

ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF ACADEMIC
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

Final Report
of the
American Political Science Association
Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities

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AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities

Marver H. Bernstein, *Chairman*
Stephen K. Bailey
Samuel H. Beer
William D. Carey
Manning J. Dauer
David Fellman

Jack W. Peltason
Douglas W. Rae
Randall B. Ripley
Wallace S. Sayre
Vernon Van Dyke
Aaron B. Wildavsky

*Harold D. Lasswell was unable to serve because of other commitments

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INTRODUCTION

On April 20, 1967, the Executive Committee of the American Political Science Association announced the appointment of a Committee of Professional Standards and Responsibilities to consider and report on the "problems of professional standards, responsibilities, and conduct." The establishment of the Committee reflected the growing concern of members of the Association with questions pertaining to ethical and other professional standards of political scientists.

This concern had manifested itself earlier. Following discussions at several annual meetings of the Council of the Association, the Council, in September 1966, unanimously adopted a motion that the Association's President appoint an *ad hoc* committee on criteria to be applied to the professional activities of political scientists. On February 22, 1967, President Dahl appointed an *ad hoc* committee to inquire into two matters: first, the alleged involvement with the CIA of the Executive Director and Treasurer through their relationship with another organization, and, second, "the broader and extremely complex problem of standards of behavior for all political scientists in their relationship with government agencies." The report of that committee to the President of APSA on March 30, 1967, related only to the first¹, and it was unable in the time available to it to pursue the second and more general matter. It concluded that "before any constructive consensus can be achieved a great deal of work by a specially constituted committee will be essential." Shortly thereafter the present Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities was appointed consisting of ten academic political scientists. On recommendation of this Committee the President of APSA appointed an additional non-academic member to the Committee in June 1967, and two additional younger academic members in January, 1968.

Two political scientists provided valuable staff assistance to the Committee during 1968. James D. Carroll, then a postdoctoral fellow of The American Society of Public Administration, explored the interests of various professional groups in the area of ethical behavior and prepared materials relating to the terms and conditions of governmental support of research. R. Roger Majak, a doctoral candidate at Ohio State University and a Congressional Fellow of the American Political Science Association in 1967-1968, explored the attitudes of graduate students and younger faculty members of political science departments toward problems of ethical conduct.

The full committee met several times from June 1967 to June 1968 for discussion and to review draft statements prepared by members and staff.

Scope of the Committee's Work

In its letter of April 20 to the Committee, the Executive Committee of APSA indicated several illustrative questions for Committee consideration relating to the relationship between political scientists and government agencies, formulation and adoption of a code of professional ethics, alternatives to a code of ethics for the maintenance of high professional standards, disclosure of sources of financial support for research, and ways of making the profession more alert and sensitive to problems of ethical behavior. In addition, the Committee was instructed that it "is free to inquire into any other

¹ After receiving the report of the *ad hoc* Committee, President Dahl and the Executive Committee mailed a statement on the matter to all members of the Association (Printed in the *APSR* Vol. 81, June 1967, pp. 565-568). The statement of the Executive Committee concluded that "upon full inquiry and reflection" the Executive Committee "accepts and confirms the findings of the *ad hoc* Committee" that the Executive Director and Treasurer had "violated no policy of the Association," and were "involved in no conflict with their responsibilities to the APSA." The statement then expressed the "highest confidence in the conduct and motives" of the two officers. The members of the *ad hoc* Committee were: Gabriel A. Almond, R. Taylor Cole, David B. Truman, and C. Herman Pritchett, Chairman. The members of the Executive Committee were: President Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, Harry Eckstein, Heinz Eulau, Austin Ranney, and Clinton Rossiter.

questions it believes are relevant to the problems of maintaining a high sense of professional standards and responsibilities.”

The Committee has also been guided by the following statement of the Executive Committee in its letter of April 20:

“Because of the complexity and novelty of these questions, and the diversity of views among our members, we believe it would be a mistake to impose too brief a life or too short a deadline on the work of the Committee. If the Committee concludes that more time is necessary, it is free to continue its work beyond the next Annual Meeting in September (1967). Nonetheless it is our hope that the Committee will be able to report some of its recommendations to us in time for action next September by the Council and by the Members at the business meeting of the Association.”

In its Interim Report of September 1, 1967, the Committee described the setting of ethical problems of political scientists today, illustrated the complexities of selected aspects of ethical behavior, and proposed some general steps and specific rules of conduct. The Interim Report stressed the exploratory and preliminary nature of the Committee's deliberations to date and solicited the views, reactions, and proposals of members of the Association on these different issues.

Among the nearly 12,000 individual members of The American Political Science Association, four categories of members can be identified:

- faculty members
- graduate students
- researchers in public and private organizations not affiliated with universities
- government officials and employees

The ethical problems confronting each of these groups of political scientists tend to be different in kind or in degree. It is necessary, therefore, to differentiate the ethical problems of faculty members and other researchers from those of government employees. Exceedingly little is known about political scientists serving as government employees. Thus, the Committee has not been able to include government employees who are members of the Association in its inquiry. Instead this Report focuses on the ethical problems of academic political scientists. First, it reviews the setting and complexity of these problems, and then discusses them under four headings and recommends adoption of twenty-one rules of conduct. It concludes by presenting three administrative proposals, including one for a standing committee on professional ethics.

The Setting of Ethical Problems of Political Scientists

In recent years events such as the Camelot episode and disclosures of the existence and activities of C.I.A. conduit foundations, have sharpened the concern of political scientists about ethical issues. At the same time it is important to place these events in proper perspective and to give them due but not exaggerated weight in thinking about the issues and dilemmas of ethical conduct today. There are varying opinions on the matter but no conclusive evidence showing that ethical standards have been declining or that political scientists have demonstrated a weakness in maintaining high standards of behavior.

In only two areas of conduct have political scientists indicated any significant concern about standards of ethical behavior in the profession. These are first, restraints on the freedom of researchers imposed by government in financing overseas research, and second, political activity by academic political scientists. Very few Association members have responded to the Committee's requests for comments and proposals on the issues confronting the Committee.

On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that the social setting of ethical problems of the profession of political science has become exceedingly complex. Consequently ethical dilemmas and paradoxes have developed for which clear guides or standards may be lacking. It is especially important that political scientists consider ethical problems not in defensive reaction to recent events, but rather as an affirmative effort to understand the complex conditions and factors that produce problems and issues of ethical behavior.

Among the factors influencing the behavior of individual political scientists, the following must be noted because of their primary significance for ethical conduct:

- (a) Financial support for research has increased, particularly in the form of government grants, and the financing agency's concern with the impact of publications based on such research has likewise increased.
- (b) The availability of research funds to finance particular lines of research tends to have some influence on the research plans of individual scholars and university and other research institutions.
- (c) The costs of research have increased markedly for a variety of reasons, including the development of more sophisticated tools of research and analysis, increases in salaries of researchers, and the development of more rigorous standards of scientific method and intellectual sophistication.
- (d) Institutional arrangements for financing research have become increasingly complex, with a major emphasis on the use of contracts, both governmental and non-governmental, as a way of getting research done.
- (e) Professors increasingly have become men of property. Both faculty members and government officials enjoy better salaries today than ever before. In addition, professors and researchers often have multiple sources of income and find themselves on several payrolls at the same time. Potential conflicts of interest have multiplied.
- (f) As standards of research have become more rigorous, political scientists are becoming more sensitive to ethical issues. Similarly, the research possibilities opened up by surveillance technology, survey research, and techniques for accumulating, processing, and analyzing data have created difficult ethical problems. One of these is the balance between privacy and the interests of scholarship.
- (g) The great increase in the demand for political scientists, especially in colleges and universities, has created a fast moving market that tends to increase mobility, institutional competition for qualified staff, and complex institutional arrangements designed to improve the capacity of a university to recruit and hold staff.
- (h) It is becoming harder to distinguish between what is public and what is private, between what is governmental and non-governmental.
- (i) University teachers are being drawn into public life to an extent unmatched in previous periods. There is an urgent demand both for specialized expertise at all levels of government, and the intellectual—including the political scientist as intellectual—has won a more secure place in politics.

