CONSOLIDATING PEACE AND MITIGATING CONFLICT
IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE

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DRAFT: COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, AND ADDITIONS ARE ALL WELCOME

At some point organized violence between opposing groups ends. The aftermath of violence contains a number of specific challenges including creating constitutional arrangements and institutions, (re)constructing civil society, demilitarization, redefining the role of the military and police forces, providing transitional justice and reconciliation, addressing the needs of vulnerable sectors and groups for which the society often requires outside assistance in the form of resources, skills, and political support, reintegrating internally and externally displaced populations, and deciding how to mark the past and memories of it (Hampson 1996; Kriesberg 2003). Our goal is to offer an overview of these crucial issues suggesting, where possible, what social scientists currently believe are good answers to each one.

In addressing the problems of peace keeping and peacebuilding, it is useful to consider them as a two-level game—one played out within each group and one between groups. Peacebuilding and conflict mitigation become difficult because the reduction of conflict between groups often provokes within-group opposition and claims that those dealing with opponents are selling out their own community (Horowitz 1985; Kelman 1987; Licklider, 1999). As a result, movement towards better intergroup relations is often slow and can depend on developing support for continuing peace processes that isolate extremists and spoilers, and promotes the ingroup policing of intergroup violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Third parties, NGO’s, IGO’s, and individual states often play an important role in transitions, yet the key to success rests with the development of internal political changes in local institutions and practices and a significant commitment to the peaceful management of differences.

Our focus is on a set of issues and trade-offs that post-conflict societies face, but it must be noted at the outset that the severity of these issues differs across settings, as do the goals of the opponents, so that the trade-offs among different issues will not be the same in all places. As a result, we are unable to articulate a single model of success for effective peacebuilding although we hope that the issues we highly provide an outline of problems that must be addressed at some point in any society coming out of severe, violent conflict.

ALTERNATIVE EMPHASES: SECURITY, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE PUBLIC GOODS

Peace settlements generally have three goals beyond ending violence: the provision of infrastructure and public goods, good governance, and democratization. The problem is that in the real world these goals often conflict. A wealth of historical experience and empirical evidence suggests that it is extraordinarily difficult to promote security, good governance, and provide public goods in war-torn societies. Poorly timed elections or democratization efforts that are promoted in a hostile security environment can easily go awry and exacerbate social cleavages. So too can power-sharing schemes or ill-conceived federal arrangements that are imposed from the outside on reluctant local participants. Thus, there is much debate, but not so many definitive findings in the scholarly and policy literature about the about the appropriate timing, sequencing, and effectiveness of these activities in the state-building/nation-building enterprise.

(1) Security is necessary but not sufficient. The security dimension often attracts the most attention and resources for without security it is widely believed that neither good
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governance nor the provision of an adequate level of public goods is possible. Some scholars believe that establishing security and basic political stability should be the first—if not primary—goal of international interventions, especially if the objective is to establish viable states that have the capacity and instrumental authority to manage their internal security affairs after external forces are withdrawn. Comparing the experience in Iraq with those of other international interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East Timor, where many of the same underlying problems of social order obtain, some observers have concluded that the overriding challenge for international authorities intervening in failed states is to restore political order through the provision of fundamental security guarantees, not through the practice of democracy. In divided societies that have experienced violent conflict, oppression, or war, narrow clan-based, tribal, or religious identities tend to harden, destroying any broader national identity that may have existed previously and raising the barriers to creating or re-creating one in the future (Kaufmann, 1996 and 1999; Downes, 2004). Even if possible, manufacturing a new national identity, or re-establishing an old one, may take generations, and very often a great deal of coercive power (Byman, 2002). Sometimes, however, new national and ethnic identities emerge or take new forms in a relatively short period as political situations change, new states are created and new alignments transform previous coalitions (Chandra, 2006).

At a minimum, in deeply divided societies, where ethnic, religious, or sectarian rivalries run deep, externally-provided security guarantees are critical to taming the security dilemma. These external security guarantees must contain two crucial elements: (1) they must be offered on sustainable terms by the intervening power or international authority in order to attenuate, if not entirely eliminate, the security dilemma; and (2) they must be offered in a way that allows local authorities to secure their borders and control their own territory. Walter argues that third-party security guarantees, which protect different groups and ensure that promises are kept, are a key variable that explains the success of such undertakings. She distinguishes between “weak,” “moderate,” and “strong” security guarantees. Whereas weak guarantees involve only a political commitment if the peace process breaks down, and perhaps very modest troop deployments, strong guarantees typically consist of many thousands of troops who can provide an unambiguous and indisputable demonstration of intent (Walter, 1997 and 2002).

