialo
Dissertation: "Employee Perceptions of the Department of Human Services, Mental Retardation and Development Disabilities Administration's (MRDDA) Organizational Effectiveness."
Advisor: Michael Frazier. Ph.D.

Raymound Muhula
Dissertation: "Contentious Politics and Democratization in Africa: The Social Movement Dimension of Regime Change and Transition in Kenya, 1988-2002. Advisor: John Cotman, Ph.D.

ReShone LeVelle Moore
Dissertation: "Citizen Participation Unleashed: An Analysis of Mississippi Delta as an Empowerment Zone: 1994 - 2004." Advisor: Michael Frazier, Ph.D.

Calvin Hill
Dissertation: "The School Choice Decision Making Process of Policy Makers in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania: A Quantitative and Qualitative Comparative Case Study. Advisor: Richard Seltzer, Ph.D.

Lisa Nikol Nealy
Dissertation: "Religiosity and Political Consciousness as a Combined Predictor of Progressive Political Action and Participation Among African American Women in United States National Elections from 1964-1992. Advisor: Louis Wright

Department Alumni

D. Michael "Mickey" Collins (B.A. 1969) is Director of the Office of Diversity and Economic Opportunity (ODEO) for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). He also provides oversight for the Corporation's Diversity Strategic Plan and initiatives and serves as Chairman of the FDIC's Diversity Steering Committee.

Prior to becoming the ODEO Director, he was Deputy for Equal Opportunity, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Environment, Washington, D.C. He held this position from May 1994 to June 1999. He retired from the United States Air Force at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on April 1, 1992, with more than 21 years active service.

Elijah Cummings (BA 1973) the Phi Beta Kappa graduate serves as a five-term member of the U.S. House of Representatives and speaks for the 7th district in Maryland which includes the city of Baltimore. Congressman Cummings serves on numerous Maryland boards and commissions including the Morgan State University Board of Regents, the Baltimore Zoo Board of Trustees, the Baltimore Aquarium Board of Trustees, the Baltimore Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America Board of Directors and the Yale-Howard Nursing Partnership Center to Reduce Health Disparities by Self and Family Management Advisory Committee.

Mohammed-Bassiru Sillah Ph.D. (1989) is an Associate Professor of political Science at Hampton University. Dr. Sillah is a member of the editorial Advisory Board for The New World of Politics at Collegiate Press, San Diego, California. He is the author of two books and over 20 published articles. His research interest include: Government and Politics in Africa, African American politics, Radical Islam, African and European History, Political Economy and International relations.

M. Kasim Reed (BA 1991, JD 1995) is a Georgia State Senator and partner in the Alanta law firm of Holland and Knight. During his two terms as a state representative in the Georgia General Assembly, Reed helped pass legislation for $1.5 billion in spending for new school construction, increased teacher's salaries, reduced class sizes and improved educational quality for students grades K through 3 (*Howard Magazine*, fall 2004).

Photo credit: Ben Gray/Atlanta Journal-Constitution Howard Magazine 2004

Lalania Gilkey-Johnson (B.A. 1992) has worked in the telecommunications industry. She spent 11 years at Sprint Corporation in a variety of leadership positions. A large portion of Lalania's position focused on negotiating multi-million dollar contracts with Fortune 100 corporations. She most recently resigned her position as a Branch Sales at Sprint 5 years where she was awarded the Sprint Diamond Award in 2004, Sprint's most prestigious award for performance and community involvement, which was presented to her by Sprint's Chief Operations Officer. Lalania decided to pursue her dream of attending law school and she is enrolled at Chicago Kent Law School in IL.

Robin Bramwell, (B.A. 1992) joined JPMorgan's Public Finance Department in January 2000. Ms. Bramwell has executed over $45 billion in fixed rate, variable rate, auction rate and derivatives transactions for an assortment of issuers. Most recently, Ms. Bramwell worked with the New Jersey Transportation Trust Fund Authority on its $953 MM fixed rate issue to benefit the State's Transportation Trust Fund. In addition, she has worked extensively with JPMorgan's corporate finance teams on Blue Cross Blue Shield conversions and stadium financing projects. Before joining Morgan, she worked as a research and policy analyst and a labor negotiator in the New York State Governor's Office. Ms. Bramwell received her JD from Brooklyn Law School.

