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THE RELATIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE TO HISTORY AND TO PRACTICE

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Ladies and Gentlemen, Members of the Historical and Political Science Associations:[1]

Whether or no it be true, as someone has said, that with words we govern men, it is at least certain that when a name has once passed into common speech it becomes a fact and a power. The term Political Science seems now generally accepted and your Association has by its very title expressed the opinion that Politics is a science. Nevertheless, to prevent misconception, we may properly ask "What sort of a science is it?" The mathematical sciences are described as exact sciences: and so too are such departments of knowledge as mechanics and physics. The laws and conclusions of these sciences can be expressed in precise terms. They can be stated in numbers. As the facts which these sciences deal with are the same everywhere and at all times, so the relations of those facts which we call Laws are of universal application. That being so we can predict their action and rely upon them to be the same in the future as they have been in the past.

Evidently Politics is not a Science in this sense of the word.

There are, however, also sciences less perfectly developed, such for instance as Meteorology. The phenomena of the atmosphere belong

[1] This address was delivered at a joint meeting of the American Political Science Association and of the American Historical Association, held at Washington, D. C., January 28, 1908.

to the sphere of inanimate nature in which laws are universal and permanent. They are laws of the same kind as those which have been shown to exist in other departments of physical enquiry. But meteorology is not yet an exact science in the same sense as mathematics or mechanics, the facts it deals with being still imperfectly known, because our opportunities of observation are insufficient. We know that the weather tomorrow will be the result of certain factors which are present today, viz: facts of temperature, direction of the wind, quantity of vapor present in the air, electrical currents, and so forth, but we are not able by the most elaborate system of observation to arrive at a complete knowledge of these facts and hence we cannot with certainty predict what the weather will be tomorrow. Meteorology therefore, although exact in one sense, because its data and its laws are certain and capable of being expressed with complete precision, is for practical purposes still inexact, because the data at any given moment are too incompletely known to admit prediction.

Is Politics a science in the sense in which meteorology is? Its subject matter,—and this remark applies also to Economics,—is, like the subject matter of meteorology, imperfectly known to us. The data of any political problem at any given moment cannot be exhausted by observation, just as at present we are not yet able to exhaust by observation the facts needed for predicting tomorrow's weather. But the difference between Meteorology and Politics goes deeper. In the former the data and the laws, though at present imperfectly known, could, if we knew them much more fully, be set forth in a definite and precise form. In the latter, however, the laws, even if we knew far more about them than we do, would still remain incapable of definite formulation. We could never express them in the terms of numbers. Human phenomena may be described, but cannot be counted or weighed as you can count and weigh natural phenomena. The factors or forces which go to make the weather can, when known, be stated with precision. We can measure temperature and humidity and the force of the wind, but when we say that the passion of a mob was hot we cannot say how hot it was. We may say that in a political crisis the opinion of a cabinet or a senate will have weight, but we cannot define how much weight. Such terms as heat and weight are metaphors drawn from natural science, terms which although con-

venient, are altogether vague and inexact. Emotions, opinions and the other factors which influence politics are not the subjects of computation. Accordingly, in calling Politics a Science we mean no more than this, that there is a constancy and uniformity in the tendencies of human nature which enable us to regard the acts of men at one time as due to the same causes which have governed their acts at previous times. Acts can be grouped and connected, can be arranged and studied, as being the results of the same generally operative tendencies.

The data of politics are the acts of men. The laws of political science are the tendencies of human nature and are embodied in the institutions men have created. These tendencies are in so far uniform and permanent that we can lay down general propositions about human nature and can form these propositions into a connected system of knowledge.

I have made these prefatory remarks lest it should be supposed that the Association is claiming for its subject more than it can properly claim. Now let us see what the materials of Political Science are.