The security situation in conflict and post-conflict situations in failed states also requires effective strategies of spoiler management—that is to say, strategies that deal with those extremists or groups in a conflict who have been radicalized, use violence to pursue their aims, are not interested in political compromise, and will, in fact, do anything to subvert the political process. Coercive strategies are generally required to deal with the “total spoiler” who sees the world in “all-or-nothing terms.” This involves measures that root out and destroy the spoiler and his bases of political support, include the direct application of force, targeted sanctions, and other kinds of penalties that raise of costs of noncooperation and noncompliance (Stedman, 1997).

Accordingly, some argue that effective security management is the paramount consideration in nation-building undertakings. Comparing recent peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations with those of occupying imperial powers in the colonial era, Marten argues that not only must “robust peace operations [be] designed to provide security for the affected populations,” but “also when people’s security is assured is it possible for them to invest in the future” (Marten, 2004, 157),

Who provides these security guarantees, and with what effect? Doyle and Sambanis (2000) show that, for example, in the case of civil wars, multilateral UN peace operations make a significant difference in ending violence and supporting democratization. Like Walter, they also warn that when interventions are very limited the chances of ending violence completely or decreasing the chances of recurrence diminish, and have little effect on institutionalizing a participatory peace (2000: 791). Clearly, security alone is not enough to consolidate a peace and
create the conditions under which the society might prosper. Longer-term political arrangements are also required to guarantee political order and authority in war-torn states.

(2) **Governments need to provide significant short and medium term benefits to citizens.** As a result, *infrastructure and public goods* are just as critical to the creation of an effective government as security—even if the belief that security is a prerequisite for a successful transition. Without significant perceived benefits to citizens that not only enhance stability but also improve well-being, citizens are less likely to comply with or support the government (Levi 2006).

A major problem confronting the contemporary world is how to build effective governments where they do not exist. This requires offering powerful constituents enough in the way of benefits to desist from violent predation (Bates 2005) and to cede to public officials the sine qua non of an effective government: the capacity to enforce the laws and extract the taxes necessary to pay for essential public goods. However, there must be assurances that the governors do not then turn around and exploit the governed. Legal constraints and limits on the bargaining and coercive powers of the governors can significantly inhibit officials’ behavior only when embedded in institutions that enforce credible commitments. This was Madison’s great insight, that we must build distrust into the very constitution of government.

The failure to achieve credible commitments is endemic, in large part because many rulers have no incentives to be have their power delimited. The Idi Amins and the Saddam Husseins are illustrative. Having significantly weakened the opposition, they were without constraints on their opportunism or favoritism. What would ever induce such a head of state, particularly one with a reliable army, to agree to arrangements that will evoke automatic punishments should he violate the agreement? Yet, at least sometimes, competition for control of resources or international pressure may have that effect (North and Weingast 1989; Rosenthal 1998).

We know that effective governments secure property rights, adjudicate disputes, and provide the public goods that enable its citizenry to flourish. But many governments, even those that engender domestic peace and prosperity, are still not doing enough for the populace. By serving special interests, by over regulating the economy, by stomping on civil liberties and rights, by inhibiting scientific and technological progress, government can be oppressive. It can then become a source of economic and political decline.

Because so many governments engage in venality and corruption or actually harm the personal and professional lives of citizens, there are good reasons to distrust government. Such distrust is in fact a healthy reaction when it produces legal frameworks, checks and balances, and vigilant citizens. Indeed, distrust often generates institutional change and creation (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005): “Good defenses make good neighbors” (Levi 2000). Essential are assurances that officials will do their duty and be caught and punished if they do not.

Increasing resources and capabilities are needed to build infrastructure and provide public goods, but the process by which allocation decisions are made and how they are perceived also matter. Seldom, especially in the modern and democratic world, is confidence in a government officialdom based solely on the extent to which it secures property rights and refrains from predation. Confidence—and legitimation—also depend on the extent to which each citizen is assured that all others are being held to the same legal obligations; and the extent to which citizens generally believe they are getting something in return for their compliance. People are more likely to comply with government requirements when they have confidence that there is something approaching a quid pro quo. Their confidence increases when they believe that

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1 This sections draws from Levi (2006).
officials are honest, that what is collected in revenues will actually find its way to the public till, that all eligible young men face the same probability of being drafted, etc. Confidence further increases with the actual production and distribution of valued public goods (Levi 1988, 1997). Especially in divided societies where past allocation was often based on ethnic or religious group attachments, citizens need to come to feel that these criteria are no longer dominant in governmental decisions.

Underlying confidence in government and the willingness to comply are assessments of the fairness in the implementation of law and the distribution of public goods. What constitutes fairness and what are deemed desired public goods vary across societies and time. Any government that does not meet widely-held expectations on these matters is likely to suffer resistance and dissent, passive and active (Tyler 1990; Levi 1997; Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005).