Leon T. Andrews, Jr. (B.A. 1993) is a Fellow with the Forum for Youth Investment in Washington, D.C. He has an extensive background working in government, the community, the private sector and academia for the last 12 years. He earned a Master of Science degree in Public Policy and Management from Carnegie Mellon University, and is currently completing his Ph.D. in Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Michigan. Leon also serves on the board for a local community development corporation in Ann Arbor, Michigan, POWER, and as a board member for an international nonprofit organization Universal Learning Centre.

W. Frank Williams, III (BA 1993) is Senior Vice President and Senior Client Manager for Bank of America's Healthcare and Institution Group. He manages the commercial banking relationship for several national not-for-profit organizations, including AARP, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, American Film Institute, Howard University Hospital and Howard University. He serves on Howard University's Office of Career Service Advisory Board and the Board for Alumni By Alumni (FABA), which connects alums from his era to provide book scholarships to current students.

Irelene P. Ricks, Ph.D. (1996) is the Director of Biotech Talent for the Biotechnology Institute in Rosalyn, VA. Prior to her position at the Biotech Institute, Dr. Ricks served as Director of Minorities Affairs for the American Society for Cell Biology (ASCB) where she managed a committee of minority biomedical researchers, university professors, and postdoctoral fellows. Before joining the ASCB, Dr. Ricks held various positions on Capitol Hill, the White House, D.C. Control Board, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Dr. Ricks also taught political science at Morgan State University and Howard University, and received a commendation from then-Secretary of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Carol M. Browner for teaching policy analysis to EPA employees.

Derrick Cogburn Ph.D. (1997) is an expert on global information and communication technology (ICT) policy and in the use of ICTs for socio-economic development. He is currently an assistant professor at the Syracuse University School of Information Studies and senior research associate at the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs. Dr. Cogburn also directs the Collaboratory on Technology Enhanced Learning Communities (Cotelco), an award-winning social science research collaboratory investigating the social and technical factors that influence geographically distributed collaborative knowledge work, particularly between developed and developing countries. He is also a faculty affiliate with the Convergence Center, a member of the Internet Governance Project, and a faculty member of the Syracuse University Africa Initiative.

Aretha R. Ferrell-Brown (MAPA 1997) was appointed director of the Office of Neighborhood Action & the Community Empowerment Cluster by Mayor Anthony Williams in May 2005. Prior to this appointment she served as the Chief of Staff for the District of Columbia Office of the Deputy Mayor for Children, Youth, Families and Elders since June 2004. As Chief of Staff, Ms. Ferrell-Brown managed the day-to-day operations of the Deputy Mayor's office and coordinated budget development for the agencies in this cluster. She also oversaw multi-agency initiatives such as the Juvenile Unauthorized Use of Vehicles Action Plan, which aims to stop the rise in vehicle thefts by District youth by developing alternative means to reach at-risk youth. From 1997 to 2002, Ms. Ferrell-Brown worked for the City of Chicago, as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Chicago Housing Authority and Assistant Chief Information Officer for the Department of Business and Information Services.

Michael K. Fauntroy (Ph.D., 2000) is assistant professor, school of Public Policy, George Washington University and the author of *Home Rule or House rule? Congress and the Erosion of Local Governance in the District of Columbia*, Rowman and Littlefield/University press of America (November 2003).

Sekou M. Franklin, Ph.D. (2001) is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Middle Tennessee State University where he teaches courses in American, Urban, Civil Rights and African American politics. He completed a Post-doctoral Fellowship, University of Illinois' African American Studies and Research Program from 2001-2002.

Prachak Phromsiri, Ph.D. (2001) is an Inspector and has the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Royal Thai Police, Nakornpathom, Thailand. In this capacity he is a policy-making officer, a policy analyst, and evaluator with specializations in organizational planning and design, system analysis, job design and job analysis. Prior to this position he served as an Inspector, Sub-Inspector and assistant to a number of other offices during his 15 year career in the Royal Thai Police.

