Indigenous Voters and the Rise of the Left in Latin America

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Raúl Madrid, *University of Texas at Austin*

During the last two decades, a historic shift has occurred in the voting patterns of the indigenous population of some South American countries. Indigenous people, who traditionally voted for a mix of different types of parties, have begun to vote in large numbers for new left-wing parties. This shift has been particularly pronounced in the Central Andean countries, specifically Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, which have the largest indigenous populations.

What explains this historic shift? Why have indigenous voters embraced leftist parties in recent years? And what are the consequences of this shift for policies in the region?

This chapter argues that leftist parties in the Central Andes have used a combination of ethnic and populist appeals to win the support of large numbers of indigenous people. Whereas centrist and rightist parties have largely avoided politicizing ethnicity, leftist parties have sought to appeal to indigenous voters as indigenous people. They have forged close ties to the indigenous movement, recruited indigenous candidates, invoked indigenous symbols, and advocated indigenous rights. These appeals have resonated with many indigenous people who have become increasingly ethnically conscious in recent years.

Leftist parties have also used classical populist appeals to attract indigenous as well as nonindigenous voters. I define classical populist appeals as a mix of personalist, antiestablishment, nationalist, and state interventionist appeals that are focused on the subaltern sectors of the population. Leftist parties have recruited charismatic candidates, denounced the traditional parties, vigorously opposed market-oriented reforms, criticized foreign intervention in their countries, and called for income redistribution. These types of appeals have resonated among indigenous people because they continue to be overwhelmingly poor and they have benefited little from the policies implemented by the traditional parties beginning in the 1980s. Although some centrist and right-wing parties have also employed populist appeals, they have not done so to nearly the same degree as leftist parties.

Support from indigenous people has helped the leftist parties win significant representation in the legislature and, in some cases, win the presidency of the Central Andean nations. In office, these leftist parties have implemented their policy platforms to varying degrees. Some leftist parties have aggressively worked to expand indigenous rights and address ethnic inequalities. Others have attempted to dismantle market-oriented policies and reduce foreign influence in their countries. Still other leftist parties, however, have largely eschewed ethnopopulist policies, preferring to maintain largely the same policies as their centrist and right-wing predecessors.

This chapter provides an analysis of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, the three South American countries with the largest indigenous populations. The first section discusses the traditional voting patterns of indigenous people in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. It shows how those patterns began to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the rise of new leftist parties. The second section examines the causes of this shift, focusing on the ethnic and populist appeals that these new leftist parties have made. It also discusses the key differences between the mix of ethnic and populist appeals made by different parties in different countries. The conclusion reviews what consequences the left governments have had for the indigenous population in these countries and provides some policy recommendations to address the gaping ethnic inequalities that remain.

SHIFTING LEFT IN THE CENTRAL ANDES

The indigenous population of the Central Andes has undergone a pronounced electoral realignment in recent years. Before the 2000s, the indigenous population of the Central Andean nations did not demonstrate any consistent ideological tendency in their voting behavior.[1] Indigenous areas often voted for leftist parties at higher rates than nonindigenous areas, but centrist and right-wing parties typically won most of the vote in indigenous areas just as in nonindigenous areas.[2] In the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, indigenous voters began to shift to the left.[3] In Bolivia, they have voted en masse for a leftist indigenous-led party, the Movement Toward Socialism (known by its Spanish initials as the MAS), since 2002. In Ecuador, they

similarly voted in large numbers for an indigenous leftist party, Pachakutik, between 1996 and 2002, but in recent years they have increasingly supported Rafael Correa's leftist-populist movement, Country Alliance. In Peru, they have voted for Ollanta Humala's leftist-populist movement since 2006, although it is unclear whether they will continue to support this movement given Humala's rightward drift since taking office. Nonindigenous voters have also voted for the left in the Andean countries in recent years, but not to the same degree as indigenous voters.