They are the acts of men as recorded in history. In other words they are such parts of history as relate to the structure and government of communities. Political Science takes all the facts that history gives us on this subject and rearranges them under proper heads, describing institutions and setting forth those habits of men and tendencies of human nature which correspond to what in the sphere of inanimate nature we call natural laws. Thus your science may be defined as the data of political history reclassified and explained as the result of certain general principles. It is not any more a science than history is, because its certainty is no greater than the certainty of history. But whereas History takes the form of a record of facts and tendencies as they have occurred or shown themselves in past times, Political Science assumes the form of a systematic statement of the most important facts belonging to the political department of history, stringing these facts (so to speak) upon the thread of the principles which run through them. They are so disposed and arranged as to enable us more easily to comprehend what we call the laws that govern human nature in political communities, so that we can see these laws as a whole in their permanent action and can apply

what we have learned from history to the phenomena of today and tomorrow.

Thus Political Science stands midway between history and politics, between the past and the present. It has drawn its materials from the one, it has to apply them to the other. As I am addressing two Associations, which devote themselves, the one to the study of history, the other to the study of political science, it has seemed proper to choose a subject which belongs equally to both.

The questions which we are tonight to consider are therefore these:

1. How may Political Science sift, arrange and dispose in the most philosophical way the data it finds in History?

2. What help can it render to the world by placing its facts and conclusions at the service of statesmen and citizens?

Let us begin with the former of these two questions. Political Science has to be constructed out of historical facts as a building has to be reared out of the stones which have been quarried and placed on the ground. What is the best way of doing this?

I start by offering to you one maxim of universal validity. Keep close to the facts. Never lose yourself in abstractions. Never fancy that a general proposition means anything more than the facts which it sums up. We shall find that it is more profitable to keep to the facts. It is also much more interesting. Has it not often occurred to you to ask—"Why are so many of the treatises on the science of politics and government so dry? Why does the subject make such hard reading?" "Von Mohl and Bluntschli in the last generation, and even such acute and thoughtful writers of our own time as Wilhelm Roscher and Henry Sidgwick—I might perhaps add a still more famous name—John Stuart Mill in his *Representative Government*,—are full of excellent matter and well deserving of study. (For obvious reasons I do not mention living writers.) But they are rather hard reading. May the reason be this, that these writers keep us too much in the field of abstractions and do not sufficiently refresh our imagination by that sense of living color and direct contact with men and events which history gives? All the general propositions and leading principles of politics get their significance and value from their illustrations in the concrete and when severed from these they become not only comparatively lifeless but also less helpful, because we do not grasp

their direct application. The best books are those in which we feel ourselves constantly in contact with some human fact or other. Take Montesquieu, for instance, who may be deemed the father of the modern way of treating the subject. He is sometimes wrong in his facts and often wild in his conjectures. But he is always interesting, always suggestive. Tocqueville again, from whom the political philosophy of the last and the present generation took a sort of secondary new departure, rouses and sustains our interest in his theories entirely by his description of the actual phenomena of a constitutional government which he had seen and studied at first hand. His observations are grounded on the facts and derive their point from the facts. Where, as in the last volume of his *Democracy in America,* he leaves the facts to soar into the region of speculation he is harder to follow as well as less instructive. The same may be said of the writings of Burke upon English or Irish affairs, and of that discussion, conducted in a truly philosophical and scientific spirit, of an actual political situation which we find in the pages of *The Federalist,* and of Walter Bagehot's well known criticism of the English Constitution and of Albert Dicey's *Law of the Constitution.* I might add that Henry Sidgwick's treatise (*The Development of European Polity*) which deals with politics from the side of history is, if not positively more valuable, yet certainly more interesting than his theoretical book upon politics. The most striking instance of all is, of course, the founder of our science —Aristotle himself. Nobody ever had a greater power of handling abstract ideas with power and freedom. But in his writings on politics the reader feels that the philosopher has always concrete facts present in his mind from which he directly derives his dicta and by which he illustrates his broad generalizations.

If you want your science to be influential you must make the treatment of it, I will not say popular, for that is sometimes taken to mean superficial, but at any rate attractive.