Eugene Laney (Ph.D. 2003) was named director of Government Affairs DHL (Express (USA), the global leader in express logistics and freight solutions. He is responsible for representing DHL before the Department of Homeland Security on aviation and cargo security issues and customs programs. Dr. Laney also serves as DHL's government affairs and trade association representative to various transportation trade associations. He most recently finished working for seven years as Director of the Information & Legislative Service for the National Business Travel Association.

Sally Boskey (MAPA 2003) began her career with federal government as an Emerging Leader within the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Emerging Leaders Program is a two-year leadership program, which recruit, retain and train talented professionals to become leaders within the Department. As a participant in the highly selective program she has rotated to various offices within the Department and works with senior officials and other governmental and private sector organizations.

Ganna Baryshnikova (MAPA 2003) is a second year law student at George Mason University School of Law in Alexandra, Virginia. Prior to beginning her legal studies she served as project coordinator with the French-American Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco, California and as a paralegal with Steptoe & Johnson, LLP in Rockville, Maryland.

Takara Swoops, 2005 political Science graduate, received a Fulbright Fellowship to study and research in Japan for 12 months during 2005-2006. With a minor in Japanese, Swoops says she looks forward to engaging in an intensive study of the language, politics and culture during the trip. Her research project will explore the impact of expanding international influences on Japan public policy as it relates to the educational system. This is not her first time traveling to Japan. During her junior year, she participated in a field experience at an elementary school in Ichikawa, Chiba.

Abdullah Ibrahim Elmoneif, Ph.D. (2005) is currently the Head of Studies Division at the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). Before joining SANG, Dr. Elmoneif held various positions on Ministry of Justice and SANG. He was the Ass. Managing editor of SANG's magazine, then the Head of Protocol at SANG Headquarter, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Prior to his position at the SANG, Dr. Elmoneif taught public administration at King Kahiad Military Academy. Also, he worked as an Ass. Director for Military and PR Affairs in the SANG's Office in Washington, D.C., USA. He regularly writes articles for Saudi newspapers.

Faculty and Alumni Recent Books

Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999
Olayiwola Abegunrin
ISBN: 0-275-97881-8, Praeger Publishers, Publication Date: 2/28/2003

Your Past and the Press: Controversial Presidential Appointments: A Study Focusing on the Impact of Interest Groups and Media Activity on the Appointment Process.
Joseph Michael Green

The Global War On Terrorism: - 2003 Assessing The American Response
John Davis, Ph.D., Howard University
ISBN:1-59033-918-5 - $49.00

Title Deforestation in Ghana: Explaining the Chronic Failure of Forest Preservation Policies in a Developing Country (First Edition) 267 Pages
ISBN 0-7618-2297-6
University press of America, Price $64.00 discounted to $44.80 for pre-publication orders.

Your Past and the Press: Controversial Presidential Appointments: A Study Focusing on the Impact of Interest Groups and Media Activity on the Appointment Process.
Joseph Michael Green
ISBN 0-7618-2802-8 (Paperback)
University press of America, Price $44.00 discounted to $34.80 for pre-publication orders.

"CHOOSING A POSTDOC: A GUIDE FOR NEW Ph.D.S"

by
JOHN WALTON COTMAN, Ph.D

WHAT IS A POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIP?

Postdoctoral fellowships are offered by universities and other academic institutions to promising recent Ph.D.s in order to provide them the opportunity to integrate more fully into the academy and to expand research beyond the doctoral dissertation.

Postdoctoral fellowships facilitate: a) the creation of mentoring relationships with established scholars; b) publishing significant new scholarship that extends the work of the relevant community of scholars; c) developing a research agenda; and d) learning new skills and developing new areas of expertise.

WHY ARE POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS OFFERED?

Institutions provide postdocs to: a) identify and develop the most promising young scholars; b) help promote diversity in higher education; and c) create a pool of young scholars for visiting lecturer positions, research positions in university, government, and nongovernmental institutions; and future tenure track positions.

HOW TO SELECT A POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIP

Ideally a postdoc would have minimum teaching requirements, preferably none. Look for a decent salary–a minimum 30K if possible. Look for adequate money for books, subscriptions, photocopying, computer hardware and software, long distance phone calls, etc. Look for a significant travel budget. Look for support for an academic year (eight months at least).