Bolivia

In Bolivia, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), a centrist catch-all party, largely monopolized the indigenous vote after leading the 1952 revolution in that country (Romero Ballivián 2003; Ticona Alejo, Rojas Ortuste, and Albó 1995; Van Cott 2005). After the revolution, the MNR eliminated literacy restrictions on the franchise and expanded schooling and social programs in rural areas, bringing significant benefits to indigenous communities (Albó 2002, Rivera Cusicanqui 1986, Yashar 2005). The MNR also created peasant unions in rural areas, which it used to help control the indigenous population. As a result, the indigenous population voted overwhelmingly for the MNR. In the 1958 elections, for example, the MNR won 95% of the vote in provincial areas, which were overwhelmingly indigenous, as opposed to 51% of the vote in the departmental capitals, which had a larger proportion of whites and *mestizos* (Madrid 2012, 40).[4] The complete dominance of the MNR in the countryside ended after the 1964 military coup in that country, but the MNR continued to fare well in indigenous areas even after the return to democracy in the late 1970s. Indeed, the MNR finished first in majority indigenous areas in the 1985 and 1993 elections, and second in the 1980, 1989, and 1997 elections (Madrid 2012, 46).

Leftist parties did make some inroads among indigenous voters in Bolivia after the return to democracy, but their performance was inconsistent. The Democratic and Popular Union (UDP), a left-wing coalition, finished first in majority indigenous provinces in the 1980 elections and its successor, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), won these provinces in 1989, although it finished a distant third in 1985.[5] In the late 1970s and 1980s some left-wing indigenous-led parties, dubbed the Katarista parties, also sprang up in Bolivia. These parties, which were based in Aymara organizations in the Department of La Paz, did not fare very well, however. Although the Katarista parties collectively won as much as 12% of the vote in majority Aymara provinces in some elections, they never won more than 3% of the national vote (Madrid 2012, 43). Moreover, these parties all disappeared after participating in one or two elections.

The indigenous population in Bolivia did not shift to the left until a new indigenous party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), emerged from the largely Quechua-speaking coca grower unions in rural Cochabamba (see figure 1). In early 1997, the coca grower unions, which had gained control of the largest indigenous federation in Bolivia, founded an indigenous-led party called the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (ASP). This party initially fared little better than the Katarista parties, winning ample support in the indigenous coca-growing areas of the Department of Cochabamba but only 3.7% of the vote nationwide. After a leadership split, however, Evo Morales and other leaders left the ASP and created a new party called the Movement Toward Socialism, borrowing the name and registration of a defunct left-wing party. The MAS developed a much broader and inclusive platform and appeal than the ASP or the Katarista parties, and it fared much better. In the 2002 elections, it won 21% of the national vote, followed by 54% in 2005 when Morales was elected president for the first time. Morales has since been reelected twice, capturing 64% of the nationwide vote in

Figure 1: Vote for Leftist Parties in Bolivia, 1993–2009



2009, and 61% in 2014. The MAS has fared particularly well in indigenous areas. In the 2005 elections, it won 73% of the vote in majority Aymara municipalities and 74% of the vote in majority Quechua municipalities. The MAS was even more dominant in the 2009 elections, capturing 95% of the vote in majority Aymara municipalities and 90% of the vote in majority Quechua municipalities (Madrid 2012, 57).

Ecuador

The indigenous population of Ecuador has also voted increasingly for left-wing parties in recent years (see figure 2). During the 1980s and early 1990s, no single type of party dominated in indigenous areas in Ecuador, and majority indigenous provinces tended to favor the same parties as the nation as a whole.[6] In the 1978 presidential elections, the populist Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP) and the conservative Social Christian Party (PSC) split most of the vote in indigenous provinces. In 1984 and 1988, Democratic Left, a center-left party, finished first in indigenous areas, followed by the PSC in 1984 and the populist Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE) in 1988. In the 1992 elections, however, two conservative parties, the PSC and the Republican Union Party (PUR), divided up most of the vote in indigenous provinces.