There are two kinds of good books—the book which is sound but dry, and the book which is suggestive and therefore readable but not critical. There is a still better kind which is both sound, critical and suggestive, and to this class Aristotle's famous treatise belongs. There is a worst kind, which is neither critical nor sound nor suggestive, but parades a pseudo-scientific terminology covering mere common-

places or perhaps fallacies. Examples occur to me of this kind also, but they need not be mentioned.

A revered teacher of mine in the University of Oxford used to give to us youths this maxim for our guidance in the paths of literature, "It is better to be flippant than to be dull."

For what are books written but to be read? Dullness is one of the great evils of this world and it is seldom a necessary evil.. Never assume that it is inevitable. Fight against it and you will prevail. If dullness is allowed to infect your science its chances of doing good will be reduced. Many books must, of course, be written for the specialist, which will seem dry to other readers. But even they need not be dull.

That the study is, moreover, more instructive the closer it keeps to facts will appear when we consider the nature of the matter it deals with. Broadly speaking, it treats of Tendencies and of Institutions. The general and permanent tendencies of men in communities are the substratum of all political theory. We learn them from Ethics and Psychology as well as from history. Considered as general and as permanent they are few, and can be briefly stated. But when we come to studying their action at any given time or in any given place it becomes necessary to know the surrounding and modifying conditions which affect them. A particular community may have more or less intelligence, habit of self-restraint, experience in self-government, deference to authority, and so forth. To understand the working in it of the tendencies of human nature we need to know the racial characteristics of the people, their religion, occupations, education, social structure, and in short all that may be called their environment. These we get from history. These are what fill out and give body and substance to the mere skeleton which Psychology and Ethics supply. It is by studying these that we are able to understand what has happened, and to conjecture, though seldom to predict, what will happen hereafter.

Political institutions, by which I mean constitutions and forms of government, representative assemblies, national and local, and such like matters, are the principal subjects with which our science deals. They used to be treated as abstract entities, if the term be permissible: things existing *in vacuo*, like the Platonic ideal, with a definite

and permanent type. The greatest progress made of recent years has been in perceiving this sort of treatment to be unfruitful. Every institution—say the English parliament or the New England Town Meeting,—must be studied through its growth and in its environment. Now in examining a political institution there are four things to be regarded.

The first is its formal and legal character.

The second is the needs it was meant to meet and the purposes it actually serves.

The third is the character of the men who work it.

The fourth is what may be called the traditional color of the institution itself, i.e., the ideas entertained respecting it by the people among whom it lives, the associations they have for it, the respect it inspires.

Without a comprehension of these three latter the investigation of the institution as a formal legal creation is unprofitable and may be misleading. The essential point is to get hold of the thing in its working. Just as in studying Tendencies, we must see how those tendencies which belong to civilized men generally are modified by the institutions under which the particular community has lived, so likewise in studying Institutions it is essential to see how the varying tendencies of those who work them have modified their character. This reciprocal action is one of the prettiest things in history. The tendencies of the English settlers in New England disposed them to create a scheme of local self-government, developing the germs which they brought with them from the old country, and the Town Meeting of New England was the result. The town meeting formed the habits and trained the aptitudes of the colonists: and these habits determined the type of self-government which grew up in the American States and imprinted a sort of localism upon political arrangements which has remained ever since and has had, together with its many merits, what Europeans deem the unfortunate result of establishing the habit of choosing as members of the State legislature, and ultimately of the federal legislature also, none but persons resident in the area to be represented.

You may ask: Are we then to study everything in the light of everything else? and if so, what limit can be set to investigation?

The answer is: No limit. Every political organism, every political force, must be studied in and cannot be understood apart from the environment out of which it has grown and in which it plays. Not all the facts of that environment are relevant, but till you have examined them, you cannot pronounce any irrelevant. Aristotle says somewhere that among the Greeks changes in the style of music were always followed by political disorders. It is not an observation which we should make of any modern people, but it doubtless was true then and it may be true again. Competitions in games and athletic sports might seem to lie a good way from political institutions. But no one who studies either England, or Australia, or the United States as they are today can doubt that the present passion for these competitions will, if it continues, gravely affect the political character of these three peoples and the working of their institutions. The dynamics of political society are an infinitely complex subject of study, and therein lies their interest, for everything that happens in the present or will happen in the future may throw some light back into what are now the dark corners of the past.