New or restored institutions will be effective to the degree that they meet the tough challenges of resource allocation, coordination and communication, the institutionalization of reciprocity among groups, and legitimacy. To achieve these goals, institutions need to be viewed as fair, efficient and inclusive—no small test in any society—and especially daunting in one coming out of conflict. It is also critical to recognize that maximization of one of these criteria, such as fairness, can be at odds with another, such as efficiency (Shively, 2006) so that achieving an optimal outcome requires balancing and subjective assessment. In post-conflict societies while up-front inclusive gestures can offer reassurance to skeptical groups, it is plausible to hypothesize that the effects of these gestures only endure when there is significant capability to allocate services and material resources and integrate previously excluded groups.

While these challenges can seem are particularly difficult, success does not necessarily require that they all be accomplished fully or immediately. Rather, we need to see success and failure on a continuum. Criteria of success can be minimal or maximal ranging from simply the degree to which there is no return to violence to the extent to which citizens believe that their lives are better than they were prior to, and during, the period of violence, and to citizen satisfaction with governmental institutions and services. Partial success may be “good enough” (Ross 2000) to promote the conditions for continued improvement and the understanding that peacebuilding in an on-going, not a one-shot, process as Doyle and Sambanis (2000: 779) suggest.

Not all public goods are equally important politically or equally hard to provide. Some such as clean water, improved sanitation services, child immunization programs, and roads are relatively inexpensive while others such as an expanded and accessible educational system, economic and opportunities, and quality health care require a great deal of infrastructure that may require decades to construct. What is probably especially significant early in any transition is that people develop a sense the responsiveness of a new regime to their daily needs and projects that are visible and have a widespread impact are likely to be especially effective in their symbolic impact on citizen perceptions.

Distribution of public goods can be problematic when they are seen in group-based terms. In societies such as South Africa that had previously experienced significant variation in the provision of public goods by race or ethnicity, new patterns of distributions aimed at increasing equality can increase the resentment of formerly privileged groups while only partially meeting the needs and demands of those who had been most deprived in the past. Where opposing groups are distributed unevenly across regions, decisions such as those to build roads, construct schools, or provide health services are readily viewed through a distrustful eye and easily engender the belief that other groups are getting more benefits than one’s own. A challenge therefore is how to best promote the belief that the provision of public goods is mutually beneficial not a particularistic payoff. Equally challenging is importance of balancing expectations and available resources in societies where needs are pent up over time and previously deprived groups often
have a strong sense of entitlement.

(3) Establishing good governance requires creative contextually relevant institutions and practices that increase a government’s legitimacy and ability to provide goods and services. In divided societies majoritarian political rules are generally insufficient for minorities who fear this offers them little more than permanent minority status. This problem is particularly acute when electoral competition produces strong ethnic or regional parties since as Horowitz (1985) points out, elections become akin to census taking. Both formal and informal constitutional arrangements for power sharing are often needed to reassure minorities and these can take a number of forms (Horowitz 1991; Sisk 2003).

In Northern Ireland, for example, selection of the First and Deputy First Ministers as well as the passage of significant legislation requires significant support from both the Protestant and Catholic members of the Assembly. Other arrangements that have been used include election procedures that require candidates to get a minimum percentage of votes in a certain number of regions to win an election; requirements that high offices be divided among different groups, e.g. if the President comes from one community, the Prime Minister must come from another, and the head of the Legislature from a third (Lijphart 1977; 1985; McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Nordlinger 1972; O’Leary 2001); and arrangements that leave control over domains such as family law, including marriage and divorce, to each cultural or religious community and not a state function.

Constitutional and informal arrangements that guarantee minority participation and rights must ultimately be tested through practice. In Northern Ireland, for example, the institutions established in the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement have been suspended more time than they have been in force as the two communities have failed to agree on the First Minister and Deputy First Minister for long periods. In other societies, despite constitutional guarantees to protect religious, linguistic or other cultural rights, one or more groups sometimes comes to feel that this is not happening. For example, in the mid 1990’s ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia felt at risk from the government’s militant nationalist policies that threatened to control history teaching, street signs and other cultural expressions in regions with large numbers of Hungarians.

Establishing—or reestablishing—order in a society that has experienced severe disruption is an essential part of the consolidation of peace. Civil order is more than just providing security however; it is also the restoration and/or development of direct or indirect government services such as education, health care, transportation, and markets that can provide tangible benefits to people and these successes become evidence to citizens of a new regime’s efficiency and legitimacy. Of course in societies where groups have been fighting, the distribution of these services is easily politicized and conflict around group differences in judgments about the fairness, equity, and efficiency of resource allocation can arise quickly given a history of mutual suspiciousness and concerns with group-based political favoritism.