It was not until the rise of an indigenous-led leftist party, the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement, in the mid-1990s, that Ecuador's indigenous population began to swing decisively toward the left. Pachakutik, which was founded in 1996 by Ecuador's indigenous federation, won 24% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 1996 legislative elections, and 37% in 1998 and 2002 (Madrid 2012, 90). It also won 34% of the presidential vote in majority indigenous counties in 1996, 19% in 1998, and 53% in 2002, although its presidential candidates in these elections were not members of Pachakutik (Madrid 2012, 87). Other leftist parties also fared well in indigenous areas in these elections. For example, the Democratic Left won 23% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 1998 presidential elections and 11% in the 2002 presidential elections.

Support for Pachakutik declined somewhat after 2002 in the wake of the party's increasingly ethnocentric turn and its failed alliance with Lucio Gutiérrez and the Patriotic Society Party (PSP). The party continued to fare reasonably well in indigenous areas, but its support elsewhere dissipated. In the 2006 legislative elections, the party won 28% of the vote in majority indigenous counties but only 6% in counties where the indigenous population represented a minority. Similarly, in the 2006 presidential elections, Pachakutik won 15.9% of the vote in majority indigenous counties, but only 2.8% of the vote elsewhere (Madrid 2012, 105). In 2009, the party did not nominate a presidential candidate, but it did compete in the legislative elections, winning 19% of the vote in indigenous majority counties, but only 3% of the vote elsewhere.

The main beneficiary of Pachakutik's decline was the party's erstwhile ally, the Patriotic Society Party. The PSP had started out as a left-of-center populist movement that was critical of neoliberal policies, but it veered toward the right after Lucio Gutiérrez was elected president in 2002, implementing sweeping market-oriented policies that led to the rupture with Pachakutik. The PSP nevertheless managed to maintain its ties to many indigenous communities, thanks in part to its clientelist programs. These ties paid off electorally, enabling the PSP to win 42% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 2006 presidential elections and 54% in the 2009 presidential elections.

Figure 2: Vote for Leftist Parties in Ecuador, 1992–2013



The other beneficiary of Pachakutik's troubles was a new left movement, the Country Alliance (AP), founded by Rafael Correa, a left-wing economist who had served as economics minister in the government of Alfredo Palacio. Correa has dominated the Ecuadorian political landscape in recent years, winning the presidency by large margins in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Correa has had rocky relations with the indigenous movement in Ecuador, but he nevertheless has managed to win a growing amount of support in indigenous areas. Indeed, Correa won 35% of the vote in majority indigenous counties in the 2009 presidential elections. The only election in which he has fared better in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas, however, was the second round of the 2006 presidential elections. In this election, Correa won 74% of the vote in majority indigenous counties, as opposed to 58% elsewhere, thanks in part to the endorsement he received from Pachakutik and the indigenous movement.

Peru

Indigenous voters in Peru have also veered left in recent years (see figure 3). Traditionally, the indigenous population in Peru, like that in Ecuador, did not vote consistently for any particular party or ideological tendency. Rather, they typically supported the same party as the rest of the Peruvian population. The left typically fared better in indigenous areas than in other parts of the country, but it did not typically win these districts. In the 1980 elections, a center-right party, Popular Action (AP), finished first in majority indigenous provinces as well as in the country as a whole. In the 1985 elections, a center-left party, the Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA), swept to victory nationwide and won a plurality of the vote in indigenous provinces, but APRA actually fared worse in indigenous areas than in nonindigenous areas.[7]

During the 1990s and early 2000s, indigenous voters, like the Peruvian electorate more generally, mostly voted for the center-right personalist movements led by Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo. Fujimori, the dean of a Peruvian agricultural school, won the 1990, 1995, and 2000 elections. Fujimori had initially campaigned on a vaguely centrist platform, but in office he shifted appreciably to the right, implementing sweeping market-oriented reforms. These policies generated strong economic growth, leading Fujimori to garner high levels of support among Peruvians of all ethnicities. He finished first in majority indigenous provinces in each of these elections, but he did not fare appreciably better in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas. In 2000, Fujimori resigned in the wake of a corruption scandal and, as a result, new elections were held in 2001. These elections were won by Alejandro Toledo who headed Peru Possible, another personalist, center-right political party. Toledo, who had finished second in the 2000 elections, captured 54% of the vote in majority indigenous provinces in 2001, as opposed to 37% of the vote in provinces where the indigenous population was in the minority.