Optimally a postdoc should offer additional support to write up the results of your research after completion of your stay at the host institution. For example, assume your postdoc runs from September through May. Additional resources may be offered for research and writing from June through August.

HOW TO WRITE A SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION

Think about a postdoc as you are writing your dissertation, and especially after you have been scheduled for your oral defense. Compile a list of potential postdocs and obtain applications. Take advantage of dissertation defense to develop your future research agenda and revisions of your thesis for journal articles and a book manuscript. Your dissertation committee should assist you in writing drafts of application.

Ask recent grads who have applied for and receiving funding grants. Contact other departmental faculty and request assistance. Professors with experience in obtaining grants can provide invaluable assistance. Expect major deadlines to fall between September and December, so spring and summer are prime time to prepare applications. Maintain an up to date curriculum

vita and biographical sketch. Ideally, you should have the proposed mentor at your host institution help you with the application.

Research Design

Your application must have a carefully thought out research design with explicit hypotheses, theory, methods and justification. By justification I mean, how does your work address issues that the community of scholars is currently investigating? Make explicit the connection between your research and current scholarship in your area. What gaps in current knowledge will your research fill? Are you creatively applying new theories, methods or data to address important research questions? Frankly discuss any weaknesses you have that you wish to address during the postdoc year, e.g., language deficiencies, methodological deficiencies. Discuss the connection between your postdoc research and your academic/research agenda for the next five years. Provide a detailed and reasonable budget, annotated bibliography, and list of data sources to be utilized in your research. Justify your selection of mentor and host institution using the above criteria as a guide.

PICKING YOUR HOST INSTITUTION AND MENTOR

Your mentor at the host institution is key to a successful experience. This point cannot be overemphasized. Work with your dissertation committee in developing a list of possible mentors. Familiarize yourself with potential mentors publications and latest research interests. Take the initiative and establish contact with scholars whose work you respect and inquire about their willingness to collaborate with you. If they sound interested send them your curriculum vitae, the abstract of your dissertation, a sample of your best writing and a summary of your research interests.

Questions to ask about potential mentors should include: a) Is she/he well published? b) Does he/she win significant grants? and c) Does she/he have a reputation of working well with and promoting the interests of young scholars?

Questions about host institution and department should include: a) Do the institution and department have faculty or researchers in key journals? b) Does the host institution house key data sources for your work on campus or are they in the vicinity? c) Does the institution host a major conference related to your work? d) Does the institution house important research centers, institutes in your area of interest? e) Does the host institution provide adequate office support, i.e., your own office and computer, voice mail, and staff support (e.g., research assistant)? f) Does the host institution provide opportunities to regularly collaborate with researchers, faculty and graduate students on campus, e.g., in research seminars?

If possible utilize existing contacts at the proposed host institution (Howard alumni, colleagues of HU faculty) to help ascertain answers to the above questions.

GOALS OF POSTDOC YEAR

Publications

At a minimum produce one peer reviewed article in a prestigious journal and one review essay in a prestigious peer-reviewed journal. Revise your thesis for a book. Write up a detailed book prospectus and secure a publishing contract with a university press. Your mentor should

assist you in selecting publishers and journals. Remember, one solid peer reviewed article in a prestigious journal can facilitate getting a book contract from a university press.

Build Your Scholarly Community

Identify other mentors and scholars with whom to collaborate. Identify and join professional organizations, their work groups and committees. Attend key academic conferences and participate by organizing panels, presenting papers, being a panel discussant, and volunteering to assist conference organizing. Identify, read and subscribe to your key journals. Volunteer to write review essays for these key journals.

Apply for Teaching Positions/Research Positions

Apply for academic positions, preferably tenure track assistant professorships. Look into the possibility of a research position in a think tank as well. Also apply for another postdoctoral fellowship. It's easier to get other postdocs once you have been awarded one.

Further Develop Research Agenda for at Least Three Years

Your research agenda should be related to, but expand on your dissertation work. Outline a timetable for publications. Provide a list of future research grants. Specify your career goals and how you aim to achieve them.

*Develop New Research Skill*s

Learn new research methods, e.g. statistical techniques. Hone your language skills. Learn how to use new software and research technologies.