(4) The linkages between peacebuilding and democratic development are complex and not necessarily well understood. Democratization and the consolidation of peace may work at cross purposes in ethnically and religiously divided societies unless certain key conditions are met. Although this paper is explicitly focused on the challenges of peacebuilding and mitigating conflict in the direct aftermath of a peace settlement, it is important to recognize that international efforts to promote democratic development are generally viewed as central to the peacebuilding enterprise (Chesterman, 2004; Dobbins, 2003; Hampson and Mendeloff, 2007; Paris, 2004). In recent years, the United States along with many members of the international community, including the United Nations, have explicitly promoted democratization as the best long-term cure for the ills of “failed states.” In many cases—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq—although the initial intervention was prompted by a combination of
humanitarian and/or national security considerations, subsequent efforts to restore political order were—and continue to be—intrinsically related to laying the foundations for democratic political processes through the promotion of elections and the development of legal institutions. The widespread belief in the “democratic peace” (Russett, 1993) thesis—that democracies are less conflict prone than other political regimes and much less likely to wage wars against one another—has given key impetus to the democratic, state-building imperative, especially with the collapse of communist regimes in East Europe and the former Soviet Union, which marked the end of the Cold War.

A key aspect of peacebuilding and civil order following conflict concerns who can participate in political life. One contentious issue here is the competing pressures that on the one hand seek to exclude those who endorsed or perpetrated violence in the past from holding public office and engaging in politics, while on the other hand the recognition that excluding these same people is unacceptable and counterproductive to achieving long run consolidation. Evidence from recent decades suggests that exclusion is rarely effective and a stable agreement requires broad inclusion in the post-conflict political process as in cases such as South Africa, Mozambique, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, and even Israel-Palestine, where former enemies in varying degrees have found ways to enlarge civic space and develop more inclusive, and mutually acceptable, political institutions and practices (Gibson 2004).

Good governance is generally associated with some meaningful form of representation and voice which is often associated with democratization and entails a wide range of processes including citizen participation, the minimization of corruption, the existence of a strong and independent judiciary, and governmental responsiveness. While each of these can be measured independently and consist of both objective and subjective dimensions, the evidence suggests that they tend to be highly intercorrelated.

In settings in which violence has hardened the bases for distrust, individuals may turn to the families, networks, and groups they know, increasing the obstacles to trade and cooperation with those outside the familiar (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005). There are a range of hypotheses that political scientists have developed concerning the paths for developing effective institutions. Yet differences remain about sequencing and the timing of elections, creating of new institutions, and the development of a shared, perhaps new, national identity. Some research have argued that imposing political institutional arrangements, such as power sharing or federalism in deeply divided societies in the absence of a common national identity have almost always failed (Roder and Rothchild, 2005; Bermeo, 2002). Post-war electoral processes can also introduce uncertainties that reinforce rather than attenuate social cleavages and provoke a relapse into civil conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Snyder, 2000), Lyons (2005), however, expressed a different view arguing that elections, if properly carried out, can help “demilitarize” the political environment by putting a country back on the road to peace, and others argue that elections, in spite of their many problems, are critical to validating peace settlements and providing political legitimacy to governing authorities in the postwar environment (Reilly, 2003).

Confronted with these challenges, many scholars argue that a much more measured and discriminatory approach has to be taken in exporting democracy to those cultures and societies where there is no previous tradition of liberal democracy (Carothers and Ottaway, 2005). Democratization is a process of cultural, social, and political development that does not simply revolve around the exercise of the franchise and the holding of free elections. It also involves the establishment of a civic culture where citizens learn to become active and intelligent participants in the society and political life of their country. Most critically, democracy can only develop in a society with a strong, well-functioning administrative state apparatus that is responsive to the needs and welfare of the general public (Fukuyama, 2004 and 2005).
The provision of essential services and “public goods” is thus a critical element of good governance, as is a proper understanding of the requirements for governance at both the national and local levels. As Diamond asserts, “a country must first have a state before it can become a democracy” (Diamond, 2004). Mansfield and Snyder offer a similar assessment: “Without a coherent state grounded in a consensus on which citizens will exercise self-determination, unfettered electoral politics often gives rise to nationalism and violence at home and abroad. Absent these preconditions, democracy is deformed, and transitions towards democracy revert to autocracy or generate chaos” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005 and 2005-06). As a result, some contend that a higher priority needs to be placed on the development of social and economic institutions that rapidly provide needed goods and services to people and that the development of democratic political institutions is most effective later in the sequence.

DISPUTANTS’ GOALS

There is not just one model of a successful post-conflict society, and not all post-conflict societies have the same goals. Following extended conflict and violence, there is often widespread support for change in social and political institutions and practices. At the same time, not all groups or societies coming out of conflict necessarily share the same goals and a serious challenge to peacebuilding efforts is to bridge both within and between group differences over goals. As Gurr points out, minorities differ in their self-understanding and aims. National peoples include ethnonationalists with a history of political autonomy pursue separatist objectives, while indigenous peoples, typically located in peripheral regions, often emphasize cultural rights and autonomy. In addition, minority peoples that he divides into ethnoclasses, militant sects and communal contenders pursue distinctly different political goals and strategies generally seeking more integration into society, rather than separation, and a larger share of resources (Gurr 1993).