Beginning in the 2006 elections, however, indigenous voters in Peru veered left. In 2006, Ollanta Humala ran for president as the leader of a left-wing populist movement called the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP). Humala swept the highlands of Peru, winning 58% of the vote in majority indigenous provinces and 35% of the vote elsewhere. He lost the runoff election to Alan García of APRA who had drifted to the right since his first term in office in the 1980s. Humala ran again in 2011, this time as the head of a left-wing alliance called Peru Wins (GANA). Once again, Humala triumphed in indigenous areas, capturing 59% of the vote in majority indigenous provinces, as opposed to 36% in provinces where the indigenous represented a minority.

Thus, the indigenous populations in all three Central Andean countries have shifted to the left in the last three

Figure 3: Vote for Leftist Parties in Peru, 1990–2011



decades. So far, the shift has been most pronounced in Bolivia, but it has also been clearly apparent in both Ecuador and Peru. What has caused this dramatic change in voting behavior?

THE LEFT'S ETHNOPOPULIST APPEALS

During the 1990s and early 2000s, indigenous voters, like the Peruvian electorate more generally, mostly voted for the center-right personalist movements led by Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo.

The shift to the left among indigenous voters has stemmed in part from the widespread use of ethnic and populist appeals by the leftist parties. The indigenous-led leftist parties, such as the MAS and Pachakutik, have used ethnic appeals the most, but the *mestizo*-led leftist parties, such as Country Alliance in Ecuador and the PNP in Peru, have also used them significantly. They have nominated numerous indigenous candidates for prominent positions, and they have forged close ties with indigenous organizations. They have advocated indigenous land and water rights, multicultural education, affirmative action, and numerous other policies that benefit the indigenous population. And they have made various symbolic appeals to the indigenous population, employing indigenous language and symbols in their campaigns. These ethnic appeals have helped attract numerous indigenous voters, many of whom have become increasingly ethnically conscious in recent years.

Leftist parties in the Andes have also used classical populist appeals to woo both indigenous and nonindigenous voters. They have denounced the traditional political and economic establishment, accusing it of corruption and incompetence. They have recruited charismatic political outsiders as their presidential candidates and built campaigns around them. They have deplored foreign intervention in their countries, and vowed to take back their countries' natural resources from foreign hands. Finally and perhaps most importantly, they have criticized the market-oriented policies that Andean countries implemented in the 1990s, and they have pledged to use the state to redistribute wealth to the masses. These appeals have resonated strongly among the indigenous population because they benefited relatively little from the market-oriented policies that were implemented by the traditional parties under pressure from foreign governments and the international financial institutions. As a result, during the 1990s indigenous people grew increasingly disenchanted with economic and political elites and the foreign interests that were allied to them.

The MAS in Bolivia has gone the furthest to employ ethnic appeals, and it has been rewarded with overwhelming support from the country's indigenous population. As noted above, the MAS was founded by indigenous-dominated organizations, and from the outset most of the party's leaders were indigenous. The MAS, unlike previous indigenous parties in Bolivia, established ties to indigenous organizations throughout the country, including in Aymara, Quechua, and the lowlands indigenous communities. Over time, the MAS established ties with many urban *mestizo*-dominated organizations and recruited white and *mestizo* candidates for some key posts, but indigenous organizations remained the bulwark of the MAS and most of the party's leadership continued to be indigenous, including the party's head Evo Morales.