From among the maxims which might be laid down for the student who wishes to turn political history into political science, I select three.

He must be critical: must test his sources of information: never get his data at second hand if he can (without too much expenditure of time) get them at first hand.

He must beware of superficial resemblances. So-called historical parallels are usually interesting, often illuminative. But they are often misleading. History never repeats itself.

He must endeavor to disengage the personal or accidental from the general causes at work. By the Personal Cause I mean the presence of some wholly exceptional man who so much affects the situation as to disturb all calculations. People are wont to say that the time or the need produces the man. That is not true. The man often appears quite outside what people call the natural course of things: and often does not appear when the natural course of things seems to require him. He is, not indeed in reality, for there is no chance in Nature, but so far as our knowledge goes, an accident, i.e., the product of antecedents altogether unknown and unknowable. Only in a broad

and rough sort of way can we say how much is due to the presence of such a person (or group of persons) and how much to the general causes at work. But we are obliged to try to distinguish the results of his presence, for it affects the value of the conclusions to be drawn from the phenomena as a whole. Suppose that the king of France in 1789, had been such a man as Frederick the Great, or the king of Prussia in 1740 such a man as Louis XVI, how different would the history of Europe have been!

From these and other principles applicable to the construction from historical data of a systematic science of politics, I return to observe once more that the accuracy of the science, its solid value, its usefulness to the world we live in, depend upon the closeness with which it keeps to the data supplied by history. It is not a deductive science any more than it is a branch of speculative philosophy. Some writers have treated it as a set of abstractions. They have tried to create by efforts of thought, and to define, such general conceptions as sovereignty, the State, the origin of political right, the ground of political obligation, and so forth, following the methods of metaphysics and keeping as far from the concrete as possible. So much time and toil have been spent on these discussions, and so many of them have a kind of historical interest as revealing the ideas current three or four centuries ago that we must speak respectfully of them. But what have they given us of substantial worth? How vague and cloudy are many of the German treatises of the last sixty years on the theory of the State? They take the writer's own conceptions for realities instead of starting from the facts and so defining the conceptions as to make them express realities. What can be more windy and empty, more dry and frigid and barren than such lucubrations upon sovereignty as we find in John Austin and some still more recent writers? Is this sort of treatment helpful today either to a comprehension of the facts, which is science, or to the service of mankind, which is statesmanship? Whoso seeks to understand the nature of the State will do better to enquire what forms the state has taken and which have proved best, what powers governments have enjoyed and how those powers have worked. Whoso desires a clear idea of sovereignty will be well advised to throw over artificial definitions, unreal distinctions, idle logomachies, and be content to ask, Where in each state does the

law lodge supreme legal authority, and is the possessor of supreme legal authority also in fact the actually strongest power?

You will not suppose that I am questioning the value either of systematic treatment or of analytic method. Far from it. It is always necessary to analyze current conceptions and to define popular terms. If half the writers who have talked about Liberty had explained the sense in which they use the word, how many confusions and misunderstandings should we have escaped! He who tries to define the State is forced to analyze and judge between different views entertained of the nature of the state, such as those of the German, such as those of the American type, and in doing this he will learn much, including a good deal of the history of thought. By all means let political philosophers clarify their own minds and stimulate their readers' minds by these analytic processes, so long as they remember that after all they are only dealing with language, and that words ought to be so used as to fit the facts instead of twisting facts to suit the words. So again let the philosophers imitate Plato and Aristotle and many after them in considering what is the best form a state can take, and what the organs through which it must work. But if their enquiries are to be fruitful, their state and its organs will have to be tangible things, such as belong to the field of experience, not chimeras buzzing in emptiness.