The Clarification of Ethical Problems

The Committee has explored the feasibility and desirability of a code of ethics and alternatives to codes, and it has concluded that the primary need at this time in this area of the profession of political science is for clearer guidance and clarification of significant ethical dilemmas and problems. The Committee believes that the Association should undertake in a variety of ways to alert the profession to these ethical problems, to make it more sensitive to actual and potential problems that challenge the integrity of individual political scientists and the profession as a whole. The *Interim Report* attempted some first steps in this direction.²

The Committee has found that issues of ethical conduct of political scientists are tangled, with no short cuts to making simple provisions of codes of ethics operational. To illustrate, one need only consider complexities surrounding the problem of maintaining privacy and individual integrity in the conduct of research. Concerning considerations of privacy in interviewing individuals, it might appear to be that interviewing avoids ethical difficulties because of the impossibility of interviewing a person without his consent and willing cooperation. As Professor Shils has indicated, the ethi-

² In September 1967, the Association adopted the following two proposals set forth in the *Interim Report*:

4. For the education of the profession, the Committee recommends that the Executive Director be asked by the Executive Committee to formulate and set in motion a program to encourage more sensitive awareness by members of the Association of ethical problems. Consideration should be given to various devices, such as the organization of special panels on professional ethics at national and regional meetings of political scientists; the encouragement of the publication of articles on ethical and other professional problems of the profession, as described in the *Interim Report*, in the *Review* and in other political science journals, the discussion of such problems in an Association newsletter, and the preparation of case studies involving ethical questions, published and distributed in a manner to be determined later.
5. The Executive Director of the Association should continue his special efforts to establish and maintain close, fruitful liaison with other professional associations active in the field of professional standards and ethical conduct and to seek to coordinate the efforts of the Association with the activities of other groups by giving timely notice of developments to the Association's members through various forms of publication and in other appropriate ways.

cal problems may be very substantial. Has the interviewer given the prospective interviewee a satisfactory explanation of the intent and nature of the inquiry? Is it merely a perfunctory explanation sufficient to get the interviewer's foot in the door?

"Is a general explanation which truthfully covers the early part of the interview sufficient, if the latter part of the interview, once good rapport has been established, moves far beyond the original assertion of aims? Can explanation be omitted as long as assent is obtained on other grounds?

Moreover, as Shils points out,

". . . the mere existence of consent does not exempt the social scientist from the moral obligations of respect for another's privacy."³

As Ruebhausen and Brim have noted,

"Any application of the concept of consent as a privacy-protecting test for scientific research is further complicated by the difficult factual problem of assessing, in each particular case, what constitutes consent. When is it informed; when is it freely given; who is entitled to give it?"⁴

Shils also notes that the ethical quality of the relationship of the investigator to the person he interviews derives from the social scientist's relations, as a person and as a citizen, with his society and fellow man. The use of new techniques that destroy privacy—concealed cameras, microphones, and chemical manipulations, etc.—will become dangerous, according to Shils, "only as the more general ethic of the social scientist is hostile toward society and diabolical in its curiosity."

Another problem that illustrates the complexity of problems of ethical conduct is that of special access to and the confidentiality of sources. A political scientist is sometimes a participant in a political or governmental process. In this role, he has access to information and sources not generally available to his peers and colleagues on the outside. He may have been cleared for reading confidential and secret documents. In some cases, even though not a direct participant, a scholar may be given privileged access to materials not generally available to the scholarly community (e.g., biographical material, private letters, personal files, or other ephemeral documents made available for his eyes only). If he uses such a privilege as a basis for scholarly writing, what obligations for advance clearance or even prior censorship are ethically defensible or necessary? And how can less privileged peers check upon the validity of either his source or his judgments? If he scrupulously refrains from taking advantage of special access to privileged information, is not the profession denied a possibly rich insight into reality?

PART I. PROPOSED RULES OF CONDUCT

A. *Teacher-Student Relations*

Few, if any, academic political scientists would disagree with general statements of proper ethics for scholars. For example, the teacher should not neglect his teaching duties, plagiarize, deliberately withhold evidence, alter findings for reasons of personal advantage, financial or otherwise, or report his conclusions and data in such a manner as to deceive the reader. What is portrayed as a product of scholarship should meet the standards of scholarship and not those of special pleading.

The Committee sees little need to dwell on the responsibility of political scientists to follow the recognized canons of scholarship: objectively gathering and reporting data, awareness of one's own biases, recognition of the impact of selective perception, honesty of statement and so on. Nor do we see any need to dwell on the normal professional and civic obligations of the academic political scientist to his students and to his department and university, including his willingness to devote a reasonable amount of time to service on committees and participation in studies and in appropriate meetings

³ Shils, Edward A., "Social Inquiry and the Autonomy of the Individual," in Lerner, Daniel, ed., *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 114-57.

⁴ Ruebhausen, Oscar M. and Brim, Jr., Orville G., "Privacy and Behavioral Research," *Columbia Law Review*, November 1965, pp. 1184-1211.

and discussions. We doubt that many political scientists deliberately violate these canons.

However, the Committee proposes rules of conduct governing two potentially troublesome aspects of the teacher-student relationship.

Rule 1. A faculty member must not expropriate the academic work of his students. As a dissertation adviser, he is not entitled to claim joint authorship with a student of a thesis or dissertation. The teacher cannot represent himself as the author of independent student research; and research assistance, paid or unpaid, requires full acknowledgement.

Rule 2. The academic political scientist must be very careful not to impose his partisan views—conventional or otherwise—upon his students or colleagues.

B. Conduct of Officers and Employees of the Association

Officers and employees of the Association have special obligations to avoid confusion between their position as political scientists and their formal responsibilities within the Association. They should not engage in activities that are inconsistent with their duties to the Association, and they should not be permitted to engage in any activity involving a conflict of interest.

The following rules are proposed governing the conduct of officers and employees of the Association. The first of these rules also covers members of the Association.

Rule 3. When an officer, member, or employee of the Association speaks out on an issue of public policy, endorses a political candidate, or otherwise participates in political affairs, he should make it as clear as possible that he is not speaking on behalf of the Association unless he is so authorized by the Association, and he should not encourage any inference that he acts for the Association unless he is so authorized by the Association.

Rule 4. Officers and employees of the Association are free to engage in activities outside their obligations to the Association provided that such activities are consistent with their duties and responsibilities to the Association. When doubts arise about the activities of subordinate staff members, they should be resolved by the Executive Director in consultation with Executive Committee of the Association. Similarly when doubts arise about the activities of the Executive Director, they should be resolved by the Executive Committee.

Rule 5. An officer or employee of the Association should not knowingly participate in a transaction involving the Association in the consequences of which he has a substantial economic interest. In such event he should disqualify himself from participating in a transaction involving the Association when a violation of this rule would result. Procedures for such disqualification shall be established by the Executive Committee.

C. Political Activity of Academic Political Scientists

A major concern within the profession currently is the political activity of academic political scientists, such as signing statements for newspaper publication, making speeches open to the public, holding office in a party, taking part in political campaigns, and running for elective office. Difficult questions arise when political scientists who take public positions on political issues give the impression that their views are supported by the research findings of political science.

All professionally trained people, and indeed intellectuals in general, have special responsibilities correlative to their training, capacities, and functions. The professor is put under exceptional obligations by his special commitment and capacity to discover new knowledge and to communicate it to others. This commitment and capacity are a principal basis for his claim to academic freedom, a privilege which exempts him from certain controls by his employer, especially over opinion and speech, to which employees in other lines of work might legitimately be subject. Moreover, his discoveries are not his private possessions, but must be made publicly available. In the research that led to these discoveries, he may have been moved entirely by curiosity and without regard for social consequences. Still, we would agree that he has an obligation to make his knowledge available.

When, however, we ask how far he may or ought to go in trying to influence or persuade the public or to champion causes and men, controversy arises. As a recent statement of an AAUP Committee on professors and political activity notes, some colleges and universities severely restrict the political activities of their faculties. The AAUP Committee recommends the following governing standard: "The college or university faculty member is a citizen and, like other citizens, should be free to engage in political activities so far as he is able to do so consistently with his obligations as a teacher and scholar." This means, for example, that those restrictions are not legitimate which are based on such considerations as the fact that the institution is publicly supported, that the political views of its professors may conflict with those of donors or trustees, etc. It leaves open, however, the possibility of restriction—whether enforced by individual conscience or institutional regulation is not now the question—based upon the professor's obligations as teacher and scholar. A few of our colleagues may well believe that these restrictions begin when the professor goes much beyond talk in the classroom or publication in the scholarly journal and certainly to bar him from any significant political activity.

The case for abstention from political activity is said to follow from the needs of scholarship, but the reply of the political scientist may rest on the same grounds. He can argue that his own understanding of political behavior will be enhanced by participation and even that such participation is necessary if he is fully to appreciate the meaning attached to this behavior by the subjects of his study. Participation may enable him to get to the center of decision-making where the mere observer would never be permitted. But observation is not the essential point, which is that he will never be able to interpret the inner life of politics—its passions, commitments, and beliefs—unless he has himself in some degree and at some time experienced such an inner life.