The MAS has made numerous symbolic and substantive appeals to the indigenous population. The party has styled itself as the legitimate representative of the country's indigenous population, and the party's leaders and candidates have used indigenous clothing, given speeches in indigenous languages, and invoked indigenous symbols, rituals, and sayings. The MAS has also advocated many of the traditional demands of the indigenous movement, including indigenous land and water rights, agrarian reform, antidiscrimination laws, and multicultural education as well as state recognition of indigenous forms of knowledge and justice.

Evo Morales and the MAS have also used all of the classically populist techniques to court indigenous and nonindigenous voters. Morales's humble origins, down-to-earth popular style, and status as a political outsider have enabled him to connect with poorer, politically disenchanted voters. Morales has railed against the traditional political elites in Bolivia, denouncing them as criminals and frauds who serve only their own interests. He has vigorously opposed foreign intervention in Bolivia, expelling the US ambassador from Bolivia and rejecting a proposed free trade agreement with the United States. The MAS has also aggressively opposed the US government-sponsored coca eradication programs in Bolivia, going so far as to expel the Drug Enforcement Agency from the country. He has criticized the neoliberal policies of the traditional

parties and moved to nationalize or assert greater state control over key industries in the country. For example, during the first year of his administration, he announced a gas "nationalization" plan and demanded that foreign firms pay a higher share of their revenues to the Bolivian government. The Morales administration has also sought to redistribute income to the poor by establishing conditional cash-transfer programs, such as the Bono Juancito Pinto and the Bono Juana Azurduy, that make payments to mothers who keep their children in school and attend pre- or postnatal doctor visits.

Pachakutik in Ecuador also used ethnopopulist appeals extensively, which helped the party attract substantial indigenous support. Like the MAS, Pachakutik was founded by indigenous organizations, notably the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), in 1996, and the party has maintained those ties since that time. The party's name, its banner, and its logo are all indigenous symbols, and Pachakutik is often referred to as the political arm of the indigenous movement. Moreover, most of Pachakutik's leaders and many of the party's candidates for key elected positions have been indigenous, although Pachakutik, in alliance with other parties, nominated *mestizo* presidential candidates in 1996, 1998, and 2002. Pachakutik has also embraced many of the traditional demands of the indigenous movements. The party has advocated indigenous autonomy, land reform, water rights, multicultural education, and the representation of indigenous organizations in government agencies.

Pachakutik used classical populist appeals as well. In 1996, 1998, and 2002, the party nominated as its presidential candidates well-known celebrities from outside the party and built their campaigns around them. These candidates were not traditional politicians. Freddy Ehlers, the party's presidential candidate in 1996 and 1998, was a television journalist, and Lucio Gutiérrez, the party's candidate in 2002, was a military colonel who had first risen to fame when he participated in the indigenous-led overthrow of then-president Jamil Mahuad. Both Ehlers and Gutiérrez criticized the traditional parties extensively and presented themselves as independent and honest alternatives. Ehlers and Gutiérrez also criticized the market-oriented policies that had been implemented by previous governments and they called for redistributing the country's wealth. Gutiérrez, for example, declared that he was going to form "a government of the people against neoliberalism" (Quintero López 2005, 99). After the 2002 elections, however, Gutiérrez began to shift to the right, signing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, maintaining the country's market-oriented policies, and establishing close relations with the United States. Nevertheless, the populist appeals Ehlers and Gutiérrez made in their campaigns helped them win the support of large numbers of indigenous and nonindigenous voters.

Pachakutik continued to make some populist appeals in subsequent elections, but with considerably less success. Many of its white and *mestizo* leaders left the party because of its increasingly ethnocentric direction, and after 2002, the populist space came to be occupied by Rafael Correa and, to a lesser extent, Lucio Gutiérrez. In spite of Gutiérrez's shift to the right after he became president, he continued to implement some populist policies and engage in populist rhetoric. He denounced the political elites, boosted social spending in poorer areas, and created a poverty subvention program, all of which helped him continue to win many votes in indigenous areas. Correa went even further than Gutiérrez in populist appeals. He railed against the political establishment and promised to bring an end to the "long night of neoliberalism." Moreover, in office, Correa made good on many of his promises. He rejected a free trade agreement with the United States, declined to renew the US lease on a naval base in Manta, Ecuador, imposed major taxes on foreign oil companies, and boosted social spending considerably. Such populist rhetoric and policies helped Correa win support among many indigenous and nonindigenous voters.