Most generally, we can identify broadly different structural goals in long-term conflicts while recognizing that in many specific situations there is some combination of two or even all three that come into play: (1) Integration of previously divided groups within the contexts of a unitary political system; (2) establishment or maintenance of pluralistic institutions within the context of a single state characterized by both shared public institutions and separate civil societies; and (3) separation either in the form of creating two or more states out of what was formerly a single unit or the creation of strong regional autonomy within the context of a relatively weak central state. Well known cases that fit each of these three models relatively well are: post-apartheid South Africa, a state seeking intergroup integration; Northern Ireland a case of pluralism; and Israel-Palestine a case moving fitfully towards separation.

Within the context of these three broad goals, there are additional choices to be negotiated and different ways they can be combined. Integration into a unitary system still leaves a great deal of room for regional arrangements concerning administration, civil society and the expression of religious and other forms of diversity. Pluralism is at best a general goal as well and specific decisions must be made about which institutions formerly opposing groups will share and which will remain in the province of distinct communities. Will there be, for example, a shared school system that children from all communities attend or will each community maintain its own schools? How about language? Will there be a single official language or will the society recognize multiple languages as Spain and India have done? An emphasis on separation either in the form of creation of separate states or strong autonomous regions still leaves many questions unanswered about the relationship between the new states or the regions and the center. Will there be a single currency? What about movement of peoples and goods across borders? In the case of a single state with strong regional autonomy, what are the taxation powers of the regions and what are their responsibilities in areas such as education policy and policing?

ROLE OF OUTSIDE PARTIES
Outsiders can offer crucial assistance to transitional societies especially in building local capacities. Hampson (1996), Walter (2002), and Page Fortna (2004) show that peace agreements are more likely to be successful when third parties take an active role in their implementation. While there are exceptions such as the case of South Africa where outsiders were relatively unimportant during the transition period (1990-94), the general consensus is that outside facilitation in reaching and implementing agreements is often crucial. (It is perhaps worth noting that in South Africa, civil society served as an effective third party at some key points in the negotiations and worked hard to create the conditions under which the final constitutional arrangements were negotiated (Gastrow 1995).

Third parties such as international organizations like the UN or its regional agencies, local and international NGO’s, and third party states can play a variety of roles in peace processes (Darby and MacGinty 2003). Early on, some serve as mediators or facilitators in negotiations; others provide skills and resources for the implementation of agreements; some outsiders encourage desired behavior simply through their active involvement (Hampson, 1996; Crocker, Hampson, Aall, 2004). During peacebuilding, outside parties can provide a wide range of assistance including personnel and materials needed for security, expertise and personnel for institution building, and material resources and skilled individuals to improve and increase the delivery of public goods. The level of resources afforded such operations is also critical to their success. Poorly funded or under-staffed operations run a much higher risk of failure than those that receive the requisite resources commensurate to the challenge at hand (Stedman, Rothchild, Cousens, 2002).

Three caveats are appropriate here. One is that, as Anderson (1999) argues, outside actors be the governments or NGO’s become, whether they want to or not, political actors as a function of their resources and in some cases manage to do more harm than good when they become destabilizing forces in local politics. Second, is that as highly skilled actors, effective outsiders can unintentionally disempower local groups and individuals and fail to leave behind the skills and institutions needed locally when their missions are completed. Finally, evidence strongly suggests that ultimately, effective peacebuilding and conflict mitigation cannot be externally imposed except under conditions of ethnic homogeneity and some history of democracy (Bermeo, 2002) and require the active engagement of local parties who own the processes and are committed to implement agreements (Stedman, Rothchild, Cousens, 2002; Crocker, Hampson, Aall, 2004).

CONFLICT WITHOUT VIOLENCE

Normal politics needs to become a chief method for settling conflicts. A key feature of political stability and peacebuilding includes the ability of groups in society to engage in conflict without violence. Democratization is certainly part of this and in conceptualizing what it entails, it is important to include far more than competitive election. As noted above, there are certainly a good number of cases where early elections polarize opposing groups and reinforce previous lines of cleavage. However, even when elections do not do this, democratization is much broader than voting. There is also the need to develop institutions and practices of non-violent conflict management, support for a free press and political dissent, and the establishment of an independent police and judiciary. For societies coming out of conflict, however, there are a series of pressing challenges each of which is crucial to long term success: the complex questions of prisoner releases and amnesty, demilitarization of the society, and police and court reforms.

Prisoner releases and amnesty
In many long-term conflicts and especially in domestic ones, a central issue for the opposing groups is obtaining the release of its partisans held prisoner and seeing that they are granted amnesty. In practice, this is quite complicated politically since it is often one of the strongest demands of rebel groups and one that they want implemented early in the peace process but one of the last things that opponents including governments wants to grant. This is simple because the people one side views as freedom fighters provoke the anger of those on the other side who continue to view them as treacherous criminals who killed friends and members of their families. In Northern Ireland, South Africa, Spain (the Basque conflict), and Israel-Palestine the prisoner issue and demands for amnesty were/are especially difficult matters for each of their peace processes precisely because each side had such different understandings of the kinds of people the prisoners were and the meaning of their actions. Yet in the end, the cases of successful peace processes show that the release of large numbers of former prisoners most of whom were involved in violence and their reintegretion into civil society is necessary (Darby and MacGinty 2003).