Intensive Reading and Research

Postdoctoral fellowships are an ideal time to fully immerse yourself in research, writing and networking free from the time constraints associated with being a lecturer or assistant professor on tenure track. Think of it as a year free from teaching and most administrative responsibilities. In effect, it is the equivalent of your first sabbatical. Use the opportunity wisely!

John Cotman, Ph.D. is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Howard University

CALL FOR PAPERS

92nd Annual Conference
Association for the Study of African American
Life and History

Charlotte, North Carolina

October 3-7, 2007

"From Slavery to Freedom:
The Story of Africans in the Americas"

The Association for the Study of African American Life and History is soliciting papers for its 92nd Annual Conference. Since the theme focuses broadly on the experiences of Africans in the Americas "from slavery to freedom," submissions are encouraged that treat the Atlantic slave trade, slavery, resistance, abolition movements, emancipation, and the development of "New World" communities in all parts of the African Diaspora. Individuals interested in submitting proposals should give particular thought to comparative perspectives on slavery and race. The theme will also allow for broad and varied discussions on reparations and the meaning of freedom and citizenship for Africans throughout the Americas. ASALH invites scholars from all disciplines to make presentations in Charlotte on African and African American life, history, thought, and culture from the Atlantic coast of West Africa to the Caribbean Islands, Latin America, and the United States.

Preference will be given to session proposals that address the specific conference theme; other submissions, however, are invited and will be gladly accepted. ASALH supports and values all scholarship on peoples of African descent.

ASALH will begin accepting proposals on October 31, 2006. The deadline for submissions will be May 31, 2007.

All proposals must be submitted electronically to ASALH. For information on how to make electronic submissions, please visit:

www.asalh.org/92ndconvention.html

Chair: David C. Dennard, East Carolina University

College of Arts and Science
Howard University

THE FLAGSHIP OF HOWARD UNIVERSITY

Established in 1867, the College of Arts and Sciences (COAS) is Howard's oldest and largest academic unit. It has four divisions: Fine Arts, Humanities, Natural Sciences, and Social Sciences. The College offers twenty-one academic programs and each year provides instruction to its thirty-one hundred students and to approximately four thousand students from other schools and colleges of Howard University.

The College of Arts and Sciences claims as its own students and graduates who come from nearly every state in this nation and from many parts of the world. It is justly proud of the accomplishments of its graduates, and is confident that current students will make their mark in the world.

PROGRAMS

The Bachelors of Arts degree is offered in African studies, Afro American Studies, Art, classics, economics, English, modern languages and literature, health human performance and leisure studies, history, music, philosophy, political science, sociology, Theatrical arts, criminal justice administration and anthropology.

The Bachelors of Science degree is offered in biology, chemistry, comprehensive science, mathematics, physical education and recreation, physics and astronomy, and psychology.

ADMINISTRATION
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Dr. Charles Jarmon, Associate Dean for Social Science
Dr. Robert M. Catchings is Associate Dean for the Natural Sciences
Dr. Barbara Griffin, Associate Dean for Humanities
Dr. Tritobia H. Benjamin, Associate Dean for Fine Arts

For More Information contact:
EM/Admission, Howard University
2400 Sixth Street NW, Room 111, Washington, DC 20059
(800) 822-6363 or (202) 806-2763
admission@howard.edu

The Office of the Dean for Special Student Services

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Veteran Affairs

Who is eligible for VA Benefits?

Chapter 30 - GI Bill

Chapter 31 - Disabled Veterans
(Voc Rehab)

Chapter 35 - Dependents

Chapter 1606 - Reserves

Disabled Student Services

Who is eligible for Disabled Student Services?
How do you apply for Disabled Student Services?
How is it determined who gets accommodations?
What if I disagree with a decision, how do I file a grievance?

Judicial Affairs

Student Code of Conduct
Judicial Board Hearings
Administrative Judicial Hearings

Howard University 101 - New Student Orientation

Acclimate all new incoming students to the policies and procedures that will be necessary for their navigation through Howard University.

For further information:
The Howard Center
2225 Georgia Avenue, NW, Suite 725, Washington, DC 20001
202.238.2420

100th Anniversary
Commemoration

Ralph J. Bunche, Ph.D.
Scholar and Diplomat