Rafael Correa also undertook some efforts to attract indigenous voters with ethnic appeals. In the 2006 elections, Correa aggressively sought the support of Pachakutik and the indigenous movement for his campaign, arguing that they should support him because "we have much affinity. I have even advised the indigenous movement. I am an *indigenista* in the good sense of the term" (Zeas 2006, 225). A significant sector of Pachakutik wanted to support Correa, but in the end, the party opted to run its own candidate, the indigenous leader, Luis Macas, for president in 2006. Correa, nevertheless, continued to court indigenous voters, emphasizing his experience working in indigenous communities and speaking Quichua on the campaign trail. In addition, Correa recruited some former leaders of Pachakutik to his new party and embraced some of the traditional demands of the indigenous movement. Nevertheless, Correa nominated significantly fewer indigenous candidates than the MAS or Pachakutik, and he made significantly fewer ethnic appeals. Correa did not do too well in indigenous areas in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections, but he fared much better in the second round thanks in part to the support he received from Pachakutik and the indigenous movement in the runoff election.

After taking office, Correa's relations with Pachakutik and the indigenous movement rapidly deteriorated, however. Tension first surfaced in the constituent assembly, which had been tasked with revising the Ecuadorian

constitution in 2008. Pachakutik and the indigenous movement sought to amend the constitution to declare Ecuador a plurinational nation, to grant Quichua status as an official language on a par with Spanish, and to give the indigenous population veto power over mining operations in their territories (Becker 2011). Correa and the indigenous movement ultimately compromised on these issues and the indigenous movement supported the approval of the new constitution, but relations continued to deteriorate in the years that followed. Pachakutik and the indigenous movement bitterly opposed the 2009 mining law, with CONAIE calling his actions "neoliberal and racist" (Becker 2011, 58). Correa, on his part, has denounced some indigenous leaders with equally intemperate language and he has sought to marginalize CONAIE and forge alliances with smaller indigenous federations. Although Correa has continued to try to court indigenous voters, his poor relations with CONAIE and Pachakutik and his party's lack of indigenous candidates has made that difficult (Becker 2013, León Trujillo 2010). Partly as a result, Correa fared worse in indigenous areas than in nonindigenous areas in the 2009 and 2013 presidential elections, even though his overall share of the indigenous vote has been relatively high.

Ollanta Humala in Peru has also used ethnic appeals to gain the support of indigenous voters, but much less than the MAS or Pachakutik. Indeed, Humala's ethnic appeals have more closely resembled Correa's than those of the indigenous-led parties. Humala does not self-identify as indigenous *per se*, but his name and appearance convey his indigenous origins. Moreover, Humala has frequently employed indigenous symbols, such as the indigenous flag, in his campaign, and he has often worn indigenous clothing at campaign events and interspersed his speeches with Quechua sayings. Humala has also recruited various indigenous candidates. Indeed, according to Paredes (2008, 11), 13% of his party's congressional candidates in 2006 had indigenous surnames, as opposed to 6% of the candidates of APRA, his party's main rival that year. Humala has not forged many alliances with indigenous organizations, which are notoriously weak in Peru, but many of these organizations ended up supporting his campaigns in any event. Humala has also adopted a number of ethnic demands, although they have not been a central component of his platform. For example, he pledged to recognize Peru as a multicultural country, to expand multicultural education, to increase the use of indigenous languages in government affairs, and to permit the use of indigenous forms of justice. He has also denounced racial and ethnic discrimination and vowed to promote indigenous values and customs. Humala, however, has been careful to distance himself from the radical ethnonationalist views of his father and some of his siblings.