Demilitarization issues

Societies that have suffered prolonged periods of conflict and violence must confront the question of how to treat soldiers, militia members, and others who had previously engaged in violence. Demilitarization involves a number of related issues including the large number of people under arms in both rebel militias and the army, the long period of time this activity was the main source of identity for many, and often the absence of economic and social opportunities in the civilian sector. Sometimes former rebel groups demand to be integrated into a newly created national army that includes opposing combatants from all sides. At other times there are targeted job programs and support for other opportunities for social participation intended to integrate former fighters into civilian life. In societies where they has been long-term fighting, there are many who work providing private security as well, many of whom lose their jobs as a consequence of a stable peace so there is a need to retrain/reintegrate them as well. As a result, sometimes former combatants continue a life of violence forming gangs that engage in criminal activities that present new challenges to post-conflict stability.

Societies that have experienced severe violence are typically heavily armed and the disposal of weapons in the hands of former paramilitary fighters is a severe challenge to the post-settlement regime especially in situations where the government is relatively weak and lacks the power to disarm militias as is the case in Lebanon. Sometimes international organizations including UN or regional peacekeeping forces can assist here but their record of success is mixed (see Hurrell and Fawcett, 1996; Peck, 1998 Lekha Sriram and Nielson, 2004 on the role and effectiveness of regional organizations). International organizations have sometimes instituted weapons buy-back programs in countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone which particularly focus on child soldiers although it is not clear that these programs are very effective given the relatively easy access to arms in the world. In Northern Ireland, a three member international commission was changed with monitoring the decommissioning of weapons that both Catholic and Protestant paramilitary groups possessed and yet it took more than seven years for the IRA to finally announce that it was prepared to place its weapons beyond use. The slowness of the process then produced widespread skepticism among Protestants and a very bumpy transition to self-rule that was finally solidified in 2007—nine years after the original peace agreement.

Many societies that experienced long-term violence face issues of disposal of land mines, an especially difficult task since good documentation of where they were placed rarely exists. In these cases, international assistance through IGO’s and NGO’s or third party states is needed to help remove these hidden devices and to allow people to restore agricultural fields, forests and roads for civilian purposes (Hampson, 2002; Cameron, Tomlin, Lawson, 1998).

Police and the courts
The aftermath of violence

The justice system—the police (and sometimes the army) and courts present another set of challenges since in high violence societies they are typically seen as partisan because they were frequently controlled by one party in the conflict. Yet, because the police are the front line in the maintenance of order their actions are highly scrutinized and frequently controversial. Good policing is central to effectively implementing agreements and increasing the base of support for a regime but a problem often develops when police reform increases the perceived vulnerability of the formerly dominant group while not fully meeting the demands of minorities who were discriminated against in the past. While citizens do not encounter the judicial system and courts as often as the police, court decisions can readily evoke support or anger in fragile post-conflict contexts and feed protests and mobilization (Popkin, 2000; Levinson, 2000; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003).

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: TRIALS, TRUTH COMMISSIONS, AMNESTY, AND REPARATIONS

Various forms of transitional justice are now part of most peace processes although the evidence for its success is far from clear. Following violent conflict, there are the tough issues of how to treat the perpetrators of violence and who will be charged with this responsibility. Minow (1998; also see Horne and Levi 2004) analyzes three responses: (1) trials, including those for war crimes, that the Allies used following World War II and those that the UN initiated through the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague against Milosevic and others involved after the war in Bosnia, and in Arusha in Tanzania to prosecute those responsible for atrocities committed in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide; (2) Truth and Reconciliation Commissions such as those held in South Africa, Chile and more than 30 other countries to investigate gross violations of human rights and political oppression; and (3) reparations intended to compensate victims of large-scale violence both materially and symbolically for their losses and suffering.

Each of these instruments involves trade-offs between truth and justice and relies on different mechanisms to move societies beyond violence (Rotberg and Thompson, 2004). Military interventions by great powers or the United Nations also pose their own distinctive challenges for promoting the rule of law in conflict ridden societies (Stromseth, Wippman, Brooks, 2006). Trials meet a basic desire for vengeance on the part victims and others and are used to assess the culpability of top leaders. TRC processes, based on a therapeutic model, address the need of victims to know what happened to their family members and friends and to document a previous regime’s gross violations of human rights. They have also been used where trials and punishment of large numbers of office holders or soldiers in a previous regime is potentially highly destabilizing (Crocker, 2000; Carothers, 2006; Kritz, 1995). In the vast majority of TRC processes there is not an implicit or explicit trade-off between truth-telling aimed at entering past abuses part of the public record and granting amnesty to perpetrators who come forward to testify. The only case where this was done was the South African TRC. As Hayner (2002) notes, the vast majority of TRCs do not involve any clear quid pro quo.