Where the democratic ethos is strong and the professor is taken seriously—i.e., as a man with useful truth and not merely a kind of Ichabod Crane—the impulse for some professors to get into politics will be irresistible. Certainly, in the U.S. since the rise of the research university, the professor has been closely associated with government service, whether in LaFollette's "university in the service of the people" or Roosevelt's "brain trust."

It is no solution to the problem to say that the professor in general, and the political scientist in particular, has all the rights and duties of the ordinary citizen in a democracy. One must at least have the realism to recognize, as the AAUP statement does, that special conditions are created by his "obligations as a teacher and scholar." These obligations not only involve the needs of scholarship but also the professor's relationship with the democratic public. In that relationship he is not just an ordinary citizen; on the contrary, he has special capacities and functions and these impose special responsibilities upon him. When, for instance, a political scientist signs a statement on foreign or domestic affairs for publication in the *New York Times*, and adds his university and disciplinary affiliation, does the little note at the bottom "for identification only" mean that the affiliation is mentioned only to avoid confusing him with other "ordinary citizens" who may have the same name? Obviously, it is there to show that he is a person with special abilities whose opinion should be given special weight. Presumably the public thinks that a professor is a man who is particularly skillful and particularly scrupulous in assessing the merits of a question and who, moreover, depending on the issue, may have some special knowledge of the subject being agitated.

If this is what the public thinks, it would seem that the professor-signer is under the obligation to make such a skillful and scrupulous assessment. How far then must he have direct, professional knowledge of the question at issue? How far, on the other hand, may he give his assent simply because a colleague whose expertise he trusts, has assured him of the merits?

The example of signing a political advertisement raises considerations which apply along the whole spectrum of political activities, from occasional polemical interventions to sustained activity on behalf of a party or candidate. On the one hand, it may be argued in the democratic vein that the professor has not only the right, but in some degree a duty to bring to the democratic process his special capacities. These may be a field of special knowledge relevant to public policy or they may be simply his presumably superior ability for rational inquiry and communication.

At the same time, restraints are put on his activity by the need to foster the professional development and use of these capacities. The professor may well feel some obligation to contribute directly to the public good through political participation. Yet in most cases surely the main contribution he can make is through his professional activity as scholar and teacher. He must take care, therefore, not to let political participation undermine his ability to make such a professional contribution. Moreover, the fact that he presumably has such special capacities and functions will arouse certain expectations among members of the public and these expectations themselves will impose special conditions on his conduct. No one suggests that the rules of a political campaign are the same as those of a seminar. Yet even when he is openly in the political arena the professor may not entirely forget his professional standards of skillful and scrupulous inquiry and rational utterance.

The following recommendations are made respecting the political activity of academic political scientists.

Rule 6. The college or university teacher is a citizen, and like other citizens, he should be free to engage in political activities insofar as he can do so consistently with his obligations as a teacher and scholar. Effective service as a faculty member is often compatible with certain types of political activity, for example, holding a part-time office in a political party or serving as a citizen of a governmental advisory board. Where a professor engages in full-time political activity, such as service in a state legislature, he should, as a rule, seek a leave of absence from his institution. Since political activity by academic political scientists is both legitimate and socially important, universities and colleges should have institutional arrangements to permit such activity, including reduction in the faculty member's work-load or a leave of absence, subject to equitable adjustment of compensation when necessary.

Rule 7. A faculty member who seeks a leave to engage in political activity should recognize that he has a primary obligation to his institution and to his growth as a teacher and scholar. He should consider the problems which a leave of absence may create for his administration, colleagues and students, and he should not abuse the privilege by asking for leaves too frequently, or too late, or for too extended a period of time. A leave of absence incident to political activity should not affect unfavorably the tenure status of the faculty member.

Rule 8. Special problems arise if departments or schools endorse or sponsor political activities or public policies in the name of the entire faculty of the department or school. One of the purposes of tenure—to shelter unpopular or unorthodox teaching—is in some degree vitiated if the majority of a departmental faculty endorses or sponsors a particular political position in the name of the faculty of the department. The simple way out of this dilemma is to adhere strictly to the rule that those faculty members who wish to endorse or sponsor a political position or activity do so in their own names without trying to bind their colleagues holding differing views. Departments as such should not endorse political positions.

D. Freedom and Integrity of Research

The Paramount Concern

In administering research funds the paramount concern of a university and its faculty and research staff should be to maintain an environment in which the freedom and integrity of research can flourish. The purpose of research is to advance knowledge. The ability of scholars to advance knowledge will depend in no small measure on two factors: first, on their freedom to seek and use all relevant evidence and to draw conclusions from it by the rigorous application of the methods of science and the disciplines of humane learning; secondly, on the integrity of their personal commitment to the spirit of free inquiry. To the extent to which the range of evidence open to them is narrowed or their ability to draw unbiased conclusions from it is impaired either by external pressures or by the infirmity of their scholarly purpose, to that extent their research will be deficient in qualities which are essential for the advancement of knowledge.⁵

⁵ Some of the material in this section has been adapted from a report on "Freedom and Integrity of Overseas Research," adopted by the Faculty of Princeton University in May 1968.

In administering research funds entrusted directly to its care, a university, together with its faculty, should do its best to ensure that no restrictions are placed on the availability of evidence to scholars or on their freedom to draw their own conclusions from the evidence and to share their findings with others. Having fulfilled its responsibility to recruit good scholars to its faculty and research staff and to foster honest and rigorous inquiry in its graduate students and undergraduates, a university should be scrupulous in assuring their right to engage in the pursuit of knowledge according to the dictates of their individual consciences. They, in turn, are personally accountable for the conditions of research which they accept and for the integrity with which they examine and use evidence. It is, of course, assumed that they will conduct their research with due consideration for the rights of those whom it affects.

The financing of research by public and private sponsors highlights some of the most important issues of ethical conduct confronting political scientists. The external sponsorship of intellectual endeavor is fraught with risks to the integrity of the scholar. Problems arise not so much because a scholar is told by his sponsors what to write but rather because a scholar may, wittingly or unwittingly, condition his manuscript to the assumed or divined values of his financial sponsors.

This issue is further complicated by the fact that whether or not the scholar has been true to himself, the acceptance of research funds from certain kinds of donors raises in the minds of peers and of the public the question of the *possibility* of scholarly objectivity. This is notably true in the United States in the case of money contributed by government intelligence agencies a part of whose functions are covert, and in the case of private firms and associations with an obvious political or economic axe to grind. A study of "The Administration of Farm Policy" conducted by a scholar with funds provided by the American Farm Bureau Federation, or a study of "Chinese Ambitions in Southeast Asia" conducted in the field with funds provided by C.I.A., may represent unfettered scholarly research. The very nature of the sponsorship in each case would, however, cast doubt upon the aims, methods, and objectivity of the investigation. If such sponsors remain anonymous, the ethical questions for the individual scholar, and for the profession he represents, are even more serious. For if the scholar purports to be free, the very assignment of anonymity to his sponsor may be interpreted as an act of subservience. If the anonymity is subsequently blown, the scholar may be faced with the charge of prostituting both himself and his profession—drying further access for himself and for other scholars in his particular professional field.

And yet totally disinterested sponsors of social science research are relatively scarce. The least corrupting research money is probably that which has been homogenized and purified in the investment portfolios of colleges and universities. Next is money from large and secure private foundations issued directly, or through peer panels (e.g., Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, Social Science Research Council). Third are funds from government agencies and sub-divisions specifically charged with the subvention of general and basic research (e.g., N.S.F., N.I.H., the Bureau of Research in the U. S. Office of Education). Many other public agencies at all levels provide research funds, and have a vested interest in the impartiality and objectivity of sponsored scholarship; but the more specific the mission of the sponsoring agency, especially if it is politically insecure or deals with politically sensitive issues, the more danger there is that its research money will be, or will appear to be, wrapped in strings and bound by conditions of preview and censorship.

In the past twenty years the scholarly community in the United States has been engaged in an effort of unprecedented scope with the aim of understanding the forces at work in the modern world—an effort directed toward problems that concern the fate of mankind itself. The very size and vigor of the American academic activities lie at the heart of many of the problems that have been encountered in the foreign aspects of this research. Within the United States, the problems created by programmed and individual research on a large scale are difficult enough to plan, administer, and finance within the existing institutional system. When this research effort is extended to other countries, it raises issues that have not yet been fully understood or adequately handled.