Ollanta Humala has also used populist appeals to attract voters, including indigenous voters. Humala, like Morales, is a political outsider. Humala served as a military officer prior to entering politics, and he first came to the public eye when he carried out an uprising against Fujimori during the waning days of his regime. In 2006, Humala created his own party, the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP), to run for president. The PNP's campaigns have focused to a large extent on Humala himself, but the party has also promoted a diffuse anti-establishment, leftist-populist ideology. Humala has proudly referred to himself as an "anti-system candidate," and he has vigorously denounced the traditional political elites (Humala 2006). Humala has aggressively opposed neoliberal policies as well. His 2006 governing plan declared that "the systematic application of neoliberalism ... in our country has meant a social fracture without precedents in Peruvian life." He proposed to redistribute wealth to the poor by boosting social spending and creating various agricultural, employment, and education programs. Humala has also voiced strongly nationalist views. He blamed foreign countries for many of Peru's problems, and he vowed to recuperate Peru's natural resources, to reexamine Peru's foreign debts and investments, and to renegotiate the free trade agreement that Peru had signed with the United States. This rhetoric helped Humala sweep the largely indigenous Peruvian highlands, which had been largely left out of the economic growth that market-oriented reforms had brought to coastal areas of Peru.

Humala toned down his rhetoric somewhat after he lost the 2006 runoff election for president, however. He distanced himself from Hugo Chávez who had intervened in the 2006 elections, promising that he was not going to follow Chávez's model. Humala also acknowledged that market-oriented policies had helped Peru in some ways and he promised to respect property rights, foreign investment, and the free trade agreement with the United States. Nevertheless, Humala did not abandon his populist appeals entirely in 2011. He continued to denounce the neoliberal policies of his predecessors and he vowed to redistribute the country's wealth and to recuperate the country's natural resources, which, he argued, had been given away to foreigners. He also continued to rail about the corruption of the traditional parties and political elites (Núñez 2011). These continued populist appeals helped him win the support of indigenous voters again in 2011.

Thus, in all three Andean countries, left parties have made significant ethnopopulist appeals in recent years. The left-wing parties' ethnopopulist appeals have helped them win the support of numerous indigenous voters, and most of the left-wing parties have fared significantly better in indigenous areas than in nonindigenous areas. The one important exception is Rafael Correa who has typically

fared worse in indigenous areas, but this exception can be explained in part by his limited ethnic appeals, his poor relations with the indigenous movement, and the tough competition he has experienced in indigenous areas from Pachakutik and other parties.

By contrast, centrist and right-wing parties have typically made only limited ethnopopulist appeals. They have maintained largely frosty relations with indigenous leaders, recruited relatively few indigenous candidates, and embraced few of the demands of the indigenous movement. Nor have they typically opposed market-oriented policies and foreign intervention. As a result, they have recently fared much more poorly in indigenous areas. The two notable exceptions to this trend in recent years are Alejandro Toledo in Peru and Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador, both of whom won the support of significant numbers of indigenous voters by using a combination of ethnic and populist appeals. Nevertheless, even these two center-right politicians ultimately saw their strong support in indigenous areas vanish in recent elections.

The economies of all three countries have grown rapidly, inflation has largely remained under control, and poverty has declined sharply. However, inequality, which dropped sharply in Bolivia and Ecuador between 2008 and 2011 has begun to increase again, and poverty rates continue to be much higher in indigenous than in nonindigenous areas.

CONCLUSION

Indigenous voters have undergirded the success that some leftist parties have enjoyed during recent years in the Central Andes. Nevertheless, the influence that indigenous leaders and organizations have wielded over leftist governments has varied considerably from country to country and so have the policies that these governments have pursued. Although some leftist governments have implemented both ethnic and populist policies, others have focused more on populist policies or have largely eschewed both types of policies.