Least of all will you, I hope, find in what I am trying to say any disparagement of historical generalizations or political theory. The study of facts is meant to lead up to the establishment of conclusions and the mastery of principles, and unless it does this it has no scientific value. The Fact is the first thing. Make sure of it. Get it perfectly clear. Polish it till it shines and sparkles like a gem. Then connect it with other facts. Examine it in its relation to them, for in that lies its worth and its significance. It is of little use alone. So make it a diamond in the necklace, a stone, perhaps a corner stone, in your building. Let the building be strong with stones fitly compacted; and let it be also smooth and shapely, adorned to please the eye as well as to serve its uses. You do not give fair play to the facts, nor artistic quality to your work unless you so state and connect the facts as to bring out their pictorial and what may be called their human and dramatic interest, whatever it may be, as well as their more strictly

scientific interest, not that there is any opposition, for the subject of history no less than of poetry is human nature, and to show the workings of human nature is part of your science. Accordingly, to counsel you to stick to facts is not to dissuade you from philosophical generalizations, but only to remind you—though indeed you as trained students do not need to be reminded—that the generalizations must spring out of the facts, and without the facts are worthless.

Now let us turn to the second branch of our subject and consider the relation of history and politics to life. What is the use of Political Science? Can it be made to serve the practical needs of the time? The question is worth asking, for though Science is justified of all her children and astronomy would fascinate us even if it had no relations at all with human life, still those sciences which approve themselves by works as well as to faith have a stronger claim on the attention of the average man.

Plato, who like all the great thinkers in the sphere of the human sciences, was stirred by the conditions of his own time and sought to be a practical reformer, Plato deemed a mastery of the principles of politics essential to statecraft when he said that states would never prosper till philosophers were kings or kings were philosophers. Yet in the world as we see it the positions of a scientific student of politics and a practical statesman are so seldom united that they are usually assumed to be incompatible, because the qualities needed for excellence in each are seldom found together. Doubtless the gifts which in popularly governed countries bring a man to the highest posts and those which fit him to use most wisely the power he there wields are not the same gifts. I used to ask myself in looking round the British cabinet what sort of help one of the great luminaries of political philosophy would have rendered had he been there. How Edmund Burke or Alexander Hamilton or Alexis de Tocqueville would have thought and spoken, we can imagine, for all three played their parts in the world of affairs, and showed their weak points as well as their strong ones. But Aristotle? Would his majestic intellect have dealt with the emergencies of the moment as the nimble parliamentarian learns to do, and would his counsels on questions of taxation or employers' liability or the policy to be followed towards Russia and Austria and the Turks have been as much wiser than those of his

colleagues as he would have surpassed them in range of knowledge and width of view? The man whose mind is stored with historical instances ought to have some advantages for grappling with practical problems. His knowledge ought to warn him from certain dangers and enable him to foresee certain risks, ought to suggest expedients for meeting resistance or getting round obstacles. Everbody accumulates in the course of his career a stock of examples or precedents. To obtain this early in life by systematic study instead of picking it up by degrees ought to ripen faster a man's capacity for political service.

That, however, which concerns us here is not the training of exceptional persons for legislative or administrative work but rather the influence which Political Science can exert upon the whole community.

If in every free country the chief problem of democracy is to make the citizens intellectually and morally fit to conduct their government, this is most clearly so in the United States, where the ultimate control of public affairs belongs to the mass of the people. To enlighten their judgment by a large knowledge of facts, and show them how to draw sound conclusions from facts would be to render an inestimable service. What can Political Science do towards this? To reach the whole people is in any country impossible. But may not the educated classes, or at least a part of them, be so far reached and leavened that through them the nation will be affected?