Special Problems of Research Overseas

The very magnitude of this American effort, motivated though it is by the desire to extend the frontiers of knowledge in the interest of human welfare, tends to arouse apprehensions on the part of officials and scholars abroad. The number of American scholars abroad is large and growing. In some countries it is larger than that of the native scholars concerned with the study of their own society, culture, and resources. Local sensitivities on this score are often aggravated by differences in cultural heritage and political outlook. In some countries the fear has been expressed that if American research plays too large a role in the study of their problems, it will favor solutions alien to their way of life. Most countries welcome American scholarly assistance in the study of problems affecting them, but they wish this assistance to be in a reasonable proportion to their own research capacities.

A special dilemma surrounds research conducted in foreign countries. Regardless of sponsorship, a political scientist conducting research in alien cultures may be faced with the excruciating dilemma of retaining academic integrity at the price of the national interest or of denying to himself and his professional peers a continuing access to documents and interviews. The scholar must report the truth as he perceives it, but truth has consequences. A fearless exposition of corruption in the administrative procedures of a friendly, under-developed nation, might have local as well as international consequences of the most serious nature. If the research were conducted with U. S. Government funds, the dimensions of the exposition might be increased exponentially. Even within our own nation, the content and timing of the publication of political science research may have serious repercussions for individuals, agencies, and programs.

The United States government plays an important, legitimate, and valued role in the sponsorship of research abroad; and the research that it sponsors, whether it is administered directly, by universities, or by other institutions, normally conforms to the highest standards of freedom and integrity. There may be exceptional and regrettable cases, however, when agencies of the United States government concerned primarily with foreign policy and national security covertly support research abroad. On occasion, these agencies might also supplement the support received by scholars from a university, and without the knowledge of the latter. We are opposed to such arrangements. It is difficult for officials and scholars abroad to make clear distinctions between the policies of the United States government in the political, economic, and military spheres, and the objectives of the research sponsored by it. When it becomes known or suspected that such research is covertly sponsored, the freedom and integrity of all research abroad by Americans tends to be affected.

A scholar cannot divorce himself from these kinds of considerations; and yet he has to remain faithful to his basic commitment to search for the truth and to report reality as he sees it. To state that this is one of the dilemmas of all social science research may help to sensitize political scientists to the nature of ethical paradox.

Disclosure of Financial Support for Research

Perhaps the issue that has aroused the most concern among political scientists has to do with disclosure of financial support for research. There appears to be general agreement that a scholar should be what he says he is and make known the sources of his support, and any fact or circumstance that might be thought to limit his freedom to pursue the truth.

But should we as an Association make it a rule of professional ethics that one must always disclose the sources of financial support? Should we make it a matter of ethical obligation to disclose any financial interest that might have an impact, or which some might think might have an impact, for example, stock ownership in a publisher whose book is favorably mentioned, or stock ownership in a company under study?

Furthermore, unless it is assumed that financial interests are the only or the primary factor that might bias one's research, how should such potential "biasing factors" as political affiliation, race, religion, or national origins be treated? Personal wealth, political affiliation, or even the network of friendships, and a host of other factors may be more relevant in attempting to assess biasing factors than financial sponsorship. Should we require the political scientist to disclose *any* factor that the reader should know

about that might bias the outcome of the research? In any case the primary protection against unethical, non-professional, or incompetent performance remains the evaluation of the merits of a publication, judged independently of who writes it or who paid for it.

Even if the disclosure of financial support is placed in proper perspective, the application of a simple rule of disclosure may be confronted by difficulties. The following questions may be suggestive:

- a. Is disclosure enough? Are some sources of support so tainted—or at least so suspect—that support from them must simply be rejected? The answer is easy when the sponsor fixes conditions that restrict the freedom of the scholar to pursue the truth, but it is not easy when and if he gives the necessary assurances on this point. The question is how credible the assurances are, and to whom. Suppose that, with full publicity and with all necessary assurances given, a professor of political science is offered a grant or contract for research by a governmental or private agency. Suppose, further, that the individual professor is satisfied that the assurances of freedom of inquiry are reliable. Does this make an acceptable basis for proceeding? Is it important for him to ask whether others will find it credible that he has been given adequate assurances? Who are the others whose attitudes are relevant? If the professor believes that the significant others within this country would approve his acceptance of the invitation, should he be deterred (e.g., in case of research for the C.I.A.) by the possibility that others abroad would take a different view? Suppose that the suspect agency is willing to channel its funds through an intermediary. What kind of intermediary, if any, might provide the necessary assurance that freedom is being accorded? Under what conditions, if any, is a university sufficiently reassuring as an intermediary?
- b. Is disclosure mandatory even when a sponsor wants to remain anonymous for quite innocent reasons? For example, suppose that, though he is willing to support one project, he wants to avoid publicity that might lead to requests that he support others. Might the use of an intermediary (e.g., a university) solve this kind of problem acceptably? Would it be sufficient, in these circumstances, to disclose the character, but not the identity, of the sponsorship?
- c. Is disclosure mandatory against the call of moral or patriotic duty? Suppose, for example, that a political scientist on a university faculty believes it to be his duty to serve the C.I.A. in some way, and suppose that disclosures would impair his effectiveness in one or another of his two roles. Does the nature of the covert activity affect the answer? One can imagine numerous possibilities: e.g., that the scholar pursues his scholarly work abroad in genuine fashion for his own purposes, but then on his return to the United States reports privately to the C.I.A. on a matter thought to be of interest to it; that the scholar uses his status as a cover in connection with the publication of material that the C.I.A. wants to appear for purposes of its own. Does the political scientist respond to the problem in one way in his capacity as a political scientist, and in another way in his capacity as a citizen?
- d. What must be disclosed? Simply the fact of sponsorship? The precise nature of the work undertaken? The outcome, or the results achieved? If a political party wishes to retain a political science professor to make studies that are not to be published but are for its internal use only, is this acceptable? If so, is it also acceptable for a political science professor to make studies for the Department of Defense or the C.I.A. on the understanding that the results are to be classified? Is it acceptable to make studies for a sponsor who retains control over the results, and who may publish on a selective basis—releasing such studies (or parts thereof?) as serve its purposes and withholding the rest?

Instruments of Financial Sponsorship

Research financing may take any of several forms, including a research contract, a grant, appointment as a consultant, and part-time or temporary employment. Private sponsors normally use the device of the grant; government agencies make extensive use of all of the instruments noted, although some agencies emphasize research contracts while others make grants.

In recent years considerable controversy has developed over the definition and use of contracts and grants by government agencies. Loosely speaking, a contract for research calls for specific performance under terms set by the contractor. A grant is often—but not always—regarded as a gift given in trust to an individual in support of some general activity that the granting agency believes to be desirable.

A critical aspect of these loose formulations relates to the responsibility of the recipient. Under a contract, the government agency carries a heavy responsibility for insuring proper and prudent expenditure of government funds. Under a grant, some tend

to argue, the responsibility for lawful and effective expenditure of government funds rests more heavily, if not exclusively, with the recipient. It is not surprising that Congressional committees generally regard these distinctions as invalid and assert that a government agency "is equally responsible for the proper, efficient, and economical use of public funds irrespective of the final instrument employed."⁶

The Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, in its report of 1965,⁷ deplored the trend toward more detailed reporting and accounting by grantees of the use of grants and advised grant-aided researchers to recognize that grants are trusts and not to spend grant money for purposes unrelated to the grant. In this context of continuing controversy, more support has developed for the view that the supervisory role of the grantee institution be strengthened. This in turn has highlighted serious administrative weaknesses in universities and other grantee institutions, a condition that leads some in Congress and elsewhere to demand that government agencies exercise more control over the universities. The response to these demands generally has been the effort by universities to overcome their administrative weaknesses and to strengthen their supervisory effectiveness.

The distinction between contracts and grants has been blurred also by government agency practice. Grants may sometimes be made for purposes similar to or as specific as those set forth in research contracts. Some research contracts may be as general in setting forth the purposes and product of the contract as grants are normally expected to be. An agency may prefer to avoid the administrative and legal complexities of the contractual instrument and utilize the device of the consultant appointment or temporary employment to achieve the same substantive result. The researcher, in any case, has the obligation to utilize research funds, from whatever source derived, for the purposes set forth in the instrument.

Because of persisting ambiguities in the distinction between contracts and grants, the Committee has not proposed rules of professional conduct keyed in detail to the distinctions between these two types of instruments. Rather it proposes guidelines generally applicable to the financial sponsorship of research, public and private, supplemented by more specific rules for government contract research.

Guidelines to Maintain Integrity of Scholarship

The academic political scientist may be confronted by dangers to his scholarly integrity, whether his research is carried out in the United States or overseas, and whether it is financed by external sponsors—public or private—or by his university or his own personal resources. In recent years the more conspicuous dangers have tended to arise from federal funding.