Evo Morales and the MAS in Bolivia have gone furthest in implementing proindigenous policies. Upon taking office, the Morales administration oversaw the drafting of a new Bolivian constitution. The new constitution recognized the country as plurinational, granted official recognition to various indigenous languages, and made the indigenous flag, the *wiphala*, one of the country's national symbols. The new constitution also granted the indigenous population the right to territorial autonomy and self-governance, including the right to benefit from the exploitation of natural resources in their lands, to employ traditional forms of justice, and to elect their own leaders through traditional practices. In addition, the Morales administration has sought to expand the teaching of indigenous languages and history, it has mandated indigenous representation and indigenous language use in some state institutions, and it has passed legislation that tightens the laws against ethnic and racial discrimination.

The Morales administration has also enacted numerous populist measures. It has nationalized some companies and renegotiated contracts with others. It has boosted social spending and has enacted a variety of anti-poverty programs, including programs that provide cash transfers to mothers who make pre- and postnatal doctor visits and who keep their children in school. The Morales administration also has taken over and restructured the privately managed pension system and has implemented an agrarian reform measure that has redistributed a significant amount of land to indigenous and peasant communities. The Morales administration has been careful to keep inflation under control, however, by maintaining rather conservative fiscal policies, and it has sought to expand its trade links to countries throughout the world.

The Correa administration in Ecuador, by contrast, has adopted a much more limited ethnic agenda. As noted earlier, the government has had a poor relationship with the main indigenous organizations in Ecuador and it has largely marginalized them from the policymaking process. It has rejected efforts by the indigenous movement to control mining in indigenous territories and it has repressed indigenous protests. The Correa administration, however,

has aggressively pursued populist policies. It has boosted social spending, renegotiated oil and mining contracts with foreign companies, and adopted more interventionist policies on foreign trade. The Correa administration has also taken a hard line with its foreign creditors.

Finally, the Humala administration in Peru has avoided both ethnic and populist policies. Indigenous leaders and organizations have not played a prominent role in the Humala administration, and it has mostly declined to embrace indigenous rights. It has largely maintained the same market-oriented policies as its predecessors, declining to nationalize foreign enterprises or antagonize foreign investors and creditors. The Humala administration has retained Peru's commitment to free trade policies and expanded its trade links with its neighbors.

All three administrations have enjoyed similar economic policy successes in spite of these policy differences. The economies of all three countries have grown rapidly, inflation has largely remained under control, and poverty has declined sharply. However, inequality, which dropped sharply in Bolivia and Ecuador between 2008 and 2011 has begun to increase again, and poverty rates continue to be much higher in indigenous than in nonindigenous areas.

To address this gap, the governments of all three nations will need to invest heavily in social programs. These programs do not need to be narrowly targeted at indigenous people. Conditional cash transfer programs, minimum wages, and educational investments, for example, have all been shown to reduce poverty and inequality in indigenous areas even when they have not been narrowly targeted at indigenous citizens. Nevertheless, it is crucial that Latin American governments pursue inclusive policies that seek to bring development to the entire country, rather than just focusing on a few core areas. ▪

NOTES

1. I code party ideology using the database on Latin American party ideology from Baker and Greene (2011). This data is available at: http://spot.colorado.edu/~bakerab/data.html.
2. Electoral volatility tended to be higher in indigenous areas than in non-indigenous areas, however, and indigenous voters tended to split their votes among more parties (Madrid 2005a, b).
3. Indigenous voters have also supported non-leftist parties in some cases, most notably Lucio Gutiérrez's Patriotic Solidarity Party, but the vast majority of their votes have gone to leftist parties in recent years.
4. These figures exclude the departments of Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, and Potosí for which data were not available.
5. I identify majority indigenous departments and provinces in Bolivia using data from the 2001 census in Bolivia on the number of indigenous language speakers. I also use language data from the 2001 census to identify majority Aymara and Quechua areas. The language data is highly correlated with self-identification data across sub-national units.
6. I use self-identification data from the 2001 census in Ecuador to identify majority indigenous counties and provinces.
7. I use language data from the 1993 census in Peru to identify indigenous majority provinces in the country.

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