The means at your disposal are two. One is teaching in universities. Probably more than half of you here present are doing this work. The other is literature. Probably more than half of you have written on the subjects for whose sake we are here assembled. Historical lectures and books no doubt reach but a small fraction even of the educated class. But suppose that they did now or would in time reach a much larger percentage of the voters, what is it that the historical and philosophical matter they contain could do for the bettering of civic intelligence? By influencing through that matter say five per cent, consisting of the most intelligent and educated voters, you would be producing a substantial effect on another thirty, forty or fifty per cent, perhaps indeed on a majority of the voters. What then is it you would aim at doing and hope to effect for this five per cent whose capacity and knowledge enable them to be leaders or instructors of the rest?

History and Political Science may do much to inculcate the habit of trying to study and understand the questions a citizen has to vote upon. The persons who in any country and in any class of the community do so try are a minority and indeed a small minority. The old belief that the possession of a vote makes a man competent to judge on public questions,—a belief much more loudly professed than it was ever really held,—this belief is dying, though no doubt it dies hard. Even the notion that common sense, which by the way is not such a common wayside weed as people fancy, is all that the voter needs to take with him to the polls,—this notion is seen to be less defensible the more difficult and complicated do the issues of modern politics become. Doubtless the honest, simple voter is a pretty good judge of a man. He has often proved it in America. Nowhere is the instinct of the people for an upright and courageous character, above tricks or self-seeking, so strong and so true as it is here. But most of the questions that now come before legislatures, and many even of those determined at an election, lie beyond the range of the honest simple voter, for they need ample knowledge and a trained mind. Such minds are none too frequent in any class. The neglect to inform oneself about and reflect on political issues is as common in the bank-parlor or the club smoking-room as it is among farmers or mechanics.

Let me give from my own country two instances of questions which have constantly come before the nation and have been voted upon with very little knowledge of the true facts and of the conditions affecting them.

The relations of Ireland and England have been for two centuries one of the gravest problems of Britain. If the English governing classes had realized how much they could learn from Irish history, if they had studied and been influenced by such writings as those of Edmund Burke upon Irish affairs, if more of them had gone to Ireland to see things there with their own eyes, how different might have been the policies followed!

Of those who in England discuss at public meetings, or at parliamentary or local elections cast their votes upon, proposals dealing with the phenomena of pauperism and unemployment, how few are there who have tried to reflect on the economic principles involved, how few know what experience has to teach us of the results of past legislation

on the subjects either in Britain or elsewhere. It may be said that they leave this to Ministers and to their representatives in Parliament or in local authorities. But both these classes are influenced by the wishes which they understand the electors to be expressing by their votes.

I take an instance from the United States.

You have now pretty well adopted the views of those who are called civil service reformers and have at last reversed the unfortunate policy which came to prevail in the generation of President Jackson. The Spoils System is almost gone from the federal civil service and is in other directions beginning to disappear. Had there been a fuller study of how other countries fared when they brought places into politics and how much better they fared when they took places out of politics, the voters and the statesmen of America would have been long ago led to the conclusion now happily reached and much loss and harm suffered meantime would have been avoided.

A further service which the habit of looking at things in a scientific spirit can render is to keep at least a fraction of the community cool and calm at times of excitement. In every country the bulk of the citizens are apt to be swept off their feet by fits of emotion. The habit of reflection corrects this. It steadies opinion, dissuades sudden or violent changes of policy, teaches that reforms made cautiously are usually those that best stand the test of time. Further, he who has learnt how to study history is delivered from the tendency—frequent and mischievous in political discussion—to be carried away by *a priori* reasonings or by phrases and catchwords. The glittering generalities which swayed men in France during the Revolution and were popular both here and in England then and for some time later had their value, for they sometimes embodied important doctrines in a form easy to remember. But they were often fallacious, and as we stand today they are more likely to work harm than good. Instead of helping men to reflect they become a substitute for reflection and are most powerful with the least thoughtful.

Thirdly. In advocating the conservation of natural resources three weeks ago the President of the United States observed that neither the selfish interest of individuals nor the localism of particular communities should be allowed to obstruct reforms which the public

welfare demands. Selfish interest and localism are evils not confined to any one country or form of government. They can be overcome only by those large views of national opportunities and national policy, and by that sense of the mischief which they do in facilitating jobs and preventing comprehensive schemes, which a study and grasp of the whole subject create.