The management of federal research funds by individual researchers and universities has received considerable attention in the past decade by Congress and agencies of the federal executive branch.⁸ As federal academic research enterprise has expanded, some government agencies have tended to impose substantial controls on researchers and research administrators in the universities in consequence of perceived weaknesses in supervision within the universities. Political scientists must exercise honesty and prudence in their relations with federal funding agencies. They must not engage in practices that provide additional and justifiable grounds for the sharp criticism of fed-

⁶ U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *Administration of Grants by the National Institutes of Health*, Report of the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 2d Session, 1962, p. 15.

⁷ National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Science and Public Policy, *Federal Support of Basic Research in Institutions of Higher Learning*, 1965.

⁸ (See, e.g., U. S. Congress, House, House Committee on Government Operations, *Health Research and Training: The Administration of Grants and Awards by the National Institutes of Health*, Report of the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961; *The Administration of Grants by the National Institutes of Health*, Hearings before the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962; *The Administration of Research Grants in the Public Health Service*, Report of the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967; National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Science and Public Policy, *Federal Support of Basic Research in Institutions of Higher Learning*, 1965; *Biomedical Science and Its Administration*, Report to the President by the Office of Science and Technology, 1965; U. S. Bureau of the Budget, *The Administration of Government Supported Research at Universities*, 1966.)

eral support of political science research that has been expressed by members of appropriations subcommittees of Congress.⁹

While it is highly appropriate for the Association to stress the professional obligations of its members in a relationship with research sponsors, the relationship is many-sided. Funding agencies and universities administering external research funds also have major obligations to act in ways that protect and advance the freedom and integrity of scholarship. Accordingly the following sections set forth proposed principles and rules for the guidance of public and private funding agencies, universities, and political science researchers.

Principles for Funding Agencies. The Committee urges the Association to undertake vigorous efforts in cooperation with other interested academic and professional groups to seek the adoption of these principles by public and private financial sponsors of research in the United States and overseas.

Rule 9. Financial sponsors of research have the responsibility for avoiding actions that would call into question the integrity of American academic institutions as centers of independent teaching and research.¹⁰ They should not sponsor research as a cover for intelligence activities.

Rule 10. Openness concerning material support of research is a basic principle of scholarship. In making grants for research, government and non-government sponsors should openly acknowledge research support and require that the grantee indicate in any published research financed by their grants the relevant sources of financial support. Where anonymity is requested by a non-government grantor and does not endanger the integrity of research, the character of the sponsorship rather than the identity of the grantor should be noted.

Rule 11. Political science research supported by government grants should be unclassified.

Rule 12. After a research grant has been made, the grantor shall not impose any restriction on or require any clearance of research methods, procedures, or content.

Rule 13. The grantor assumes no responsibility for the findings and conclusions of the researcher and imposes no restrictions on and carries no responsibility for publication.

Principles for Universities. The Committee urges academic members of the Association to work within their Universities for the adoption of the following principles:

Rule 14. A university or college should not administer research funds derived from contracts or grants whose purpose and the character of whose sponsorship cannot be publicly disclosed.

Rule 15. A university or college that administers research funds provided through contracts and grants from public and/or private sources must act to assure that research funds are used prudently and honorably.

Rule 16. In administering research funds entrusted directly to its care, a university or college should do its best to ensure that no restrictions are placed on the availability of evidence to scholars or on their freedom to draw their own conclusions from the evidence and to share their findings with others.

Principles for Individual Researchers. The following rules are proposed for the guidance of academic political scientists in their relations with any governmental or private sponsor of research.

⁹ (See e.g., U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on Independent Offices Appropriations for 1967*, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966, pp. 144-45; D. S. Greenberg, "NSF: Senator Warns Against Budget Lobbying," *Science*, Vol. 169, No. 3827 (May 3, 1968), p. 518, which *inter alia* reports sharp criticism of NSF support of political science research projects by Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Senate Independent Offices Appropriations Subcommittee. See also James D. Carroll, "The Support of Political Science Research Projects by the Division of Social Sciences of the National Science Foundation," U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs*, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, Vol. IV (pp. 81-105).

¹⁰ This is identical with A1 of the Guidelines for Research Contract Relations between Government and University as printed below.

Rule 17. *In applying for research funds*, the individual researcher should:

- (a) clearly state the reasons he is applying for support and not resort to stratagems of ambiguity to make his research more acceptable to a funding agency;
- (b) indicate clearly the actual amount of time he personally plans to spend on the research;
- (c) indicate other sources of support of his research, if any; and
- (d) refuse to accept terms and conditions that he believes will undermine his freedom and integrity as a scholar.

Rule 18. *In conducting research so supported*, the individual

- (a) bears sole responsibility for the procedures, methods, and content of research;
- (b) must avoid any deception or misrepresentation concerning his personal involvement or the involvement of respondents or subjects, or use research as a cover for intelligence work;
- (c) refrain from using his professional status to obtain data and research materials for purposes other than scholarship; and
- (d) with respect to research abroad, should not concurrently accept any additional support from agencies of the government for purposes that cannot be disclosed.

Rule 19. *In managing research funds*, the individual researcher should:

- (a) carefully comply with the time, reporting, accounting, and other requirements set forth in the project instrument, and cooperate with university administrators in meeting these requirements; and
- (b) avoid commingling project funds with personal funds, or funds of one project with those of another.

Rule 20. With respect to *publication* of the results of his research, the individual researcher:

- (a) bears sole responsibility for publication;
- (b) should disclose relevant sources of financial support, but in cases where anonymity is justified and does not endanger the integrity of research, by noting the character of the sponsorship;
- (c) should indicate any material condition imposed by his financial sponsors or others on his research and publication;
- (d) should conscientiously acknowledge any assistance he receives in conducting research; and
- (e) should adhere strictly to the requirements, if any, of the funding agency.

Contract Research Funded by the Federal Government. Research by political scientists may be financed and sponsored by governmental agencies, private foundations, and other non-governmental units. While political scientists must be alert to dangers to maintaining the freedom and integrity of their research, whatever the source of those dangers may be, the dominant threat emerging in recent years lies in governmental influence over and control of research.

In the area of federal research contracts, the most constructive step to date has been taken by the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group, a voluntary interagency body of the Federal government. On December 5, 1967, the FAR Group adopted guidelines on government contracts with academic institutions for research in the behavioral and social sciences dealing with foreign areas and international relations. A primary objective of the guidelines is to end covert support of academic institutions for foreign area research and to recognize governmental responsibility for avoiding actions that call into question the integrity of academic institutions. The guidelines deal only with contracts with academic institutions and not with non-contractual research grants to an academic institution or an individual or consultant relations between an individual scholar and a government agency.

The Committee recommends that the American Political Science Association endorse and support these guidelines. They are reproduced below, together with an official introductory statement. Collectively they constitute proposed Rule 21.

Rule 21. Foreign Area Research Guidelines. The following guidelines have been adopted by the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (FAR) to provide general guidance to the FAR agencies. These agencies of the United States Government—twenty one in number—seek through their voluntary association in FAR “the systematic coordination of government-sponsored foreign area and cross-cultural research in the social sciences.”

These guidelines deal with two sets of problems: A) Those that arise when a government agency contracts with an academic institution for behavioral and social science research dealing with foreign areas and international relations, and B) Those that arise when such contracts call for the conduct by academic personnel of some or all of the research in foreign countries.

It should be recognized that these guidelines have been formulated and adopted by government departments and agencies that have a variety of missions and a great diversity of programs for supporting research. Thus not every guideline will have equal applicability to all research programs of every member agency. The guidelines are meant to deal with what, from the point of view of government-academic relations, are usually perceived to be the most troublesome cases of foreign area and foreign affairs research involving the social and behavioral sciences. Typically, those cases involve a contractual relationship between a policy or operating department or agency of government and an academic institution in which the latter undertakes to conduct research which the former has determined is pertinent to its policy or action responsibilities in the foreign affairs field. Though they may have some applicability, the guidelines were not designed to deal with consultant relations between an individual scholar and a government agency or with non-contractual research grants made by a foundation-like government agency to academic institutions or individuals.

In formulating the first set of guidelines (section A below), FAR members recognized the importance in an open society of strong, independent universities. FAR members worked from the premise that the government, in carrying out various foreign affairs missions on behalf of an open society, needs to seek contributions from all sectors of American society, including the resources of knowledge, analysis and insight available on university campuses. The problem—in which the government, the universities, and society at large all have a stake—is for government agencies to arrange to draw upon university resources for this purpose without diminishing either those resources or the status of the universities as centers of independent teaching and research. This problem takes on added dimensions when scholars associated with American universities go to foreign countries to carry out government--supported contract research. Thus the second set of guidelines (section B below) is designed to reflect the desire of government agencies to avoid adverse effects on foreign relations as well as concern with restrictions on the access of American scholars overseas and increased difficulties in carrying out many types of foreign area research.