Reparations to victims are also often demanded, but only sometimes paid and even in cases where they are paid, there is often disputation over the amount that victims receive. Nonetheless many see them as a measure of sincerity on the part of perpetrators or those who offer reparations to the victims and for that reason they can be more meaningful than a simple verbal apology. However, compensation or reparations is a potentially explosive issue in many peacebuilding contexts. On the one hand, payments to individuals or groups are easily viewed as a verdict or admissions of guilt and on the other frequently those receiving such payments view them as too small and trivializing the loss and suffering they experienced. One dramatic example of this is South Africa where individuals who had testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission strongly protested the compensation they were awarded saying it was far too small.
While post-war societies may struggle to balance truth and justice, the relative importance of truth and justice mechanisms in consolidating peace in the aftermath of violent conflict -- be it a war crimes tribunal, a truth commission, amnesty, lustration or reparations -- remains empirically ambiguous (Mendeloff 2004).

**RECONCILIATION**

Reconciliation demands are prominent in post-conflict societies, and there is modest evidence that it is associated with lower future violence following civil wars. Reconciliation was not a concept of particular interest to political scientists until a generation ago but today it is widely viewed as important to conflict mitigation (Abu-Nimer 2001; Bar-Siman-Tov 2004; Ross 2004). Perhaps this is due to an emphasis on human rights and transitional justice issues in recent years as well as the influence of the highly publicized South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Gibson 2004; Krog 1999). Whatever the reason, however, demands for apology and reparations as well as requests for forgiveness are now a common feature of contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding although there are only a few systematic assessments of what the impact of these gestures are or the mechanisms underlying them in large-group conflicts.

Long and Brecke (2003) examined the impact of reconciliation on the durability of conflict settlements and found that civil conflicts were significantly less likely to recur when reconciliation between the parties takes place that includes acknowledgment, new identity construction, abandonment of retribution, and a public reconciliation event involving physical contact, a ceremony and ritual behavior ending the conflict. They suggest that reconciliation matters because forgiveness involves the transformation of emotions making a settlement more viable in the eyes of the parties. Interestingly, their data also show that following international wars, effective signaling is far more important than reconciliation in lessening threat perception and the likelihood of returning to overt hostilities.

Yet, reconciliation is neither straightforward nor simple. Not many perpetrators of violence are willing or able to apologize for their past actions—sometimes because they view them as justifiable in defense of their group and at other times because to do so would be political suicide. In addition, reparations are often used to signal the sincerity of those apologizing for their past actions, but as noted above, there is often a large gap between those granting and those receiving compensation about what constitutes an adequate level of payment. Finally, reconciliation can be problematic in that it is a concept much more familiar in some cultures than others so that in cross-cultural situations what one side intends in as an expression of reconciliation might not be understood as an appropriate or needed gesture by another side. For example, following the fall of the Nazi regime, West Germany began paying, and Israel accepted reparations. However, what many Germans saw as compensation and a reconciliation gesture was viewed by Ben-Gurion and many Israelis only as money that was crucial for the new state’s survival not as a statement of reconciliation where it was widely understood that no one alive could accept an apology for the Holocaust.

Nonetheless, there are examples of dramatic gestures of apology that illustrate its emotional relevance in conflict mitigation although we lack data on their impact. What is needed is a better sense of when these acts reflect or reinforce existing worldviews and when these dramatic actions actually change them. In July 1962 French President Charles De Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer celebrated a mass in Reims to mark Franco-German reconciliation. In 1970, Willy Brandt, German Prime Minister and an opponent of the Nazi regime himself who had spent the war in exile, spontaneously fell to his knees as he lay a wreath at the memorial for the Jews murdered in 1943 by SS units in the Warsaw Ghetto. In 1997 Jordan’s King Hussein got on his knees in the homes of Israeli families to apologize for a
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A deranged soldier who had killed seven school girls on a school trip. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act that provided redress for Japanese-Americans. Each living survivor was paid $20,000 for the forced incarceration and the following year, President Bush issued a formal apology for the US government’s actions.

In many cases where there is a call for reconciliation one or both of the parties involved in the actions for which an apology is offered is no longer in power or alive. Pope John Paul II apologized to the Orthodox Church for the Crusade sacking of Constantinople in 1204; Tony Blair apologize for the English inaction to distribute food that would have prevented much of the starvation and death in Ireland during the potato famine in the 1840’s; and some white Americans have apologized to African Americans for slavery and its aftermath. The contemporary political relevance of each of these powerful symbolic and ritual gestures is that they evoke strong emotions that shape political relationships on the part of both the group making the gesture and those responding to it by providing emotional closure associated with present grief and loss (Volkan 1997). In the end, it is often the perceived sincerity of the gestures, not their explicit content, which determines their political impact (Ross 2004). At the same time, we need to recognize and better understand the diversity of responses to reconciliation gestures within large groups as Gibson (2004) finds in his South African study and not assume group homogeneity in responses.

REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Displaced populations are not simply a humanitarian problem but are also a problem for international peace and security. In most long-term violent conflicts there is a significant displacement of civilian populations that consolidation of peace has to address through the return or resettlement of people displaced during the conflict. Sometimes it is possible to “return home,” while at other times there are formal or informal decisions to settle displaced people in new areas. In either case, they need material and emotional assistance in building new lives. Some of this work is best done by third party NGO’s and international organizations and it is important to recognize that these agencies often have some conflict with the government over issues of resources and control over their allocation (Anderson 1999).

As displaced populations move into areas inhabited by other groups, even within the borders of the same state, social and political tensions are likely to rise with the increasing risk of violent conflict. Refugees and displaced populations pose not simply a humanitarian problem but also problems for international peace and security—problems that international organizations and nongovernmental organizations are ill-equipped to deal with in the absence of comprehensive, refugee/IDP policy framework (Loescher, 1996; Helton, 2002). There is increasing evidence that refugee camps themselves are sources of violence and conflict although the causal connections between the appalling living conditions that most refugees experience and the outbreak of violence are only just being understood. Lischer (2005) argues that three factors are critical in explaining the propensity towards violence: the level of the refugees’ political cohesion before exile, the ability and willingness of the host state to prevent military activity, and the contribution, by aid agencies and outside parties, of resources that exacerbate conflict. As Lischer further argues, depending on the situation at hand it may be necessary to use private security forces in refugee camps to thwart the outbreak of violence or, in extreme cases, to close camps in order to prevent a further outbreak of conflict.

SYMBOLIC AND RITUAL DIMENSIONS

In many contemporary conflicts, especially those defined in terms of ethnicity or religion, identity issues are prominent and contribute to the conflict’s duration and intransigence. Clashes in which identity plays a central role revolve around the presence or absence of mutual recognition among competing groups as well as the group’s relative position in a society (Ross
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2001). When a conflict is rooted in mutual denial of an opponent’s legitimacy and even fears that acknowledging an opponent’s right to exist is a denial of one’s own, peacebuilding is especially challenging (Kelman 1987). In these conflicts, not only do the substantive constitutional and material issues that divide the parties require attention, but in addition symbolic and ritual expressions surrounding identity also are can play a crucial role in bridging former opponents who remain wary of each other.

Cultural expressions and enactments can promote peacebuilding through the development of shared, inclusive narratives (Ross 2007). For example, expressions communicating changes in the public symbolic landscape such as ceremonials, museum presentations, memorials, language use, flags, music, or shared sites of past conflict can communicate mutual recognition and a basic redefinition of the relationship among previously mutually exclusive identities. Changes in the symbolic landscape that express a more inclusive relationship acknowledge past mutual suffering and losses while expressing a vision of a shared future by offering new images and metaphors that bridge older differences (Coombes 2003; Ross 2007). At the same time, broadening narratives about the past and identity redefinition does not require abandonment of one identity as much as it is the layering of multiple identities so that people can hold a national, state, and regional identity at the same time as people living in Brittany, Wales or Catalonia.

EVALUATION, FEEDBACK AND CHANGE

Systematic evaluation is required to choose among strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding to decide what works and what does not—yet this is done far too infrequently. Evidence from a diversity of post-conflict settings points to the inescapable conclusion that the success of policies to consolidate peace and mitigate conflict following violence are often contingent upon local contexts. Few strategies of peacemaking and peacebuilding are effective across all political and cultural settings. As a result it is crucial that whatever actions governments, NGOs, IGOs, and third party states take be evaluated to see if they have the impact that is intended. Anderson points out that interveners in post-conflict societies often arrive with significant resources and need to be aware of, and evaluate, the impact that their actions have on reinforcing or inhibiting past patterns of violence (Anderson 1999). Policies are, as Campbell (1970) noted a long time ago, hypotheses and implementers always need to consider what works and what does not and not assume that good intentions are the equivalent of good results (Ross and Rothman 1999). Interventions need to be evaluated in terms of goals that a public and standards of evaluation need to be articulated that are sophisticated, multiple, and operational.

Implicit throughout this discussion are a series of hypotheses to be examined about consolidating peace and mitigating conflict with an eye towards the need for security, good governance, and the provision of public goods. To examine the specifics of each of these we then turned to questions concerning goals, the role of external parties, the effect of constitutions, institutions and civil society, conflict without violence, transitional justice, reconciliation, refugees and internally displaced persons, the extent to which reconciliation lessens the likelihood of a return to violence, and the contribution of symbolic and ritual expressions. Still not clearly answered is specification of when and how does each of these issues matter and how do they interact in the aftermath of violence?

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