So, too, historical training ought to tend to emancipate a man from party spirit. It does not always do so. As the articles of the Church of England say "this fault of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerate." We know of not a few historians and philosophers who gave up to party spirit what was meant for mankind. Neither do I presume to disparage party feeling and party organization. We have not yet found how to work popular governments without it: and it is the duty of each one of us who can form an opinion to take a side and as a rule to vote with the side which on the whole he prefers. But the scientific habit of mind ought to enable a man to think for himself and to think liberally and tolerantly, recognizing what is sound in the doctrines of those to whom he is usually opposed and dealing with each political issue on its merits.

Lastly. We live in an age when national sentiment, a thing excellent in itself, has been tending to overshadow and dwarf the regard for humanity at large. In Europe at this moment pride in one's own country, the desire to see her strong, rich and prosperous, with her horn exalted among the nations of the earth, coupled with that spirit of competition which shows itself as a growing force in everything, from the size of navies and the speed of steamships down to athletic contests between football teams,—these things have made men fancy that the greatness of their own country can be secured only at the expense of other countries. They are not content to be strong unless they are evidently the strongest. Many are indifferent to, some even rejoice in, the misfortunes of other countries. Even those whose good sense and good feeling forbid jealousy to carry them so far. seem nowadays to think that patriotism requires them to give all their devotion, all their praise, all their effort to their own country, leaving none for mankind as a whole. Ought there not to be limit to this habit? Might it not be well if the six great nations took now and then a sort of "year off," during which the orators of each nation should

refrain from glorifying its gifts and achievements, and should occupy themselves in setting forth the merits and charms of each, or some at least, of the other five? A wide study of politics, like a wide study of literature, tends to correct the excesses of Nationalism. For a political philosopher as well as for a Christian the true spirit is a cosmopolitan spirit, which recognizes the good that there is in all peoples, the contributions each of the civilized peoples has made, the services each may render in the future, the duty to help forward the races that are behind, the gain to each nation from developing the intellectual gifts and material prosperity of the others. To reduce national vanity—apt to flaunt itself in vulgar forms—to soften the arrogance of national pride, to make a people see the good there is in others, even in their rivals, to give them ideals for the whole human race transcending those of any one nation—this is one of the best things that those who have become pervaded by the true spirit of learning and of science ought to seek to do for their fellow-citizens.

So far we have seen that the chief aim of your science is to create in the class which leads a nation the proper temper and attitude towards the questions which from time to time arise in politics. Temper and attitude of mind are so supremely important in the large play of human affairs that to mold them aright is to raise, to broaden and to refine a nation's life.

You may admit this, and yet say: "Is this all that historical and political science can do? Cannot it not descend from general precepts to particular counsels and prescribe the right course to be taken, if not in all, yet in most of the questions that come before a nation? If knowledge is the first condition of efficiency and success, why should not those who possess it be the best advisers of governments and peoples in economic questions, in constitutional questions, in questions of foreign relations?"

I hope you will not think that I am "giving away" your science if I say that it must not be expected to provide authoritative solutions for current problems and controversies. Historical study is a fine tonic for the system, but does not furnish prescriptions for every day ailments. Doubtless the professors of the science are ready to prescribe. Each of us has his view and will defend both his diagnosis and his remedies, drawing arguments for them from his historical storehouse.

But the professors agree among themselves no more than ordinary politicians do, for when it comes to the interpretation of historical facts and their application to a concrete controversy, each man interprets and applies according to his own personal or party proclivities.

There have been exceptions to this rule in economic questions, at least here in the United States, for in the Free Silver issue almost all the serious students were on one side. Nor do I forget that the weight of educated opinion always was and is very decidedly against the "spoils system" in politics. Still it is generally true that whenever Party comes in at the door Science flies out at the window. During the last half century there have been in England many debates regarding the extension of the parliamentary suffrage, which is now enjoyed by a far larger proportion of the people than it was in 1860. In these controversies, for the question always became a party question, there were about as many historians opposing as there were advocating that extension. So those who make a systematic study of our subject are divided today upon the question of granting the suffrage to women, upon proportional representation, upon the reform of the House of Lords, and in fact upon pretty nearly every current issue.