Many of the factors behind these latter restrictions and difficulties are not amenable to government action, and certain of them should not be. Some stem from the cultural and political sensitivities of other nations, especially newly independent ones. Others derive from the relative scope, size, sophistication, and affluence of American social science research, which have resulted in high concentration in certain countries and in high visibility of research personnel. Still others result from the inadequate preparation of the researcher himself or from his personal characteristics. Insofar as these problems lend themselves to solution, responsibility must ordinarily lie with the academic profession itself. Thus the government looks to the academic community to formulate its own standards of conduct in performing research overseas and welcomes the initiatives which have already been taken in this regard. However, the government recognizes that its own research programs can sometimes affect not only official U.S. foreign relations but also the overseas relationships and access of private scholars. The role of the government is therefore significant and carries an obligation to ensure that government-supported foreign area research is conducted in ways that reflect favorably on the United States and on the integrity of American scholarship.

FAR members hope through the promulgation of these guidelines to alleviate some of the difficulties encountered in government-supported foreign area research and to participate with the academic community in constructive and clarifying interaction.

Through the FAR and similar mechanisms, government agencies concerned with foreign area research will try to strengthen their liaison with the scholarly community. While the guidelines will neither solve every problem of relations between government and the academic world nor be applicable to every situation, the process of application by individual agencies and discussion with the academic community should help to illuminate the interests and obligations of the parties concerned.

A. Guidelines for Research Contract Relations between Government and University

A1. *The Government has the responsibility for avoiding actions that would call into question the integrity of American academic institutions as centers of independent teaching and research.* A large portion of government-supported contract research carried out by American universities is long-range unclassified and of academic interest to the faculties concerned; it poses no more serious challenges to academic integrity than do public and private research grants. The issues of acknowledgment and classification may pose problems and are dealt with below in paragraphs A2 and A3. In addition, there are certain specialized research needs—sometimes involving foreign sensitivities—for which Government agencies should continue to use or develop their own capabilities or those of non-academic institutions in order, among other things, to avoid possible embarrassment to academic research personnel and institutions.

A2. *The fact of Government research support should always be acknowledged by sponsor, university, and researcher.* Covert support to institutions of higher education is contrary to national policy,¹¹ on the broad and vital principle that it runs contrary to the spirit of our institutions, and on the pragmatic basis that it may reduce the reliability and credibility of the research project's conclusions and eventually result in damage to the reputation of our scholarly community.

A3. *Government-supported contract research should in process and results ideally be unclassified, but the practical needs of the nation in the modern world may require that some portion be subject to classification; the balance between making work public or classified should incline whenever possible toward making it public.* The free flow of ideas is basic to our system of democracy and to academic freedom. There are other reasons why the government should make generally available the results of its contract research; to do so not only results in the advancement of learning and public enlightenment, but also subjects government-supported research to the closest possible professional scrutiny.

Nevertheless, other responsibilities of the government sometimes must prevail. Material which cannot be declassified must sometimes be used in research required for important purposes. There are other reasons why the use of confidential limitations is as legitimate a practice in the government as it is in the private sector, where the substance of information is sometimes withheld even when its existence is known. In exploring alternative courses of action, the government often needs research-based analysis and reflection which if made public, could produce serious misunderstandings and misapprehensions abroad about U.S. intentions. To abandon restrictions of these sorts altogether would impose serious limitations on the agencies' use of contract research.

However, to the maximum extent feasible, agencies should design projects in such ways that only those portions requiring restrictive treatment are so treated. If classification is necessary, the university is its own judge of whether or not it wishes to contract for research in this category. In any case, the researcher should always be notified in advance of entering into the contract if the project is to be classified or if the results will need to undergo final review for possible security classification or administrative control.

A4. *As a general rule, agencies should encourage open publication of contract research results.* Subject to the ordinary canons of confidentiality and good taste which pertain in responsible privately-supported academic research, and subject to paragraph 3 above, open publication of research results in government or private media serves the greatest general good, both at home and abroad. The best guarantee that government-

¹¹ As stated in the report of the committee chaired by Under Secretary of State Katzenbach which was accepted by the President on March 29, 1967. See *The Department of State Bulletin*, April 24, 1967, p. 665.

supported research will be of high quality is to have its results exposed to peer-group judgment; open publication is the most effective means for this purpose. To assure maximum feasible publication of research results and to minimize the risk that research publications will be misconstrued as statements or indicators of public policy, government agencies should give careful attention to the language and places in which their support is acknowledged and their responsibility for accuracy, findings, interpretations, and conclusions asserted or disclaimed. The researcher should be given a clear understanding of the agency's position on these matters before entering into the contract.

A5. *Government agencies that contract with university researchers should consider designing their projects so as to advance knowledge as well as to meet the immediate needs of policy or action.* Few agencies have as their central mission the advancement of knowledge for its own sake or for its general utility. Most agencies that contract for research look to research—and rightfully so—for assistance in carrying out specific missions or tasks in policy or action, in short, for applications of scholarly knowledge. It is therefore often assumed that these agencies consume a tailored product and do not contribute to the nation's intellectual capital. Consumers they certainly are; however scholars, as they work on applied problems, may also collect new data and again new insights into the theoretical and methodological strengths and weaknesses of their scholarly fields; thus they generate as well as apply scholarly knowledge. Agencies should entertain research proposals and encourage research designs which permit such contributions to basic knowledge to the maximum degree consistent with the project's sensitivity and mission-related purpose.

A6. *The government agency has the obligation of informing the potential researcher of the needs which the research should help meet, of any special conditions associated with the research contract, and generally of the agency's expectations concerning the research and the researcher.* The researcher has a right to prior knowledge of the use to which the agency expects to put his research even though, as in the case of privately-supported research, no assurances can be given that it will in fact be used or that other uses will not also be made of it, by either the supporting agency or others.

Nothing is more conducive to bad relations between researcher and government agency than failure to establish mutual understanding in advance concerning a research project. The best research designs are often those that emerge from extensive discussion between potential contractor and supporting agency; if elements of the design cannot or should not be completed until the project is under way, this prospect should be explicitly acknowledged and provided for.

A7. *The government should continue to seek research of the highest possible quality in its contract programs.* As scholars have much to contribute in assessing the quality of research designs and the capabilities of colleagues, their advance should be sought at key stages in the formulation of projects. Advice can be obtained through consultants, advisory panels, independent review, or utilization of staff scientists.

B. *Guidelines for the Conduct of Foreign Area Research Under Government Contract*

B1. *The government should take special steps to ensure that the parties with which it contracts have highest qualifications for carrying out research overseas.* Some of the points to be considered in assessing qualifications are professional competence, area experience, language competence, and personal alertness to problems of foreign sensitivity. Scholars in the same field or discipline are usually in the best position to judge the qualifications of a given researcher. Whenever feasible, consultation with academic experts should be a part of the process of contracting for foreign area research.

B2. *The government should work to avert or minimize adverse foreign reactions to its contract research programs conducted overseas.* All other things being equal, government-supported projects are more likely than private ones to be misinterpreted by both government and nongovernment institutions in foreign countries. Sponsoring agencies should keep in mind that ordinarily research supported by government will be held abroad to have a very practical purpose—often a purpose more immediate and direct than the agency intended, or even imagined. Thus, some combinations of topic, place, time, and agency support result in sensitivity so great as to make pursuit of some research projects actually harmful. While the existing procedures for review of

government-supported foreign area research projects in the social and behavioral sciences have clarified and alleviated many of the problems, the supporting agency should always be on the watch to ensure that its research projects do not adversely affect either U.S. foreign relations or the position of the private American scholar.

B3. *When a project involves research abroad it is particularly important that both the supporting agency and the researcher openly acknowledge the auspices and financing of research projects.* (See paragraph A2 above) One source of difficulty for the scholar overseas is the unfounded suspicion that all American researchers are covertly supported by the U.S. Government. A policy of full disclosure of support will help to eliminate the suspicion of *all* American research—whether private or government, classified or unclassified—and will allow that which is supported by the government to be judged on its own merits. If the research is of such a character, as in opinion sampling, that the objectivity of its research techniques is substantially destroyed when respondents know of the project's auspices, then it is doubly important that either the host government or collaborating local researchers, or both, be fully informed about the nature of the project.

B4. *The government should under certain circumstances ascertain that the research is acceptable to the host government.* In most cases the open acknowledgement of auspices and financing discussed in paragraph B3 is sufficient to satisfy the interest of the host government in the research. In some cases it is desirable to take specific steps to inform the host government. For example, when the U.S. Government supports a classified research project involving substantial field work abroad by scholars associated with American universities, sufficient information about the project should be communicated to the host government to convey a true picture of the character and purpose of the project. Similar steps may often be desirable for unclassified projects which either deal with very sensitive matters or easily lend themselves to misunderstanding and misrepresentation.

B5. *The government should encourage cooperation with foreign scholars in its contract research programs.* Cooperation with local scholars not only adds valuable viewpoints to a foreign area research project, but also goes far to remove antagonisms and suspicions. This cooperation must, in large part, be the responsibility of the American scholars who carry on the projects, but the government should, where legislation permits, look favorably upon research proposals that contain provisions for cooperative ventures and should otherwise seek to facilitate and encourage these ventures within the limits imposed by local resources and needs. The supporting agency should encourage and assist American researchers to distribute to those foreign colleagues who have cooperated in the research copies of open publications arising from the project. The supporting agency should also consider distribution of such publications to other interested persons and institutions in the host country, either directly through appropriate sections of the U.S. Embassy or by submitting copies to the FAR Secretariat for transmittal to the Embassy.

B6. *Government agencies should continue to coordinate their foreign area research programs to eliminate duplication and overloading of any one geographic area.* Agencies planning projects will continue to make use of the various FAR facilities for information exchange and consultation in order to ascertain whether similar projects have already been completed or are underway and in order to coordinate with other agency plans where feasible. Since the proliferation of American researchers overseas has been one source of irritation, government agencies should continue to ensure that their programs do not arouse foreign sensitivities by concentrating too many researchers and research projects in any one overseas area.

B7. *Government agencies should collaborate with academic associations on problems of foreign area research.* Professional scholarly associations, both American and international, and especially those related to specific areas, have much experience with the problems of research abroad, and they have an interest like that of the government in ensuring that research relationships across national boundaries flow smoothly. Government agencies, through such mechanisms as the FAR, should consult with these associations on the problems involved to arrive at mutually agreeable procedures and solutions.

PART II. ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSALS

1. *Proposal for a Standing Committee on Professional Ethics*

The Committee proposes the creation of a standing committee on professional ethics which would be authorized, as hereinafter provided, to consider questions of professional ethics involving members of the American Political Science Association. In the pattern of the common law courts of the Anglo-American world, this committee would identify and clarify specific rules of conduct in the context of actual situations as they may arise. Furthermore, the absence, at least to this date, of a formal written code of ethics for the political science profession does not mean that it does not already have a rather considerable unwritten code relating to questions of ethical behavior. The plain truth is that certain ethical principles, as noted on page 8, are very well understood and generally accepted in the political science profession.

No one in the profession will seriously challenge, for example, any of the following propositions: that it is unethical to falsify or misrepresent research data; that it is improper to plagiarize; that the exploitation of colleagues or graduate students is impermissible; that the confidentiality of sources and data should not be violated; that we cannot tolerate unconsented invasions of privacy; that it is wholly wrong to use human beings in research in such a manner as to do harm or expose them to harm; that it is improper for a political science professor to use his position to impose his own personal partisan or political views upon his students or colleagues; that it is wholly impermissible for a member of the profession to misrepresent his publications, status, rank, or degrees; that it is unethical to conceal the sources of research support; that secret research is ordinarily unacceptable; that research funds should not be used for unauthorized purposes; that a political scientist should not claim credit for work done by someone else; and that it is wrong for a professor to grade his students on the basis of the acceptability or nonacceptability to him of their political opinions.

Undoubtedly, this list of ethical principles as to which there already exists a very broad consensus in our profession can be extended by anyone who chooses to devote further thought to the subject. There is, of course, a grey area where general consensus is still to be achieved, but it is precisely in this area that a standing committee on professional ethics can help by defining issues and refining the principles needed for judgments.

The proposed standing committee would serve to protect the rights of individual political scientists. If, for example, a member of the Association is accused of some sort of unethical conduct, how can he secure a remedy? There is no remedy today, except in the courts, for some issues, perhaps by appealing to institutional administrative officers, or by going to the mass media. It is the position of the Committee that the political science profession, through the instrumentality of its national association, should undertake to provide an agency through which at least some of the charges of unprofessional conduct can be processed in a fair and judicious manner. Such an agency would have to enjoy the confidence of the profession, and indeed of the general public, and thus it must include men and women of good repute, and observe principles of fair dealing which are the essential requirements of justice. It is suggested that the committee should be a fairly large one, but that it should be authorized to function either *en banc*, or through panels, as it may choose.

The Committee is not prepared to recommend at this time, that the proposed committee on professional ethics should have the authority to receive specific complaints of unethical or unprofessional conduct, directed against specific individuals, to hold hearings thereon, and then pronounce judgment in some public fashion. There are very persuasive reasons which suggest that it would not be desirable to establish a judicial or quasi-judicial body to make decisions on charges brought by one member of the Association against another. The underlying law is not yet sufficiently well developed and is not yet formulated with adequate clarity. Since an Association hearing committee would lack some of the weapons which courts possess, such as the power of subpoena, it would be very difficult, in many instances impossible, for it to assemble and test the facts needed for a proper decision. There is also the danger that the committee would become an instrument for the airing of mere private grudges, for once such a committee is

created, we may be sure that attempts will be made to bring to it matters which would not otherwise be made known to our public. While the Committee concludes that it would be unwise—at least for the near future—to create a quasi-judicial committee which would be authorized to hold adversary hearings on complaints against individual parties, and render public judgment in terms of publicized conclusions and public censure, it is prepared to recommend that a standing committee on professional ethics can and should be entrusted with the performance of several significant functions, in certain well-defined and limited circumstances.

1. The Committee recommends that the proposed standing committee be given authority to give advisory opinions, on the request of any member of the Association, or upon the request of the administrative officers of any American college or university, or of any learned society. The committee should have the discretion to publish advisory opinions in some suitable form which will reach the members of the Association, and be released to the mass media, but without identifying those who make the requests or the names of the institutions which may be involved. The overriding purposes of the advisory opinion should be to encourage the exploration of specific ethical issues, arising in the context of real life situations, and to develop a body of recommendations and conclusions which will contribute to the growth of a general code of ethical principles for the profession. A request for an advisory opinion should in the first instance be directed to the Executive Director of the Association for initial screening, and he should be authorized to reject a request for an advisory opinion if he finds that the issue presented is trivial or unrelated to ethical considerations or is otherwise not suitable for consideration by the standing committee. He should from time to time consult with the standing committee as to the standards of judgment he will use in the exercise of his discretion in these matters. The Committee wishes to emphasize that the proposed committee on ethics should not permit the advisory opinion procedure to be used for the adjudication of specific cases.

2. The Committee recommends that a member of the Association who has been accused of unethical conduct may appeal to the standing committee for consideration of his case. Those who appeal to the standing committee must indicate in writing that they understand that the committee may ultimately arrive at an adverse judgment. The standing committee, in considering the charge or charges which the complaining party brings to its attention shall be careful to observe the essential elements of fair procedure. All who wish to be heard on the issues should be given a fair opportunity to state their views, and witnesses appearing before the standing committee should be subject to cross-examination by those whose interests would be served by cross-examination. A record should be kept, and findings of fact and ultimate conclusions should be based upon the record. The standing committee should publish its findings and conclusions in some appropriate form which will reach the members of the Association. In its final report, the standing committee may make judgments about the ethics involved in the making of false and irresponsible charges of unethical conduct against members of the Association.

Whenever a member of the Association appeals to the standing committee for an investigation into charges of unethical conduct made against him, he should be required to do so through the Executive Director, who should first make very serious effort to resolve the difficulty through mediation. He should always try to persuade the parties to resolve their dispute in some honorable way. One may hope that most disputes of this sort can be successfully resolved through the good offices of the Executive Director. In addition, the Executive Director should have the authority to reject a request for an investigation by the standing committee if he finds that the issue presented is trivial, or unrelated to ethical considerations, or is otherwise not suitable for consideration by the standing committee. Normally, his decision that a *prima facie* case for committee consideration has not been made ought to be final, though some sort of appeal from his decisions ought to lie to the President of the Association, or to its Executive Committee. In exercising his discretion, the Executive Director should be free to consult with leading members of the profession, and, from time to time, he should consult with the standing committee as to the standards of judgment he will use.

3. The standing committee should also have jurisdiction to deal with charges of unethical conduct brought against those officers of the Association who are listed in Ar-

ticle IV of its Constitution. The committee's jurisdiction should be limited strictly to the activities of the Association's officers as officers. Whatever hearing procedure the standing committee will devise for these complaints should observe the fundamental requirements of procedural fairness; all proceedings should be conducted *in camera*, and the committee shall have discretion in respect to the publication of findings and recommendations.