In the autumn of 1876, after the Bulgarian massacres, there was in England a keen struggle between those who thought that the interests of England required her to support the Sultan and those who held it wrong and foolish to do so. In that autumn I met one day in the street an eminent historical professor who was fond of descanting on the value of history as a guide to politics. We naturally talked of the crisis in the East which filled all minds, and I said "Here is a fine opportunity for applying your doctrines. Party politicians may be divided, but no student of history can doubt which is the right course for the Government to follow towards Russia and the Turks." "Certainly," he replied, "the teachings of history are plain." "You mean, of course," I said, scenting some signs of disagreement, "that we ought to warn the Sultan that he is wholly in the wrong and can have no support from us." "No, indeed," rejoined my friend, "I mean just the opposite."

So it has always been and so it will always be. Rarely will you find a preponderating weight of authority, historical or philosophical, on either side in a political discussion. All that your enquiries and dissertations can effect is to make the discussion more careful, more

rational, more temperate, more illuminative than it would be in the hands of ignorant men.

Cherish no vain hopes of introducing the certitude or the authority of science into politics. If you help to create among the most enlightened part of a nation the right temper and attitude, if you strengthen their sense of civic duty, if you enforce the need there is for accurate knowledge of facts and intelligent reasoning from the facts, you will have done as much as can be expected and more than has ever yet been accomplished.

The time-hallowed classification of forms of government divides them into Monarchies, Oligarchies and Democracies. In reality there is only one form of government. That form is the Rule of the Few. The monarch is always obliged to rule by the counsel and through the agency of others, and only a small part of what is done in his name emanates from his mind and will. The multitude has neither the knowledge nor the time nor the unflagging interest that are needed to enable it to rule. Its opinions are formed, its passions are roused, its acts are guided by a few persons—few compared with the total of the voters—and nothing would surprise it more than to learn by how few. Yet the excellence of a democracy largely depends on the extent to which the number of those who really rule by virtue of their intelligence and their activity can be increased, so whatever stimulates these qualities strengthens a democratic government and raises its quality. Had I not detained you too long already I should have liked to develop this thesis. It is now mentioned only to anticipate the objection that even the limited range I have claimed for your study is too wide. To him who tells you it is vain to hope you can reach the multitude you may reply that the multitude is led, here as elsewhere, even if rather less here than elsewhere, by a small fraction of the citizens. To raise the standard of political knowledge and thinking among those men, to give them an always increasing sense of the need for knowing accurately and thinking soundly, if they are to help their country forward, this is your aim and this may well be your achievement.

So much for the practical side of your pursuit. But be the practical utility what it may, the science will flourish and deserve to flourish as a branch of knowledge existing for its own sake, as the

philosopher says that Virtue is to be loved even though it bring no gain with it.

It is an Experimental Science, for though it cannot try experiments it can study them and note their results. It is a Progressive Science, for every year's experience adds not only to our materials but to our comprehension of the laws that govern human society. In the measureless future that lies before those who will pursue the study in days to come many of our present expectations will be falsified and many propositions now deemed axiomatic may be discredited, for that eternal flux of things whereof Heraclitus spoke may be attributed even more truly to human than to natural phenomena. You here have a wider field for experiment and are trying a greater number of experiments than any European country can try, so you can contribute more to the common stock of knowledge. That the results may be commensurate with the abundance of your opportunities and with the zeal you bring to the use of them is the sincere wish of your friends and fellow laborers in England. We are all laboring together for one another, for science, and for the world, for that future world in which humanity may have learnt so to discipline its passions and so to elevate and refine the sense in each man of his duty to the whole community that it will be able after long ages to create institutions better than any we now possess and to work them in a purer spirit.