Finally, the Committee emphasizes that the jurisdiction of the proposed standing committee on professional ethics should be limited to matters involving members of the Association. The Association should not attempt to make judgements about the ethical quality of behavior on the part of the general public. Our concern is with our own membership.

Through the instrumentality of a standing committee on professional ethics, as described herein, the Association will serve further notice upon the profession that political scientists have responsibilities as well as rights, and that it stands ready to take some sort of action where serious breaches of ethical responsibility are alleged to have occurred. The Committee does not recommend a formal adversary hearing approach culminating in penalties. On the contrary, it recommends that at least for the near future, its efforts should be mainly educational, exploratory and hortatory. It is believed that through the device of the advisory opinion, the investigation of charges brought by those who are the victims of charges of unethical conduct, and the *in camera* inquiry into charges brought against officers of the Association, the standing committee may in time develop a substantial body of case law in this area. Perhaps at some later date, on the basis of a considerable body of experience, the Association may well decide to move into the area of formal adversary hearings and punitive sanctions, but the Committee suggests that the Association is not ready for such a procedure at the present time. Unlike members of the medical and legal professions, political scientists are not licensed to practice their profession, and for the most part do not have client relationships. Furthermore, in contrast with the medical and legal professions, our control over the members of our profession is altogether tenuous and standards for making judgments about unethical conduct are much less well developed. Our immediate task, the Committee suggests, is to explore specific ethical issues as they may arise in the future, and develop a greater interest and concern among the members of the profession with such issues. Once a comprehensive and well-defined code has been developed, it will be time enough to consider the advisability to devising additional procedures.

B. Relationships with Other Professional Groups

The members of the political science profession can do much to raise the level of ethical performance by cooperating with other learned and professional societies which are concerned with ethical problems. This cooperation will necessarily take different forms, depending upon the nature of the activities of those with whom we seek to work. It is recommended that, as a general policy, the officers, the Council and the Executive Director of the Association should be alert to the possibilities of strengthening the efforts of other associations which have programs concerned with the maintenance of acceptable ethical standards in the professions.

A specific case in point is the American Association of University Professors, which, for over fifty years, has been involved in the handling of actual cases presenting academic freedom issues. Where efforts at mediation and conciliation have failed, AAUP proceeds with a complaint in a quasi-judicial manner. An on-the-spot investigation by a committee of disinterested scholars leads to the preparation of a report which, if approved by Committee A, on Academic Freedom and Tenure, is published in the journal of the Association. The ultimate sanction against an institution which has been adjudged guilty of a serious breach of accepted principles of academic freedom is a vote of formal censure by the Annual Meeting of the Association, on the recommendation of Committee A. AAUP publishes the list of censured administrations in each issue of its journal, and seeks to persuade the institutions on the list to correct their rules and procedures, and give suitable redress to the injured parties. Censure is a moral weapon, and depends for its effectiveness on the capacity of AAUP to reach public opinion. Here the American Political Science Association can be of great assistance to AAUP in its struggle to make censure an ever weightier weapon. Many learned societies, including

our own, are now cooperating with AAUP in one way or another, and it is recommended that our Association should continue to give its support to a program which is designed to protect academic freedom in the teaching profession.

Specifically, the Committee recommends that the AAUP list of censured administrations should be published by our Association in each issue of *P.S.* In addition, it is proposed that the Association should decline to extend the benefits of its placement service to institutions on the censured list. If this is deemed too drastic, then, alternatively, it is suggested that at the very least our placement service should be required to call to the attention of those who seek positions that certain institutions are on the AAUP list of censured administrations.

The Committee calls attention to the fact that the American Political Science Association formally endorsed the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure of AAUP in 1947. It was among the first of some seventy learned societies to endorse this basic charter of the AAUP. Thus the Committee's proposals are in accord with long-standing Association policy. We suggest there that this policy should be strengthened.

As other learned societies get involved in efforts to define and defend proper ethical, professional standards of conduct, our Association should make every effort to strengthen such programs through whatever means may be available to us under the circumstances. This matter should be under constant review by the Executive Director, and from time to time he should make suitable recommendations to the officers and Council of the Association as to what assistance it can offer to other professional or learned societies.

C. Education of the Profession in Ethical Conduct

As the foregoing sections of this report indicate, the Committee has emphasized educational rather than regulatory objectives in its consideration of the Association's role in establishing and maintaining appropriately high standards of professional conduct and ethical behavior. The Committee has not sought to establish a comprehensive code of professional conduct, with accompanying regulatory and disciplinary instruments, like those adopted by professional associations whose members are subject to licensing controls and who charge substantial membership dues; have rather rigorous membership requirements, a substantial staff, and formal disciplinary procedures; and conduct extensive advisory and lobbying activities.

Professions based on extensive direct client relationships generally have regulatory associations in which major sanctions for the enforcement of rules is the actual or threatened expulsion from the association. The American Political Science Association has as its sole objective the encouragement of the study of political science (Article II of the Constitution). Any person sharing this objective may join upon payment of dues and may remain a member in good standing by paying the annual dues. There are provisions for life membership as well. The focus of this report on educational, non-regulatory matters and proposals relating to professional standards of political scientists is consistent with the non-regulatory character of the Association.

The Committee's review of the experience of several other associations indicates strongly that questions of professional standards are quite difficult to handle and can be dealt with more effectively over a sustained period rather than through the immediate promulgation of a comprehensive code of conduct. By focusing attention on ethical problems and by providing for a standing committee to deal in an advisory way with problems of ethical conduct, the Committee is hopeful that the profession will become more sensitive to these problems and will gradually develop a set of common-law practices for its guidance.

Several approaches are open to the Association to encourage more sensitive awareness of Association members of ethical problems. The Executive Director has been authorized by the approval of Recommendation 4 of the Committee's Interim Report to encourage the organization of special panels on professional ethics at national and regional meetings of political scientists, the discussion of such problems in *P.S.*, and the preparation of case studies of ethical problems.

Graduate Training and Ethical Conduct

The Committee recommends further that additional steps be taken by departments of political science in the universities to include thoughtful and informed discussions of ethical and other professional problems of academic political scientists in programs of graduate training. The number of persons (and jobs) added to our profession annually is increasing at an increasing rate. The number of Ph.D.'s produced annually has nearly trebled over the period since World War II, and nearly seventy departments have granted these degrees in recent years. These new entrants into the profession—along with many non-Ph.D.'s—now staff more than 500 departments, expanding the Association's membership to about 12,000 individual members compared with about 5,000 as recently as 1960.¹²

Rapid growth generally opens the way to rapid change. A stagnant profession might preserve a standing code of conduct almost effortlessly, but we cannot expect to do so. It seems unreasonable to suppose that "osmosis" alone will even *expose* new members of the Association to any but the most obvious of our ethical difficulties. And it may be equally risky to assume that the many new entrants will share the same assumptions or premises which may in the past have allowed us to take certain of our standards for granted. Without presuming to suggest that a changing membership may not rightly want a changing code, we wish to suggest that each department, especially graduate departments, consider certain efforts to familiarize new members of the profession with the major difficulties and established standards which lie before them.

Most important learning, especially ethical learning, occurs by example. Students often learn to accept, even to imitate the conduct of their teachers and advisers. Insofar as this is the case, the actual behavior of faculty will be the most important force in the ethical development of new political scientists. There are, nevertheless, a great many actual and potential difficulties which are unlikely to come to the surface in ordinary teacher-student relationships. And there are other issues which require protracted, often subtle elucidation if they are to be appreciated. Example may not, in these instances, be enough.

It may, therefore, be useful to institute formal discussion of ethical problems in graduate curricula. In some cases, it may be possible to spend a small part of a scope and methods seminar on the ethical problems of the individual scholar or of the discipline at large. In other cases, it may be more sensible to organize a series of informal discussions, perhaps using the auspices of an existing graduate club. In still others, it may be suggested that the discussion of ethical problems have some major place in the adviser-student dialogue. In all events, it would certainly be helpful if staff members encouraged students to ask questions (and to make criticisms) based on ethical as well as intellectual grounds.

To give ethical problems priority over intellectual ones would itself be unethical, but the combination of these suggestions for organized discussion and the power of example may make an important contribution to the careers of young political scientists. And they will almost certainly make a contribution to the common welfare of the profession.

¹² These data are drawn from Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus. *The Development of American Political Science* (Boston, 1967), chap. 11; *American Universities and Colleges*, Allen M. Carter, ed. (Washington, 1964); and the Report of the Executive Director 1966-67, American Political Science Association.

